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ABSTRACT 
It is generally appreciated that the drill and tactics of the army in 
the eighteenth century were exceedingly complex, their efficient performance 
requiring skill and precision and, in consequence, the most intensive train- 
ing. 
Expertise at the drill was largely a function of time and opportunity; 
the regiments had to be concentrated and stationary, with a free hand. 
It was in the nature of the British Army's peacetime service that the 
majority of the regiments should, from the point of view of training, be 
much preoccupied, and ill-situated: dispersed about the Empire, dispersed 
when arrived upon foreign stations, dispersed in Great Britain and Ireland, 
dispersed upon the coast duty, dispersed either in active assistance to 
the civil power or in the maintenance of a police presence, strung out 
upon the march, ill-housed, and often wretchedly cared and provided for, 
any opportunity for advanced training in peacetime was a luxury. 
The training of the regiments was carried on in four successive 
phases, these determined largely by the numbers of soldiers concentrated 
and the time available. Neither of these conditions could for long be 
satisfied in the peacetime routine of the army, where civil and imperial 
duties were given precedence over strictly military requirements. Only the 
first two training phases could be attempted in peacetime; and this meant 
that the drill proficiency attained in the majority of the regiments was 
inadequate. It was in wartime, consequently, that the most intensive and 
effective advanced training was carried on, either in the encampments at 
home or in the cantonments and the field abroad. 
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NOTES & ABBREVIATIONS 
1. ) ABBREVIATIONS: 
Add. MSS Additional Manuscripts 
BM British Museum 
Cumb. Pprs. Cumberland Papers 
HMC Historical Manuscripts Commission 
NAM National Army Museum 
R. O. Record Office 
Public Record office. To save space, I have not entered 'PRO' each time I 
quote from documents located there. The following letter references refer 
only to papers in the PRO, which comprise the bulk of my footnotes: 
SP State Papers Office 
WO War Office Records 
AHR The American Historical Review 
CJAC The Canadian Journal of Arms Collecting 
JSAHR Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 
1 The Mariner's Mirror 
2. ) DATES: All dates given herein (prior to the 1752 changeover to the 
New Style, Gregorian calendar) are Old Style, except that the year is taken 
as beginning not on 25 March but rather on 1 January. 
3. ) SPELLING & PUNCTUATION: All quotations from eighteenth-century sources, 
whether printed or in manuscript, are given in their original spelling, 
grammar, and punctuation. I have occasionally fleshed out abbreviations, 
but have noted that liberty with square brackets []. 
4. ) PLACE OF PUBLICATION: The place of publication of all books is London, 
unless noted otherwise. 
5. ) REGULATIONS: For simplicity's sake, I have adopted the custom of describ- 
ing each set of drill regulations, collectively, by the date of their first 
issue by authority. Eighteenth-century titles being cumbersome and - when 
dealt with in great numbers - confusing, a shorthand description is pre- 
ferable. When a new regulation drillbook is first described in the text, 
therefore, it is referred to by its proper eighteenth-century title; but 
it is referred to subsequently by its date of issue. Thus, The Duke of 
Marlborough's New Exercise of FireZocks and Bayonets; Appointed by His 
Grace to be used By all the British Forces, and the Militia (n. d. [c. 1708]), 
becomes and remains the 1708 Regulations. 
In that part of our Bibliography devoted to the regulations, entries 
are made not alphabetically but chronologically, so that this system of 







THE FRICTION OF PEACE 
For philosophical purposes Clausewitz assumed the existence of an 
archetypical or ideal form of war - namely ultimate, 'absolute war' - 
towards which violence, viewed in the metaphysical, would tend. He was 
quick to point out, however, that when passing from conceptual to real war 
we leave behind us the realm of certitude and pass over into that where chance 
operates and where politics intrudes, describing limitations. Absolute war 
could be no more than a postulate in Clausewitz's day, therefore, because 
the carrying on of military violence was hobbled by an inertia which was 
the result of the accumulation of considerable 'friction'. 
The Clausewitzean notion of friction in war is well-enough understood. 
Let us suppose, then, that there can be a "friction of peace". Let us 
suppose that, as it is the business of an army in war to fight, to exert 
pressure, it is the business of an army in peacetime to prepare for war, to 
train. All of those things - friction-producing agents - which act upon 
the army in peacetime so as to interfere with training for war are part of 
the "friction of peace". No army is able, of course, to devote itself fully 
to training in peacetime, just as no army can advance unhindered, can be 
fully violent, in wartime. The training of the peacetime British Army in 
the eighteenth-century was hampered by certain basic, structural features, 
and also by a variety of petty friction each bit trivial in itself but 
cumulatively quite significant. It is with these major, structural features 
contributing to the friction of peace that we shall be concerned in the 
present chapter. 
From his vantage point as Adjutant General at the Horse Guards 
Col Edward Harvey, writing in 1775, described himself as 'too sensible of 
ye relaxation of discipline & of the want of System in the Brit. Service'. 
But there was little which he could do; 'Too many concurrent Circumstances 
contribute to this Misfortune'. 
1 In the following discussion of the train- 
ing of the eighteenth-century army we have addressed ourselves primarily to 
these "many concurrent Circumstances", the operation of which, by and large, 
described the limits of the possible. Among the majority of the regiments, 
horse and foot, the training which it was possible to carry on in peacetime 
1. WO 3/5, p. 97. 
6 
was insufficient; among the remaining minority it was only just barely suff- 
icient. The problem was essentiallly one of time and opportunity. Both 
were lacking, since "many concurrent Circumstances" restricted the former 
and almost denied the latter. To determine and then to discriminate among 
these circumstances we have had to reconstruct the timetable according to 
which the peacetime service of the regiments was conducted - that is to say, 
how much time was left over for training, and where lay the opportunities 
for the most effective sorts of training. 
When we analyse the way in which the army spent its time we discover 
that from the point of view of training there is both time gained, and a 
very great deal of time lost. Indeed, so much time is "time lost", it turns 
out, that our common conception of the training and tactics of the 
eighteenth-century army must to a considerable extent be altered. Thus, 
having measured the activities of Handasyde's 16th of Foot from the spring of 
1737 to the spring of 1743, we discover that the regiment spent 63% of its 
time totally dispersed in billets or upon the march, another 17% of its time 
operating against smugglers, and 2% suppressing and then overawing rioters; 
only 13% of its time was spent fully concentrated and stationary, and another 
5% at a lower level of concentration. Meanwhile Peers' 23rd of Foot was 
traced from the spring of 1738 until embarking for the wars in Flanders 
early in the summer of 1742. During that period the regiment spent 62% of 
its time either marching of dispersed, and 23% of its time operating against 
smugglers. Like Handasyde's, Peers' spent only 13% of their time fully con- 
centrated and stationary, and another 2% at a lower level of concentration. 
Neither Handasyde's by 1743, then, nor Peers' by 1742, was prepared to per- 
form complicated tactical evolutions. Neither had spent so much as one- 
seventh of its time in England, in sufficient concentration, to permit even 
the rudiments of the "firings" to be practised. Neither regiment is an 
exceptional case, but quite typical of the army in general. 
2 
If we may generalize broadly, the British Army in the eighteenth- 
century may be said to have had three roles to play. The first of these was 
its war role, which is self-defining and which, as we shall see, was most 
important for our purposes because it was while carrying out this role that 
the most essential tactical training was done. That this was so was due to 
the nature of the other two roles, which were essentially peacetime roles: 
these were the police role, and the, garrison 'role. 
2. Quite detailed statistics, such as those just given, have been as- 
sembled here for all regiments serving in England and Wales; the figures, 
their source and method of computation, are to be found in Appendix A. The 
value of these statistics in assessing the training of the army will be 
made clear below. 
7 
The army, acting in aid of the civil power, was for much of its time 
involved in the suppression of smuggling, riot, and disorder in general, 
come war or peace; since the age was a turbulent one and because police 
forces as such were either non-existent or at best nascent, the regular 
army had an essential social role to play. But the playing of the police 
role - either actively in the pursuit of felons or, much more commonly, in 
the maintenance of a simple passive presence - required that individual 
regiments be very widely dispersed and preoccupied for lengthy periods of 
time. Training, in consequence, suffered very considerably. 
3 
A garrison is simply a body of troops stationed in a territory or a 
stronghold to defend it, or to hold it down. Thus, regiments in the 
Highlands of Scotland until the mid-1750's; regiments in Ireland until 
perhaps 1720, and then again at the very end of the century; regiments in 
Minorca, Gibraltar, and the West Indies throughout the century; and regiments 
in Nova Scotia and later in the Canadas were, all of them, clearly garrisons. 
The Guards in London and Westminster were a garrison too. Garrison duty was 
usually passive; but since the army was widely distributed about the 
Empire and because its individual regiments were often being shifted from 
one place to another, garrison duty meant continually subjecting units to 
new sets of circumstances which mightily affected their training and pro- 
ficiency. Units in North America were often so widely dispersed and ill 
supplied as to be in no condition for active service, and were months beyond 
the inspection of the War Office. Units in the West Indies fell apart, as 
fever and boredom did their work. Gibraltar and Minorca, each with as many 
marching regiments of foot as were usually to be found in the whole of 
England, were dismal places, hard to recruit, and often in a sorry state 
where training was concerned. 
3. We cannot enter directly here into the fundamental social and con- 
stitutional issues raised thereby -a major new interpretation of which is 
pointed by recent studies of the activities of the eighteenth-century army, 
the present among them. The legal aspects of the problem are best dealt 
with in Sir L. Rodzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Lary and its 
Administration from 1750, IV (1957), 124-27,141-50, and passirn; in 
A. J. Hayter, 'The Army and the Mob in England in the Generation before the 
Gordon Riots', unpubl. London Ph. D. thesis, 1973, pp 8-25,39-49, and passim 
and in Hayter's forthcoming study, The Army and the Mob in Mid-Georgian 
England (1978). W. J., Shelton, English Hunger and Industrial Disorders 
(Toronto, 1973), is useful, if myopic. For a new but different interpretation 
of the means of social control, cf. the work of E. P. Thompson and his col- 
leagues, notably in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, et al, AZbion's Fatal Tree. Crime 
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (1975); in E. P. Thompson, Whigs 
and Hunters. The Origin of the Black Act (1975); and in Thompson's 'The 
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', Past d- 
Present, 50 (1971), 76-136. 
8 
We shall see, then, that the peacetime training of the eighteenth- 
century British Army was not good. Where training-time was restricted and 
where proper opportunities were come by only with difficulty, and erratic- 
ally, peacetime training became a thing not so much of artful design, but 
of expediency. Only when war came did expediency give way to necessity; 
and it was always at the eleventh hour that the best training was done in 
the British Army. 
PART A: Distribution + Rotation Abroad: 
At no time during the eighteenth-century were the land forces avail- 
able for the peacetime policing and defence of the Empire sufficiently 
strong for the task. The Empire was huge; and the responsibility for its 
defence, in relation to the size of the army, was a major burden. 
4 
During 
the periods of peace a considerable part of the foot which survived the 
war-end disbandments was sent abroad; between 1716 and 1739, an average of 
one-quarter of the foot was serving abroad; between 1748 and 1755, one- 
quarter of the foot was still doing so; between 1763 and 1775, more than 
one-third of the foot was serving outside of the British Isles; and 
between 1783 and 1793 more than one-third of the foot was, on average, 
serving abroad. The world-wide deployment in peacetime of what was so 
significant a part of the forces, therefore, were it to be maintained in a 
proper state of training and au courant with tactical developments on the 
Continent and at home, must needs be done with considerable care. But in 
fact the opposite was the case. 
Under the material conditions prevailing in the eighteenth-century, 
any extended stay on a distant station was bound to have the most serious 
effects upon a unit. The greatest of the several problems affecting 
regiments so situated was the replacement of dead men and deserters - for 
where were recruits to be found on Minorca or Gibraltar, let alone in the 
West Indies or Acadia? Since recruits for units on foreign stations were 
scarce, commanding officers preferred not to discharge worn-out men, and 
consequently the regiments left overseas for extended periods began to age, 
and to decline in efficiency. 
5 
Regiments aged quickly where little could 
4. See Appendix D for the fluctuations in the army's size, throughout our 
period. Peacetime imperial commitments, and hence dispersal, can be 
measured against this scale. 
5. The Adjutant General, in a lengthy letter to the Secretary at War of 
8 Dec. 1767, noted these problems. He was particularly disturbed by the 
tendency in units serving abroad not to discharge old and worn-out men, but 
rather to retain them 'while they can Crawl'; recruiting difficulty was 
the cause. Such units were becoming ever more aged and infirm; and the 
9 
be done to infuse new blood, in the shape of recruits, in a steady trickle. 
Thus the 2nd Foot, seen at Gibraltar in April 1772, was quite typically 
reported as 'very much worn Out' and 'the worst in the Garrison'; the men 
were 'in general Old, & mostly worn Out'. 
6 
The regiment had been there 
less than five years. Likewise in May 1788 a reviewing officer described 
the 11th Foot, then serving with the Gibraltar garrison, as 'very 
indifferent ... the men being chiefly low, Stunted and a very large pro- 
portion of them elderly; & in their present State, would be totally 
unequal to active Service in the Field'. The 11th had been in Gibraltar 
for five years; and of its 364 men only 42 were recruits -a very low 
percentage, pointing the age of the corps. 
7 
The "drafting" of men from one regiment into another - lifting them 
from one unit not likely to see action immediately and transfering them into 
another unit already in the field, or about to go on service - was resorted 
to, in consequence, a process which did neither unit any short-term good. 
8 
Thus in May 1787, for example, 44th Foot was seen at Hilsea Barracks, 
lately returned from the Canadas: only 132 men were able to appear under 
arms, since '134 of their best men' had been drafted into other regiments 
still in Canada upon the 44th's sailing for home; and the few men whom the 
44th received in exchange were 'indifferent', and must soon be discharged. 
The 44th was wholly unfit for service. 
9 
Soldiers might meanwhile contract 
alliances and, when at last the regiment departed from a foreign station, 
considerable numbers (as in the case of the 44th Foot above), might be 
allowed to volunteer as drafts to fill up the newly-arriving unit; and in 
this way the military efficiency of such men would continue to decline. 
10 
Drafted, below strength, agj, 9 , discipline began inevitably to fall 
off in regiments on long foreign service, the cumulative effect of boredom, 
Adjutant General feared that, in case of a sudden war, 'the Greatest National 
Inconveniencys must Arise' because the regiments would have immediately to 
discharge great numbers of invalids even before they could think about aug- 
menting to wartime strengths. Peacetime regimental establishments abroad, 
therefore, became increasingly illusory as units remained unrotated. WO 3/1, 
pp 129-36. 
6. WO 27/25. 
7. WO 27/62. The average number of recruits with the regiments is discussed 
in detail, below, on pp 62-9. 
8. For other instances of drafting, see below pp. 37-8,66-8. 
9. WO 27/59. 
10. Thus in May, 1788, the 29th and 31st of Foot were seen at Pershore 
and Andover respectively, both recently home from Canada. The 29th had 
been in North America since 1767, and the 31st since 1776. The 29th was 
in ruins, all of its arms either bad or wanting, and so understrength that 
'only 28 file' appeared under arms at a regimental review. The condition 
of the 31st was similar. WO 27/61. Both had been drafted heavily before 
sailing for England, to fill out regiments in Canada. 
10 
long leaves of absence among the officers, and a relaxation of punishments 
and fatigues for fear of driving the men to desertion. The customary 
practice of letting the men eke out their pay by working away from the 
regiment, during off hours, increased; 
11 
make-work projects flourished; and 
like the constant use of the private men as coolies on the road-gangs in 
Scotland this cannot have contributed to the drill proficiency of the units 
concerned, though it may at least have provided the men with variety and so 
have kept them with the colours. 
Worse could happen on some stations: the rigours of the winters in 
Nova Scotia took a heavy toll of the 40th Foot, stationed there from 1717. 
The Caribbean heat could prostrate, or sap the will; more surely, its dis- 
eases would kill great numbers. Describing the fate which was the lot of 
Dalzell's 38th of Foot, in garrison on Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua and 
St. Kitts, Pares wrote that the West Indies were 'the grave of English 
soldiers, and the planters would not have the regiments recruited among 
their own servants, so the numbers began to fall'. How dramatically the 
numbers "began to fall" is easily illustrated. In 1738, the 38th Foot 
numbered 700 men, while by 1745 it numbered only 492; in the interim, 960 
recruits had been sent out to the regiment, and it had only once been on 
active service - and that a trivial affair. 
12 
The 31st Foot, lately 
returned from the West Indies, was luckier than the 38th had been: seen 
at Sittingbourne in June, 1773, the 31st could muster 299 men (the establish- 
ment called for 440), half of whom had worn-out firelocks; the regiment 
was reported unfit for service - but more than half of the men were still 
alive. 
13 
Gibraltar was an unhealthy station too, although hardly com- 
parable to the Indies. Garrison returns for 1740, for example, show that 
the regiments there were losing 17% of their men to sickness -a rate un- 
changed by 1748.14 Minorca, if healthier, was a depressing, boring place, 
measuring only twelve miles by thirty. When in 1725 Tyrell's 17th and 
Handasyde's 22nd were embarked for Minorca, it was remarked upon that the 
11. On this, see J. T. Findlay, Wolfe in Scotland in the '45 and from 
1749-1753 (1928), 188-9. 
12. R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-63 (Oxford, 1936), 258. 
On the pitiful situation of regiments condemned to West Indian duty, see hts 
pp 257-64. P. Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (1964), 526, cal- 
culates that 11% of the men in twelve regiments sent from the British Isles 
to the West Indies between 1776 and 1780, died on passage. 
13. WO 27/27. 
14. C. T. Atkinson, 'Jenkin's Ear, The Austrian Succession War and the 
'Forty-Five'. JSAHR, 22 (1943-44), 287-8,298. (cited hereafter as 
Atkinson, 'Jenkin's Ear'). In 1740, Kirke's 2nd Foot had lost 124 men, 
while Hargrave's 7th had lost 102, Columbine's 10th had lost 138, Clayton's 
14th had lost 144, and Fuller's 29th had lost 129. In 1748 Fowke's 2nd 
needed 101 men, Hargrave's 7th needed 114, Reade's 9th needed 153, and 
Tyrawley's 10th needed 134. The establishments called for 780 other ranks 
per regiment. WO 24/273. 
11 
establishments of both regiments were nearly complete - 'it being very 
disagreeable to the common soldiers to go into garrison abroad, which in 
consequence entails much desertion'. 
15 
The Duke of Argyll said in 1742 
that a long term of service at Port Mahon 'was equivalent to a punishment, 
and that his only surprise was that the troops had not mutinied both at 
Minorca and Gibraltar'. 
16 
Long service overseas, then, did little good to the units so employed. 
Neglect was no doubt the worst evil from which the distant units suffered; 
and the more distant the units, given the, clumsiness of bureaucracy and 
the slowness and expense of communications, the greater the neglect. In 
1768 the 8th Foot arrived in the Canadas, and was distributed with four 
companies at Niagara, three at Detroit, one at Oswego and two at 
Michilimackinac - spread over a distance of some 700 miles, by inland 
waterways. Seventeen years later when the 8th came home to England it con- 
sisted of 150 'very Old Men'. Five hundred officers and men had gone out; 
and the 1785 establishments called for 392 nco's and men. 
17 
When reviewed 
at Plymouth in May 1787, two years after coming home, the regiment had 
recruited to a strength of 311 men; but the reviewing officer reported that 
since the 8th had 'been many years in the Back Settlements of Canada, ' it 
would require 'two or three years to get rid of their Old Men, & to form 
Non Commission'd Officers'. 
18 
The regiment was not fit again for service 
until 1789. A system of rotation or, failing that, at least frequent re- 
placement, was obviously essential, so that the burden could be shared and 
its evils mitigated. This was recognized, and on at least one occasion (in 
1729) the Board of General Officers urged the question upon the King. 
19 
But incredibly, no such rotation took place before 1749. Until then, regi- 
iments were sent abroad and left to rot. Only fortuitous events, such as 
a crisis in British relations with the Bourbons or the discovery of some 
new Jacobite threat, saved units from perpetual exile. In the confusion 
always incident to Britain's last-minute preparation for war, some regi- 
ments might be fortunate enough to be recalled (in both senses of the word); 
and their replacements had at least the knowledge that a state of war was 
15. C. T. Atkinson, 'The Army Under the Early Hanoverians', JSAHR, 21 (1942), 
143. (Cited hereafter as Atkinson, 'Early Hanoverians'). 
16. Sir J. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, II (1899), 45. (cited 
hereafter as Fortescue). 
17. WO 27/56; WO 24/446, and /534; and P. R. N. Katcher, King George's Army, 
1775-1783. A Handbook of British, American, and German Regiments, 
(Harrisburg, Penna., 1973), 32. 
18. WO 27/59. 
19. Fortescue, II, 46. In 1730 the King asked the Governor of Gibraltar 
for a detailed report on the regiments serving there, since a 'rotation for 
foreign service' was to be planned 'to relieve soldiers of despair of ever 
returning home'. Atkinson, 'Early Hanoverians', 145. No such rotation was 
introduced, however: the expense involved was deemed too great. 
12 
either imminent or actual, to sharpen their new-found exile. 
20 
But in some 
cases not even war, invasion threats, or the rebels at Derby were enough 
to release a regiment from-foreign garrison duty. Some regiments were 
lucky. At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession two companies were 
drafted from Handasyde's 22nd of Foot and sent, as Independent Companies, 
to garrison Port Royal in Jamaica; the whole of the 22nd had, at least, 
been spared. 
21 
Lucky too were Hayes' 34th and Newton's 39th of Foot, sent 
from Ireland via England to reinforce the besieged Gibraltar garrison, 
early in 1727. The 34th and 39th remained at Gibraltar until late in 1730, 
when they were ordered to Jamaica to deal with slave insurrection; but 
luckily both were recalled to Ireland in 1731, and remained there in peace, 
having narrowly escaped the imprisonment of Gibraltar and the disease of 
the Caribbean. 
22 
The 22nd, 34th, and 39th of Foot were, as we have said, lucky; for 
many other units, it was to be a different story. During that same half- 
century before the introduction of rotation a number of regiments spent in- 
credibly long periods on foreign service, without relief. In June of 1730, 
for example, Kirke's 2nd of Foot embarked from England for Gibraltar, and 
stayed there for nineteen years before being relieved in 1749 and sailing 
for Ireland. 
23 
In 1725 Tyrrell's 17th of Foot was sent out to Minorca and 
was not relieved for twenty-four years when, in 1749, the corps was brought 
home to Ireland. In that same year, 1725, the luck of the 22nd Foot ran 
out when it too was dispatched to Minorca for a twenty-four year stay. 
24 
Otway's 9th of Foot served in Minorca from 1718 until 1746, was transferred 
to Gibraltar temporarily, and returned to Ireland in 1749; the regiment 
had been continuously on foreign service for thirty-one years. 
25 
Cosby's 
18th of Foot joined the Minorca garrison in 1718 and returned to England 
only in 1742.26 Yet these were all merely quarter-century stints, and so 
not extraordinary. In August 1717 Philipps' 40th of Foot was formed from 
20. In 1718, when Byng's squadron sailed for the Mediterranean to deal 
with the Spanish fleet then harrying Sicily, the opportunity was taken to 
embark the 9th, 18th, 30th, and 35th, from Ireland, to relieve the Minorca 
garrison (7th, 12th, 27th, and 39th), which regiments had been in that 
island since 1713. Atkinson; 'Early Hanoverians', 142. 
21. Fortescue, II, 42-6. 
22. R. Cannon, Historical Record of the Thirty-Ninth, or The Dorsetshire 
Regiment of Foot (1853), 10-12. 
23. R. Cannon,... Second Foot (1838), 35; Anon., The Quarters of the Army 
in Ireland in 1748 (Dublin, 1748), 18; and Quarters... in 1749 (Dublin, 
1749), 23. 
24. R. Cannon,... Seventeenth Foot (1848), 16-17, and ... Twenty-Second Foot (1849), 6-7. See also Anon., Quarters ... in 1748, p. 18, and Quarters... in 1749, p. 24. 
25. Fortescue, II, 45 n. l; WO 24/273 and /282. 
26. Fortescue, II, 45 n. 4; and WO 5/35, p. 461. 
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Independent Companies then serving in the Americas, and was sent to garrison 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. There the regiment remained until 1765 when, 
at last, it was relieved and sent to Ireland. The 40th had been continuous- 
ly on foreign service for forty-eight years; it was under its fifth 
colonel before it laid eyes upon the British Isles. The record, however, 
belongs to the 38th Foot, for that unlucky corps rotted in the West Indies 
from 1716 until 1765. Replaced after half-a-century, the 38th was allowed 
less than nine years' respite in Ireland, when in mid-1774 it was packed 
off to Boston, a place by then even less hospitable than the West Indies. 
The whole of the horse and the Guards were stationed permanently in 
the British Isles, during peacetime; and so it was the marching Foot27 
which suffered from the capriciousness of imperial garrison duty. As we 
have observed there was no pattern of rotation, and almost no relief for 
regiments abroad, until the mid-century. Thus of the forty-one battalions 
composing the marching regiments from 1718 to 1739 (we exclude the 42nd 
here, raised only in 1737), an average of eight were always to be found in 
the Mediterranean garrisons. Only the 1726-28 war with Spain caused some 
movement in these garrisons, in effect merely ending the exile of some 
units to impose exile on others. 
28 
For the West Indian and Nova Scotian 
regiments there was to be no relief at all. Therefore, one-quarter of the 
marching Foot of the British Army was left unrelieved on distant foreign 
stations, for the whole of the period. 
The rapid expansion of the army beginning in 1739 led to some rein- 
forcing of the overseas garrisons, but few of the units already in those 
garrisons were relieved during the war. In 1749 however, the Duke of 
Cumberland initiated the first (and indeed the only) system of regular 
rotation of the regiments in Europe; it functioned until 1755, and not for 
the rest of the century was so regular a system attempted again. To set 
the stage the old Gibraltar and Minorca garrisons were replaced in 1749: 
the four regiments which had until then been serving in Minorca (the 17th, 
22nd, 26th, and 43rd), were relieved by two from Britain (12th and 31st) 
and two from the army in Brabant (33rd and 37th); and similarly the four 
Gibraltar regiments (the 2nd, 7th, 9th, and 10th), were replaced by four 
from Brabant (the 8th, 19th, 32nd, and. 36th). Beginning in 1751, one each 
of these units at Minorca and Gibraltar was rotated annually back to 
Britain, from where their replacements were drawn. By late 1754, therefore, 
27. "Marching" regiments of Foot, or regular line infantry regiments with 
no fixed and permanent quarters, as distinct therefore from the sedentary 
Foot Guards. 
28. R. Cannon,... Thirty-Ninth Foot (1853), 9-10; Cumb. Pprs., O. B. Ex. 1/21, 
34,38,55; Anon., Quarters... in 1744, p. 15, Quarters... in 1745, p. 14, 
Quarters... in 1748, p. 18, Quarters... in 1749, p. 23. See also Appendix B. 
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the whole of these new Mediterranean garrisons had been fairly replaced. 
29 
In the Americas during this period, however, there were no rotations; the 
38th and 40th continued there, and so too did the new 45th, 47th, and 49th 
of Foot. With the coming of war in 1755 the system ceased to function. 
The influence of the Duke of Cumberland lingered beyond the end of the 
Seven Years' War, however; his system had been found useful and workable, 
there were now many regiments in the Americas and - although the system was 
not restored to the letter - peacetime rotation was recognized as neces- 
sary, and was now extended beyond Britain and the Mediterranean to include 
Ireland, North America, and the West Indies too. Thus after half-a-century 
of neglect there were to be periodic attempts made at large-scale reliefs, 
and occasional (although unsuccessful) attempts at regular rotation; and 
this was to continue through the rest of our period. 
The new, imperial system of reliefs worked from 1763 until 1775, when 
war once again interfered. Thus in 1763 a restored Minorca was garrisoned 
by the 3rd and 67th from Portugal, the 57th from Gibraltar, and the 11th, 
33rd, and 37th from Germany. In 1771 the 3rd, 11th and 67th were relieved 
by the 2/1st, 51st, and 61st, all from England, the rest of the Minorca 
garrison having by then already been relieved. 
30 
Gibraltar regiments too 
ware likewise being periodically relieved. After the 1763 peace fifteen 
battalions were left in North America; 
31 
and early in 1764 the Secretary at 
War outlined a plan for a 'general fixed rotation' between the British Isles 
and that station. 'The plan called for the replacement of five regiments 
in North America in 1765, five in 1766, and three in 1768'; and this proved 
to be only a shade too ambitious since, with Irish troubles intervening, 
the timetable was put off although thirteen regiments had been rotated by 
1769.32 Rotation continued across the Atlantic through 1773. Regiments in 
the West Indies, similarly, were being rotated with others in the British 
Isles between 1764 and 1774. 
The post-1763 rotation schemes were never so successful as had been 
that of Cumberland; and considering the difficulties of communications not 
just on a Mediterranean but on an Atlantic scale too, this is understandable. 
29. R. Cannon,... Twenty-Third Foot (1850), 75; Anon., Quarters... in 1744, 
p. 15, Quarters... in 1745, p. 14, Quarters... in 1748, p. 18, Quarters... in 
1750, p. 27, Quarters... in 1751, p. 27, and Quarters... in 1752, p. 27. 
30. R. Cannon,... Sixty-Seventh Foot (1849), 9-10. 
31. J. Shy, Toward Lexington: The RoZe of the British Army in the Coming 
of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965), 269; J. R. Alden, General Gage 
in America (Baton Rouge, 1948), 128; and WO 24/446. 
32. J. Shy, ibid., 274; and see this work for maps showing the distribu- 
tion of the army in America late in 1760 (p. 97), early in 1763 (p. 112), in 
1766 (p. 238), in 1772 (p. 328), and early in 1775 (p. 419). 
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The Carib War and the American War for Independence interfered; and the 
result was that during the period 1743-93 many regiments - like the 8th 
Foot which we noted earlier, left in central Canada from 1768 to 1785 - 
spent long periods on foreign service, suffering the same ills (if not for 
such extraordinarily lengthy periods), as had the regiments serving abroad 
prior to 1749. The 45th Foot, for example, was in 1746 dispatched from 
Gibraltar to Louisbourg; and for the next twenty years the regiment re- 
mained in North America, returning home in 1766 after four years' service 
at Gibraltar followed by twenty across the Atlantic. The 16th Foot ship- 
ped from Ireland to New York in 1767, and served in America for fifteen 
years before sailing for home. 
33 
Similarly the 29th Foot arrived in 
America in 1767; and after a spell of duty in Boston the corps was 
shipped to Quebec where it remained until embarking for England in 1787. The 
29th had been overseas for twenty years. 
34 
The 14th Foot spent nine years 
in Jamaica, from 1782 to 1791; and the 67th Foot too spent nine years in 
the West Indies, sailing from Ireland in 1785 and returning home in 1794.35 
Several other regiments saw equally lengthy service abroad, during these 
decades; and the Inspection Returns submitted on all of these regiments, 
upon their return to the British Isles, show clearly that the effects of 
long foreign service were as harmful after 1763 as they had been prior to the 
appearance of rotation and reliefs. A great many of these units, es- 
pecially after 1783, suffered too-lengthy spells of foreign duty simply 
because it was their misfortune not to get caught up in the nets periodical- 
ly cast by the War Office and the Horse Guards. The post-war reduction of 
the army and the dreadful condition of many old regiments, by 1783, likewise 
caused some confusion during the mid-1780's. Still, from 1783 until the 
renewal of war in 1793 considerable reliefs were going on annually, to and 
from all foreign stations; and as in the period of the Duke of Cumberland's 
administration there was again in operation, from 1787 onwards, another 
regular annual rotation system - now embracing Britain, Gibraltar, Ireland 
and (if not quite so regularly), the West Indies and the Canadas. This 
system usually involved the rotation of three regiments from Britain to 
Ireland, three from Ireland to overseas stations, and three from abroad 
back to Britain. In 1787, for example, three from Britain (the 43rd, 64th, 
and 70th) crossed to Ireland, three from Ireland (the 4th, 5th, and 26th) 
sailed for the Canadas, and three from the Canadas (the 29th, 31st, and 
34th) returned to Britain. And so the system proceeded, the most ambitious 
33. G. W. H. Peters, The Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire Regiment (1970), 30. 
34. P. R. N. Katcher, op. cit., 44. The unit had a three-year respite in 
England 1773-76, however. 
35. R. Cannon,... Fourteenth Foot (1845), 37-8, and ... Sixty-Seventh Foot 
(1849), 10. 
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attempted in the century if - unlike that of Cumberland - not wholly regu- 
lar. 36 During this period, too, regiments did duty on Jersey and Guernsey; 
but those few now serving in India were, needless to say, left to the fate 
which had once been the lot of the old 38th of Foot from 1716 until 1765. 
Regiments serving abroad suffered, as we have seen - and as we shall 
see repeatedly, below - from the effects of distance, mismanagement, dis- 
ease, privation, dispersal, and dearth of recruits. That the material 
technology of the century was ill-equipped to deal with many of these 
problems, is true enough; but it is true too that little or no attempt was 
made to alleviate the cumulative effects of long service abroad, where help 
could be rendered, until the Duke of Cumberland took matters in hand at the 
mid-century. Training in the units long abroad was left to the industry of 
local governors or regimental officers, who in most cases could not for long 
periods overcome the friction of foreign service. Some efforts were made 
by the central authorities after the mid-century to improve training 
abroad, as we shall see; but rotation was really the only effective pal- 
liative. As we noted earlier, however, the army was at no time large enough 
to handle efficiently all of the duties imposed upon it in peacetime. Rota- 
tion or replacement for those units stretched out over the Empire helped to 
mitigate a burden which was simply too great for so few regiments; but 
for all intents and purposes we must conclude that at least one-fifth and 
often as much as one-quarter of the marching foot of the British Army, 
strewn abroad, was in a perpetually low state of interior economy and train- 
ing and was, consequently, either unfit for service or capable of only 
modest exertions. This conclusion will be the more apparent once the con- 
dition of those units safely home in Britain and Ireland is considered, 
which we shall do in the following section. 
PART B: Distribution + Rotation in the British Isles: 
When serving in Britain the army conformed to a set of patterns which 
varied hardly at all, throughout the century, and which collectively had 
the most profound impact upon the training of the regiments. The dictates 
of physical and social geography generally and, most specifically, popula- 
tion densities in the various regions, economic fluctuations and their 
accompanying social unrest, an as yet unimproved and archaic road-network, 
together with a general lack of quarters sizeable enough to house large 
numbers of troops, and also the vagaries of crisis - international dis- 
putes and wars, local riots and disorders - these were the most 
36. WO 5/66, through /68 passim; and see WO 3/10, p. 77, for details of the 
1792 rotation. 
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significant factors contributing to the formation and maintenance of this 
set of patterns. 
Where geography provided the framework - the points of embarkation 
around Britain's shores, the crossings between England, Wales, and 
Scotland, the main march-corridors which the army used once arrived within 
Britain, and to some extent the duty areas which these corridors linked - 
it was primarily the more immediate requirements of civil society which 
provided the motor-mechanism, setting the army in motion along the cor- 
ridors, determining its distribution and dispersal about and within the 
duty areas and along the coasts, rotating the regiments from one place to 
another, and deciding the duration of their stay. 
It was the result of these patterns that the army when serving in 
Britain was always on the move from one area to the next, was always very 
widely dispersed, and in consequence was ill-trained and unprepared for 
war. Since the effect of these patterns on the training of the regiments 
was so marked, and so primary, we must consider them here in detail. 
Although the number of soldiers in Great Britain was always com- 
paratively large - that is, compared with the numbers serving anywhere 
else in the Empire - the actual number of regiments 'entertaining' them 
was small, since regimental establishments in Britain were considerably 
greater than those of sister units in Ireland. 
37 
Since many of the regi- 
ments serving abroad were sent out from Britain while many of those re- 
placed abroad returned directly to Britain, it is quite clear that this 
small number of corps made each of them much more mobile, relatively, than 
any of their counterparts in Ireland. The Irish Parliament disliked send- 
ing its regiments abroad, at least during the earlier part of the century; 
the Irish administration would pay for its own (and for part of Britain's) 
defence, but it disliked paying to defend New York. Peacetime mobility for 
units on the British establishment was therefore considerable - and not 
only between Britain and the Empire, but also between England and Scotland. 
Only during the 1760's and 1770's were units in Ireland as mobile, Irish- 
American rotation having been introduced. 
There were patterns to this mobility, discernable at various levels. 
37. For charts of regimental establishments, see Appendix C. The size of 
the peacetime Irish establishment was fixed and permanent: 12,000 men 
from 1699 to 1769, and 15,000 from 1769 until the Union. The size of the 
peacetime British establishment varied: it stood at around 17,000 from 
1720 to 1739, at about 19,000 from 1748 to 1755, and was cut to 17,000 
again from 1763. See Sir J. Fortescue, The British Army, 1783-1802 (1905), 
18; F. G. James, op. cit., 175; and C. M. Clode, The Military Forces of the 
Crown: Their Achninistration and Government, I (1869), 398 (cited hereafter 
as Clode). For the disparity in the number of units on the two establish- 
ments, see Appendix B. 
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Mobility in and out of Britain (and once arrived, within Britain), was 
great; but the regiments arrived and departed at a set of points whose 
number was limited. Regiments moving between England and Scotland passed 
from one command into the other at either Carlisle or Berwick or, occa- 
sionally, at Coldstream - the Cheviots of the Border, and the barren 
Pennines stretching south from Northumberland and Cumberland, effectively 
canalizing traffic into the Lancashire or Durham road corridors. By sea, 
regiments arrived at Plymouth, Portsmouth, or Bristol (Bideford, when weather 
made the Bristol Channel dangerous); less often, regiments landed in the 
Dee, near Chester, at Liverpool, in the Clyde, or at the Thames ports. 
Regiments sailing from Britain embarked at Plymouth, Portsmouth (and the 
Isle of Wight), or Bristol; less often from the Thames reaches at Greenwich, 
Woolwich, Dartford, or Gravesend, or from the Medway embarkation places, 
Chatham and Rochester; and much less commonly units sailed from Newcastle, 
Liverpool, and the Clyde ports. This then is a first pattern, that which 
operated at Britain's frontiers. 
Once arrived in Britain, there was another pattern: there were areas 
in which the density of troops was always great, and other areas where a 
red coat would have been a rare sight indeed. Wales saw very little of the 
army: during our survey periods (Appendix A) there was never, at any one 
time, so much as a whole regiment in that country. Small detachments from 
regiments stationed in England were usually to be found only at Carmarthen, 
Aberystwyth, and Aberdovey, and only occasionally at Wrexham, Harlech, 
Pembroke, and Milford Haven. The main billeting towns just across the 
border in England were, north to south, Chester, Malpas, Whitchurch, 
Oswestry, Shrewsbury, Church Stretton, Ludlow, Leominster, Hereford, and 
Ross; and it was from these places, and from bigger Bristol and Worcester, 
that the small detachments moved into Wales. There were only four main 
routes used when marching into Wales, running along the lines Montgomery - 
Llanidloes - Aberystwyth (that is, up the Vale of Powis cut by the Severn, 
and then skirting the southern slopes of the Pumlumon Fawr); from Monmouth, 
up the valley of the Usk by Abergavenny and Brecon to Llandovery, then north 
via Tregaron or south via Llandeilo along the cut of the Tywi stream; New 
Radnor (or Hay on Wye) - Builth Wells - Tregaron - Aberystwyth, a dif- 
ficult route across spurs of the southern Cambrians; and south of the 
Brecons along the easy line of the Glamorgan coast, that is Chepstow - 
Caerleon - Caerphilly - Neath - Swansea - Llanelli - Carmarthen - 
Narberth - and on to Haverfordwest, Pembroke, or Milford Haven. The whole 
of north Wales, then, almost never saw the British Army. 
The same was true for most of north Devon and south-west Somerset, since 
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soldiers almost never strayed north of the line Bude - Okehampton - 
Crediton - Tiverton - Milverton. Again, almost as deserted of troops as 
Wales was that great section of the six northern counties cut by the Pennine 
Chain: the area bounded on the north by Hadrian's Wall; to the east by 
the line Newcastle - Darlington - Ripon - Leeds; across the south by 
the line Leeds - Bradford - Rochdale - Wigan; and bounded on the-west 
by the line Wigan - Lancaster - Kendal - Penrith - Carlisle. East-west 
crossings north of the Leeds - Wigan line were seldom attempted; when 
they were made, the soldiers followed the stages Clitheroe - Skipton - 
Ripley, between Preston to the west and either Boroughbridge or Ripon to the 
east. Otherwise, the British Army followed the ancient route of the 
legionnaries, from Newcastle via the stages Hexham and Haltwhistle and so 
to Carlisle. But even that well-worn path was a difficult one: Field 
Marshal Wade attempted it, in earnest, late in November 1745, as the 
Rebels moved upon Carlisle; but he had to give it up and return to 
Newcastle with a sick and exhausted force, wind and snow having prevented 
his crossing. 
The Pennines and the Welsh Cambrians were rugged, bleak and exposed; 
they were sparsely inhabited, there were few roads, and there were almost 
no towns with facilities to house and feed troops. North Devon, with its 
Exmoor, was difficult country and little-inhabited too. There was not only 
considerable logistical difficulty presented by these regions, but little 
occasion for a military presence anyway. How difficult such country was 
can be judged not only from Wade's experience but from the fact that, 
during all of the periods surveyed (Appendix A), there were only four 
occasions on which cavalry was sent into Wales, and each time in aid of 
the civil power; and significantly, on three of those occasions the 
troopers marched dismounted. 
38 
Indeed, the orders which sent three troops 
of Argyll's 2nd Dragoons from Worcester in March, 1753, to suppress rioters 
at Aberystwyth and environs, pointed out that to 'go to those Places, 
39 Mounted, is almost Impracticable'. 
Save for the periods of Jacobite outbreaks and suppression, much of 
Scotland was left empty of the regular army, the more rugged and inhospitable 
areas being left to Independent Companies like those from which the Black 
Watch was regimented. Most troops were quartered between the Border and the 
Highlands, and along the east coast north of the Forth and around Rattray 
Head. Farther north, the line of the Great Glen and its forts of "the 
Chain" - Fort William, Fort Augustus, and Fort George at Inverness - was 
38. WO 5/41, pp. 144,356-8; /42, pp. 82,152; and /59, pp. 136,154. 
39. WO 5/41, pp. 356-8. 
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the only other regular station for troops in the country, save for isolated 
police barracks like Ruthven and Bernara. There were seldom regulars north 
of the Great Glen and, except in times of rebellion, cavalry seems never to 
have penetrated the Highlands. Save for the posts at which the few re- 
cruiting additional companies lay (Inveraray, Dunkeld, and Taybridge), there 
was maintained between the Great Glen forts and the cities of the Lowlands 
only a fleeting and irregular presence as detachments moved to rotate with 
others along Wade's roads, cut through the Grampians for the purpose. Most 
of Scotland, like Wales, was rugged and barren, and large numbers of 
soldiers could neither be subsisted nor moved without great difficulty and 
expense. 
The rest of Britain, other than these areas, was quite familiar with 
the army. From the great concentration of troops at London and Westminster 
to the more thinly quartered areas like Monmouth or much of Lincolnshire, 
the map of quarters was a leopard-spot map. And yet another pattern emer- 
ges, that of duty areas. A regiment once arrived in Britain could expect 
to do various kinds of duty in any of a number of geographical areas; it 
must be emphasized, however, that at no time during the century was there 
any fixed rotation pattern or timetable connecting these areas. Regiments 
were shunted from one area to the next in a haphazard fashion, and officers 
can seldom have known where in Britain their unit would be sent next. Only 
the relatively small number of regiments in Britain, the thorough dislike 
of most officers for service in the wilds of Scotland, the need to keep 
cavalry horses fed on good English grass, and fear that lengthy residence 
in one place might encourage liaisons between the men and the locals, thus 
encouraging desertion, ensured that a regiment would not remain overly long 
in any one part of Britain. The frequency of war, of Jacobite scares and 
European crises which failed to become wars (as in 1722,1734, and 1787), 
militated against any long-term planning of regular rotation in Britain. 
Not only major, widespread hunger riots caused by slender harvests (as in 
1766), and those innumerable local crises and tumults which occurred in an 
economy subject to violent short-term fluctuations; but also recurring 
regional economic crisis which resulted from long-term shifts in trade 
patterns or technological change - as in the Cornish stannaries or the 
West-country cloth industry - meant that units in one region might always 
be on call in another. And then the "political", industrial, or other 
violent riots which periodically swept the big towns would always throw any 
fixed plan into confusion. 
There was thus a large number of specific geographic areas in each (or 
in most), of which one or more regiments were to be found; but there was no 
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orderly pattern to these assignments. We have already described the sit- 
uation in Wales (where the small detachments were simply on call to the 
Revenue service, or maintaining a usually passive police presence), and in 
north Devon and the great empty area of the Pennines; and we will add a 
few notes on Scotland below. It remains then to list the duty-areas 
(however briefly), which long study of the Marching Orders (WO 5) has led 
us to isolate, in England. 
There were fifteen of these areas: 
1. ) Cornwall and south Devon invariably quartered a regiment of foot, 
usually headquartered at Exeter, or often at Plymouth later in the century. 
The duty in this area was the most onerous in England, since the regiment 
was broken into small detachments stretching from Penzance to Ottery 
St. Mary. The area was the most notorious centre of unrest and riot in 
England, the tinners in particular being given to disorder in the 1720's, 
'30's, and '40's; and the officers of Customs and Excise were always in 
need of military assistance since smuggling was endemic on those coasts. 
Due to the difficult nature of the terrain and the great numbers of 
soldiers required to aid the civil power, horse (a regiment of horse 
usually had only about 4 to 2 as many men as one of foot)40 was almost 
never employed in this area. Only during the years 1788-90 do we find 
horse doing the duty here, and that at a time when the army was under- 
strength, overworked, and overextended. 
41 
2. ) "Dorset", or the area including the towns and villages between 
Exeter and the New Forest (stretching to Salisbury, often the headquarters 
of a regiment in this area), and from the Channel coast up into south 
Somerset and south Wiltshire, always had a regiment. Of horse more often 
than of foot, the unit usually spent only a few months on the Dorset duty, 
since riots were uncommon and the "cost duty" (i. e., patrols again smugglers), 
was less taxing here than elsewhere along the Channel. 
3. ) The city of Bristol, and the area stretching out to include the 
weaving towns between the Mendips and Salisbury Plain, and then northwards 
towards Marlborough and into the southern Cotswolds, was always occupied by 
a regiment of foot. Huge Bristol had to be watched, and its food supplies 
assured. Places like Trowbridge, Bradford on Avon, and Chippenham were 
chronic centres of riot, while Frome, Devizes, Marshfield, and the villages 
about Stroud were very busy communications centres. The duty here varied, 
but the suppression of riot throughout the area was common. After London 
40. For regimental establishments, see Appendix C. 
41. WO 5/67, pp. 9,146-285 passim. 
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and Dublin, Bristol was the largest city in the Empire, and it was con- 
sequently subject to all of the disorders of such sprawling places. 
4. ) The very large area within the rectangle formed by Gloucester - 
Ludlow - Warwick - oxford (an area sometimes extended to include 
Coventry on the one side, and Hereford and Ross on the other), usually pro- 
vided quarters for two regiments of horse. This was a quiet area but, oc- 
casionally, detachments were dispatched towards Bristol, the Welsh coast, or 
to the Midlands industrial towns, if the civil power in those places was 
hard pressed. 
5. ) The sprawl of towns around Birmingham, Stourbridge, Wolverhampton 
and Coventry provided fairly transient quarters usually for a regiment of 
horse, and often for one of foot. There were no particular duties in this 
area but, as these towns grew with the progressing capitalist economy of 
manufacture, the horse tended to stay longer, and action in aid of the civil 
power occurred more frequently. 
6. ) Manchester and the surrounding area usually supported a cavalry 
regiment whose duties were little more arduous than suppressing the oc- 
casional riot, or finding detachments to check disorder at Liverpool or 
north towards Preston. It was very common for a cavalry regiment, having 
marched south from a tour of duty in Scotland, to settle in at Manchester 
for some months as its first station in England. Like the industrial 
centres south of it, Manchester's reputation declined with the rise of 
local industry and population. Both south from this area and north from 
the Birmingham area, noted above, a few troops or companies were sometimes 
extended to include Burton, Stoke-on-Trent, and Macclesfield among their 
quarters. 
7. ) As the century progressed, the growth of Liverpool and increased 
attention to the smuggling of Irish goods through the Isle of Man led to 
the establishment of a regiment of foot partly on the island, partly at 
Liverpool and partly doing coast duty about Whitehaven -a regiment thus 
much dispersed. Before the mid-century the area had been little-frequented 
by the army. Often enough, Man itself was policed by companies detached 
from the foot in Ulster, and so only irregularly was the island a problem 
for the army on the British establishment. 
8. ) The Border area usually occupied the time of one foot regiment, 
or of two if we include Newcastle and Gateshead. The few companies at 
Carlisle were often extended down to Maryport, Cockermouth, and Whitehaven, 
on the coast duty; and the many companies at Newcastle often detached to 
Sunderland, and there was a barrack at Tynemouth from early in the century. 
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The G. O. C. North Britain often drew detachments from Berwick to patrol the 
East Lothian and Berwickshire coasts. There was persistant agricultural 
unrest in Durham and Northumberland, and a few companies close at hand at 
Newcastle and Gateshead were a comfort to magistrates. The Newcastle mob 
- notably on the waterfront, where wages fluctuated considerably - had 
occasionally to be suppressed. 
9. ) York, like Manchester, usually quartered a cavalry regiment for 
a few months as it passed into or from Scotland. Detachments were reg- 
ularly quartered at Leeds; and Beverley, Bridlington, Scarborough, -and 
Whitby often housed further detachments out of York on the coast duty. 
10. ) A regiment of horse (and often one of foot, too) was usually 
headquartered at either Stamford or Peterborough, or occasionally at 
Norwich. From these places, many detachments were found to serve through- 
out Norfolk and Suffolk, mostly patrolling against smugglers; and places 
as far inland as Oundle, Huntingdon, and Bury St. Edmunds served as 
quarters on the southern and western borders of this area. 
11. ) Essex usually maintained a cavalry regiment, occasionally in com- 
pany with detachments of foot. Colchester and Chelmsford were the main 
quartering centres in this area, and Ipswich across the county line was 
often used for this purpose. 
12. ) A cavalry regiment always patrolled the Sussex coast making de- 
tachments as far north as the Surrey border to choke off the inland smug- 
gling arteries. 
13. ) Kent usually supported all or part of a regiment of horse, again 
on the coast duty; and at least one and usually two regiments of foot were 
normally to be found in the county. One of these foot units was generally 
quartered along the Straits of Dover from Rye to Margate, the other along 
the Thames shore. Canterbury was a constantly-used headquarters centre, 
as was Chatham with its defensive Lines and, later in the century, its big 
barracks; and Dover Castle always quartered a few companies. 
14. ) London and Westminster were, of course, the province of the Guards, 
horse and foot. Only in wartime (or occasionally in detachments as escorts 
to the Sovereign, in peacetime), did the Guards leave the capital ; and 
the regular line cavalry and marching foot only quartered in the outlying 
villages round the metropolis when. ordered in briefly for royal inspection. 
The privileges of London's 'Liberties' (the Rolls in Chancery Lane, 
for example, were exempt from army quartering) created great problems, 
making of the capital a leopard-spot quartering map, just like the 
wider kingdom. 
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42. Typical were the quarters of the Foot Guards late in 1726. The 1st Foot 
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15. ) The very large area including Northamptonshire, the west Midlands, 
and extending as far north as Sheffield, occasionally but rather infrequent- 
ly supported in its northern end (that is, from Leicester through Nottingham 
and Sheffield), a regiment of horse or of foot; while The Blues constantly 
patrolled a beat in the southern part of the area, so constantly in fact 
that they very seldom left these parts in peacetime. 
These, then, were the regular duty areas. In addition to these, four 
other regions should be mentioned which, although not duty areas, were 
nevertheless areas reserved for special purposes. The first was the 
countryside round about Lincoln city, stretching from Grantham north to 
Doncaster, and from Mansfield on the western side to Horncastle towards 
the coast. This was an area very seldom occupied and, when it was, it 
served only to provide quarters for a foot regiment which could not be 
accomodated elsewhere. There were three other areas which, though not 
duty areas, were almost constantly in use. The first of these was the 
Portsmouth hinterland, usually including Havant, Bishops Waltham, 
Petersfleld, Liphook, Alresford and Alton; these were the transient quarters 
for a regiment of foot waiting to embark on board transports or the fleet 
for overseas duty, or for service as marines. The second area consisted of 
the swathe of towns and villages in the southern parts of Buckinghamshire, 
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, and in Middlesex, forming an arc around north- 
ern London. Here, places like High Wycombe, Uxbridge, Aylesbury, Dunstable, 
Barnet, Baldock, and St. Albans were constantly used to quarter regiments - 
notably of horse - destined for London inspections. The last of these 
areas, finally, was the small area extending from Windsor west to Newbury 
and south to Winchester, an area in which regiments normally quartered for 
only a short time while doing guard-duty at Windsor, resting after returning 
home from overseas, or preparing for inspection at Reading or nearer London. 
Because of the paucity of archival material on the day-to-day acti- 
vities of the army in Scotland, we shall have to deal with that country 
rather quickly, adding here only a few generalizations (and a list of dis- 
positions) to the details already given. 
Guards had 9 companies distributed about Holborn and the parish of 
St. Andrew Holborn, 2 companies in Clerkenwell, 2 in St. Giles Cripplegate, 
1 each in Spitalfields, Whitechapel, and St. Sepulchre without Newgate, 1 
company in Shoreditch and Folgate, another in East Smithfield and 
St. Katherines, and a further 10 companies lying across the river in the 
Borough of Southwark. The Coldstream, meanwhile, lay with 9 companies in 
the Tower and another 9 up-river at the Savoy. The 3rd Foot Guards were 
spread throughout the City and Liberty of Westminster. (WO 5/27, pp. 60-1). 
This sort of in-town dispersal was common in most places. "Worcester" 
quarters meant, for example, the central city and the parishes of SS. John, 
Peter, Michael, and Martin. "Salisbury" quarters usually included that city 
plus Milford, Fisherton, and Harnharn. 
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The number of regiments normally serving in Scotland was very small 
(see Appendix B), and these were mostly to be found in the Lowlands. In 
1716 and 1746, however, in the aftermath of the great Jacobite risings, 
immense concentrations of troops were to be found in the northern kingdom43; 
and their dispositions, reflecting as they do the main centres of pop- 
ulation and lines of communication, point at the same time the main 
quartering and duty regions into which the geographic and demographic 
patterns naturally divided the country, as they did England and Wales. 
There were five distinct areas of occupation both in 1716 and 1746: 
1. ) The first such area was the Great Glen, the great fault cut between 
the Grampians and the almost impenetrable north-western Highlands. Here 
the foot was based chiefly at Inverness and in smaller numbers at Fort 
William (and at Fort Augustus by 1746); while single additional companies 
were normally out at Ruthven and well to the south at Inveraray. 
2. ) The north-east coastal plain, from Inverness round Rattray Head 
and then south to Aberdeen where the Dee comes down from the Eastern 
Grampians, formed another area of occupation. Aberdeen was the main 
quarter here, with smaller numbers at Banff and Elgin; Nairn, Forres, 
Farmouth, Cullen, and Peterhead held detachments. 
3. ) The third region consisted of the lowlands of Fife and Strathmore, 
stretching from the Ochil Hills north of the Forth and along the narrow 
coastal plain to Aberdeen. The main quartering towns were Montrose, Dundee, 
and Perth, while smaller numbers might be found at Dunkeld and Cupar; de- 
tachments lay at Brechin and Arbroath, and two additional companies usually 
lay at Dunfermline and up in. the hills at Taybridge. 
4. ) Much of the Lowlands, broadly speaking, composed the fourth and 
chief area of occupation: that is, the area stretching out from the line 
Dumbarton - Glasgow - Stirling (from Forth to Clyde), south to the line 
Stranraer (or Ayr) - Lanark - Dunbar, bounded all along its southern edge 
by the Southern Uplands. The main quarters here were Glasgow, Stirling, 
and Edinburgh, while smaller numbers might be based at Dumbarton, and 
43. Early in 1716 there were in Scotland more than 12,000 soldiers, 
serving in 7 regiments of British dragoons (1700 all ranks), 10 battalions 
of British foot (4500 all ranks), and 11 battalions of Dutch foot (6000, 
all ranks). Late in 1746 there were, in Scotland some 13,000 soldiers (all 
of whom were British), serving in 5 regiments of dragoons and 16 bat- 
talions of foot, plus 9 additional companies. See J. Baynes, The Jacobite 
Rising of 1715 (1970), 200-01, and C. S. Terry (ed. ), The Albemarle Papers: 
Being the Correspondance of WiZZiam Anne, Second Earl: of Albemarle... 
1746-48, I (Aberdeen, 1902), 201-7,226,274-7, from which these figures 
and the following dispositions are principally drawn. 
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and detachments found at Ayr, Stranraer, Dalkeith, Haddington, and 
Musselburgh. 
5. ) The last area consisted of the plain of the Tweed, and the line of 
the Border. Troops at Carlisle and Berwick were on call here, so that the 
area was thinly quartered; but Dumfries, Swinton, Foulden, and Duns were 
often employed. 
As we observed earlier these quartering regions, despite the extra- 
ordinary circumstances prevailing in 1716 and 1746, reflect the geographical 
realities of eighteenth-century Scotland - most especially the difficulties 
of movement and quartering inland from the coastal plains anywhere to the 
north of the Highland line. The normal routine of peacetime duty in the 
country, where it can be traced, conformed to this area pattern. We can 
for example follow the movements of Bury's 20th of Foot in Scotland, 
1749-53; its movements and the areas where it served were typical. Early 
in 1749 the regiment arrived at Stirling, and stayed there until March when 
it moved to Glasgow. From 5 June to the end of that summer, half of the 
regiment fanned out from there to do road work. In October 1749 the 20th 
marched to Perth, and the following spring was again employed on road work. 
In September 1750 the regiment moved to Dundee, and a few weeks later went 
on to Banff. Late in September"1751 the 20th marched to Inverness, and in 
May 1752 moved to Fort Augustus. By April 1753 the regiment had finished 
its spell of patrolling out of the Chain forts, and was again at Glasgow. 
In September 1753, finally, the regiment marched south into England. 
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The big cities of the Lowlands and the coastal plains were, like their 
English counterparts, subject to riot and disorder, and the coasts them- 
selves were much frequented by smugglers; and the Lowlands were in con- 
sequence as thickly quartered and as often patrolled as were most parts of 
southern England. Many of the Lowland towns had barracks, and in Scotland 
quartering upon private houses was legal. Edinburgh and Stirling had their 
old border castles, which housed troops. But the Highlands, as we noted 
earlier, were another story. Before the later-1740's and the pacification 
which ended even the possibility of another Jacobite rising, the army had 
been engaged in pushing roads into the Highlands, as arteries to feed the 
forts along the Chain. But these forts in normal times held few troops, 
45 
and after the 1750's all save Ardersier were allowed to fall into disrepair. 
44. J. T. Findlay, Wolfe in Scotland in the '45 and from 1749-1753 (1928), 
143-298, passim. 
45. On the outbreak of the '45, the forts were almost empty, as were the 
few smaller posts. R. C. Jarvis, CoZZected Papers on the Jacobite Risings, 
I (Manchester, 1971), 8-9,25-47. Curiously, there is no decent study 
of the surveying and road-building of'the 1720's and '30's; J. B. Salmond, 
regularly cited, is thin (Wade in Scotland, (1934). 
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The Highlands themselves, despite Wade's road-building of the 1720's, were 
too thinly settled to support sizable forces, and the rugged country made 
the use of cavalry impracticable; the rule of law, there, was in consequence 
left to small detachments of regulars, to the Whig militia, to Independent 
Companies, and to the watches. 
Since the later seventeenth century the number of soldiers acting in 
assistance of the Revenue on the coast duty had been growing, very slowly, 
as the demands of the Revenue Service brought increasing pressure. By 
1730 large numbers of troops were so employed; and by then also a large 
number of separate areas, in some cases corresponding to the duty areas 
noted earlier, were being regularly patrolled. This was a pattern which was 
to continue throughout the century. 
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The most heavily patrolled areas were 
six in number, each usually under the care of at least one regiment. These 
six areas were as follows: 
1. ) The coasts of Cornwall and Devon, stretching from Bude Bay on 
St. George's Channel, round Land's End, and down the Channel coast to Lyme 
Regis and the Dorset border, were heavily trafficked by the smugglers. The 
particular stretches of those coasts most constantly patrolled by the army 
were those running from Port Isaac past Padstow to St. Ives; next, the 
stretch from Penzance down-Channel to East Looe; and finally the strip be- 
tween the Great Mew Stone in Wembury Bay and the lesser Mew Stone off 
Dartmouth. Inland, detachments large and small were to be found everywhere, 
but Redruth, Helston, Tregony, St. Austell, Modbury, Kingsbridge, and Ottery 
St. Mary were most regularly employed as the headquarters of the detachments. 
2. ) The Dorset and Hampshire coasts, notably about Weymouth, and from 
Poole to Lymington, were constantly patrolled, even though the shorter dis- 
tances to be covered here made the duty less onerous than in Cornwall or 
elsewhere. Inland, the larger detachments were regularly to be found at 
Wimborne Minster, Ringwood, Bere Regis, Cerne Abbas, and Beaminster. 
3. ) The Sussex coast had constantly to be patrolled. The whole coast, 
from Chichester to Rye, was frequented by the smugglers, and there were 
detachments far inland to choke off run goods. No particular section of 
the Sussex coast can be singled out, for the army was thick along the whole 
46. These areas showed up in plotting troop movements and dispositions 
for Appendix A; the method is explained there. On the organization and 
development of the Revenue service, see E. Hoon, The Organization of the 
English Customs System, 1696-1786 (Newton Abbot, 1968), and E. Carson, The 
Ancient and Rightful Customs (1972), which outline the organization of the 
Board, the Port of London's Revenue officials, and the officers in the 
Outports. See also H. Atton and H. Holland, The King's Customs (1908), 
esp. I, 102-445. 
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of it. Inland, places like West Dean, Petworth, Arundel, Storrington, 
Lewes, and Battle, quartered the largest detachments. 
4. ) The Channel coast of Kent was almost as heavily patrolled as that 
of Sussex, notably in the Romney Marsh stretch between Lydd, Romney, and 
Folkestone. Although the Thames estuary was another major smuggling artery, 
the army was less active on the Kent shore than on the Essex side; Revenue 
cutters probably accounted for this, forcing some of the waterborne con- 
traband trade heading for London to take to the less-peopled north shore. 
5. ) Essex, like Cornwall, was a scene of considerable smuggling activ- 
ity. The topography of gently rolling East Anglia made it an easy area for 
cavalry to patrol, easing the manpower required. Colchester or Ipswich was 
usually the headquarters of the cavalry regiment doing the coast duty in 
Essex, although Chelmsford was frequently used also. The whole of the Essex 
coast from the Crouch to the Stour was constantly patrolled; and detach- 
ments at Colchester, Witham, Braintree, Maldon, Chelmsford, and Billericay 
were all admirably placed to choke off some of the incoming traffic. 
6. ) Norfolk and Suffolk were, like Essex, well sited for the reception 
of smuggling craft on their coasts, and were broad enough inland to make the 
movement of goods fairly safe. The flatness of the country suited it for 
cavalry. From Ipswich north all the way around the coast, past Lowestoft 
and Yarmouth to King's Lynn (and indeed as far as Boston across The Wash), 
the whole coast was used for smuggling. This was an immense area to patrol; 
and the detachments, consequently, tended to operate out of small and 
numerous posts rather than from the shore-bases typical of Sussex. Thus 
Framlingham, Halesworth, Southwold, Beccles, Bungay, North Walsham, Holt, 
Walsingham, Lynn, Long Sutton, Holbeach, and Spalding, all served this purpose. 
There were four other areas in which the army operated regularly against 
smugglers, but never so intensively as in those areas described above. The 
Welsh coast from Harlech to Aberystwyth was one such. Another was the 
stretch along the Solway Firth from Whitehaven to Carlisle, with detachments 
on the Isle of Man (that 'warehouse of Frauds', as the Whitehaven Customs men 
described it), after its sovereignty was re-vested in the Crown in 1765, to 
choke off this main entrepot for run Irish goods. Lastly, the troops were 
deployed along two stretches of the North Sea coast: the first running from 
the Humber to about the Tees, an area seeing but little illicit traffic, and 
patrolled from York city; and the second, just north of Berwick along the 
Berwickshire and East Lothian coasts, where the patrols were directed by the 
G. O. C. North Britain. 
Along with the pattern of duty areas, in England, there also existed 
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a pattern of main march-corridors. Units seldom remained in any one area 
for more than several months, before they were set in motion again, or sent 
abroad. Movement about the kingdom (save in Wales, and across the Pennines), 
was easily managed, since there were roads almost everywhere; but naturally 
some routes were more heavily travelled than others, and we can isolate nine 
major corridors or road-systems which were most commonly used. These were, 
briefly: 1. ), the London - Dartford - Canterbury route, along the busy 
artery between the south shore and the North Downs; 2. ), the London - 
Newbury - Devizes - Bristol route, an easy route well worn since ancient 
times; 3. ), the busy London - Guildford - Petersfleld - Portsmouth route; 
4. ), the route from Plymouth which reached Exeter by skirting to the south 
of Dartmoor, then went north via Bridgwater to Bristol, and then passed on 
to the Midlands manufacturing towns via a general series of roads lying in 
the easy Vales of Berkeley and Gloucester, and along the Severn east of the 
Mendip Hills; 5. ), the route from Walsall north via Stoke-on-Trent, 
Warrington, and Preston, to the Border at Carlisle (another series of roads 
following the Cheshire and Lancashire Plains, before ascending the slopes 
between the Pennines and the Lake District peaks along the route Lancaster 
- Kendal - Penrith; 6. ), the great north-south artery along the line 
London - Northampton - Nottingham - Rotherham - Leeds; 7. ), the Chester 
to Gloucester routes, either via Whitchurch, Shrewsbury, Ludlow, Hereford, 
and Ross, or via Whitchurch, Wellington, Bewdley, and Worcester; 8. ), the 
whole complex of the Great North Road; and 9. ), the Worcester to Worksop 
route via Birmingham, Lichfield, Burton-on-Trent, Derby, and Mansfield. 
These were the main movement corridors; but as we noted earlier, 
roads were everywhere. The road-system of eighteenth-century England was 
complex but there were almost no long, single-surfaced highways. There 
was, rather, an intricate web of smaller roads (often no more than tracks), 
weaving from every village to each of its neighbours, with the best heading 
towards the market town. Given this road-system, there existed a very 
great number of small villages functioning largely as secondary halts or 
stages along the routes between the bigger towns: these stages were essen- 
tial to the economy of an age moving at the speed of a horse, a wagon, or 
of drove cattle. As Braudel observed of such places, 'the cities could 
not do without them, any more than the traveller along a road could do 
without somewhere to change his horses or lay his head. The life of these 
intermediary places was linked to the arithmetic of distances, the average 
speed of travellers along the roads. 
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Conforming to the dictates of the 
"arithmetic of distances", the stages used by the army in England appear, 
47. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean... in the Age of Philip II, trans. 
S. Reynolds, 1 (1972), 282. 
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when plotted on a map, as regular as beads on a necklace. Most of the 
villages along the march-corridors had for centuries served as halting- 
places and, though most were small, they were nevertheless well supplied 
with inns and stables for the relief of travellers. It was possible for the 
Quartermaster General, therefore, to choose from a number of parallel 
routes when moving troops along the corridors noted above, betweenthe major 
centres. There were always alternate routes and stages along the corridors, 
given the complexity of the village and road network. Thus on the busy 
north-south route running down the Vale of York and then along the banks of 
the Trent, between Durham and Newark, the following places were all very 
frequently-used stages, north to south: Bishop Auckland, Darlington, Bedale, 
Northallerton, Thirsk, Ripon, Boroughbridge, Knaresborough, Wetherby, 
Tadcaster, Sherburn, Ferrybridge, Pontefract, Doncaster, Blyth, Bawtry, East 
Retford, and Tuxford. That is to say, there were eighteen stages to choose 
among, for a march which usually required only seven of them. Another 
example is the complex of roads in the Vale of Berkeley between Gloucester 
and Bristol, again heavily travelled. A marching unit (of horse or foot, 
for both invariably covered the same amount of ground on a day's march), 
spent no more than one or two nights on the thirty miles between those two 
cities; but the Quartermaster General could choose from among seven stage 
towns, namely Thornbury, Chipping Sodbury, Wickwar, Wotton under Edge, 
Dursley, King's Stanley, and Stroud. 
The fact that most of the stages or halting-places were small exacer- 
bated another problem always encountered when moving the forces in England. 
During the course of the seventeenth century, it had come to be regarded as 
one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen that troops (lewd, licentious, 
unbridled fellows by definition), could not be quartered upon private 
householders without prior consent and payment. By the beginning of the 
eighteenth century this right had been recognized in law, and any infringe- 
ment was henceforth an offence punishable under the Mutiny Acts. In con- 
sequence - since barracks were virtually unknown, and great numbers of 
troops (whatever their character) had to be sheltered - 'the Government 
had to make shift for their dangerous charges by visiting them upon the 
other criminal class - inn-keepers. '48 
48. R. E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), 164. On the 
issue in general, with a few interesting notes on practice in Scotland, see 
S. M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in Worth America (New Haven, 1933), 188-9. 
Scouller, 164-70, discusses the problem in the three kingdoms in some detail 
(for the "rights of Englishmen" did not extend to Irishmen, and of course 
few rights at all were accorded the Scots vis-a-vis the army). Good 
Victorian that he was, Clode, I, 229-38, discussed the legal technicalities 
and niceties of quartering, and the ensuing financial complications; while 
J. Shy, op. cit., 163-91, considers the thorny problem of quartering the arm"" 
in America where, as in Ireland, the "rights of Englishmen" were sometimes 
deemed inoperative. 
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The troops, then, were billeted in "public houses" - specifically, 
"'inns, livery stables, alehouses, victualling houses, and all houses sell- 
ing brandy, strong waters, cyder, or metheglin by retail to be drunk on 
the premises, and in no other"', as the Mutiny Acts had it. 
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The inn- 
keepers, however, raised continual complaints, largely over the small sums 
received in payment for their unwanted guests; humble petitions were 
frequent and, in parts of Sussex and other places off the beaten track, 
'it had become a practice with the publicans, as a class, to take down 
their sign-boards and throw up their licenses upon the approach of troops. 
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Because troops could only be quartered in certain types of buildings, 
then; because most stages were small places, with few inns, and because 
it took time to cover ground at the pace of a walking horse or man, it 
took what seems to us an inordinately long time for a regiment to carry out 
a march. The quarters in the halting-places being limited in capacity and 
number, whole regiments could not possibly be moved from one place to an- 
other as single units; they had, rather, to march in from two to four 
"divisions", each setting off upon the intended route one day ahead of the 
next. Marching, it was invariably the custom to rest on two days out of 
every seven ("halting-days", usually Thursdays and Sundays), and this again 
added to the time spent by a unit strung out upon a march. Thus in May 1738, 
for example, Montague's 11th of Foot set out for Berwick, from Exeter; it 
quartered at twenty-nine stage-towns in between, marched in three divisions 
which remained halted on Thursdays and Sundays, and rested for a full week 
at Newcastle and Gateshead. The regiment, therefore, took fifty-one days to 
complete a march of about 430 miles. Another long march, from Portsmouth 
to Carlisle and environs, was made by Holmes' 31st of Foot beginning on 
13 July 1752. Holmes' quartered at twenty-five places in between, marched 
in three divisions and observed the usual halting-days, and rested for 
seven days at Newbury and another seven at Preston (they had just returned 
from Minorca, and were allowed these rests to refresh themselves after the 
fatigues of the voyage home). Holmes' whole march, therefore, took fifty- 
two days to complete. 
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The same rules applied to short marches as to long. 
49. Quoted in R. E. Scouller, ibid., 165. 
50. Clode, I, 237. The publicans had good cause to be wary. Late in May, 
1756, Kingsley's 20th of Foot marched across southern England from Canterbury 
to Devizes, following the stages Wye - Lenham - Tonbridge - Westerham - 
Leatherhead - Woking - Bagshot - Hartley Row and Hartfordbridge - 
Basingstoke - Newbury and Speen - Burbage. WO 5/43, p. 245. The 
lieutenant-colonel of the 20th, writing home from Basingstoke, observed that 
'We have ruined half the public houses upon the march, because they have 
quartered us in villages too poor to feed us without destruction to them- 
selves'. Beckles Willson, Life and Letters of James Wolfe (New York, 1909), 
292. 
51. WO 5/33, pp. 114-5. 
52. WO 5/41, pp. 231-2. 
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In July 1732, Cadogan's 4th of Foot was ordered from Bristol via the stages 
Axbridge - Bridgwater - Wellington - Cullompton, to Exeter; marching in 
three divisions and observing halting-days, it took Cadogan's nine days to 
carry out this move. 
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An ordinary traveller could easily have arrived in 
Exeter on the third day out. These few examples, it must be stressed, are 
wholly typical. 
Many other factors slowed the movement of troops upon the march, or 
broke up units once they had arrived at new quarters; and thus the units 
were kept dispersed or long on the roads, and so generally even more time 
was wasted. The effects of bad weather, of ruined roads and broken bridges, 
and of riot, war, crisis and rebellion, need hardly be detailed. When the 
annual fairs and racing meets were held in the towns and big villages, any 
troops quartered there had to be dispersed into tiny billets in the vil- 
lages of the surrounding countryside. Several companies of Harrison' 15th 
of Foot, for example, were cleared out of Chester at fair time in 
September 1728; and the whole of Sabine's 23rd of Foot was dispersed from 
Newcastle in May 1732, the crowds come to the local horse races being given 
precedence. 
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Likewise, soldiers had to be cleared form towns where assizes 
were bring held (unless, of course, the gaol or the court needed protection 
from the mob); hence in July 1728 the army was cleared form seventeen 
towns, because of the coming assizes. 
55 
Similarly, if the county militia 
mustered in a town where regulars occupied the billets, the regulars had to 
clear out; hence, three troops of the 1st Dragoons were, in 1764, literally 
sent to Coventry when the militia arrived in Warwick city. 
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Again, local 
elections meant that the troops had temporarily to be removed, as happened 
to the whole of Barrell's 4th of Foot when at Bristol, in November 1742; 
or later, when elections were held at York in October 1774, four troops of 
the 2nd Dragoons were removed to Leeds, and the other two sent to 
Wakefield. 
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Stragglers, and large numbers of sick men, were often left 
behind: thus in January 1766 the 'recovered men' of the 22nd and 35th of 
Foot, who had been left in a party of sick men at Carrisbrooke Castle, were 
from time to time setting out for Chatham to rejoin their regiments. 
58 
This list contains but a few, random examples of the dozens of burdens under 
which the army laboured, all the time. We can conclude by noting one or two 
of the many "Acts of God" which, like those of Whitehall, spared neither men 
53. WO 5/30, pp. 313-4. 
54. WO 5/28, p. 177; and /30, p. 299. 
55. List in WO 5/28, p. 154. There are innumerable examples of gaols and 
court buildings needing military protection, throughout WO 5. 
56. WO 5/53, p. 99. 
57. WO 5/35, p. 498; and /58, pp. 487-8,500. 
58. WO 5/54, p. 36. 
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nor beasts. In January 1753 the move of three troops of Tyrawley's 3rd 
Dragoons from Colchester was cancelled because of the arrival of 'letters 
from Ipswich, Earnestly begging, the Troops now Quarter'd at Colchester 
may not be removed to Ipswich the small Pox much raging at Colchester'; 
59 
and from September 1753 to May 1754, a troop of Argyll's 2nd Dragoons had 
to be kept detached from the regiment, the troop-horses being infected 
with glanders. 
60 
The lieutenants-colonel, majors, and adjutants of the 
regiments - not to mention the nco's - the men most responsible for the 
training, discipline, and good order of their regiments, must have often- 
times been called upon to exercise the most considerable patience. 
We have, thus far, looked at the patterns of density, of mobility, of 
duty areas, of routes and of marches, in Britain. We shall now turn to the 
pattern of rotation in Britain, the specific details of which and the actual 
units involved, during the periods of years singled out for our surveys, can 
be found in Appendices A and B. 
As we noted earlier, there was never any fixed rotation pattern be- 
tween the main duty areas in Britain; but there was often a pattern of 
sorts operating between England and Scotland. Since the cavalry regiments, 
unlike the foot, left Britain only in time of war, their service pattern 
was much more stable than that of the foot. Until the 1780's there were 
almost invariably two regiments of horse serving in Scotland, while only 
one regiment did duty in that country thereafter, at any one time. During 
the survey periods 1726-29,1737-43, and 1751-56, a regiment of horse served 
in Scotland for one or two years (usually about eighteen months), after 
which it could expect to remain in England until the ten regiments ahead of 
it had completed their tours on the same duty. Wars and crises could alter 
4he 
this pattern, of course, as is evident with06th and 7th Dragoons, 1741-42, 
fie 
with^7th Dragoons, 1753-56, and with the 2nd Dragoon Guards, 1754-56 (see 
Appendices A and B). During our three later survey periods (1764-67, 
1772-76, and 1786-90), a regiment of horse served for only one year in 
Scotland, before returning to England and waiting for all the rest to take 
their turn. 
Foot serving in Britain enjoyed no such security. 
61 
War and the shift- 
ing patterns of imperial duty, as we have seen, affected the foot erratical- 
ly. The period of the 1720's, for example, was one of great mobility for 
the foot in Britain, stimulated by Jacobitism and the aggression of the 
Spanish court. On average, however, some three or four regiments of 
59. WO 5/41, p. 343. 
60. WO 5/41, pp. 491,503,516; and /42, p. 87. 
61. The Foot Guards, always relatively stationary, are excluded from this 
discussion. 
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marching foot were serving in Scotland, and five or six in England, at any 
one time. Much the same was true of the later 1730's - earlier 1740's, 
for the foot: the regiments serving in Britain were in constant motion, 
so that there was again no rotation pattern between the two kingdoms; 
but new-raised replacements kept the strength in Scotland at an average of 
four or five regiments. 
The most interesting period of rotation in Britain is that between 
1751 and 1755, since during those years - and they are the only years 
during the century when such a system operated - the pattern in Great 
Britain was fixed. The hand of the Duke of Cumberland, as always when so 
efficient a system was in operation, is evident. As we have seen, the old 
Gibraltar and Minorca garrisons were replaced at the end of the War of the 
Austrian Succession, four regiments going to each place. By 1751 the 
whole of the army had been similarly settled into peacetime quarters, and 
the Duke's fixed rotation could begin. In 1751 there were seven marching 
regiments in Scotland, and four in England; and so their numbers remained 
until 1755 although the whole of them, by that year, had successfully been 
rotated onto different stations and replaced by newcomers. The system 
worked as follows (and we illustrate its functioning with examples drawn 
from 1753): each year, a regiment from Minorca (Johnson's 33rd), and one 
from Gibraltar (Leighton's 32nd), sailed home to England, landed at 
Plymouth or Portsmouth, and then marched north for Scotland; meanwhile, 
the two regiments in Scotland thus replaced (Bocland's 11th and Bury's 
20th), moved south into England; and to complete the rotation two regiments 
embarked from England, one (Guise's 6th) for Gibraltar and the other 
(Rich's 4th) for Minorca. Thus the Duke had not only set up a fixed rota- 
tion in Britain, but had drawn in the two major overseas garrisons. 
62 
The 
1755 crisis put the system into abeyance. During this period there had 
always been seven battalions of marching foot in Scotland, and four in 
England, what with the "pacification" proceeding. 
During the period 1764-67 there were always four regiments of foot in 
Scotland, one being replaced annually from England. The situation in 
England was capricious, however, for full imperial rotation was at long 
last being attempted, although the great disturbances of 1766 in both 
England and Ireland did not contribute to its smooth functioning. On 
average, seven regiments of marching foot were in England at this time. 
Finally, during the periods 1772-76 and 1786-90 rotation between 
England and Scotland was carried on frequently, but according to no plan; 
the concentration of the authorities was now on imperial rotation, as we 
62. It is possible that the Duke planned to include Ireland in his 
infantry rotation scheme. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #140, f. 3. 
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have seen, and this in itself guaranteed mobility within Britain, if not 
regularity. On average during the earlier 1770's, four or five marching 
battalions were to be found in Scotland, and ten in England; while during 
the later 1780's the average figure was five for Scotland, and twelve for 
England. 
A rather different pattern prevailed in Ireland. After Westminster, 
it was the Irish Parliament which voted the largest amount of money to main- 
tain the regular army; and the number of troops maintained on the Irish 
establishment (12,000 men from 1699 to 1769, and 15,000 from 1769 until 
1801), was the second largest in the Empire, accounting for more than one- 
third of the standing peacetime army. As James put it, 'from the stand- 
point of the British government the existence of the army in Ireland, paid 
for out of Irish taxes, constituted perhaps Ireland's greatest contribution 
to the welfare of the empire', 
63 
while at the same time the Irish army not 
only defended Ireland from invasion and maintained order and the laws, but 
provided the Anglo-Irish ruling classes with a large and rich field for 
careers and patronage. 
Of primary importance was the fact that the standing army in Ireland 
had considerably fewer men in its ranks than had the army on the British 
establishment, while at the same time the Irish army was composed of many 
more regiments of marching foot than were to be found in Britain, and 
of as many regiments of horse. During the 1720's and '30's an average of 
about 22 marching battalions were to be found in Ireland, while only 10 
served in Britain; during the later 1740's and earlier 1750's Ireland 
supported about 25 marching battalions, while there were only eleven in 
Britain; during the 1760's and earlier 1770's an average of about 25 
marching battalions were in Ireland, as against an average of only 13 in 
Britain; while during the later 1780's and earlier 1790's there were some 
27 marching battalions serving in Ireland, compared with an average of 16 
in Britain. Of the regular horse there were always 10 regiments in 
Ireland and 12 in Britain during peacetime, until 1763, when new-raised 
corps raised these figures to 12 and 14 respectively. 
64 
The consequence 
of this disparity was that regiments in Ireland - notably the foot - 
were kept on establishments very much weaker than those of the regiments 
in Britain. 
65 
As Appendix D illustrates, there was always with the conclusion 
of a peace an absolute increase in the number of units kept on in the standin3 
army; but the several establishments were kept as low as possible by 
63. F. G. James, Ireland in the Empire, 1688-1770: A History of Ireland 
from the WiZZiamite Wars to the Eve of the American Revolution (Harvard, 
1973), 177. 
64. See Appendix B for annual variations. 
65. See Appendix C for examples of Irish regimental establishments. 
36 
cheeseparing legislators, and establishments never expanded at the same 
rate as did the number of standing regiments. Since it was the custom to 
keep up at reasonable strengths those regiments serving on the British 
establishment, in the Mediterranean garrisons and the Plantations, the 
result was that Ireland was crammed full of regiments at scarcely more than 
cadre strength. Ireland, therefore, served a useful twofold purpose: the 
number of individual units in the army could be kept high by keeping them 
from the attention of the backbenchers in the English Commons; and at the 
same time great numbers of regimental officers serving on a full-time 
basis and gaining experience, rather than rusting on half-pay, could be 
maintained. This was all to the good of the Service. 
Irish corps could be kept weak because the eighteenth century ( that 
is, until 1798) was one of the most quiet periods in the history of that 
troubled country; 
66 
and the army in Ireland was regarded not principally 
as a garrison (as it was in Scotland, at least until the earlier 1750's), 
but rather as a strategic reserve which could be drawn upon by Britain 
in time of emergency. In any such emergency regiments were brought over 
to Britain, transferred onto the British establishment and recruited or 
drafted up to that strength. Meanwhile, the vacanies thus created in the 
Irish establishment were filled either by raising new regiments there, or 
by augmenting those remaining. With the return of peace the ex-Irish reg- 
iments (or substitutes from elsewhere) were returned to Ireland, their est- 
ablishments reduced, and most or all of the new-raised units disbanded. 
These changes in establishment caused endless headaches, administra- 
tive and otherwise. In the spring of 1734, for example, in response. to the 
recent Franco-Spanish declaration of war upon Austria, eight battalions of 
foot were brought over from Ireland to beef up the defences in Britain, 
should the conflagration spread. These had come over on the Irish establish- 
ment strength of ten companies per regiment, each company consisting of 
a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, a drummer and 
33 private men; and each regiment had now to recruit 10 sergeants, 10 
drummers and 260 private men, in order to fill up to the British establish- 
ment strengths. The twelve battalions remaining in Ireland were augmented 
at the same time, taking in thereby an additional 290 men each. 
67 Remaining 
in Britain until January 1736, these eight regiments had each in 1735 to 
66. How quiet it was is shown by the fact that, in the summer of 1745 with 
most of the British Army holding the Mediterranean garrisons or campaigning 
in Flanders, the forces in Ireland had been reduced to a mere four battalions 
(the 5th and 35th, together with Bruce's 60th and Folliott's 61st, the latter 
being both new-raised), plus six old regiments of horse. 
67. WO 24/161; and Atkinson, 'Early Hanoverians', 146. 
37 
find an additional 110 private men, since the British establishment was 
augmented generally that year. Thus, the reinforcement of the army in 
Britain with eight Irish battalions involved the recruiting of 6680 men 
on both sides of the Irish Sea; and all of these were turned loose when, 
early in 1736, the Irish units went home again, and establishments were 
reduced. 
68 
The authorities were obliged to accept the Irish cadre system if 
sufficient officers, nco's, and seasoned privates capable of being formed 
into nco's were to be kept on hand, immediately available in skeletal 
regiments which could be fleshed out speedily upon any emergency. There 
was always the possibility, however, that years of training could be 
thrown away by such an operation, if it was done too quickly. When in the 
autumn of 1754 it was deemed necessary speedily to check the French in the 
distant Ohio country, two regiments of foot were taken from the Irish 
establishment for the purpose. Those chosen, Halkett's 44th and Dunbar's 
48th, were at weak Irish strengths: each was made up of ten companies, a 
company consisting of a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, 2 sergeants, 
2 corporals ,a drum, and 29 private men. The total strength of each 
regiment was 374 officers and men. 
69 
Halkett's and Dunbar's had to be 
filled up quickly to the strength of regiments on the British establish- 
ment, for active service, each of which was made up of ten companies, a 
company consisting of a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, 3 sergeants, 3 
corporals, 2 drums, and 70 privates, for a total regimental strength of 
815 officers and men. 
70 
Halkett's and Dunbar's, then, each stood in need 
of 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 10 drums, and 410 privates. 
71 
To save time 
the two regiments were assembled at Cork, and drafts from other regiments 
were sent to them there. Thus, 100 men were taken from Bocland's 11th and 
another 100 from Bury's 20th, both in England; and in addition 78 men from 
each of four regiments in Ireland (the 2/1st Royals, Pole's 10th, 
Anstruther's 26th, and Bragg's 28th) were drafted, and sent on to Cork. 
72 
68. Atkinson, ibid., 147. 
69. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #124. See also Anon., Quarters... in 1752 (Dublin, 
1752), and WO 24/313. 
70. WO 24/303. 
71. WO 24/313 
72. K. L. Parker, 'Anglo-American Wilderness Campaigning, 1754-1764: Logisti- 
cal and Tactical Developments', unpubl. Columbia University Ph. D. thesis, 
1970,75-77. The confusion in the six regiments so drafted was considerable, 
their state of training and efficiency reduced, and recruiting parties had 
now to set out in search of raw replacements. When ordered to make this 
draft Bury's 20th, for example, was lying with 5 companies at Bristol, 4 at 
Exeter and 1 at Tiverton; and to save time the 100 drafts were stripped 
from the companies at Bristol. A detachment of 50 men had then to be skimmed 
from the companies at Exeter and Tiverton and sent 'to Levell the Comps. ' at 
Bristol. Then recruiting parties were sent out. WO 27/42, pp. 53-4,68, 
176. 
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Thus Halkett's and Dunbar's each received 256 drafts, and stood in need of 
only 185 men more, apiece. These were found by enlisting 350 men from the 
unregimented companies of Virginia Provincials, when arrived in America. 
73 
The rapid mobilization of two Irish regiments meant, therefore, that four 
others should each loose one-fifth of their already skeletal strength, and 
that two good English regiments should be significantly weakened. Then, a 
large number of Provincials - better than militia, but still ill-trained 
at the regular discipline - was dumped among them. Halkett's and Dunbar's, 
clearly, had been completely altered during this process: from trained but 
understrength regiments they had been converted into jumbled associations 
of uneven quality. But given a little time, fine regiments could have been 
built up around their old original Irish cores. This was the purpose of 
the cadre system. 
Although cavalry regiments on the Irish establishment remained much 
smaller than their British counterparts, throughout our period, the practice 
of keeping the battalions of Irish foot at cadre strength ceased in 1770. 
Several factors made possible this change, which was salutary. The setting 
up of a large garrison in North America, from 1763, together with an 
increase in the number of regiments regularly sent to do West Indies duty 
or to man the Mediterranean strongholds, plus a general reduction in the 
strength of regiments on the post-1763 British establishment, were all con- 
tributory; but most important in forcing the change was the adoption in 1765, 
as noted earlier, of a rotation scheme between the British Isles and the 
Americas. From 1765 through 1773 regiments relieved one another across the 
Atlantic; and the problem of the small size of the Irish regiments, com- 
pared with those serving in the Americas (297 officers and men in an Irish 
corps, as against 497 in America), meant that to continue with the good 
policy of rotation units arriving in Ireland had immediately to draft away 
or discharge half their men (unless they had already left them behind to 
feed the weak newcomer to America), while those leaving Ireland had to 
double their strength almost overnight by receiving drafts. This being 
quite unworkable, it was finally arranged by the King and the Lord Lieuten- 
ant, at the instance of the Adjutant General in London, 
74 
to augment the 
Irish establishment in 1769 from 12,000 men (where it had been fixed since 
1699), to 15,000. Henceforth the foot in Ireland, Britain, and the 
Americas stood on similar regimental establishments. 
75 
73. F. T. Nichols, 'The Organization of Braddock 's Army', Wn. 4 Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 4 (1947), 131. 
74. J. Shy, op. cit., 274-7. 
75. WO 27/20 through /75, for Irish regimental establishments, and WO 
24/449 through /578 for those of corps elsewhere. 
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In spite of the fact that, from 1764, Irish regiments were rotating 
through the Americas, reference to Appendix B will show that Irish reg- 
iments were much more likely to remain at home for long periods, than 
were those in Britain, in peacetime. Irish regiments suffered less from 
dispersal onto foreign stations and the consequent deterioration in dis- 
cipline, efficiency, interior economy, and strength which plagued such a 
large proportion of those going abroad from the British establishment. 
Similarly, the pattern and incidence of rotation within Ireland itself 
was quite unlike that prevailing in Britain. In Ireland the standing army 
was neither subjected to the abuse, nor did it stir the same fears, which 
it aroused in England. Although Ireland was quiet for most of the century, 
the supremacy of the Anglican ruling classes in that country rested ul- 
timately (as in 1690, so in 1798) upon the army - and the ruling classes 
knew this only too well. Quartering therefore did not create in Ireland 
the legal and political problems which it occasioned in England; and hence 
the dispositions of the army in Ireland more closely resembled those of the 
army in Scotland, than the leopard-spot dispositions of England. 
Many of the towns in Ireland were provided with barracks by the later 
1720's, and most of the big townswere certainly well-provided by the 
1740's. Billeting seems to have been much less commonly resorted to than 
was the case in Britain, save by troops upon their march, suppressing or 
overawing the disorderly, or by detachments patrolling the isolated 
smugglers' coasts. As Map 1. shows, the army was widely dispersed about 
the country in these quarters: in 1752, typically, its 250 companies of 
marching Foot, 24 troops of Horse, and 39 troops of Dragoons were dis- 
tributed among 69 towns and forts. But as the map also shows, there were 
two sorts of quarters in Ireland: there were, firstly, the numerous small 
posts, often little better than police stations, strewn everywhere; and 
secondly there were the half-dozen big towns where two or three regiments 
were usually headquartered. It was the cavalry regiments in Ireland which 
were most dispersed about the small places, since cavalry, with its 
superior mobility, was the arm best adapted to the patrolling duties 
necessary when aiding the civil power. For most of the cavalry in Ireland 
the scattered state of its quarters inevitably meant a decline in training 
and drill proficiency: some units, like Ligonier's 8th Horse, were kept 
in good order only through the most dedicated and careful management; 
76 
but dispersed with two troops at Clonmell and one each at Cappoquin, 
Mallow, Charleville, and at Carrick on Suir, as was Ligonier's in 1734 - 
76. On the situation of the 8th Horse in Ireland, 1720-1742, see 
R. Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier (Oxford, 1958), 41-56. 
40 
'a spread of a 100 miles and more over terrible roads'77 - efficiency could 
hardly be maintained. Although the cavalry was widely dispersed in Britain, 
too, it was not kept in that condition for such lengthy periods as was the 
Irish horse. Half of the foot in Ireland suffered from being distributed 
in quarters as widely dispersed as those in which the bulk of the Irish 
horse was to be found; but if half of the foot regiments were dispersed in 
this fashion, the rest were headquartered - and often concentrated - in 
and about the six big garrison towns. Of the 25 battalions of foot in 
Ireland in 1752, for example, 4 were in Dublin barracks and 10 were head- 
quartered at Galway, Limerick, Cork, Waterford, and Kinsale. 
78 
It should 
not be imagined, however, that the regiments in these towns spent most of 
their time in the concentration which these figures might suggest; for all 
of these places (with the exception of Charles Fort at Kinsale, Duncannon 
Fort at Waterford, and Dublin itself), detached the bulk of their small com- 
plements of men to patrol the surrounding beaches and countryside, billet- 
ing in the villages roundabout. 
In contrast to the practice in Britain, the regiments in Ireland were 
each assigned a set of quarters to be occupied for a one-year period; 
there was thus none of that constant and irregular shifting of quarters or 
duty areas which characterized the distribution and rotation of the army in 
Britain. Annually, in the late spring of early summer, the whole of the 
Irish army shifted its quarters from one set to another; and in so doing 
the Irish foot regiments - if to a much lesser extent the Irish horse reg- 
iments - avoided the worst evils of that constant dispersal to which most 
corps in Britain were subject. For an Irish regiment a full year's dis- 
persal was, naturally, exceedingly harmful to its advanced training and 
drill; but this could be recouped to some extent every second or third 
year when, as was always the case, a regiment was rotated into one of the 
main garrison towns. We might illustrate this annual rotation by following 
the movements of one corps, O'Farrell's 22nd of Foot, over a few years' 
period. 
79 
Having returned to Ireland from Minorca after Aix-la-Chapelle, 
O'Farrell's was quartered as follows in 1749: three companies at Cork, 
three at Youghal, one each at Macroom, Clonakilty, and Inchigeelagh, and 
one distributed between Kilmeedy and Needeen. For 1750, the regiment was 
concentrated at Kinsale. In 1751 the regiment was again dispersed, this 
time with three companies at Youghal, three at Cashel, two at Dungarvan 
and two at Nenagh, thus stretching over some sixty miles from Youghal to 
77. Ibid., 45. 
78. Anon., Quarters... in 1752 (Dublin, 1752), 8-20. 
79. Anon., Quarters ... in 1749 (Dublin, 1749), 29; Quarters... in 1750,11; 
Quarters... in 1751,11; and Quarters ... in 1752,13. 
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Nenagh. Then, in 1752, O'Farrell's was again quartered together, at 
Limerick. The rest of the Irish Foot followed a similar quartering pattern. 
A very large garrison was always maintained in Dublin barracks, and 
a regiment could be sure of spending a year in the great city, every few 
years. The big Dublin garrison was, indeed, always the largest peacetime 
concentration of regular regiments of horse and marching foot in the British 
Isles; in size, it was rivalled only by the Gibraltar and Minorca garri- 
sons in the Empire as a whole. Dublin's Phoenix Park was the largest 
exercising-ground at the disposal of the peacetime British Army; and as we 
shall see it was often the scene of some extraordinary mock battles, and on 
one occasion of advanced tactical experimentation. 
Granting, then, that the Irish regiments were sure of a kind of peace- 
time permanence unknown among their sister regiments across the Irish Sea, 
there was much in their situation - their weak establishments in particular 
- that was not to be envied. Even the supposed advantages and comforts of 
the barracks in the big towns could be illusory, as is often indicated in 
the inspection reports. When Lt-Gen Lord Blayney saw the 27th Foot at 
Limerick in June 1774, for example he reported that 'the Lower Barrack of 
Limerick which now contains 7 Companies of this Regiment, have been con- 
demned near Twenty Years, The Stairs, floors, windows and Doors very bad, 
Officers were obliged at their own expence to Plaister the Cieling, as the 
Barrack master would not do it without an order from the Board, the 
Barrack being condemned. 180 Blayney's report shows up the inefficiency of 
the Irish Board of Ordnance; and inefficiency seems to have been an almost 
permanent feature in Dublin Castle's administration of the army. 
81 
Interesting comparisons, then, may be drawn between the army in Britain 
and in Ireland. That the laxity of Irish army administration should have 
far exceeded that prevailing in England is not surprising. Neither the 
favour of the King nor of the prestigious British C-in-C could well be 
courted from Ireland, and neither the Lord Lieutenant nor the Irish C-in-C 
were so well worth the courting. Although a significant minority of the reg- 
imental officers were drawn from the Irish ruling class, most of the officers 
found service anywhere in the country, outside Dublin, to be dull. The low- 
establishment, cadre character of their regiments, which inevitably meant a 
huge influx of drafts and recruits were the regiment to go abroad on active 
service, can have provided scant incentive to ensure a high standard of 
80. WO 27/32. 
81. This is the burden of the lengthy and detailed report on the army 




Nevertheless, among the foot, the occasionally high levels of 
individual unit concentration in the garrison towns, and the frequent op- 
portunities in Dublin quarters for brigade manoeuvres and mock battles (of 
which more below), were excellent advantages nowhere to be met with in 
Britain. On par then, and considering the views expressed by inspecting 
general officers during the half-century after 1750, we must conclude that 
the foot in Ireland was usually the equal and often the superior of the 
foot in Britain, despite occasional lapses; and the Irish horse, by and 
large, was somewhat inferior to that in Britain, largely the result of pro- 
longed dispersal. 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
It will be apparent that the several movement and disposition pat- 
terns, described above, were fundamental; and consequently they were of 
the utmost significance where the training of the regiments was concerned. 
Lengthy dispersal83 after these patterns was the chief characteristic, 
indeed the rule of peacetime service -a dispersal induced primarily by 
civil requirements. 
Come war or peace, the army served as the guardian of the civil 
order. From the outset of our period riot control was 'regularly part of 
the army's commitment', 
84 
and so too was the regular mounting of patrols 
against smugglers - to mention only the chief of these police activities. 
However uneasy and indeed uncertain army officers - and for that matter 
civil magistrates, the War Office, and a significant part of civil society 
82. How scant was illustrated in 1750, when four of these weak regiments of 
foot were brought together at Limerick to be reviewed. Their weakness led 
several officers to suggest that the regiments pair off, each pair joining 
together to form a single battalion on the day of review because there were 
so few private men on their establishments. At this suggestion other officers 
protested vehemently, one summarizing by arguing quite properly 'that it was 
an Unsoldierlike manner of Drawing up, that we were each a Regiment, by His 
Majestys orders our number so small; that haveing each our Compleat Colours, 
officers, and Every thing that Constitutes a Regiment, it was not our 
business to consider whither our plattoons were few, or of many files; but 
to Endeavour to make the few men each Regiment is Composed of, as fit for 
Service, and capable of teaching new levys, in case of an augmentation. ' 
Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, ##99, p. 13. 
83. The reader is directed to Appendix A, pp. 262-78 below, where the 
tactical and administrative subdivisions within the regiments, by which 
"dispersal" is defined and measured here, are described. The battalion of 
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itself - may have felt about the use of soldiers in a police role which, 
despite its strict legality, appeared in the light of traditional social 
usage and popular constitutional interpretation as unprecedented and un- 
palatable, the fact remains that the army was employed to 'an enormous 
extent' in this capacity. 
85 
How very widely regiments were dispersed 
through the duty areas and along the coasts, how preoccupied they generally 
were with duties in aid of the civil power, and how lengthy were the 
periods during which these conditions prevailed - thus depriving the regi- 
ments of the opportunity to carry on their advanced training - is easily 
illustrated. As the figures in Appendix A show, the coast duty ate up a 
considerable part of the army's time, notably so among the horse; and 
random examples will show this well enough. In May 1739, some 263 officers 
and men (three-quarters of the regiment) belonging to Rich's 4th Dragoons 
were distributed among forty-two towns and villages in Norfolk and Suffolk, 
averaging six soldiers in each place. Rich's was thus dispersed utterly - 
and they remained like this for more than a year. 
85 
In October 1753, half 
of Hawley's 1st Dragoons were distributed among fifteen Norfolk and 
Suffolk villages, while the rest were quartered a good way apart at 
Colchester and Norwich. Hawley's remained dispersed, in these quarters, 
for a year. 
87 
In May 1766 the Scots Greys took up coast duty quarters in 
Sussex; and their quarters and distribution pattern were typical (see 
Map 2). 
88 
Two troops were headquartered at Lewes, from which place de- 
tachments were sent our to patrol about Lewes, Shoreham by Sea, 
Brighthelmstone, Rottingdean, and Newhaven. Similarly, two troops were 
headquartered at Chichester, from where detachments were sent out to act 
about Chichester, Arundel, Havant, Angmering, and Ferring. The fifth troop 
was headquartered at Hastings, with detachments at Winchelsea, Rye, Battle, 
and Wadhurst, while the last troop was disposed at Eastbourne and Pevensey, 
with detachments at Bexhill and Seaford. The Greys were in consequence 
totally dispersed by these postings, stretched in penny-packets over 
eighty miles of coast. The regiment remained so disposed for a year; and 
it must be stressed that this example, like the others given here, is 
typical. The effects of such dispersal need hardly be pointed out. The 
effects of even longer periods of coast duty can be imagined. The 3rd 
Dragoons were on the coast duty, similarly dispersed, from October of 1751 
until May of 1756, continuously. During one part of that period, in May 
1753, three troops headquartered at Colchester had detachments on patrol in 
85. Ibid., 51. 
86. WO 5/33, pp. 241-2. 
87. WO 5/41, pp. 514-5. 
88. WO 5/54, pp. 187-9. 
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Essex and Suffolk, while the other three troops were doing the coast duty in 
Kent! Nor was this sort of dispersal, on both sides of the Thames estury, 
irregular. From October 1754 to May 1755, the regiment was strewn all the 
way from Winchelsea to (and including) the Isle of Wight. 
89 
Cholmondeley's 
6th Dragoons in 1751, meanwhile, had three troops based on Colchester op- 
erating against the smugglers, while the other three were in Kent; and the 
6th was dispersed upon the coast duty until 1754. Cholmondeley's served in 
Essex and Kent in 1751, in Kent and Sussex in 1752, in Sussex and Dorset in 
1753, and in Dorset in 1754 - all the while on the coast duty. 
90 
Such was the most common duty of half of the horse in the eighteenth- 
century British Army. The other half, in Ireland and Scotland, seem to 
have been similarly engaged. In 1776, when much of the army had been sent 
to America, the Duke of Argyll as G. O. C. North Britain wrote to the govern- 
ment to point out that there were no more than 600 soldiers left under his 
command; "'The revenue will suffer very considerably", wrote the Duke, 
"for want of military assistance, so frequently called for by the officers 
of customs and excise. "' 
91 
In Ireland, one of the 'curses' of duty was 
'the requirement for patrolling remote coasts and deserted boglands for 
smugglers and lawbreakers. This meant long and tedious isolation for small 
bodies of troops'. We know that Ligonier's 8th Horse was constantly employ- 
ed on such duties; 
92 
and the Inspection Returns show that patrols against 
smugglers remained a constant feature of Irish duty throughout the century. 
The dispersal and patrol pattern in Scotland and Ireland was probably 
similar to that in England. 
The coast duty ate up time; but riot control, though it involved 
little of the constant activity of the coast duty, was nevertheless more 
important in determining dispositions and the consequent dispersal of the 
regiments, the length of that dispersal, and their preoccupation. The 
army spent very little of its time in the actual mayhem of riot and disorder; 
but this need not be surprizing, and may perhaps be the measure of the 
success of the army in its police role. 
93 
The point of police activity, 
89. WO 5/41, pp. 54-5 and passim, to WO 5/43, p. 214. 
90. WO 5/40, p. 413 and passim, to WO 5/42, p. 157. 
91. J. Brooke, King George III (1972), 310. On the Revenue Service and 
Scotland, see H. Alton and H. Holland, op. cit., 154-202, and E. Carson, 
op. cit., 118-28. 
92. R. Whitworth, op. cit., 41-5. 
93. On this see A. J. Hayter, op. cit., p. 51, whose conclusion is the same. 
See also Sir L. Radzinowicz, op. cit. IV, 115-24, who makes no bones about 
this; and refers to the great barrack-building programme which began to- 
wards the end of our period as 'the concentration of the army' as the 'police force of industrial England'. 
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naturally, is to prevent rather than have to suppress riot and felony; and 
the army, which if small was nevertheless omnipresent, played a police 
role simply by maintaining a presence. Figures for such a passive role 
cannot of course be assembled; but a study of the dispositions which 
units assumed upon their arrival in the duty areas, indicates that policing 
was clearly a factor of major consideration when the Marching Orders were 
drawn. 
A detailed account of the activities, and consequent dispositions 
and dispersal, of the soldiers in any one of our duty areas - in this case 
Cornwall and south Devon - during the course of one of the series of 
years which we selected for study in Appendix A, will serve admirably well 
to conclude this account. Thus in May, 1736, Montague's 11th of Foot 
marched from Worcester to Exeter to take up the duty of Cornwall and south 
Devon. Upon arrival at Exeter, 150 men were detached and quartered as 
follows, in Cornwall: 22 at Penzance, 13 at Helston, 12 at Redruth, 18 at 
St. Ives and St. Agnes, 20 at St. Columb, 25 at Tregony, 12 at Mevagissey, 
and 28 at St. Austell. These detachments, representing about one-quarter 
of the strength of the regiment, were to act in aid of the local auth- 
orities in suppressing any smuggling or riotous disturbances, should these 
occur, and when called upon to do so; and they were to be relieved oc- 
casionally by like detachments from Exeter. 
94 
The regiment remained dis- 
tributed, thus, until May of 1737, when riots being apprehended along the 
east Dorset coast, a detachment equal in strength to two companies had to 
be sent to Poole and Wimborne Minster, from Exeter. This detachment was 
not recalled until the end of June, so that for over a month Montague's 
was strung out from Penzance to Poole, a good 175 miles. 
95 
Then in 
September 1737, the Secretary having received intelligence that 'very great 
Riots & Disorders have been committed at Penryn in Cornwall by the Tinners' 
- this hard upon news from the mayor of Falmouth that the tinners there 
were about 'to rise in a tumultuous manner & to go to Falmouth where they 
Threatned to commit great outrages' - the whole of the regiment still re- 
maining at Exeter set out for Penryn, Falmouth, and Padstow, to suppress 
the tinners there and anywhere else in Cornwall where the civil power might 
call for their assistance. In mid-October this task had been accomplished, 
and the troops lately marched from Exeter (save for a detachment of about 
40 men left to watch Penryn, Padstow, and Falmouth), returned to that city. 
There were now some 200 men of Montague's detached in Cornwall, a third of 
the regiment. 
96 
The winter was quiet, but late in March and early April 
94. WO 5/32, pp. 257,405-06. 
95. WO 5/32, pp. 444,453,459-60. 
96. WO 5/32, pp. 495-7,505. 
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1738 a company-size detachment had to be sent from Exeter to Modbury, to 
'preserve the Ships & Cargos belonging to the Merchants from being plun- 
dered by the Populace', and another had to be sent to Tiverton where riots 
were apprehended. By May, however, all of these detachments were being 
called in to Exeter, as they were replaced by the new regiment now coming 
in to take up the duty of the area; and early in July, 1738, Montague's 
set off for Scotland, there to take up new quarters. 
97 
Montague's 11th was replaced by Handasyde's 16th of Foot, which had 
come down from Berwick and had been doing duty at Bristol (with detach- 
ments in Wales), since August of 1737. Early in May 1738, Handasyde's had 
sent from Bristol 150 men to replace the detachments of Montague's still 
in the nine places in Cornwall first quartered by that corps, together 
with another 40 men to replace those of Montague's watching the tinners at 
Penryn, Padstow, and Falmouth. A further detachment, equal to a company, 
replaced Montague's men at Modbury, where the populace was still restive, 
and yet another detachment of company size took over the policing of 
Tiverton. Then early in July the remainder of Handasyde's 16th marched 
from Bristol and installed itself in the quarters vacated by Montague's 
11th, at Exeter. 
98 
It would seem that the Devon smugglers had grown more 
bold of late, for soon after their arrival at Exeter small detachments 
had to be settled in at Seaton, Branscombe, Sidmouth, Salterton, and 
Teignmouth. 
99 
So Handasyde's remained until January of 1740, with half of 
its strength dispersed upon the coast duty, and overawing the disorderly. 
In that month (war having been declared against Spain in October 1739), 
approximately half of the regiment was drafted, and turned over to Moreton's 
6th Marines then raising in Somerset. 
1 
In June, Handasyde's concentrated 
at Exeter and, like Montague's before them, set off for new quarters. 
Meanwhile, the war with Spain had brought about the transfer of units 
from the Irish to the British establishment. Eight regiments of foot land- 
ed in England in 1739, five of them at Bristol in the summer. One of these, 
Onslow's 8th of Foot, had been quartered in various Somerset towns since 
its landing, recruiting up to the British establishment strength; and in 
May of 1740 it sent over 200 of its men to replace all of the detachments 
of Handasyde's in Devon and Cornwall. Late in June, the remainder of the 
regiment marched to Exeter and replaced the departing 16th. Like its two 
predecessors, Onslow's was already busy with the coast duty, and was soon to 
97. WO 5/33, pp. 48,60,97-8,109,114-5. 
98. WO 5/33, pp. 91-9,108,110,129. 
99. WO 5/33, pp. 139-9. 
1. WO 5/33, pp. 418,420. 
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be caught up in major grain riots. 
2 
Onslow's 8th of Foot remained on the 
Cornwall and south Devon duty, disposed as had been its predecessors, until 
3 it too was replaced in its turn in May of 1742. 
Altogether then, the amount of time spent by the army in the actual 
suppression of riot and disorder, and in operations against smugglers, was 
considerable. In England, where the surviving records are sufficient to 
permit accurate calculations, the foot spent 3% of its time on these duties 
during the period 1726-29,13% of its time during the period 1737-43,12% 
during the years 1751-56,14% during the years 1764-67,10% during the 
years 1772-76, and 8% during the period 1786-90. During the same periods, 
respectively, the horse devoted 1%, 11%, 26%, 17%, 13%, and 27% of its time 
to these duties. 
4 
Some regiments in particular were very heavily involved 
with these duties. Thus the 45th Foot spent 43% of the full year follow- 
ing March, 1741, on the coast duty, and the 4th Dragoons had to devote 29% 
of their time to patrols against smugglers between April 1739 and June 
1742. Between August 1751 and April 1753, the 4th Foot spent half of its 
time on these duties, as did the 14th Foot between April 1751 and April 
1752. The 3rd Dragoons spent 52% of their time, 1751-56, operating against 
smugglers. Later in the century, the 2nd Dragoon Guards spent 38% of 
their time from late 1764 to early 1767 on these duties. The 3rd Foot 
spent 35% of its time, 1772-75, on vigorous police activity, while the 1st 
Dragoon Guards likewise lost 22% of their time between 1773 and 1776. The 
38th Foot spent 25% of its time chasing smugglers, betwen 1786 and 1789. 
The 3rd Dragoons, the 4th Dragoons, and the 11th Light Dragoons each lost 
33% of their time, during the period 1786-90, on these duties, and the 10th 
Light Dragoons spent 37% of their time operating against smugglers, between 
March 1786 and May 1790. 
These figures do not tell the whole story; for as we noted earlier, 
it is clear that the wide dispersal of individual regiments was partly the 
result of the need to maintain a passive police presence. As Appendix A 
illustrates, there were very few regiments of foot which spent so much as 
a third of their time fully concentrated and stationary; and among the 
horse, few spent as much as one-tenth of their time concentrated and 
stationary. 
2. WO 5/34, pp. 80-1,85-6,126-28,227-8. 
3. WO 5/35, pp. 219-20. 
4. See Appendix A for these figures. 
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CHAPTER II 
OFFICERS & MEN 
PART A: Officers: 
From the 1718 reductions until the major war augmentations of 1739-40, 
there were normally in the British Army some 500 regimental officers serv- 
ing with the horse and 1450 with the foot, for a total of 1950.1 Periodic 
crises during the long Walpole-Fleury peace saw the total number of officers 
go as high as 2250, but 1950 was the normal figure during these years. 
This number was to increase steadily as the century progressed, and spec- 
tacularly so in wartime. At the height of the 1739-48 war there were over 
500 officers with the horse regiments, 2100 with the foot and nearly 400 
with the marines, totalling some 3000 officers. The army from Aix-la- 
Chapelle until the new 1755 augmentations consisted of over 450 officers 
with the horse and nearly 1650 with the foot, all told 2100; and by the 
height of the Seven Years' War these figures had swollen to 600 cavalry 
officers and nearly 4000 infantry officers, for a total of nearly 4600 - 
the largest number ever to serve at one time prior to 1795. From the 1763 
reductions until the augmentations of 1771 there were nearly 550 officers 
serving with the horse and over 2000 with the foot, for a total of 2600; 
and from 1771 until 1776 another 200 infantry officers raised the total to 
2800. By the height of the 1775-83 war there were some 400 officers 
serving with the horse and nearly 3700 with the ht, for nearly 4100 all 
told; and from the mid-1780's until the opening of the war against 
Revolutionary France in 1793 there were, finally, more than 550 officers 
with the horse and nearly 2400 with the foot, for a total of more than 
2900. 
According to the most informed estimate some three-quarters of the 
commissions held in the British Army at any one time were had by purchase, 
1. These figures - taken mostly from the establishments in WO 24, and 
from the Army Lists - include all officers below the rank of proprietary 
colonel, that is all of the officers normally serving with the regiments. 
Only officers with the horse and foot, both Guards and Line, are included, 
as are officers of Marines during the 1740's when those units were still 
counted part of the army; otherwise, officers with the Independent Com- 
panies, Marine Companies, on the half-pay list and, of course, those 
serving in the Ordnance corps, are excluded. Our figures encompass, there- 
fore, almost all of the officers below general rank serving in the army 
proper, as then understood. 
49 
the remainder having been obtained by a variety of non-purchase methods. 
2 
The workings of this system of promotion are well-enough understood, and 
we need do no more here than provide a sketch; it is with the results of 
the system as reflected in the career patterns of the officers, and only 
incidentally with its social and political origins and significance, that 
we need especially to deal. 
The first two Georges disliked the buying and selling of commissions; 
the practice however was already customary at the time of the Hanoverian 
succession and it had created a huge vested interest, so that George I and 
his son were obliged to regulate what they could not abolish. This they 
did with some success: Royal Warrants of 1720 and 1722 fixed prices of 
all commissions, 
3 
obliged an officer to sell only to another officer hold- 
ing the rank immediately below his own, and retained for the Crown the 
right of selecting and approving an officer's successor. 
All commissions from colonelcies downwards were subject to purchase; 
general rank alone was attained strictly by seniority or merit. 
4 
A young 
man bought his ensigncy or cornetcy and then, as vacancies appeared, 
bought his way up the ladder. Purchase vacancies appeared when an officer 
retired, sold out, or transferred into another regiment. When he did so 
he received the regulated price of his commission from government, plus 
(since commissions were desirable and so usually traded at prices much 
greater than those laid down in the Warrants), he received the unofficial 
over-regulation price from his successor; the successor meanwhile paid 
the regulated price to government. 
5 
An officer selling was required to 
offer his commission to that officer in his regiment with the most senior- 
ity in the rank immediately below his; if that senior officer of the next 
lower rank lacked the funds or the inclination to purchase, then the 
2. J. H. Bassett, 'The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871', 
unpubl. Boston University Ph. D. thesis, 1969,40. 
3. The 1720 tariff was revised by warrants of 1766,1772,1773, and 
1783. 
4. The purchase of colonelcies was fairly common in the army before 1714; 
but it was an abuse which George I and George II were determined to stamp 
out. By 'excluding purchase from the appointments to colonelcies whenever 
they could', waiting for the colonels who had previously purchased to die 
off and replacing them with non-purchase colonels selected by the Crown, 
the practice had slowly dried up by 1760. J. Hayes, 'The Purchase of 
Colonelcies in the Army, 1714-63', JSAHR, 39 (1961), passim. 
5. Army agents usually handled the trading in commissions, because the 
over-regulation prices paid by purchasers were illegal, and the agents 
(one of whom handled most of the financial affairs of each regiment, as 
the private agent of the proprietary colonel) were best placed to cover 
this part of the business. J. H. Bassett, op. cit., 61. 
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commission was offered to the next senior, and so on. The purchaser got 
the rank but not the seniority of the officer from whom he purchased, thus 
becoming the most junior of the regiment's officers in his new rank. It 
will be noted that a vacancy set off a chain reaction within a regiment 
since nobody could move up the ladder without at the same time selling, 
thus requiring a chain of purchasers. A vacant captaincy, for example, 
meant four vacant ranks - the captaincy, the captain-lieutenancy, 
6 
a 
lieutenancy, and an ensigncy. A vacant lieutenant-colonelcy meant six 
vacancies, as each below moved up a step. Likewise, everyone within each 
rank in the regiment moved up one notch in seniority after a purchase was 
transacted. There was much activity whenever a vacancy occurred, therefore, 
since it involved everyone in the regiment at or below the rank become 
vacant; and if at any rung along the ladder no applicant could readily be 
found, it was the obligation of all the officers interested in the promotion 
7 
to find one. 
When an officer wished to leave active service he either sold out en- 
tirely or retired onto half-pay. If he sold out, he received the value of 
his commission as a retirement fund; and since most officers got at least 
one promotion without purchase -a process described below - they not only 
got their money back but made in this way a capital gain. 
8 
If an officer 
wished to retire from active service, but keep some part of his pay and re- 
tain his investment without selling, he went onto the "half-pay list". Here 
he kept himself "on reserve" as it were, ready to return on active service 
if called and hence given half pay as a retaining fee. Officers from regi- 
ments raised during the wars and reduced with the coming of peace also went 
onto the half-pay list, for the same reason. All three Georges, ever sol- 
icitous of the interests of their old officers, frequently provided non- 
purchase vacancies for half-pay officers when these arose in established 
regiments, and likewise appointed numbers of them to new-raised corps. 
The purchase system was simple enough and it offered several advan- 
tages. Fortescue rightly thought it secure, economical, and convenient. 
9 
6. The captain-lieutenant (since the colonel was seldom present) com- 
manded the colonel's company; he was regarded as the 'youngest captain 
though in reality he is only the first lieutenant, the colonel being himself 
captain'. Capt. G. Smith, An Universal Military Dictionary, a Copious 
Explanation of the Technical Terms ... of an Army (1779), 50. 7. J. Hayes, 'The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of 
the British Army, 1714-63', unpubl. London M. A. thesis 1965,41-60, for a 
good description of the process (cited hereafter as J. Hayes, 'Officers'). 
8. J. H. Bassett, op. cit., 155. 
9. Sir J. Fortescue, The Last Post (Edinburgh, 1934), 13-19. Quoted in 
R. E. Scouller, op. cit., 71-2. 
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It was "secure"because government held the purchase money as a bond against 
an officer's good behaviour; if he were "cashiered" his investment was 
forfeit. It was "economical" because an officer's pay 'little exceeded the 
interest on the price of his commission'. It was "convenient" for all con- 
cerned, too, since traffic in commissions, the rule of moving up one step 
at a time, and the device of retiring on half-pay all ensured a steady flow 
of promotion. The system had its abuses, naturally enough. Infants might 
be gazetted cornets or ensigns, and in this way get a head start in the 
seniority which sped an officer's first promotion. Occasional jobbery, 
or frauds by army agents heavily involved as commission brokers, sometimes 
made it possible for an officer to skip a step on the promotion ladder. 
High over-regulation prices might induce an officer selling to ignore the 
next officer in seniority, who otherwise would rightfully have been given 
first chance to buy. But save for the first these practices were thought 
less than honourable and so were exceptional, not least because sharp 
practice harmed the chances not just of one but of most of a regiment's 
officers; and the Hanoverian Kings paid such close attention to the grant- 
ing of commissions that frauds were-seldom successful. 
As we noted above, at least one-quarter of all vacancies were filled 
without purchase. Non-purchase vacancies were for the most part those 
which appeared due to the death of an officer or, infrequently, to his being 
cashiered. As with purchase promotions, when a non-purchase promotion 
occurred it too affected the senior officer in each successive rank below 
the vacancy, each of them getting a free step up the ladder. In wartime, 
when new regiments were raised and old ones augmented, a few non-purchase 
vacancies also appeared. The recipients of free promotions were a varied 
lot. A death vacancy usually went to the senior officer of the next lowest 
rank; but the King could, and often did, appoint to these vacancies from 
the half-pay list - as he did in the 39th Foot in 1747, for example, upon 
the death in harness of that corps' major. 
10 
Sons of deserving officers, 
and sons of impecunious officers' widows, often got these posts. In wartime 
it was common for large numbers of senior nco's to be given ensigncies or 
lieutenancies; four nco's in the 64th Foot and three in the 33rd, among 
others, were commissioned subalterns in 1756, for example. 
11 
Young men of 
good family but without other resources often took service in the capacity 
of 'volunteers', carrying firelocks on their shoulders and marching in the 
ranks with the private men; it was their hope that, by distinguishing 
themselves in action, they might be given an ensigncy in the regiment. 
Many officers who later reached high rank began their careers as volunteers. 
10. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 43-6. 
11. WO 27/5, and /6. 
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But if, as Hayes notes, the granting of commissions without purchase made 
it 'possible for a man with little money to climb in the service by non- 
purchase vacancies to the rank of major or even lieutenant-colonel', 
12 
still free commissions were not an unmixed blessing. Where the normal rule 
had it that there could be no purchase without a sale, the corollary here 
was that a commission obtained without purchase could not be sold. Free 
commissions represented one-quarter of all promotions, contributed notably 
to the steady flow of seniority and promotion, and raised officers who 
lacked money and "interest" and who otherwise would have mouldered without 
hope on a subaltern's pay; but the fact that they could not sell meant 
that the half-pay list was the only resource of officers promoted in this 
fashion, when they grew grey in the service. 
A system so organized was bound to produce a body of officers whose 
social origins were diverse, and whose career expectations were varied; 
and such was indeed the case. The British officer corps, after 1715, was 
a social melange. 
13 
Broadly speaking, there were four groups from which 
officers were recruited. First came the nobility and the landed gentry, 
titled and untitled, whose sons - younger sons, generally - made up at 
least one-quarter of the regimental officers and well more than half of the 
proprietary colonels and general officers. 
14 
Because of their birth they 
possessed "interest" and, in most cases, money; and it was these three 
advantages which marked them out from other officers and gave them the 
highest promotion prospects. The second group provided the great majority 
of the regimental officers: these were men drawn from the lesser gentry, 
from the cadet branches of good families now involved in the professions 
or in trade, from the clergy, and even from the surviving yeomen farmers. 
Their distinguishing characteristics were the lack of birth, money, and 
interest of the first group and, "consequently, of the prospects of high 
rank open to their betters. An officer of this class described most of 
12. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 43-6. 
13. "Officer corps" is a term used advisedly, for convenience only, since 
(just as J. Childs has observed of the later seventeenth-century army, in 
his The Army of Charles II (1976) ), there was during our period no officer 
corps in Britain, but rather an officer class. Even the notion of an 
"officer class" is (and was at the time) recognized as something of a fic- 
tion. Neither the caste exclusivity of the Prussian officer corps which 
was relaxed in favour of non-nobles only in extremis, nor the cosmopolitan 
and often quite professional nature of the Austrian officer corps, nor the 
increasing elitism and entrenchment among the noblesse d'epee which makes 
possible the use of the term to describe the French officer corps, is 
recognizable in the British Army. 
14. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 80-1. In general, I follow Hayes' system of 
classification here. 
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his fellows exactly when he referred to himself as 'a private Gentleman 
without the advantage of Birth and friends'. 
15 
Nevertheless, considerable 
numbers of this group - as of the third group below - were the proteges 
of the great, were under their "protection", and so their impecunious con- 
dition did not doom their chances of advancement. 
16 
The third group is less easy to categorize, since it was drawn socially 
from a wide spectrum stretching across the first two groups, and it included 
a significant minority of foreigners, cheifly Huguenots. Most of its mem- 
bers were without lands or much money, but were nevertheless gentlemen well- 
enough born and educated - the Huguenots being a case in point. It was a 
distinct group in that it was composed of what would later be referred to 
as "army families", families whose sons traditionally served in the army 
and - especially among the majority with little wealth - had by the end 
of the Seven Years' War developed a new, "professional" outlook and a 
"service mentality". Establishing dynasties between 1715 and 1739, theirs 
was a new professionalism, the product of the institutionalized standing 
army; 
17 
and it was quite unlike the older mercenary professionalism of the 
Kirkes or Douglass' which had characterized the later seventeenth-century 
army and had all but died out during the first decade of the eighteenth. ' 
The fourth group, greater in numbers than is generally realized, con- 
sisted of subaltern officers of advanced age and experience promoted from 
among the non-commissioned officers. These were men who had enlisted as 
private soldiers and, by diligence and luck, had become outstanding senior 
nco's. As many as two hundred of them were commissioned during the 1739-48 
war, and perhaps as many again got commissions during the Seven Years' War. 
Like the long-service subalterns with few prospects of advancement, they 
were particularly useful in new-raised units where a leavening of old 
soldiers thoroughly acquainted with training and discipline was essential. 
18 
It will be appreciated from what we have said so far about the 
15. Ibid., 80. 
16. An interesting collection of letters illustrating the workings of 
"interest" in getting commissions and promotions, is in M. Balderston and 
D. Syrett, The Lost War. Letters from British Officers during the American 
Revolution (New York, 1975). 
17. The Churchills, Lascelles', Howards, Duroures, Handasydes and, of 
course, the Campbells and other Scotch families, stand out. These families 
had their naval equivalents - the Knowles family, for example, or the Hyde 
Parkers. 
18. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 100. See, for example, those among the subalterns 
of the new 61st and 64th of Foot, in 1758, in WO 27/5; and see also 
C. Knight, Historical Records of The Buffs, East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot)... 
1704-1914, II (1935), Pt. 2,733-4. 
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mechanics of the purchase system and the social and financial advantages of 
the officer corps, that for the majority of the officers it was always rel- 
atively easy to acquire a first commission; but thereafter it was only those 
officers possessed of birth, wealth, and interest who could be fairly sure 
of advancement into the higher ranks. For most officers - those with the 
least advantages - the army promised 'nothing but the certainty of long 
years of wearisome regimental service and a limited preferment which would 
stop at the rank of lieutenant-colonel if they were favoured by fortune, or 
at captain or major if they were not'. 
19 
Most of these officers, by the 
same token, relied on the army for their livelihood: the subalterns lived 
on their pay, eked it out with the odd windfall, and hoped for the day when 
command of a company would provide a modest addition derived from the pro- 
prietary rights of a captaincy. Long service was the rule (as we shall see 
in more detail, below); and it is clear that the majority of officers - 
since they were long-serving, since they lived off their pay and meagre sup- 
plements, since they had neither interest nor private fortune, since their 
advancement was slow, and since merit was their chief or sole advantage - 
were career officers, and consciously so. The value of experience and merit, 
given the social and financial circumstances of most officers, was a much 
more important aspect of the promotion system than is usually credited. All 
commissions came from the King; and only to the Lord Lieutenant in Dublin 
and to the commanders-in-chief of forces serving in the field abroad was 
some part of this most jealously guarded of royal prerogatives delegated. 
The Lord Lieutenant could appoint to ensigncies and cornetcies only, while 
field commanders could appoint or promote to vacancies created by death or 
disease; and all such appointments were subject to the royal sanction. Any 
proprietary colonel with political influence, whose judgement in military 
affairs was respected by the King, was easily able to advance the careers of 
able officers in the regiment of which he held the command. Whenever a 
vacancy appeared it was the proprietary colonel whose recommendations to the 
sovereign - especially so in the cases of George I and George II - were 
those most likely to get a good hearing. Colonels who were at all interest- 
ed in the affairs of their own regiments knew which officers possessed 
merit and deserved advancement, and which did not; and when a vacancy oc- 
curred the colonel, in recommending, could simply pass over any officer 
lacking reputation of capacity. In 1747, for example, when the majority of 
Richbell's 39th of Foot fell vacant, the two senior captains were so ignored; 
the first was a rogue and the second incapable and, despite the fact that 
the first moved heaven and earth for the promotion neither Richbell, nor his 
19. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 158. 
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lieutenant-colonel, nor any others of the officers in the 39th would have 
either of the two succeed. 
20 
The Duke of Cumberland, as Captain-General 
from 1745-57, paid scant regard to interest and looked out for the deserv- 
ing; and the Duke of York later acted in the same fashion, whenever pos- 
sible. Since there was considerable mobility between the regiments and 
since non-purchase vacancies were common (especially so in wartime)21, 
not only experienced officers with interest and money but, equally, those 
with experience but without these other advantages, often profitted by zeal 
and merit. 
There were always, of course, officers possessed of the birth and in- 
fluence of a Lord George Lennox who, second son of the Duke of Richmond, got 
his ensigncy at the age of thirteen, in 1751, and seven years later - aged 
twenty - was lieutenant-colonel commanding the 33rd Foot. Lord George got 
his first full colonelcy in 1762, aged twenty-four. Equally there were in 
every regiment officers like Peter Franquefort of the 19th Foot who, by 
1740, had given a total of forty-six years to the service. Franquefort had 
obtained his ensigncy in 1694, and it had taken him thirty-eight years to' 
move up two steps to become a captain; eight years later, when the Spanish 
war broke out, he was still only a captain. Lennox and Franquefort repre- 
sent extremes, however; if we are to appreciate fully the workings of the 
purchase system, and to judge the career service and experience of the 
officer corps in general some detailed sets of statistics must be assembled. 
Three such sets are, therefore, advanced here: in the first set the length 
of time spent by officers in their present commissions, as held at selected 
years, is considered; with the second set the overall length of time that 
officers had spent in the service, since obtaining their first commissions, 
20. Ibid., 43-6. 
21. The officer turnover in eight sample regiments of foot during the 
1775-83 war - corps with a typical cross-section of service - illustrates 
wartime mobility. Of these regiments (the 5th, 11th, 22nd, 23rd, 29th, 38th, 
64th, and 66th of Foot), six arrived in North America prior to or in 1775, 
while the 11th and 66th spent the whole of the war quietly in Ireland. The 
5th, 22nd 23rd, 38th, and 64th were all heavily engaged; the 22nd and 38th 
finished the war at New York in 1783, and the 5th and 64th did so in the 
West Indies. Most of the 23rd had been interned at Yorktown; and the 29th 
sat out the war in Canada where it saw little or no action after 1776. 
Seven of these regiments each had 29 regimental officers in 1775, while 
the 5th (with one vacancy) had 28. Of the 28 officers with the 5th in 1775, 
only 9 were still with the corps in 1783; similarly, only 12 of the llth's 
original complement were still with that regiment in 1783, while in that same 
year only 5 of the 22nd's remained, only 4 of the 23rd's remained, only 10 of 
the 29th's remained, only 6 of the 38th's remained, only 4 of the 64th's re- 
mained, and only 8 of the 66th's remained. Death in action, disease, in- 
capacitating wounds, retirement, promotion to general rank, and exchanges 
. into other regiments 
had by 1783 accounted for 173 - 75% - of the 231 of- 
ficers who had been with these regiments in 1775, at the same time providing 
an equal number of vacancies which were filled by promotions, exchanges, and 
new appointments. Army Lists. 
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is determined; and in the third set the number of years which officers 
could expect to remain in each commission, that is on each rung of the 
ladder, is calculated. The officers serving with the regiments - that 
is, the subalterns through the lieutenants-cononel, inclusive - are dealt 
with first, after which the proprietary colonels are considered in their 
turn. It will be seen that these figures clearly support the general imp- 
ression of career service described above. 
22 
By way of illustration we might begin by looking in detail at the sort 
of figures which we can draw from the records of a typical regiment, before 
passing on to a more summary presentation of the same sort of material. 
Early in 1740 Guise's 6th of Foot had the normal complement of a lieutenant- 
colonel, a major, eight captains, 
23 
ten lieutenants, and nine ensigns. The 
lieutenant-colonel had served 27 years since first obtaining his ensigncy, 
in 1713; and he had served 14 of those years in his present commission as 
lieutenant-colonel, which he had obtained in 1726. Likewise the major had 
served 26 years since first being commissioned in 1714, and he had spent 
less than 1 year in his present commission. Among the captains the average 
length of service since their first being commissioned (from 1705 to 1719) 
was 28.5 years, while their average length of service in their present com- 
missions was 9 years. The average length of service among the lieutenants, 
since first being commissioned (from 1713 to 1731), was 18.5 years, while 
their average length of service as lieutenants was 7 years. The ensigns, 
who had been commissioned between 1730 and 1739, had now served an average 
of 5 years. It had taken the captains an average of 20 year' service be- 
fore being promoted to their captaincies; the lieutenants had taken 11 
years, on average, to gain their lieutenancies. Compared with the rest of 
the foot in the army at this time, these figures indicate (as the following 
statistics illustrate) a corps of officers of average service experience, 
enjoying promotion rates no better than average. 
22. These sets of-figures are taken from statistical bores made at selected 
years in the printed annual Army Lists, from the officers' commission 
histories compiled for each regiment appearing in WO 27, and from the reg- 
ister-books in WO 25. Our survey covers the years 1739-95, there being 
insufficient evidence upon which representative statistics could be drawn 
for the two earlier decades covered by this study. Several short lacunae 
in the materials make it impossible, in many instances, to give all three 
sets of our statistics for the same year; and not all of our survey regi- 
ments were on hand, in each of the years selected for bores. 
23. For convenience, the captain-lieutenant is counted among the captains 
here and henceforth; such was contemporary practice, too. 
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Our first set of statistics, among our sample regiments, 
24 
concerns the 
average number of years spent by officers in their presently-held commissions: 
Average Number of Years Spent by Officers in Their Present Commissions: 
HORSE: FOOT: 
YEAR Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. Crts. Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. Ens. 
1740 14 8.5 8.5 8 6 8 3 8 7.5 3.5 
1758 3.5 2.5 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 1.5 
1766 7 5 6 5.5 3.5 5 4 5.5 5.5 4 
1774 5 4 5 4 3 8 3.5 6 6 3 
1780 6 2.5 4.5 3 2 5 3 4.5 3.5 1.5 
1787 9.5 7 7 4 3 8 5 9 6 3.5 
1793 10.5 5 5 3.5 2.5 9 6 8 5.5 3 
These first figures do not, by themselves, do much more than indicate 
trends; but used in conjunction with the following set of figures - figures 
giving the overall length of time which officers had spent in the service since 
obtaining their first commissions as young cornets and ensigns - they jointly 
shed a good deal of light upon career patterns, and upon the service experience 
which officers brought with them when promoted from one rank to the next. This 
second set of figures follows here, immediately: 
Average Number of Years' Service Since Obtaining First Commissions: 
25 
HORSE: FOOT: 
YEAR Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. 
1740 35 31 26 20.5 35 30.5 27 19 
1754 28 27 13.5 8.5 22 18 15.5 10 
1759 21 20 11.5 6 15 19 14 5 
1768 24 21 14 9.5 23 24 15 10 
1773 19 18 14 8.5 29 20.5 16 10 
1777 25 19.5 15 9 30 23.5 17 10 
1785 28.5 26 15 7 26.5 22 17.5 7.5 
1789 27.5 26 17 9 23 26.5 16 8.5 
1791 28 23 13.5 8 30 29 18 9 
24. These were eleven of horse and twenty-nine of foot, chosen carefully so 
that their service records during our period would reflect closely the distrib- 
ution pattern of the army at home and abroad. The regiments of horse were: 
The Blues, 2nd, and 4th Horse; the 2nd Dragoon Guards; the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 
and 14th Dragoons; and the 15th and 17th Light Dragoons. The foot were the 
Coldstream Guards, plus the 1/1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 
17th, 19th, 22nd, 27th, 28th, 32nd, 33rd, 38th, 39th, 42nd, 43rd, 45th, 46th 
51st, 54th, 58th, 63rd, 64th, and 69th of Foot. 
25. Figures on the length of service in cornetcies and ensigncies, since they 
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Our third and last set of statistics illustrates the rates of promotion 
obtaining in the officer corps: 
Average Number of Years Served Before Reaching Present Rank: 
HORSE: FOOT: 
YEAR Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. Lts-Col. Majs. Capts. Lts. 
1740 21 22 17 14 27 26 19 11.5 
1759 18.5 17.5 9 3 13 17 10 2 
1767 16 14.5 8 4 17 19 9 6 
1775 21 9 11 6 20 18 10 4 
1786 20 18 9 3 21.5 18 7 2 
1792 21 19 10 5 23 24 10 4 
All of the above statistics illustrate strikingly the influence of war 
- with its concommitant expansion of the forces and consequent increase in 
the number of officers serving with the regiments - upon the service ex- 
perience of the officers in general; but it must be recalled that expansion 
was a short-lived phenomenon, and its effects must not be overated. With 
the coming of peace the great majority of all new officers found themselves 
relegated to the half-pay list, as their units were broken. 
26 
In the great 
majority of new-raised regiments, furthermore, half of the officers - all 
of the field officers and captains, and half of the lieutenants - were old 
soldiers either appointed from other regiments or taken up from the half- 
pay list. Entirely typical were Manners' 56th, Anstruther's 58th, and 
Montague's 59th of Foot, all new regiments raising from late December 1755; 
each was staffed with experienced officers at all ranks save for the ensigns, 
who were mostly young fellows, and save for a handful of junior lieutenants 
(one in the 59th, and four each in the 56th and 58th). In terms of ex- 
perience of the service the lieutenants-colonel of the 56th, 58th, and 59th 
had (when reviewed in the autumn of 1756) served for 28,12, and 12 years 
respectively since obtaining their first commissions; the three majors had 
served 24,10, and 18 years, respectively; the captains of these regiments 
were the first ranks obtained, are essentially the same in this as in the 
previous set of statistics; and since it would be a nuisance to keep re- 
peating these figures they are excluded henceforth. It can be taken as 
given that the average length of service of cornets and ensigns at any 
period surveyed was between 2 and 6 years; and while the total number of 
years spent as cornets and ensigns averaged, in 1740,14 and 11.5 years 
respectively, these totals varied between 2 and 6 years after that date, 
reflecting the upward pull as the army expanded and as the wars became 
more frequent. 
26. On the near-panic casting about for exchanges into older more establish- 
ed regiments which the merest hint of a peace would set off in new-raised 
regiments, see J. Shy, op. cit., 71-9, where several examples of this type of 
activity are given. 
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had served an average of 12.5,11, and 12 years respectively; and the 
lieutenants (including the new men) had behind them an average of 3.5, 
4.5, and 6.5 years, respectively. 
27 
Compared with the rest of the foot 
in the army the service experience of these officers was no less than the 
average. Not even the practice of "raising for rank" was likely to flood 
the officer corps with incompetents, since this was rarely attempted after 
the '45 Rebellion, its disadvantages being too-well appreciated. 
Several other points stand out in the figures, and the conclusions 
will be evident. All of the figures for 1740 are notably high, the result 
of the long peace which had followed upon the Utrecht settlement; the 
army's size had been stable since the reductions which followed the 1715 
rebellion; and the officer corps as a whole, when the Spanish war broke 
out late in 1739, was a very experienced, long-serving body. In the horse, 
none of the 1740 figures for average years of service in presently-held 
commissions were to be equalled again during the eighteenth century; while 
in the foot it was to be only by the later-1780's that such figures were 
once again achieved. The influence of prolonged peace and of only the most 
limited augmentations had already set a trend in career experience. The 
slightly lower promotion rate evident in the horse in the 1740 statistics, 
as compared with the foot, was exceptional; during the rest of the cen- 
tury service statistics and promotion rates were to be generally similar in 
the two arms. 
The figures for 1758-59 illustrate the effects which war (two wars, in 
fact, both those of 1756 and 1739 showing up at this date) would always 
have upon the service pattern of the officer corps: casualties, new-rais- 
ing, and augmentations together sped promotion considerably and in the 
process watered down temporarily the experience of officers in their present 
commissions. By the early 1750's, and moreso by the turn of the 1760's, 
the army was much "younger" - that is, the great majority of officers had 
much less experience of the service than had been the case in 1740. The 
figures for 1780 reflect, once again, the influence of war on promotion 
rates. 
Another trend in career patterns, already noted above, is apparent in 
1740, and remains so: field rank - lieutenant-colonelcies in particular 
- was being attained after periods of service proportionably shorter than 
those spent on the lower rungs of the ladder. This illustrates the more 
speedy promotion rates obtaining among that minority of officers - the 
first of the four groups described above from which the officer corps was 
recruited - possessed of birth, wealth, and interest. Indeed it was common 
27. WO 27/4. 
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for the lieutenants-colonel to have no more service experience than the 
majors. 
Our final figures are for 1792-93, just before the opening of hosti- 
lities against Revolutionary France and the great expansion of the army 
which then began. It will be seen that the British officer corps of 1793 
had more experience of the service than had been the case upon the outbreak 
of war either in 1756 or 1775; and among the field officers of foot there 
was more experience of service than had been the case since 1712. 
What is striking about these statistics, however, is the closely com- 
parable service records of the captains and subalterns among all the regi- 
ments of each arm, in any period surveyed. From each point of view - the 
amount of time spent by officers in their present commissions, the overall 
length of time that officers had spent in the service, and the amount of 
time spent by officers on each rung of the ladder - the essentially similar 
service experience of each regiment's body of officers is apparent. There 
were no favoured units, insofar as service with the company or troop was 
concerned; and since dispersal in penny-packets was the common lot of the 
army, this essential homogeniety of service experience among the officers of 
company or troop grade contributed not a little towards bringing a fairly 
even experience to the training of widely separated units. The Dublin 
garrisons of 1773, new and old, conveniently illustrate this point. Among 
the old garrison which was replaced late in the spring of that year and 
sent out into county cantonments the average length of service of the. 
captains and subalterns in their present commissions, together with the 
dates at which they had obtained their present ranks, were as follows: 
Old Garrison, 1773: 
9th Foot 17th Foot 27th Foot 
Capts: 3 (1764-72) Capts: 5.5 (1760-72) Capts: 5 (1764-72) 
Lts: 4.5 (1760-72) Lts: 4 (1761-72) Lts: 5 (1758-72) 
Ens: 1 (1771-72) Ens: 1.5 (1771-72) Ens: 3 (1762-72) 
28th Foot 
Capts: 7 (1761-72) 
Lts: 5.5 (1761-72 
Ens: 2.5 (1769-72) 
45th Foot 
Capts: 6 (1755-71) 
Lts: 10 (1754-72) 
Ens: 4 (1763-72) 
46th Foot 
Capts: 5.5 (1757-72) 
Lts: 4.5 (1761-72) 
Ens: 1.5 (1770-72) 
The same figures for the new Dublin garrison which came in from county can- 
torments and replaced the old, in the spring of 1773, are as follows: 
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5th Foot 
Capts: 3.5 (1765-72) 
Lts: 6 (1758-72) 
Ens: 2 (1770-72) 
55th Foot 
Capts: 7 (1760-72) 
Lts: 5 (1755-72) 
Ens: 2 (1769-72) 
New Garrison, 1773: 
42nd Foot 
Capts: 5 (1758-70) 
Lts: 8.5 (1759-71) 
Ens: 4 (1761-72) 
54th Foot 
Capts: 8 (1755-72) 
Lts: 6.5 (1759-72) 
Ens: 3.5 (1761-72) 
62nd Foot 
Capts: 4.5 (1759-72) 
Lts: 5 (1761-72) 
Ens: 3 (1768-72) 
63rd Foot 
Capts: 5 (1761-72) 
Lts: 5 (1760-72) 
Ens: 3 (1762-72) 
The average service in their present commissions of all of the captains in 
the old garrison, above, was 6 years, and it was 5.5 for all the captains 
of the new; among the lieutenants of the old garrison the average was 6 
years' service, and it was 6 years also among the lieutenants of the new; 
and where the old garrison's ensigns had served 2 years, on average, the 
new garrison's ensigns had served for 3 years. Among all twelve regiments 
only five groups - the captains of the 9th and 54th, the former rather 
"youngish" and the latter rather more experienced; the lieutenants of the 
42nd and 45th, both rather more experienced than the norm; and the ensigns 
of the 9th, who were a bit young again - stand out; and of these only the 
lieutenants of the 45th were at all exceptional. This general similarity 
of service experience was always the rule in the army. 
Considering these several sets of statistics we cannot do other than 
conclude that the British Army was, during our period, led by an officer 
corps of the most considerable experience, made up of men who, by and large, 
entered the service for life and got on by steady, competent service. This 
was careerism. Long service does not in itself, of course, imply any out- 
standing merit; but within the context of the several attributes of career- 
ism, noted earlier, and in light of the slow rates of promotion, described 
above, a thorough acquaintance with their business and, surely, a capable 
performance of it must be conceded these men. Considering also the dis- 
advantageous conditions in which the peacetime army always found itself 
serving, nothing but competence and sound proficiency among the regimental 
officers could have kept the majority of the regiments fit for service. 
This conclusion is leant additional weight by the fact that the men 
appointed to the proprietary colonelcies of the regiments were, in the 
great majority of cases, soldiers of long experience of the service. The 
colonelcies were valuable, much-sought-after plums, and their disposal was 
a matter of weight in the patronage system by which high political interest 
was maintained. But however well born, however well possessed of interest, 
and however powerful politically were the officers - usually general 
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officers - appointed, the fact remains that all but a mere handful of the 
colonels appointed during the eighteenth century were men of long years of 
service in the army. All three Georges regarded colonelcies as rewards for 
deserving officers of long service, and viewed with distaste the fact that 
patronage had also, upon occasion, some part to play in their disposal. The 
role of patronage was, however, firmly restricted by them - especially so 
by George II - with results most clearly expressed in the following stat- 
istics. There were 293 colonels appointed during the years 1714-1763. Of 
these, eighteen had served over 45 years each on appointment; sixty-three 
had seen from 35 to 44 years of service, upon appointment; another seventy- 
eight had served between 25 and 34 years, on appointment; and a further 
ninety had already served between 15 and 24 years, on appointment. More 
than half of the colonels had, therefore, served for at least a quarter- 
century before being given their colonelcies; and fully five-sixths of the 
colonels had, upon appointment, between 15 and 50 years of service behind 
them. Only forty-four of the colonels - 15% - had seen less than 15 years' 
service on appointment, and of those most had served more than 10 years. 
28 
The conclusion is inescapable that only officers of long service and ex- 
perience - many with experience of active operations - could, in the great 
majority of cases, aspire to a colonelcy while the first two Georges com- 
manded the army. The same pattern prevailed (albeit with some further nod 
to political interest), during the first four decades of George III's reign, 
which takes us to the end of our period. 
PART B: Men: 
29 
Where the great majority of the officers serving with the regiments were, 
as we have seen, men of no inconsiderable experience of the service, this was 
not the case among the non-commissioned officers, musicians, and private 
men over whom they exercised command. At no time during our period were men 
28. J. Hayes, 'Officers', 115-7,224. See also J. Hayes, 'Lieutenants- 
Colonel and Majors-Commandant of the Seven Years' War', JSAHR, 36 (1958), 
3-13,38-9, where the author concludes (p. 12) of the thirty-three commandants 
of the corps which were the last to be raised during the 1756-63 war, that 
they too were mostly 'well qualified for their command'. He adds of the mid- 
century army, that 'there was in existence at this time a well-balanced, 
practised, professional body of officers' which could be drawn on to train 
and lead new-raised units. 
29. By "men" we refer collectively, here and henceforth, to the nco's 
(sergeants and corporals), musicians (drummers, trumpeters, hautbois, fifers, 
and pipers), and private soldiers. A soldier with one years' service or less 
was generally deemed to be not yet sufficiently trained or disciplined to 
be trusted to perform all of the tasks and duties normally within the pro- 
vince of the "compleat soldier"; and we follow this approach here, describ- 
ing as recruits those men who had served for only that length of time or less. 
The basic-training scheme and timetable according to which recruits were 
brought along is described at length in Chapt. IV below. 
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available in numbers sufficient to keep the regiments recruited up to the 
strengths called for in the regimental establishments, while in the mean- 
time considerable numbers of the men actually serving with the regiments 
were mere recruits, as yet insufficiently trained to be masters of their 
business. It was with this chronic, two-pronged manpower problem - too 
few recruits to complete to the establishments, too many recruits among 
the men already with the corps - that the regiments had continually to 
contend; and both aspects of the problem, the latter especially, often 
caused the most severe difficulties for individual regiments. 
The statistical dimensions of the manpower problem reveal its very 
considerable extent; and two sets of figures describe its normal dimen- 
sions, against which the more severe cases may be measured. 
30 
Firstly, dur- 
ing the years from the mid-century down to 1795 the combined effect which 
death, desertion, discharges, drafts, and periodic augmentations had upon 
the regiments of foot serving in the British Isles was to oblige them to 
recruit an average of 1.5% of their strength every month, in peacetime, and 
2.1% per month in wartime; while the regiments of horse recruited an average 
of . 9% of their strength each month in peacetime, and 1.5% per month in war- 
time. Annual intakes on this scale represent the most considerable numbers 
of recruits. 
31 
Secondly, during the same period, the regiments of foot 
serving in the British Isles were able to recruit to an average strength of 
90% of their authorised establishments, in peacetime, and to 83% in war- 
time; while the regiments of horse averaged 95% of their authorised est- 
ablishments, in peacetime, and 94% in wartime. 
Three broad patterns or cycles in the manpower problem are worthy of 
note. To begin with, it will have been observed in the figures just given 
that the horse was much more stable than the foot: there were always 
fewer recruits serving with the horse, and the horse regiments were always 
kept up quite close to their establishment strengths. This stability was 
the result of four factors: the horse regiments were only rarely subject 
to drafting; the horse suffered very little from desertion because the 
30. The figures in the following paragraphs were calculated from the 
voted annual strengths of the regiments, which appear in the Establishment 
warrants (WO 24); from the reports on the numbers of men in individual 
regiments, and their periods of service, which appear in the Inspection 
Returns (WO 27); and from the regimental returns which give detailed ef- 
fective strengths (as opposed to the strengths in the stuffed muster rolls), 
which appear in the Monthly Returns (WO 17). Evidence surviving prior to 
the mid-century is too scanty to permit detailed calculations. 
31. cf. L. Neal, 'The Cost of Impressment During the Seven Years War', 
MM, 64 (1978), 45-56; the wastage rate in the navy, 1755-57, was 3.1% 
per month. 
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troopers (who were cut from a somewhat better cloth than were foot soldiers), 
were better paid and had a busier regimen than the foot, and consequently 
were subject to a much less brutal discipline; the horse regiments were not 
shunted about abroad in peacetime, and so escaped some of"evils described in 
the previous chapter; and lastly, the number of new mounted units raised in 
wartime was never great, in proportion to the number already existing, thus 
keeping that arm from being watered down as much as was the foot in wartime. 
It was largely due to the fact that the foot, conversely, was prey to all of 
these factors, that there were always many more recruits with the foot regi- 
ments than with the mounted units; and these same factors caused the actual 
strengths of the foot regiments to lag more noticeably behind their author- 
ised establishments, than was the case in the horse. 
As would be expected, it is clear too that in wartime there was a fall- 
ing off in effective strengths and an increase in the proportion of recruits 
with the regiments; and this is a second pattern in the manpower problem. 
The following table illustrates quite clearly the war-peace cycle, averag- 
ing the strengths of all the regiments serving in both Britain and Ireland: 
TABLE 1 
Average Number of Recruits 
per Regiment, as a 
Percentage of Actual 
Strength. 
Average Actual Strength, 
as a Percentage of 
Regimental Establishments. 
1750-54: Horse: 9% 
Foot: 16% 
1755-63: Horse: 17% 
Foot: 25% 
1767-74: Horse: 13% 
Foot: 20% 
1775-85: Horse: 19% 
Foot: 27% 












A third pattern is observable, finally, in the variations between the 
two kingdoms. Where there was never any noticeable difference between the 
horse regiments serving in Britain and those in Ireland, either in pro- 
portions of recruits in their ranks or in actual strengths as percentages 
of their establishments, the contrary was true among the foot. There were 
dissimilar recruiting rates in the foot in the two kingdoms, throughout the 
period; and (for reasons not yet understood) the manpower problem became 
less severe in Ireland at about 1773, and more severe in Britain. During 
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the years 1750-1773 there were, proportionately, more recruits in the foot 
regiments serving in Ireland than there were in those in Britain; and at 
the same time the actual strength of Irish regiments, as percentages of 
their establishments, was generally less than that of their British counter- 
parts. This whole pattern reversed itself c. 1773, and henceforth it was the 
British units which found themselved understrength, and bringing along more 
recruits. 
These general long-term trends tend to distort what was often, over 
shorter periods and at the level of individual regiments, a very irregular 
pattern. Two sets of figures illustrate these variations, and are shown in 
chart form below. The charts illustrate the manpower patterns in the foot 
regiments in Britain and in Ireland during the sample years 1768-74 and 
1784-90, years which are especially interesting because they immediately 
preceded, and followed upon, a long and bloody war. Chart 1 shows a gen- 
eral stability in the foot regiments serving in Britain, 1768-74, while in 
Ireland the years 1770-71 stand out, showing a notable increase in the 
proportion of recruits in service and a significant falling off in the 
actual strength of regiments in relation to establishments. What these 
patterns illustrate is the "levelling" of the establishments of the British 
and Irish foot, put into effect in 1770, as we saw earlier: in that year 
the Irish regimental establishments were raised by nearly 50%, and it took 
the Irish units two years to recruit up to their new numbers. 
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Chart 2 
CHART 1: 1768-1774 
( The upper figure shows the average strengths of the battalions, as a% of 
establishments; the lower shows the average % of recruits in the battalions. ) 
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32. In 1770 the establishment of a marching regiment in Ireland was 
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shows quite clearly the harmful effects of the 1775-83 war upon the foot, and 
illustrates the length of time taken to rebuild. It also shows how very 
considerable a part of the army's strength consisted of recruits during most 
of the 1780's, notably so among those regiments brought home to Britain. 
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CHART 2: 1784-1790 
( The upper figure shows the average strength of the battalions, as a% of 
establishments; the lower shows the average % of recruits in the battalions. ) 
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The annual Dublin garrisons, old and new, always serve as interesting 
barometres - and as a view in microcosm - of the state of the manpower 
problem. In 1769 for example, the manpower situation in the regiments com- 
posing the old garrison which broke up late that spring and dispersed into 
county cantonments, and in the regiments which came in from dispersed quar- 
ters to form the new garrison, was typical of that prevailing in the army 
in general; and it illustrates too the occasional irregularities always to 
be met with. As in Table I, the following figures indicate firstly the 
number of recruits in each regiment expressed as a percentage of the 
increased from 297 to 442 men, while at the same time the establishment of 
a marching regiment in Britain was reduced from 497 to 442 men, to facilitate 
the equalizing of establishments. During 1771 a light company of 44 men was 
being formed in each British battalion, and during 1772 the Irish battalions 
followed suit. On the formation of these companies (usually dated, mistaken- 
ly, in 1770), see WO 4/88, pp. 5-6; WO 55/416, pp. 269-70; and WO 27/21 
through /26, passim. 
33. From 1784 until 1788 the establishment of battalions both in Ireland 
and Britain was at 392 men, while from 1788 onwards it was at 430 men. How 
heavily the foot had suffered is indicated - as Chart 2 shows - by the 
fact that in 1784 the average battalion in Britain stood on only 59% of its 
full establishment, and that 24% of these men were recruits. By 1786 these 
figures has been raised to only 81% and 37% respectively. 
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regiment's actual strength, and secondly the actual strength of each regi- 
ment expressed as a percentage of the authorised establishment: 
34 
OLD GARRISON, 1769 NEW GARRISON. 1769 
45th: 29% recruits; 88% of Estab. 27th: 50% recruits; 84% of Estab. 
49th: 25% to ; 94% it It 28th: 27% 11 ; 94% " it 
50th: 17% ; 96% " 42nd: 32% it ; 94% " it 
51st: 22% it ; 90% " it . 46th: 26% it ; 95% " if 
56th: 4% ; 91% " it 53rd: 25% it ; 88% " it . 63rd: 14% it ; 91% " 54th: 20% if ; 91% 11 it 
Of the regiments forming the old garrison in 1769, the 50th, 51st, and 56th 
had been serving in Ireland since the 1763 peace, while the 49th had arrived 
from North America in 1764, the 63rd from the West Indies in 1765, and the 
45th from North America in 1766. All of these regiments, save perhaps for 
the last-arrived 45th, had had ample time to recruit; and all save the 
45th had a lower proportion of recruits on their s 
centage of the establishment strength than was the 
year among all the foot regiments in Ireland. The 
British Isles for only two years since its raising 
accounts for the low percentage of recruits in its 
trength and a higher per- 
average condition that 
56th had been out of the 
in 1756, a fact which 
ranks. 
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The new gar- 
rison, meanwhile, presents a rather different picture, especially as 
regards recruits. None of these regiments had been long in Ireland: the 
27th, 28th, 42nd, and 46th had arrived home from North America in 1767, 
while the 53rd and 54th had come to Ireland from the Gibraltar garrison in 
1768. Wastage abroad made good by energetic recruiting since coming home 
accounts for the relatively high proportion of recruits with these units, 
all of which save the 54th had a 'higher proportion of recruits in their 
ranks than the Irish average for that year. That 50% of the men with the 
27th Foot were recruits was due to that regiment's being drafted before 
leaving America. 
The new Dublin garrisons of 1771, and 1774, once again point trends 
quite clearly: 
36 
NEW GARRISON, 1771 NEW GARRISON, 1774 
5th: 33% recruits; 76% of Estab. 
28th: 16% It ; 88% if It 
34th: 42% it ; 82% " it . 
44th: 46% ; 90% " it . 
49th: 27% ; 89% if 
62nd: 39% ; 80% " if 
24th: 17% recruits; 91% of Estab. 
35th: 6% it ; 88% it of 
40th: 16% "; 95% it It 
49th: 14% ; 92% " it 
53rd: 10% ; 93% " of 
57th: 14% "; 92% " it 
34. WO 27/17, passim. 
35. R. Cannon, ... Fifty-Sixth Foot (1844), 10-15. 
36. WO 27/23, passim, for 1771; and WO 27/32, passim, for 1774. 
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The large number of recruits and the marked lag behind establishments, in 
1771, shows the heavy recruiting going on in the Irish foot as it was en- 
deavouring to meet the new, higher establishments set in 1770. The large 
numbers of men (of whom relatively few were recruits) with the regiments in 
1774 shows the results of four years of stability following the 1770 aug- 
mentations, and shows too the fruits of eleven years of peace. As usual 
there were exceptional cases. The 34th Foot had come home in 1769 after 
seven years' service in the West Indies, West Florida, and the Louisiana 
country; and just before sailing for Ireland half of the men had been draft- 
ed to flesh out units newly arriving in America. The 62nd too had only 
recently come home from the West Indies; and the 5th - although it had 
been in Ireland for more than a decade - had lately been drafted to fill 
up regiments departing abroad. 
As Table I indicates, it was the normal condition of things for 16%-27% 
of the men in a regiment of foot to be recruits, as it was for 9%-19% of 
those in a regiment of horse; and our sample Dublin garrisons show that 
there were always a few units containing even larger proportions of re- 
cruits. Wherever the normal figures were surpassed the regiments so sit- 
uated were normally rendered unfit for service. This was one of the hard 
realities of the service in the eighteenth century: sound regiments were 
struck down repeatedly and capriciously as the rigours of duty, the im- 
mediate needs of regiments less fortunately situated, the press of peculiar 
circumstances or the simple operation of chance came into play. Desertion, 
deaths, discharges, and heavy drafting, these together in war and peace 
fuelled the manpower problem; and in wartime the problem was greatly ex- 
acerbated by the general expansion of the forces, what with new-raising 
regular and militia regiments - not to mention the navy, marines, and 
artillery - competing for already limited numbers. 
The manpower problem - too few recruits to complete to the establish- 
ments, too many recruits among the men already with the corps - was a perm- 
anent feature in the life of the army, against which the regiments were 
obliged continually to struggle. Failure to recruit every month at the 
rates described earlier meant that strengths would begin to lag ever more 
noticeably behind establishments, necessitating eventually a large-scale 
transfusion from other units; and any such transfusion inevitably meant a 
commensurate increase in the number of recruits somewhere else in the army. 
This was a permanent situation because the material condition of the century 
ensured that there were always running sores in the army - the 38th Foot, 
for instance, rotting in the West Indies from 1716 to 1765, where men died 
almost as fast as they were shipped out. 
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Examples of regiments suffering acutely from the manpower problem are 
legion; and we can conclude here with a few typical cases. Thus in 1786, 
when the 27th Foot was seen at Limerick, 60% of its men were reported 
'weakly Recruits... who had not sufficiently the use of their Arms'; and 
of these 'a Considerable number' were 'too Small and slight for any Service'. 
The 27th was unfit for service. 
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When in 1767 the 45th Foot was seen in 
Ireland, after twenty years of American service and but one year at home, 
it stood on only 57% of the establishment and some 48% of its men were 
'Recruits who are not yet taught their exercise'. The 45th too was unfit. 
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The 37th Foot, seen at Fort George Ardersier in 1773 not long after coming 
home from Minorca, was described as being made up of 'Mostly growing Boys', 
without 'strength enough for any very hard service'. 
39 
In 1790 the 31st 
Foot, at Tynemouth, stood on 78% of the establishment and 27% of its men 
were raw: 'it consists chiefly of Young Men, and numerous Recruits', said 
a reviewing officer, 'and in this State no Corps can be reported fit for 
immediate active Service'. 
40 
The 69th Foot came home from West Indian cam- 
paigning in 1783 and, a year later, most of its men were still 'old and 
worn out objects for the Chelsea Pension'; and as late as 1788 some 36% of 
the men with the regiment were recruits. 
41 
Every year, there were always 
several regiments in this condition. 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
It is fair to say that the view most often advanced in the general 
histories of the age and, consequently, the impression most widely held 
among non-specialists, is that the British Army of the eighteenth cen- 
tury was officered by inexperienced and often indifferent amateurs; and 
that its ranks were filled for the most part with men who, for a variety 
of reasons, were long-serving professionals. Our study of the condition 
of the regiments shows, clearly, that these impressions are ill-found. 
The army was, in fact, officered by men of the most considerable ex- 
perience, the great majority of whom got on by application; and the bulk 
of the other ranks consisted of men of short service, of whom a significant 
proportion were generally recruits. Such was the actual condition of the 
regiments, dispersed about the British Isles and the overseas stations and 
garrisons. 
37. WO 27/58, Pt. 1. 
38. WO 27/11. 
39. WO 27/27. 
40. WO 27/66. 
41. WO 27/63. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DRILLBOOKS: REGULATIONS BY AUTHORITY & PRIVATE PUBLICATIONS 
Introduction: 
The administrative machinery of the British Army in the eighteenth 
century was a masterpiece of the bureaucratic principle of 'multiple 
fission'. ' Consisting of an elaborate but disconected and confused profusion 
of offices , departments and boards, most of these characterized by hazy 
jurisdictions and ponderous processes, and with the whole lacking any real 
centre of responsibility and, hence, of direction, this was an administra- 
tive "system' - or rather more accurately, 'an entanglement of disoriented 
and diffused conditions'2 - whose functioning was invariably attended by 
amateurism and inefficiency, and occasionally by incompetence. 
3 
There was 
however method in this absurdity, the army's administration illustrating the 
play of two considerations which contemporaries regarded as of overriding 
significance. These considerations were, firstly, the fear of an efficient 
and powerful standing force at the immediate disposal of any faction; and 
secondly the desire that private and not public funds should, as far as pos- 
sible, play a part and earn a return in the business of the service of the 
state. 
To satisfy these considerations the military administration was almost 
entirely in civil hands, from the regimental agents at one end of the scale 
to the great Officers of State who shared political administration at the 
other. But if civil authority had engrossed the bulk of the administration 
of the army it had, nevertheless, conceded to the army the necessity of 
administering for itself certain specialist matters which could only be 
1. R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 
1795-1809. (Cambridge, 1963), 15. (cited hereafter as Glover, Preparation). 
2. A. D. Darling, Red Coat and Brown Bess (Ottawa, 1970), 6. 
3. This conclusion is generally held. R. E. Scouller, op. cit., xiii, for 
example, concludes of the administration that it was, 'if not quite like the 
Icelandic snakes, absolutely incapable, to present-day eyes, of functioning 
at all'; while S. G. P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the 
Administrative Problems in the Peninsula (Oxford, 1957), 4, remarks upon 
'the existence of the multitude of small offices and boards scattered over 
London which anyone who takes up an almanack of the day will be astonished 
to find constituted the government of the military force of this country'. 
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regarded as purely professional; the army had, after all, to be profession- 
ally competent, capable of opposing in the field the forces of the Bourbon 
Crowns. Among these specialist matters came the preparation, dissemination, 
inspection, enforcement, and periodic alteration of the regulations govern- 
ing the training and drill of the army - all of which were essentially the 
responsibility of a small body of officers who (since their activities in 
these and certain other matters were complimentary), functioned as a central 
staff and were responsive to a competent central authority. Here the 
Sovereign, in whose prerogative were the command and allegiance of the army, 
played an essential and active role. The army had always been 'peculiarly 
the royal instrument'; 
4 
and it was the army's great good fortune that each 
of the Hanoverian Kings jealously guarded this prerogative and actively 
pursued the duties and professional interests which it entailed. 
5 
To assist 
him in these duties the King at his own pleasure appointed deserving officers to 
serve as his lieutenants and staff. As his staff, these officers report- 
ed to the King and acted at his instance; and although at best they may be 
regarded as forming no more than the embryonic general staff of the nine- 
teenth-century Horse Guards, still these officers were referred to as the 
King's "staff", they normally worked in close concert, they frequently con- 
sulted one another both officially and unofficially, and for half the cen- 
tury they shared the same roof. 
6 
As regards training and drill, this command and staff displayed what 
was an unwonted efficiency, in comparison with the standards of practice 
elsewhere in the army's administration. That part of the central, London 
staff directly concerned with these matters consisted, under the King, of 
the Adjutant General and - if one had been appointed - the Commander-in- 
Chief; occasionally involved also were the Board of General Officers, 
general officers who had served as reviewing officers, and in some cases 
officers who had experimented with or written privately upon the subject 
and had established reputations as tacticians. Since these were the source 
of drill regulations, they deserve to be looked at more closely before we 
4. R. E. Scouller, op. cit., 6. 
5. There is no monograph dealing with the royal command of the army; in 
lieu of this, the best account of the attachment and close involvement of 
George I and George II with the army's professional affairs is J. Hayes, 
'The Royal House of Hanover and the British Army, 1714-60', Buz. John 
RyZands Library, 40(1957-8), 328-57. George III's many biographers have un- 
accountably ignored that monarch's very close concern with the army, details 
of which will appear repeatedly in the chapters which follow. 
6. From its completion c. 1760, the C-in-C, the Adjutant General, the 
Quartermaster General, the Board of General Officers, their secretaries and 
staffs (together with the Paymaster General, and the field officers of the 
Guards), all shared the new Horse Guards building. Much correspondence, 
however, was dated from the shifting offices elsewhere in the metropolis, 
and from private homes. 
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pass on to the regulations themselves. 
The Sovereign from time to time delegated the actual carrying on of some 
part of his prerogative duties and powers, as supreme commander, to a much- 
trusted general officer , who was in consequence appointed commander-in- 
chief for a period determined by the Sovereign's good pleasure. The com- 
mander-in-chief was the highest ranking officer in the army; and his respon- 
sibilities, which were largely administrative, were considerable. Of 
particular importance, he had the right of nominating officers to the King or 
to his ministers for all promotions and commands; he was on occasion called 
in as a military adviser to the Cabinet; he could (in cooperation with res- 
ponsible ministers) organize the broad plan of troop movements and dis- 
positions, both in peacetime and wartime; and he ruled on all matters re- 
lating to the training, drill, and discipline of the army, and could initiate 
and enforce major reforms in this field. In performing these duties the com- 
mander-in-chief was assisted by the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster 
General, who were his principal staff officers, and he could be sure of the 
cooperation of the Secretary at War and the Master General of the Ordnance. 
The commander-in-chief's orders were taken everywhere as commands, on the 
British establishment and abroad; and they were taken as directives on the 
Irish establishment where (since there was an Irish C-in-C in Dublin), his 
authority did not officially extend. 
7 
The Adjutant General was responsible for the maintenance of proper 
drill and discipline among the troops on the British establishment and in 
the overseas posts and garrisons, that which was "proper" being laid down 
in the Regulations and Orders issuing from time to time through his office. 
To further carry out these duties he was responsible for coordinating the 
system of regular inspection or 'reviewing' of the regiments, by which it 
was ascertained if discipline was being enforced, and the regulations and 
periodic orders were being complied with. The Adjutant General's powers 
were largely executive - 'He must be under some Commander, he can't from 
the nature of his Employment act merely from himself', as Gen Thomas Gage 
put it; he was responsible to and acted at the behest of the Commander-in- 
Chief and the King. 
8 
Nevertheless although merely adjutant, in theory, in 
actual practice the office had a considerable influence in its own right 
7. On the role of the C-in-C see Clode, II, 335-8,689-714; R. E. Scouller, 
op. cit., 54-8; R. Whitworth, op. cit., passim; and S. M. Pargellis, Military 
Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland 
Papers (New York, 1936), ix-xii (cited hereafter as Pargellis, Military 
Affairs). 
8. C. E. Carter (ed), The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage, II (New 
Haven, 1933), 431-2, Gage to Barrington, 26 Aug 1967. See also p. 413, Gage 
to Harvey, 21 Apr. 1767; and pp. 415-6, Gage to Barrington, 28 Apr. 1767, 
where the red tape chain is clearly shown and with it the place of the 
Adjutant General in the command structure. 
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on tactical doctrine and training; men like Robert Napier, Edward Harvey, 
and Sir William Fawcett, all of whom held the appointment, were much regarded 
by officers. This was so largely because the Adjutant General was not a 
politician like the Secretary at War, but rather a regular officer and us- 
ually a thorough professional; he commanded professional respect in army 
circles and frequently had much to do with the preparation or adoption (in 
consultation with other individuals or bodies) of new drill, organization, 
and equipment. He was continually handling small military matters for the 
King, and was in constant communication with officers of all ranks. He was 
in daily communication with the Secretary at War, 
9 
and (significantly) was 
frequently petitioned by officers and private citizens who either confused 
his powers with those of that Secretary, or who assumed for him an in- 
fluence greater than he in fact had. Given his duties, and the close re- 
lationship with the regiments on the one hand and with the King and the 
C-in-C on the other, which the performance of his duties entailed, his 
aas the finger closest to the pulse of the army. For all of these reasons, 
then, the Adjutant General's office was a key link in what was in fact the 
most professional channel in the army's administration. 
The Board of General Officers concerned inself primarily with viewing, 
and approving as sealed patterns, the regimental clothing submitted to it 
annually by the agents of the proprietary colonels. Disputes between of- 
ficers over recruiting, and matters concerning officers' pay, seniority and 
(occasionally) their honour, were also considered by the Board. It sat 
first in 1705, and permanently from 1706. Under the presidency of a senior 
general officer nominated to the post annually, the Board sat irregularly 
as matters were brought before it; it was composed of a varying number of 
general officers (usually, those immediately available in town), who were 
called upon by the president to attend and sit. Infrequently, the King 
ordered the Board to prepare or to consider drill regulations, since its 
members as senior officers formed a pool of considerable experience of the 
service. 
Finally, there were about ten general officers appointed annually by 
letters of service to review the regiments in Britain and Ireland (and, 
where possible, in the overseas garrisons), and to report on their con- 
dition - including, prominently, their state of training. These re- 
viewing officers had by the end of each spring and summer reviewing season 
made a most intimate and immediate acquaintance with the regiments and their 
state of training; and they were, consequently, occasionally consulted by 
9. The Secretary at War was a responsible civil official, concerned with 
financing, quartering, and civil-military relations; and training and 
tactical matters were no concern of his. 
ý:: ý1 
f '.:: ý ýj ; ýý 
ý Fýý' i , 
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the King, the C-in-C, and the Adjutant General on matters of training and 
drill. The reviewing officers were considered as "on the staff" during the 
year in which they carried on their reviews; and sometimes (as with William 
Howe in the 1774 Salisbury camp) they were given active command of formations 
brought together in camps of exercise for purposes of intensive training. 
10 
Beyong the King's London staff there were two others, one in Edinburgh 
and the other in Dublin. Scotland was an area command, not a separate estab- 
lishment as was Ireland; and for almost all purposes the small Edinburgh 
Castle staff's functions were executive, the G. O. C. North Britain carrying 
out directives framed by the London staff. The details of troop movements 
and quartering, and the use of troops on the coast duty and otherwise in aid 
of the civil power, in that kingdom, were Edinburgh's business; but the in- 
itiative lay in London because of the presence there of the King and the 
C-in-C, and on all matters concerning training and drill regulations the 
London staff governed Edinburgh Castle just as it governed the commands in 
the plantations and the Mediterranean garrisons. 
In Ireland meanwhile, there was a large command and staff structure 
nominally under the Lord Lieutenant, closely paralleling that in London. 
The Irish Army's staff formed no part of the jurisdiction of the staff in 
London and it governed the army there in its own right, although for most 
purposes following the English model, as was natural. Where training and 
drill were concerned the Irish C-in-C might issue orders concerning details, 
but otherwise the Irish Army was obliged to follow all such Regulations and 
Orders as were issued explicitly in the King's name - which was not always 
the case, if they were entirely the pet project of the C-in-C in London. 
Regiments on the Irish establishment were reviewed by general officers who, 
though serving on the Irish staff and usually appointed reviewing officers 
by Dublin Castle, sent copies of their review reports to the Adjutant 
General in London for the use of the King and the Horse Guards staff. The 
Lord Lieutenant confined himself to ceremonial duties, in this regard, such 
as reviewing annually the Dublin garrison. 
These then were the agencies of uniformity, the source of all official 
drill regulations issued 'by Authority'. Most of the regulations prepared 
by one or more of these agents were issued on the direct and explicit auth- 
ority of the Sovereign as King's Regulations, and as such they commanded im- 
mediate observance by all the regiments in the army no matter which estab- 
lishment they might find themselves serving upon. Occasionally the British 
10. For a detailed discussion of the reviewing system and the duties of the 
reviewing officers, see below pp. 188-207. 
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or Irish C-in-C might issue regulations on his own authority, as we shall 
see, thereby obliging only the units on the British, or Irish establishments, 
to conform. In actual practice, whenever individual regiments left Britain, 
the Mediterranean garrisons, or the Americas - for any or all of which 
places the British C-in-C could, if he so chose, lay down binding regulations 
- for Ireland, these regiments carried such regulations with them and us- 
usally continued to follow them when arrived upon that establishment; reg- 
iments departing Ireland for other stations were obliged to conform to the 
British standard upon landing. There was therefore a clear recognition of 
the authority derived by the British C-in-C from his close proximity to the 
King, enhanced (as with the Dukes of Cumberland and York), by'their sharing 
in the blood royal or (as with Marlborough and Amherst), by their prestige 
through the army generally. Hence there was only an occasional divergence 
in the drill practised in the regiments commanded by the London and Dublin 
staffs; and the chance of any greater confusion was averted by the Adjutant 
General in Ireland normally following the example of his London counterpart. 
Indeed, from the later 1780's the Adjutant General in London had the full 
cooperation of the Irish staff, and London simply forwarded everything con- 
cerning drill. 
In spite of the keen and considerable activity on the part of the 
central authorities in preparing, distributing, and keeping up-to-date the 
army's drill regulations, and despite their almost invariably successful 
efforts at enforcing a general adherence to the practice laid down in the 
regulations, there was an occasional tinkering with various elements of it 
- with odd movements in the manual of arms, especially, and with the methods 
of giving fire when in battalion line - by the commanders of regiments, and 
by the commanders of armies serving in the field. This is understandable 
enough: it was a particularist age, and the system of proprietary regimental 
"ownership" and administration fostered such activities. But it must be 
emphasized that these improving 'fertile geniuses' (as the Duke of 
Cumberland derisively styled them), seldom strayed far from the regulations, 
and so their "improvements" were more of a nuisance than an actual hindrance 
to the achievement of regularity. On a very few occasions, however, major 
departures were made from normal practice; and although certain of these 
departures were justified by peculiar conditions of service (and sometimes 
recognized as useful, and adopted by the central authorities), others were 
absurdities prejudicial not only to the military efficiency of the units 
concerned but also to the safety of other units with which they might be 
brigaded. In any event, as we shall see, the influence of the central 
authorities soon made itself felt: corps and field forces in which undue 
liberties had been taken were obliged to conform to standard practice. 
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Throughout the eighteenth century the drill practised in each regiment 
(be it of horse or foot), consisted of five main elements known as the 
"manual exercise", the "platoon exercise", the "evolutions", the "firings", 
and the "manoeuvres"; 
11 
and it was with any or all of these elements that 
each of the several Regulations and Orders issued by the central authorities 
dealt, whether in whole or in part. 
12 
Briefly, the "manual exercise" was 
the long, slow, and detailed sequence of movements endlessly drilled into 
the private soldier whereby he learned, by the numbers, how to load and 
fire his firelock, to perform the bayonet drill, and to do a variety of 
ceremonial movements such as clubbing or saluting with his piece. The 
"platoon exercise" was that essential core of the manual which was used in 
volley-firing, and which unlike the manual was performed very quickly and 
to only a few words of command, or commands relayed by the drums. 
13 
The 
simple "evolutions" were the short, precise movements done on the spot in 
rank and file, such as left-turns, about-turns, and opening and closing the 
rank-and file-intervals. Young soldiers had at the very least to be fam- 
iliar with these first three elements, building-blocks the knowledge of 
which was essential for the performance of the final two elements of the 
drill. The "firings" comprised the quite complicated systems and sequences 
according to which fire was given and controlled - standing, advancing, 
and retreating - by sections of the line told off into a varying number of 
fire-divisions, and groups of fire-divisions. Not only did the foot per- 
form these first four elements of the drill but so too did the cavalrymen, 
dismounted; the troopers were expected to be quite as capable as the foot 
11. Often enough, however, officers used these terms interchangeably - to 
the great confusion of subsequent students - and frequently such terms as 
"exercise", "duty", "evolutions", and "discipline" were used collectively to 
refer to some or to all of the five elements comprising the drill. The 
specific usage must be studied in its original context. It is a common- 
place for historians to assume that, because two regiments are described as 
performing their 'exercise' in different fashions, their full drill must 
have differed completely; most often, such descriptions refer in fact only 
to trivial irregularities in the manual and platoon exercises, whereas the 
regiments might fire and manoeuvre exactly alike, and do so moreover quite 
in accordance with the regulations. 
To avoid confusion we shall use the term "drill", henceforth, as a coll- 
ective, refering to all five elements at once; and when dealing with a 
specific element of the drill we shall describe it by its eighteenth- 
century name. 
12. Details incidental to the uniform performance of the drill elements 
(such as the exact manner of posting all ranks when drawing up the regiment, 
the proper intervals to be observed between ranks and files depending on 
the disposition adopted, the specific commands or signals and the timing of 
responses, etc. ) : were also included in the Regulations and Orders, where 
appropriate. 
13. For example, the manual exercise made regulation in 1728 was performed 
to sixty-four vocal commands, and involved 185 separate motions for the 
soldier to perform. The platoon exercise of 1728 consisted of only four 
verbal commands, and 63 motions. 
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at the manual, platoon, and evolutions, since they might well have to fight 
dismounted, though it could scarcely be expected of them that they go 
through the firings with as much expertise as did the foot, whose proper 
province this was. The troopers in their turn, however, had to perform not 
only the foot evolutions but also a considerable number of evolutions on 
horseback; these consisted of simple facings and changes of front per- 
formed on the spot, at which not only the riders but the horses had to be 
schooled. Finally, there came the elaborate and extensive repertoire of 
close-order linear "manoeuvres"; or rather, the two distinct sets of 
manoeuvres drawn up in accordance with the peculiar tactical roles of the 
two arms, horse and foot. 
Passing from one element of the drill to the next the soldier acquired 
first, at the manual, poise, confidence and a certain skill with his arms, 
while at the same time coming under the influence of military discipline; 
next he learned to use his arms in unison with other soldiers, and as a re- 
sponse to command; then, well-acquainted with his arms, he was taught the 
basic elements of carriage and regulated movement, individually and then with 
others in rank and file. Having passed through these first three elements of 
the training regimen the private soldier had acquired the three things most 
essential to the performance of his more advanced, tactical role: knowledge 
of the use of his weapons, the ability to move in a regulated way, and a 
docile obedience. It was in training at the complicated and difficult 
firings and manoeuvres that he put these elementary skills to use, in 
combination. 
The division of its drill regimen into a system of five elements, 
taught progressively, was not by any means something foisted on the army by 
the theoreticians; it was rather the fruit of the evolution of seventeenth- 
century practice and practical experience. By the opening of the eighteenth 
century this division of the drill was so rooted in everyday practice that 
it was simply taken for granted as the established tradition of proceeding 
- that is to say, it had well before the beginning of our period come to 
be regarded as a sound and practical approach to training. The demise among 
the foot of the dual weapon-system and its supercession by the battalion 
armed uniformly with firelocks and bayonets (though technically and tactical- 
ly a development of great importance), merely simplified training and drill; 
it did not alter the logic and practicality of training according to the 
progressive drill regimen. 
14 
In an army subject to the dispersal and neglect 
14. The pikemen and musketeers of the seventeenth century had been brought 
along according to an essentially similar progressive regimen. On this, see 
G. R. Mork, 'Flint + Steel: A Study in Military Technology and Tactics in 
17th-Century Europe', Smithsonian Journal of History, 2 (1967), 25-52 
passim. 
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which characterized its peacetime condition, with an officer corps formed by 
purchase and given absolutely no common training experience prior to join- 
ing their units, the existence of a single drill regimen as unquestioned and 
ubiquitous custom was a circumstance of the most fundamental importance. 
By the earlier eighteenth century, therefore, there was already in 
existence a central command and staff structure responsible for the pre- 
paration and enforcement of drill regulations; and there existed too a 
well-established regimen in accordance with which the drill regulations were 
drawn up and according to which the regiments were trained. It remains 
only to note certain characteristics of the drill regulations in general, 
before describing in detail the genesis and the salient features of each of 
the particular sets of regulations which appeared during the eighteenth 
century. 
It was invariably the case that the drill laid down in the regulations 
was confined to the level of the regiment and its sub-units; the drill of 
larger bodies such as brigades, wings, or lines was ignored. The Crown, 
traditionally, had been obliged to farm much of the business of the manage- 
ment of its land forces, and the resulting proprietary "ownership" of 
regiments still prevailing in the eighteenth century made of each a part- 
icularist and partly self-administering unit; each regiment had its own 
staff, each shunned its neighbours and dealt directly with the central auth- 
orities, and each was therefore so constituted as to be ideally suited to 
carry on its own training, at the direction of the central authorities. 
Since the regiment was normally subject to extended dispersal, regulations 
aimed specifically at the regiment and its sub-units served the wholly nec- 
essary purpose of knitting the regiment together, providing an ideal guide 
to regularity among long-separated companies and troops. Nor were larger 
bodies than the regiment likely. to be formed in peacetime; except in the 
most extraordinary circumstances it was politically inexpedient and fin- 
ancially undesirable ever to concentrate and encamp regiments for the 
purpose of brigade manoeuvres. Additionally, the series of evolutions and 
manoeuvres in the drill regulations were designed in large part with a view 
towards preparing each regiment to take its place amongst others in the 
greater line of battle; when eventually they were brigaded, therefore, the 
individual regiments required not so much new drill techniques as they did 
constant practise at conducting the drill at a time, and pace, which would 
conform with that of the line as a whole. 
Until the large-scale remodelling and innovation which occurred on the 
very eve of and during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic liars, British 
drill regulations - whether issued as complete drills (that is, containing 
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directions on all five drill elements), as partial drills (dealing with 
only some of the elements), as general orders touching on certain details 
of the drill and issued either to the army as a whole or, on occasion, to 
one arm only, or as standing orders treating specific details of drill in 
individual regiments or field armies - were invariably brief, laconic, 
devoted to describing only the mechanics of performing the drill, and 
seldom if ever attempting to discuss the theoretical origins or practical 
application of any of the several parts of the drill laid down. Until the 
1780's, each set of regulations dealt most fully with the intricacies of 
the manual, the platoon, the evolutions and the firings; only by the close 
of the century did pride of place go to the details of the manoeuvres. 
Only the manual, platoon, and evolutions could be practised effectively by 
the dispersed companies, troops, and detachments, so that lengthy technical 
instructions on these elements were appropriate and helped to ensure uni- 
formity of practice. The firings, although they could be practised with 
profit only at the higher levels of concentration, were so technically diff- 
icult, demanding and (until the 1770's) so highly esteemed that they too 
were very carefully spelled out so as to admit of no confusion or deviation. 
As regards the fifth element, the manoeuvres, only the most important were 
treated in the regulations; and only from the mid-1760's onwards, by which 
time the theory and practice of military movement had advanced to the point 
where fast and flexible movement was possible, did detailed descriptions of 
the manoeuvres appear in the regulations. Essentially, it was only those 
manoeuvres regarded as most likely to be necessary in action, plus those 
few the mastery of which would provide groundwork upon which others could 
be based or extemporised, which were laid down in the regulations. These 
were the "core" manoeuvres; and regularity at these few manoeuvres most 
likely to be performed in the line of battle, where regularity was sup- 
remely important, was the aim of the regulations. It was the essential 
duty of each regiment to master these; and the King, the British and 
Irish C's-in-C, the Adjutants General, and the reviewing general officers 
saw to it that they did. And if regiments added to this the practise of 
several other manoeuvres - than well and good. It must be stressed here 
that, in addition to the few core manoeuvres laid down in whatever reg- 
ulations were currently in force, there were always several times as many 
manoeuvres which regiments practised. These additional manoeuvres were 
taken from the army's store of "customary" practice; and being customary, 
they were not specifically laid down in the regulations. The 1778 
Regulations, for example, laid down nine major manoeuvres which the bat- 
talions were obliged to master, thus ensuring regularity throughout the 
army at a solid core of common practice. Additionally, each battalion 
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built up (so far as it could) a considerable body of "customary" manoeuvres; 
these were derived from previous regulations, from the English-language 
treatises, from foreign regulations and treatises, from developments made in 
response to experience of active service, and from the 'fertile genius' of 
individual officers serving with their units. Altogether, these accumulated 
customary manoeuvres represented a very large, ever-increasing pool on which 
regiments drew as occasion, whim, or opportunity suited; and by 1782 a 
learned officer, John Williamson, could write that 'the number of different 
movements has been so multiplied, that some regiments can perform above two 
hundred'. 15 
That all regulations confined themselves to these technical basics, with- 
out elaboration, was due to the way in which interested contemporaries view- 
ed regulation drillbooks and drill orders, to what contemporaries expected 
from them. It was the purpose of regulations simply to lay down all of the 
details of the drill which the units concerned were required to learn and to 
conform to, so that tactical regularity could be expected of these units 
when they came to be employed together in the field by general officers. 
Drill was kept up-to-date by the issue, periodically, of new or revised 
regulations; but it was not expected even of new regulations that they 
essay the theoretical or practical application of their contents. That was 
attended to in a different way. 
The several things omitted from the regulations - theoretical justifi- 
cation and commentary on new forms of drill, descriptions of the tactical 
situations in which particular manoeuvres should be employed, notes on the 
best methods by which elements of the drill might be taught - were not by 
any means regarded as inconsequential; rather, their inclusion in the regu- 
lations was deemed superfluous. That such an approach could be adopted 
meant that the central authorities, in forming drill regulations, knew that 
it could safely be taken for granted that there existed throughout the 
service. at large a fulsome expertise in the living, accumulated custom of 
the service. Thus the means and techniques of training, and appreciation 
of the efficacy and tactical relevance of particular aspects of drill were 
learned, not from regulations, but rather from this accumulated custom. 
This custom consisted of experience of active service against enemies as 
different in their tactics as the warriors of the North American tribes and 
the troopers of horse in the maison du roi, and in geographical conditions 
as varied as the plains of Flanders and the jungles of the West Indies; it 
15. John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, and of the Disci- 
pZine of War; Adapted to the Practice of the British Infantry, I (1782), 117. 
The figure is a considerable exaggeration, since every manoeuvre could be 
performed in half-a-dozen ways hardly distinguishable one from another. 
81 
consisted of experience acquired in the actual peacetime performance of 
the drill, especially of those elements endlessly repeated in the dispersed 
condition of the peacetime regiments; in knowledge acquired in the extensive 
training of the reviewing season, and in the wartime camps of exercise; in 
knowledge acquired through theoretical and historical study; in knowledge 
gained from the voluminous literature privately published, which was readily 
available and which covered all aspects of military affairs both domestic 
and foreign; in the simple fruit of reflection and, sometimes, of common 
sense; and (at the century's end), in the new military academies just 
then being established. In the knowledge and experience of the officers 
and nco's with the regiments - knowledge which they inherited and which 
they passed on - lay that wealth which was the accumulated custom un- 
written in the drill regulations but bespoken on their every page. 
Where opportunities for advanced tactical training were infrequent 
at the regimental level, and almost unknown at higher levels; and where 
the drill regulations were technical and brief, rather than expansive, 
the existence of a large body of privately published literature devoted 
to all aspects of drill and tactics was, naturally, of especial significance. 
Such a body of literature existed in English; and before dealing with in- 
dividual works, in detail, we might consider the general characteristics which 
distinguished this literature as a whole. 
To begin with we should note of this literature that, though often wide- 
ranging and occasionally excellent, it displayed little of the intellectual 
brilliance and none of the polemicism which was, throughout the century, so 
characteristic. of the work of the French theorists and tacticians. 
16 
There 
was instead a very pragmatic bent to the great bulk of English-language 
military texts and treatises; and this pragmatism extended even to the choice 
of foreign works which were translated into English. Thus, there was room 
for the regulations of the Prussian infantry, but none for the seminal though 
controversial commentaries of the Chevalier de Folard. This pragmatism was 
the result of several factors, and only to the most limited extent does it 
indicate stagnation or sterility; most significantly, it reflects the 
physical dispersal of the small British officer corps, together with the 
prejudices of a society which made no provision for the discussion of the 
broader or topical aspects of military affairs (as in the salons of Paris), 
or of the more technical and professional military matters (as in the gar- 
risons of Prussia), just as it reflects the mood of general national in- 
difference or antipathy to military affairs and the consequent non-existence 
16. A subject dealt with by J. Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIII sidcle. La tac- 
tique (Paris, 1907); by R. Villate, 'Le mouvement des idees militaires en France 
au XVIIIe siecle', Revue d'histoire moderne, 10, New Ser., (1935); and more re- 
cently by R. S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (New York, 1957). 
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of facilities for advanced training in peacetime. This English pragmatism 
also illustrates the fact that a sound appreciation of the supremacy of 
firepower over all other forms of combat had been a lesson well learned by 
the end of Marlborough's campaigns, and had been taken to heart in the 
army; hence the issue of shock-versus fire-tactics, which so stirred the 
French after 1714, was not significant in Britain. 
Neither do the written efforts of British officers and tacticians 
reveal any lack of professionalism or expertise: on the contrary, some 
exhibited a marked interest in theoretical and practical developments both 
at home and abroad; and foreign campaigns, regulations, and treatises 
were constantly referred to and drawn on by British authors. Many were 
critical of various aspects of current British practice; and there were 
even a few who (in the vein of Saxe) set about an elaborate new-modelling 
of the army. What we would describe on the one hand as factors of grand 
strategy, and on the other as socio-political theories, were likewise 
called forth on occasion by the military writers: thus, some supposed that 
the island power should convert the whole of its land forces into marines, 
and conduct amphibious operations only; while others, well grounded in the 
political philosophy of the age, saw in this naturally brave people, living 
in liberty under the balanced constitution of a limited monarchy, where 
monarchical honour was wedded to republican virtue, the material from which 
unconquerable armies of citizen militiamen might be formed. Less elabor- 
ately, but nevertheless radically, some authors called for the establish- 
ment of universal military service based on short-term conscription; 
others thought that a system of county regiments, supported by their home 
counties and vying with one another in recruiting, in training, and in the 
field, would be an excellent innovation; still others laid down schemes 
for new weapons, clothing and accoutrements. There were also, naturally 
enough, a great many pedants who failed to rise above the pedestrian; 
there were not a few plagiarists quick to cash-in whenever the national 
interest was caught up in military affairs, as in 1745-46 for example; 
and there were even a few crackpots who (as ever), found their niche in 
the market. 
Not only the training, drill and tactics of the army were taken up by 
the military writers; ancillary topics provided scope for treatises and 
for commentary as well. Among these topics, those most closely related to 
training and drill (and those most commonly essayed) were the following: 
the mathematics, mechanics, and techniques of siegecraft, gunnery, and 
fortification; historical campaigns, in narratives with commentary; the 
service of partisans, or ranging companies; field fortification; encamp- 
ments; the "grand operations of war", that is the daily marches of an 
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army, its grand tactics and major movements; and the service of marines, 
and of the land forces on board the fleet. More immediately relevant 
topics, also commonly essayed, were the training and employment of light 
infantry, the drill employed in foreign armies, and weaponry. 
Translations of foreign regulations and treatises, together with up- 
dated editions of the military classics of antiquity, made up-an important 
part of the body of private publications to appear in English during the 
century. Caesar's The GaZZic War and The CiviZ War appeared in numerous 
editions, as did The Peloponnesian War of Thucydides ('our historian', as 
Wolfe called him); and there were at least two eighteenth-century English 
editions of Polyhius, of Tacitus, of Xenophon, of Josephus, and of Vegetius. 
17 
Translations of contemporary works, chiefly from the French and German, were 
commonplace: the main Prussian and French regulations appeared in English, 
as did the works of most distinguished foreign soldiers. 
The volume and variety of these publications illustrates what was 
indeed a very active 'Military Literary World', as Lt-Col Caroline Scott 
styled it in 1750; and if less flourishing than Paris, the London mili- 
tary printers and booksellers were certainly as busy as their Amsterdam 
counterparts, and probably busier than any others in the Germanies or 
elsewhere. The most useful of the English drillbooks, for the most part 
London-printed, were usually available elsewhere in the English-speaking 
world in reprint not long after their first impression: Dublin reprints 
were a commonplace, Edinburgh, York, and Exeter houses sometimes printed, 
and even the presses in the more advanced of the colonial towns like New 
York and Philadelphia occasionally brought out editions. If Scott found 
Limerick in 1750 to be a place affording 'nothing but bibles Missalls, 
Breviarys, Prayer books, and Child guides, by which our only Stationer 
(for he dont deserve title of bookseller) pleases protestants and papists', 
then that was just plain bad luck, for he would have been better served 
almost anywhere else. 
18 
The tacticians, editors, translators, compilers, and officers who 
'set up for an Author' (as Lt-Col John LaFaussille described himself and 
his colleagues in 1752), 
19 
appear to have served themselves fairly well, 
17. Roman antiquity was, of course, a subject of considerable interest in 
the military literary world, as it was in the civil; and Roman tactical for- 
mations were treated with as much veneration as were Roman architectural 
motifs. Engineer General William Roy published in 1793 his Military Antiquities 
of the Romans in North Britain, often cited today; and it was more than mere 
coincidence that Roy was chiefly responsible for siting the British Army's 
wartime encampments later in the century. We shall describe only one of these 
works below, in passing - Clarke's Vegetius of 1768 - since it is represen- 
tative of a body of literature not immediately germane, but not to be ignored. 
18. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #98. 
19. Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, II, f. l. 
84 
in serving their fellow officers at the presses. Their gain was not mone- 
tary. The Hanoverian Kings, all three of whom permitted several soldier- 
authors to dedicate their works to them, rewarded their efforts with the 
"Encouragement" due to zeal and merit. Lt-Col Humphrey Bland, for example, 
whose excellent treatise on military discipline appeared in 1727, was to 
gain royal favour, the comradeship of the Duke of Cumberland, and general 
rank. Capt Samual Bever, who brought out a guide for young officers in 
1756, was rewarded with a majority. Lt-Col Campbell Dalrymple got the 
governorship of Guadeloupe for his brilliant essay of 1761, and Capt 
Joseph Otway likewise 'got a Government' for his 1761 translation of 
Turpin de Crisse's treatise. Lt John Clarke got a captaincy as a reward 
for his 1768 version of Vegetius. Most favoured of all, perhaps, was 
William Fawcett. When he began to publish his translations of foreign 
treatises and regulations, during the mid-1750's, he was a mere subaltern; 
but so studious, and so devoted to the service was he that "encouragement" 
came his way, and he finished a long and brilliant staff career as a Knight 
of the Bath, a full General, and a member of the privy council. But this 
is not to imply that the aims of soldier-authors were mercenary. It is 
clear that, for most, the good of the service was the principal motive 
behind their endeavours, and a great many of them either published anony- 
mously or simply forwarded their ideas or manuscripts to the office of the 
Adjutant General, for his inspection and use. 
20 
Officers with good ideas, 
who wished to see these implemented in the service at large, could always 
expect a fair bearing from the Adjutant General, and sometimes enlisted his 
aid in forwarding such projects. 
21 
On a few occasions the Adjutant General 
leant his name as good backing for treatises; and on at least one occasion, 
in 1786, went so far as to send a circular to the commanding officers of all 
regiments recommending a forthcoming translation of Tielke's study of the 
Seven Years' War, and canvassing for subscriptions from their officers. 
22 
20. References to many such are to be found in WO 3. Typical of the tone 
normally adopted was Adjutant General Edward Harvey's reply of July, 1774, 
to Capt Staunton of the 14th Foot. Staunton had submitted proposed instruc- 
tions for the drill of a battalion of foot; and Harvey, who replied that 
he would soon take them under consideration, added that 'I am always glad to 
receive ye Opin[ion]s of Offrs whose Zeal & Abljities make them give their 
attentn. to the Service, & think myself Hon. wt this Mark of your attention. ' 
WO 3/4, p. 124. 
21. In 1775, for example, Maj Charles Vallancey was corresponding with the 
Adjutant General on behalf of himself and a group of officers who wished 
to establish a military academy in Dublin. Harvey lauded 'the Conduct of 
those Intelligent & Able Of frs, who take pains yt their knowledge may be 
of use to ye younger part of the Army', but could not assist since he had 
no command in Ireland. WO 3/5, p. 38. 
22. WO 3/27, p. 3. The Adjutant General raised 600 officers as subscribers 
for this very expensive work. 
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Of the fact that the bulk of this wide-ranging military literature, 
privately published, was widely read, and much of its topic matter taken 
to heart or directly implemented, there can be no doubt. The performances 
of drill and tactics put on by the regiments at their annual review re- 
peatedly illustrate the fact that units were practising such material; 
and the behaviour of units on campaign illustrates this further. The lists 
of subscribers appended to many of these publications are quite extra- 
ordinary. Capt Bennett Cuthbertson's treatise on the management of a bat- 
talion, for example, first published at Dublin in 1768, was subscribed for 
by some 939 officers of the land forces and marines, ranging from the C-in-C 
Granby to the lowest '2nd surgeon' - exclusive of militia officers and 
private subscribers. Similarly, Maj Robert Donkin's slight collection of 
remarks, published in 1777, was subscribed for by several hundred officers 
from subaltern through general rack. Thomas Simes' derivative, uninspired 
compil ations which appeared between 1768 and 1780, regularly drew several 
hundred officer-subscribers too. Fawcett's 1757 translation of the Prussian 
cavalry regulations drew nearly 500 officer-subscribers. Bland's treatise, 
the most successful of them all, sold several thousand copies between 1727 
and 1762. When these figures are compared with those for the total number 
of officers serving in the army (see p. 48 above), these subscribers 
represent very sizable proportions of the officer corps as a whole. 
Whatever the topics taken in hand, the common inspiration most generally 
shared by the military authors in Britain was two-fold: to assist an officer 
corps which otherwise had no formal training, and a large part of which often 
had little or no active experience of warfare, in acquiring a sound under- 
standing of the basics of the service; and secondly, to fill in with in- 
struction and commentary the gaps which, as we have seen, were left open in 
the regulations - thereby fleshing out the bones of the regulations, des- 
cribing the tactical situations in which certain manoeuvres were most 
appropriate, noting the easiest means by which the drill might be taught, 
giving the history and the theory of the development of drill procedures, 
and giving realistic tactical commentary and example the understanding of 
which would not only be of great assistance to the officer. on the day when 
he came to translate drill into bloody practice, but which would make it 
easier for him to appreciate the aim of the regulations, and thus to under- 
stand them more fully. Since many of the treatises included large numbers 
of manoeuvres which, as we noted earlier, were not included afresh in each 
sL4cessive set of regulations but which continued to be practised in the 
regiments as each individual regiment thought appropriate, the private 
publications served as an all-important vehicle for preserving and passing 
on the accumulated custom of the service. 
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In doing all of these things, the private publications gave life to the 
regulations issued by authority; this private literature served as a train- 
ing curriculum for the young officer who otherwise in peacetime could have 
acquired no more than the simple experience of the practise of the troop or 
company, less often of the squadron or grand-division, and much less often 
of the full regiment itself. Meanwhile, the field and general officers were 
in their turn provided with badly-needed drill and tactical instruction by 
the more advanced of the private treatises; for it was only when the bulk 
of the regiment was concentrated that the field officer had the opportunity 
of actually carrying on the drill of which he was expected to be master; 
and the vast majority of the general officers had even more need of such 
publications, almost never having in peacetime the opportunity to manoeuvre 
so much as a small brigade, let along lines, wings, or armies. 
1712 - 1748: 
When William of Orange landed in England he found there a small stand- 
ing army which had had considerable and varied experience of active service, 
which was well-enough armed and equipped, and which was trained to a system 
of drill and tactics quite as up-to-date as those practised elsewhere in 
Europe. 
23 
William's landing was to set in train events which, during the 
ensuing quarter-century, were to add vastly to that experience, and were to 
establish for the army a European reputation. In the years between 1688 and 
1712 the regiments of the growing British Army were to take part in succes- 
sive major operations, and were to serve with or against every militarily 
significant state in western Europe; the close cooperation of English, 
Scots, and Dutch forces, during these years, was to be especially advantag- 
eous where drill and tactics were concerned; 
24 
and the evolution of British 
arms, unit organization, drill regulations and training not only reflects 
this experience but indicates also what admirable foundations had already 
been laid in the system of drill used in the army immediately prior to 
William's landing. 
During the last decades of the seventeenth century the situation in the 
army as regards arms, and hence formations and tactics, had been one of 
23. A good recent study is J. Childs, The Army of Charles II (1976). 
24. Nowhere is the close relationship of the drill used in the Dutch, 
English, and Scottish armies more clearly illustrated, than in the detailed 
MS treatise 'Schola Martis, or the Arte of War', compiled c. 1728 by Brig- 
Gen James Douglass (BM Add. MS 27,892, ff. 209-318). Douglass served in 
the Flanders wars from 1688 to 1714, for most of that period in regiments 
of the Scots-Dutch Brigade, in the Foot Guards of the pre-Union Scottish 




Aware of this, the authorities had imposed drill 
regulations in order to provide the army with some settled core of common 
practice; and in this they succeeded admirably. The regulations issuing 
from Whitehall at this time were to serve as a lodestone, where so much else 
was flux; and by the beginning of the new century both the manner of org- 
anizing and the way of going about the drill and training of the regiments 
had been so firmly established, that it was henceforth to remain the common 
practice. The regulations which William found in force in 1688, therefore, 
and those which followed in 1690 and 1701 were only the culminating publi- 
cations in a series of official drillbooks which had been appearing with 
some frequency since mid-way through the reign of Charles II. 
26 
These 
differed one from another more in their format or style of presentation, 
and here in there in matters of minutiae, than in any of the essentials of 
the system of drill and tactics which they laid down; and where they 
varied it was on the stress laid on the exercises for the matchlock, pikes, 
flint firelocks, plug bayonets, and grenades, as arms evolution replaced one 
with the other. Taken together, this long series of very detailed regula- 
tions had cumulatively, by the time of Ryswick, established a system of 
drill and a tradition of basic practice which was to leave the most marked 
imprint on the army of the early eighteenth century. 
This survival is everywhere apparent when the drill and tactics of the 
army at the opening of our period are analysed. Nor is this survival sur- 
prising. If the weapon-system used in Marlborough's and Galway's battalions 
25. The best survey of arms evolution prior to Blenheim is G. R. Mork, art. 
cit.. On the British situation in particular, see H. C. B. Rogers, Weapons 
of the British Soldier (1972), 51-89; H. L. Blackmore, British Military 
Firearms, 1650-1850 (1967), 17-44; and C. Walton, History of the British 
Standing Army, 1660-1700 (1894), passim. 
26. In 1688 the army was following An Abridgement of the English Military 
Discipline. Printed by Especial Command, for the Use of his Majesties 
Forces (1686), which was a slightly up-dated ed. of An Abridgment of the 
English Military Discipline. Reprinted by His Majesties Special Command 
(1682). This 1682 ed., however, contained many fine plates, unlike its 
successors; and it was itself a considerable improvement upon An Abridgement 
of the English Military Discipline. By His Majesties Permission (1678). The 
original of this series appeared mid-way through Charles II's reign, the 
earliest copy being The English Military Discipline (1672): it appeared 
again as The English Military Discipline, or the way and method of exercising 
Horse & Foot, according to the practice of this present time... (1680); the 
"abridgements" (the first of which appeared in 1676), were however lengthy in 
themselves, despite the title, and were themselves the standard regulation 
drillbooks. 
A new, though hardly altered revision was prepared in 1690 as The Exercise 
of the Foot; with the EvoZutions ... By Their Majesties Command (1690). Another 
ed. of this 1690 version appeared at London in 1696, but it was quite like 
the original and bore the same title; and like the 1690 version too (but with 
a cavalry exercise appended as a supplement), was The Exercise of the Foot;... 
To which is added, the Exercise of the horse, grenadiers of horse, and 
dragoons (Dublin, 1701). 
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was a notable advance upon that employed in those of King William, never- 
theless the battalion armed uniformly with firelocks and bayonets was of 
such recent origins that many of the tactical possibilities which it offered 
were, naturally enough, not immediately apparent and so remained only 
potential. By the time of Blenheim a new fire-tactics - the famous 
platoon-fire system - had established itself as the forte of the British 
foot; but almost everything else - the evolutions, the manoeuvres, and 
the marches of the army - had changed hardly at all by the end of 
Marlborough's campaigning, so strong was the tradition of basic practice 
already established. We are too easily dazzled by the brilliance of 
Marlborough's grand-tactical dispositions, the moreso when these are con- 
trasted with those of William; Marlborough's victories were the fruit of 
the military genius of the commander, and not of any radical departure in 
the drill and tactics (save for platoon-fire) of the individual corps under 
his command. We come closest to the mark when we conceive of Marlborough's 
battalions as essentially those passed on and trained up in the campaigns 
of William, differing only in that they were newly and uniformly armed, and 
were able to lay down a most formidable and destructive fire; insofar as 
speed of movement, variety of manoeuvre, and suppleness are concerned, they 
were only marginally better than those of William, or no better at all. Any 
detailed analysis of the drill practised by the British foot just prior to 
and just after Marlborough's campaigns leads one to conclude that, if in 
some respects the soldiers and tacticians of the early eighteenth century 
were inventive, in most others they clung to that which they already knew. 
Conservatism was at work, understandably enough at a time of technological 
change. 
This conservatism is evident not only (as we shall see) in the major 
codifications of drill which were drawn up in 1727 and 1728; it is equally 
evident in the absence of any such works between 1690 and 1727. There was 
no full drill regulation published for the army of Queen Anne, despite the 
fact that it was during her reign that the British Army rose to such sudden 
prominence; and there were none published during the reign of George I, 
despite the fact that the first Hanoverian monarch was a soldier, and was 
to concern himself closely with the army's affairs. The absence of any new, 
full drill regulations during these warlike decades illustrates how extra- 
ordinarily successful and adaptable was the series of Stuart regulations 
and their Williamite re-issues; and indeed not until the end of the 
eighteenth century was there to appear again a set of regulations at once 
so informative, so detailed and (with their pleasant, discursive style), 
so immediately and easily comprehended and applied. The excellence of 
these wholly admirable Stuart drillbooks ensured the survival of the core 
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of practice which they laid down; consequently, brief supplements which 
regularized the most recent actice-service experience - and which owed 
their brevity to the fact that they implicitly (and sometimes explicitly 
27 
left most of the core of the drill to the regulations of the 1680's and 
1690's - were sufficient to transform the drill of the army of Landen into 
that of the army of Ramillies. Between 1690 and 1728, accordingly, little 
more than the manual and platoon exercises for the flint firelock and 
bayonet, together with the manner of carrying on the platoon-fire system 
and of telling off in four grand-divisions for certain manoeuvres, had to 
be set out in supplemental regulations. That part of the army which saw 
Flanders service under Marlborough became acquainted with and thoroughly 
accomplished at these revised or new elements of the drill while actually 
on the spot, in the theatre where drill modification was taking place. The 
rest of the army meanwhile - and especially the very many regiments 
stationed in Ireland - had all of the new modifications taught them nearly 
contemporaneously with their development in Flanders. By the time of Utrecht 
the whole of the army which survived the reductions was as well acquainted 
with the Flanders modifications, as it was accomplished at the surviving 
core of the practice of the 1680's and '90's. 
The first of the supplements to appear under Anne (and the only regula- 
tion of any sort to be printed during her reign, or during that of her suc- 
cessor), was drawn up by 'an Officer in Her Majesties Foot Guards' and en- 
titled The Duke of Marlborough's New Exercise of FireZocks and Bayonets; 
Appointed by His Grace to be used By all the British Forces, and the Militia 
(n. d. [c. 1708]). 
28 
This short booklet, which confined itself to the manual 
and platoon exercises as they were now being practised in Flanders, was the 
first in an endless succession of similar booklets devoted almost entirely 
to the intricacies of the manual and platoon exercises. Although 'appointed' 
by Marlborough for all the troops on the British establishment, the Duke's 
writ as Captain-General did not run to the forces in Ireland; and con- 
sequently an effort more elaborate than the simple issuing of a manual and 
platoon was required if the drill of the forces in that kingdom was to be 
brought up-to-date with Flanders practice. This effort was to be an ex- 
ceedingly important one since, with the majority of the regiments in the 
army always stationed in Ireland after any peace, uniformity on that 
27. Most of the printed and MS regulations of the period c. 1702-1727 refer 
their readers to 'King Wm. 's Book of Exercise' (i. e., the 1690 Regulations, 
so called), for many of the details which they themselves abridge or omit. 
28. Henceforth, 1708 Regulations. The date of publication has been korn 
from the only extant copy; and though a date of 1712 is sometimes attribut- 
ed, I feel that 1708 is much more likely, given Parker's activities in 
Ireland and the fact that the manual and platoon taught there is exactly 
the same as in this printed copy. 
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establishment would go far towards effecting uniformity throughout the army. 
This goal was soon accomplished, not through the office of Captain-General 
but by another of those sources of regulation which we noted earlier, namely 
the Irish Commander-in-Chief. 
The process is worth following since it sets the tone for much that was 
to follow later in the century. Upon the death of Cutts in 1707 his place 
as C-in-C at Dublin Castle went to Lt-Gen Richard Ingoldsby, a solder with 
considerable experience of William's and Marlborough's campaigns; and upon 
arrival in his new command from Flanders (where his own regiment, the 18th 
Foot, was serving under Marlborough), Ingoldsby found the troops 'very 
defective in their discipline, especially the foot'. In consequence, he 
applied to Marlborough and had a captain and ex-adjutant of his own 18th 
Foot brought over to Ireland where from 1708 to 1710, the whole of the foot 
upon that establishment was drilled by him to 'the discipline practised in 
Flanders'. 
29 
As early as September 1708 this officer, Capt Robert Parker, 
was writing from Dublin that 'I am here labouring hard w. 
h 
ye two Regimts 
here in Town in showing them & ye Ajudts our fireings, the Gen 
11 [Ingoldsby] 
is come from his progress & will See these Regimts perform in a day or two 
after which I shall be going for Corke and when ever the wether permitts I 
must be w. 
h 
ye Regimes there & at Kinsale' . 
30 
Parker spent two years on 
this duty, 'in which time all the regiments of foot passed through my hands', 
as he wrote. 
31 
The system of drill which he taught there, and which was 
made regulation in that kingdom by Ingoldsby's command, was not printed but 
was rather copied in manuscript and in that less-expensive form spread 
through all the regiments. The bulk of this regulation was devoted to the 
new platoon-fire system; included also were the manual and platoon exercises 
of the firelock almost exactly as laid down in the 1708 Regulations. Finally, 
although considerable space was given to forming the square, and although ' 
several of the evolutions already long-practiced were also included, little 
space was given over in this Irish drill to the evolutions and manoeuvres 
because these had of course not been much altered from the well-established 
practice of the 1680's and '90's. 
32 Nor does this drill, practised almost 
army-wide with the end of Parker's labours in 1710, seem to have been further 
29. D. Chandler (ed. ), Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-WesterZoo: The 
Marlborough Wars (1968), 7-8,10,75. (Cited hereafter as Chandler (ed. ), 
Parker). 
30. BM Add. MSS 23,642, f. 35. 
31. Chandler (ed. ), Parker, 75. 
32. Despite the fact that it was abridged and supplemental, this Parker- 
Ingoldsby drill since it encompassed all five elements much be regarded as 
the first full drill regulation to be issued by authority to the new 
firelock-and-bayonet army of the eighteenth century. A MS copy - 'The 
Exercise of Firelok and Bayonet with the sevýl. Fireings f the Foot... 
according to the method appointed by his Ex. 
e Lieut Gent' Ingoldsby' - 
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improved upon in Flanders during the remainder of the Spanish Succession 
war; for a series of general orders issued to the regiments there by 
Orkney, late in 1711, describe a drill which did not differ from that 
taught by Parker and Ingoldsby in Ireland. 
It was then with this system of drill - made up of the new manual 
and platoon exercises, of the new platoon-firings, with a modified system 
of telling off the fire-and manoeuvre-units, and with most of the old 
evolutions and manoeuvres - that the British Army emerged from almost a 
quarter-century of unbroken campaigning. And it was with this system that 
it entered the period of British military history under scrutiny here. 
Much had been learned. The army had been re-armed. The horse had definit- 
ely abandoned fire action in favour of the sword and had become accustomed 
to practising shock tactics. The foot had developed a successful (if com- 
plicated) system of fire-tactics and with it a keen perception of the 
supremacy of heavy fire over any other form of combat. In this view the 
British were considerably in advance of most Continental tacticians. Where 
Frederick II of Prussia was until mid-way through the Seven Years' War an 
advocate of the bayonet attack as the best offensive tactic for the foot, 
it was rather the Prussian system of alternate divisional fire which was 
to interest the British during the 1750's. 
34 
But if the horse had learned 
to trust to weight and l'arme blanche, and if the foot had learned to rely 
on the speed and volume of its fire, there had been almost nothing acquired 
at the regimental level as regards manoeuvre techniques, by 1712, that was 
not already known in 1697, and for the most part in 1688. The great 
antagonist France began, after 1712, to search for new means of intro- 
ducing flexibility into the manoeuvres of her infantry. It remained to 
be seen what new measures the officers and tacticians in Britain would put 
forward and adopt, now that a quarter-century of conflict had come to a 
close, in the quarter-century of peace which dawned with the settlement of 
Utrecht and the accession of the Hanoverian dynasty. 
The three decades which followed upon the conclusion of the Utrecht 
settlement were to be uneventful, in the development of British drill and 
tactical training. The army, reduced considerably in strength after 1712 
and widely dispersed about Britain, Ireland, and the overseas stations and 
survives in the Cornwall R. O. (DD. RH. 388), and has not before been con- 
sulted by scholars. 
33. The drill of the British foot in Flanders, by 1711, appears partly in 
general orders given out under Orkney (BM Add. MS 29,477). These 1711 
orders comprise the third major drill supplement to appear during Anne's 
reign. 
34. For Frederick's conservative, though changing views on the efficacy 
of fire, see Y. Gras, 'Les Guerres "limitees" du XVIIIe siecle', Revue 
Historique de Z'Armee, 26 (1970), 31-2. 
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garrisons, entered upon the longest period unmarked by a general war which 
Britain was to experience between 1688 and 1815. As has so often been the 
case among armies recently victorious, the British Army which came home 
from Queen Anne's wars settled down resting on its laurels. The friction 
of peace thereupon began its work; and it is but a slight exaggeration to 
say that, when occasion offered, the regiments which managed to assemble 
set about training to fight the War of the Spanish Succession. 
In almost all essentials, the drill prescribed for and practised by 
the horse and foot throughout these decades was that which had been used 
during Marlborough's later campaigns. Indeed during the years from 1712 
until 1748 only one full-scale regulation drill was issued to the British 
Army; and only a handful of orders by authority and private publications 
appeared to supplement this regulation, none of which attempted anything 
more significant than to codify current practice or to quibble over details. 
Before attempting to account for this unwonted somnolence which came hard 
on the heels of Ramillies and Malplaquet, we will first of all describe 
those few regulations and treatises. 
Because of their commanding influence in the army two works stand out 
above the others which appeared during this period, and both were published 
within a year of one another. The first, Humphrey Bland's Treatise of Mili- 
tary Discipline, appeared in 1727 and was a private venture; the second, 
the 1728 Regulations, was the first major drill regulation to be issued by 
authority since 1690. 
The genesis of the 1728 Regulations illustrates the operation of 
another of those channels for the introduction of drill alluded to above. 
Within four months of the death of his royal father the new king, George 
II, 'having Observ'd in his Review of his Forces, that the Regiments do 
not use One and the same Exercise, and that every Colonel alters or Amends 
as he thinks fit', ordered the Board of General Officers to consult together 
and 'propose a proper Exercise for the Horse, another for the Dragoons and 
a third for the Foot, which when approv'd by his Majesty will be given out 
in Orders to be Observ'd respectively'. 
35 
The Board, in consequence of this 
order of 7 October 1727, directed at their meeting of 9 October that 'a 
Comittee of the General Officers of Dragoons Horse & Foot do Meet and 
36 Prepare Rules for Exercise'. The committee acted with dispatch, since 
35. WO 71/6, pp. 19-20. The King, it is clear, was referring only to a 
general tinkering with the manual and platoon, not to any great deviations 
between the corps. The Board however took the opportunity to draw up rules 
for the full five elements of the drill. 
36. Ibid. Thirteen of the fourteen members of the Board, which met on 9 
October, were also colonels of regiments and represented all arms. Under 
the presidency of Gen the Duke of Argyll (3rd Horse), the Board was composed 
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so soon as 15 December the Board approved ('after some small Alterations'), 
the new exercises drawn up for both the Horse and the Dragoons; and on 
20 December the Board 'Mett and Sign'd the Report of the Exercise, pre- 
pared for the Horse Dragoons & Foot'. King George II quickly gave his 
approbation, and the new drills thereby became regulation. 
37 
That the Board and its committee acted with such dispatch indicates 
that considerable thought had already been given to the problem; and a 
Whitehall circular of the previous February had already directed that an 
uniform Dragoon exercise be prepared. 
38 
Likewise, the manual and platoon 
exercises which the Board proposed for the Foot had already in fact been 
published, the previous April, by Lt-Col Humphrey Bland; the Board had 
simply lifted the whole of it from Bland's book and made it regulation for 
the army. Indeed there were no departures from the norm, in fact nothing 
at all was really new in these drills drawn up and approved for the three 
arms, late in 1727; the Board and its committee had merely drawn on, 
systematized, and made uniform current practice, and that practice was no 
more than the result of the experience accumulated in the wars from 1688 
to 1712. 
The new regulations were sent to the King's Printer, John Baskett, 
within two weeks of their having been approved by His Majesty; and the 
printer was ordered to run off and bind three hundred copies, immediately. 
39 
Baskett seems now to have slowed down what had been accomplished hitherto 
in record time; for although the Secretary at War was able on 25 March to 
distribute copies of 'the Book of Military Exercise which His Majesty hath 
of Gens Lord Cobham (2nd Horse) and Sir Charles Wills (1st Foot Guards); 
of Lts-Gen Thomas Whetham (12th Foot), Joseph Sabine (23rd Foot), William 
Evans (4th Dragoons), and George Wade (4th Horse); of Majs-Gen the Earl 
of Deloraine (16th Foot), Russell, Humphrey Gore (1st Dragoons), and Lord 
Mark Kerr (13th Foot); and of Brigs-Gen Charles Churchill (10th Dragoons), 
Edmund Fielding (41st Foot), and the Hon. William Kerr (7th Dragoons). 
This assembly not only represented all types of corps, but combined a 
formidable experience of the service, as was often the case with the Board. 
37. On the boards of 15 and 20 December Wills, Cobham, Evans, Sabine, and 
Mark Kerr were not present, their places being taken by Gens the Earl of 
Cholmondeley (3rd Dragoons) and the Earl of Stair (6th Dragoons); and by 
Maj-Gen William Tatton. 
38. WO 26/17, circular, '16 Feb. 1726/7'. This was at the request of the 
colonels of the several regiments of dragoons. 
39. WO 4/29, p. 133. It should be pointed out here that, in order'to cut 
costs, it was the custom to issue only a few sets of regulations to each 
regiment. In 1728 for example, a single regiment of foot on the British 
establishment would alone have needed thirty-seven copies, were each of its 
officers to be provided with one (WO 24/133). From the few sets arriving 
at each corps, officers might copy into their manuscript commonplace books 
any material immediately relevant to their duties - or they might purchase 
printed copies at their own expense. 
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been pleased to approve of' to the colonels of every regiment then serving 
in Britain, the Secretary on 22 March had had to threaten Baskett with the 
loss of his contract, unless he set about his business more promptly. 
40 
Henceforth, however, notes from the Secretary at War to the senior secretary 
at the Treasury, desiring that the Treasury provide funds for further bulk 
printings of these 1728 Regulations, are a commonplace in the letter-books 
of the Secretary at War. 
41 
These three drills were reprinted and issued, periodically, from 1728 
until 1743, and at no time during that period were they revised in the 
slightest; and not until the pressure of events on active service began to 
be felt during the later 1740's was modification made. Each copy carried 
a printed royal warrant dated at Whitehall, 6 January 1728, directing that 
it was 'His Majesty's express Will and Pleasure' that these regulations 'be 
observed and followed without any Deviation'. Briefly, the 1728 Horse and 
Dragoon drillbooks laid down the manual and platoon exercises of the carbine 
(for the Horse), and of the firelock (for the Dragoons), and then proceeded 
to describe the simple evolutions to be performed by the troopers when act- 
ing in line, dismounted. The evolutions and the essentials of manoeuvring 
for mounted regiments told off into two or three squadrons, came next. There 
were no significant differences between the drills to be followed by the two 
mounted arms. The manual and platoon exercises prescribed for the Foot 
were quite like those for the cavalry; and lastly came the evolutions, the 
various types of firings, and a very few manoeuvres which were wholly within 
the province of the infantry. 
Late in April of 1727 - that is about two months after the circular 
calling for the establishment of an uniform Dragoon exercise, eight months 
before the drills settled upon by the Board were made regulation in Janaury 
1728, and eleven months before the 1728 Regulations were first distributed 
- there was published the first edition of Humphrey Bland's Treatise of 
Military Discipline, the best known (both then, and now) of all eighteenth- 
century military treatises in the English language. The author was in 1727 
lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Horse, had seen service under Marlborough, and 
was to serve again as a general officer under Cumberland in Scotland and 
Flanders; he was an officer of sound judgement, and an author who organized 
his ideas and his prose with the greatest clarity. 
40. WO 4/29, pp. 182-186. 
41. The last order for copies was made in 1743. For examples of these 
orders, see WO 4/34, p. 409 (300 copies, Apr. 1737), and WO 4/38, p. 263 
(500 copies, Aug. 1743). Similar orders directed through the Treasury for 
bulk printings of material for the regiments appear in WO 4. 
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Bland's book was an instant success, and for over thirty years to 
come it served as the basic text or primer for the young officer who, 
having just bought his commission and being desirous to know the daily 
duties and routine of the service, could do no better (nor for that matter 
could he do. any other, for where else was the young British officer to 
look for such guidance? ), than turn to Bland. 
42 
The whole of the manual 
exercise of the foot in the 1728 Regulations was copied word for word 
from Bland, and the platoon exercise, the rank-and file-intervals, the 
wheelings, the essentials of the firings, of platoon fire, and other details, 
were paraphrased from Bland. Similarly the 1728 manual exercise of the 
Dragoons, and most of that for the Horse, were drawn from his Foot exercise. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to trace the process whereby much of Bland's 
text was transferred to the Board of General Officers, nor can we ascertain 
whether the February 1727 circular, mentioned above, effected the process; 
the links are clear, nevertheless. Likewise, parts of Bland's book, and 
many shortened or simplified versions, were published in the American 
colonies for the use of the militia and Provincial corps. 
43 
42. Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline; In Which is Laid 
down and Explained The Duty of the Officer and Soldier, Thro' the several 
Branches of the Service, was first published in London and Dublin, in 1727. 
A 2nd ed. followed immediately in the same year. The later editions (all 
London-printed), appeared as follows: 3rd ed., 1734; 4th ed., 1740; 5th 
ed., 1743; 6th ed., 1746; 7th ed., 1753. The 2nd through 7th eds. were 
simply reprints of the 1st, the term "edition" in the eighteenth century 
only infrequently implying "revised". In 1759 an 8th revised ed., was 
published (the revision was the work of Sir William Fawcett, the noted 
tactician and soldier who had by then translated the Prussian regulations, 
and who was later to be made Adjutant General); and in 1762 Fawcett's 
revision was reprinted as the 9th rev. ed. of Bland. 
"I have used the 1743 ed. (cited hereafter as Bland, Treatise of Military 
Discipline); and I have also used the 1762 rev. ed. (cited hereafter as Bland, 
Treatise of Military Discipline (rev. ed., 1762)). 
43. Thus there appeared Anon., An Abstract of Military Discipline; more 
particularly with regard to the Manual Exercise, Evolutions, and Firings of 
the Foot. From Col. ýZand (Boston, 1743): this and others like it were print- 
ed at Boston in 1743, '44, '47, '54, and '55, and others were printed at 
New York in 1754, '55, and '59. Printed in the 1754 New York version were 
Governor William Shirley's orders, that all corps of foot within the pro- 
vince were to conform to this drill. Bland's 'evolutions' were also pub- 
lished in the colonies, in company with a 1740 manual exercise devised by 
Col William Blakeney (of whom more presently), appearing first as Anon., 
The New Manual Exercise by General Blakeney. To which is added the Evolutions 
of the Foot by General Bland (Philadelphia, 1746). This work, first printed 
by Benjamin Franklin, was reprinted at Philadelphia in 1747 and 1755, and 
at New York in 1754 and 1756. 
The only such simplified version ever to appear in England was a precis 
of Fawcett's 1759 revision, and was designed for the Yorks militia. This 
was Capt-Lt George Thompson's An Abstract of General Bland's Treatise of 
Military Discipline... With... the New Exercise, as practised by the Guards 
(York, 1760). Thompson, a militia officer himself, thought Bland's the 
'perfectest' drillbook 'in our Language'. 
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Granted its success, however, Bland's treatise like the 1728 Regulations 
offered nothing that was new, tactically. Nor was it meant to be anything 
more than a description of the drill, training, and duties as they were 
practised at the time of writing, and so immediately useful. Bland himself 
in 1727, describing a part of his work, wrote that he would 'insert no more 
here than what was practised by the Foot during the late War in Flanders'; 
and that holds true for most of his text. He wrote the book because the old 
experienced officers of King William and Queen Anne were dying off, and a 
younger generation of officers unused to service was in need of a practical 
treatise based in experience; because, although British arms had of late 
gained a great reputation, there were available no English treatises more 
recent than that of Orrery (1677); 
44 
and because in his view neither alliances 
nor treaties could of themselves be sufficient 'without the Ratio Ultima... 
it is a true Observation, that, First or Last, Force has been the Conclusive 
Argument of most Treaties, and those have been found the best, which have 
been supported by the best Troops'. 
Bland devoted about two-thirds of his text to the intricacies of the 
manual and platoon exercises, the evolutions and the firings, all of which 
was either repeated by or - because he dealt with these subjects at greater 
length - supplemented the 1728 Regulations. This was all most useful down 
to the mid-1740's. The final third of the book was given over to fine 
general comments on drill, shrewd tactical observations, and to a long 
series of chapters dealing with everyday affairs separate from drill such 
as garrison and camp duties, mounting guards, parading, regimental inspec- 
tions and reviews, and the host of other routine matters none of which were 
to be found in the official regulations, and accordingly very useful. 
Taken together then, the 1728 Regulations and the Treatise of Military 
Discipline described the drill practised in the British Army at the acces- 
sion of George II. Neither work was in any way theoretical but rather im- 
mediate and practical; and although these were by far the most important 
drillbooks of this period, there were others which - although they too 
dealt essentially with current practice, scarcely breaking new ground - 
were widely read and illustrate further the nature of English military 
literature at this time. The most important of these was Brig-Gen Richard 
Kane's Campaigns, written just prior to 1736 and first published, post- 
humously, in 1745.45 Although primarily a narrative military history, the 
44. Roger, Earl of Orrery, A Treatise on the Art of War (1677). 
45. Brig-Gen Richard Kane, Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne; From 
1689, to 1712. Also, A New System of Military Discipline, for a Battalion 
of Foot on Action; with the Most Essential Exercise of the Cavalry... (1745), 
was reprinted with the addition of several excellent plates illustrating 
manoeuvres and firings (the 'Designs of experienced Officers', as his anon. 
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short section which Kane devoted to the drill and tactics of a battalion 
reflects the trend of developments, in practice, by the mid-1730's; and 
within the limitations of its length it was both exceedingly realistic 
and, in some respects, more up-to-date than either Bland or the 1728 
Regulations. Kane's experience was very considerable, having served 
throughout the wars of 1689-1712 in Ireland, on board the fleet, and in 
Flanders and Germany. Most of his service was within the 18th Foot (the 
corps whose drill Parker had taught in Ireland); hence the realism which 
infuses Kane's tactical observations. Indeed (as his editor wrote in 1747), 
Kane 'with great Contempt, read some Books, which pretended to Teach the 
whole Military Art; and often assured his Friends, that those mean 
Performances provoked him, to attempt something on the same Subject'. 
46 
He succeeded in his purpose, Wolfe for one thinking it 'a very pretty, con- 
cise discourse, to the great advantage and improvement of those persons for 
47 
whom it was intended'. 
Of limited use on the theme of tactics, but an excellent introduction 
to the major operations of the unitary army and (with the inclusion of the 
full Standing Orders of his dragoon regiment) an important source on the 
training of the cavalry, was Lt-Gen Richard, Viscount Molesworth's Short 
Course of Standing RuZes, a treatise printed in London in 1744 and again in 
Dublin in 1745.48 Molesworth had seen much service in Flanders and Spain 
after 1702, and was an A. D. C. 'to Marlborough at Ramillies and for some time 
thereafter. He was devoted to the service: he raised a regiment of dragoons 
in the '15, and in 1723 he was planning to write a history of the Duke of 
Marlborough - 'which I propose as the chief affair of my life 149 - and he 
editor described them), as Brig-Gen Richard Kane, Campaigns of King William 
and the Duke of Marlborough... The Second Edition(1747). Parts of this work 
appeared again in 1757, although the anon. author of this version so altered 
its format, and added so much new material, that it bore little resemblance 
to the original. This last work, by a 'Gentleman of the Army', was A System 
of Camp Discipline... and other Regulations for the Land Forces... In which 
are included, Kane's Discipline for a Battalion in Action... (1757). These 
works will be cited hereafter as Kane, Campaigns, as Kane, Campaigns (2nd 
Ed. ), and as Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane(1757), respectively. 
46. Kane, Campaigns (2nd Ed. ), Editor's Preface. 
47. Beckles Willson, op. cit., 166. 
48. Lt-Gen Richard, Viscount Molesworth, A Short Course of Standing Rules, 
for the Government and Conduct of an Army, Designed for, or in The Field. 
With Some useful Observations... (1744), was published under the same title 
(though Corrected and Amended by the Author - which in fact it was not) in 
Dublin in 1745. Included in both printings was a lengthy appendix of 'Stand- 
ing Orders for the Royal Dragoons of Ireland, Given in the Year 1738', and 
which might be compared with 'The First Standing Orders of the Fifteenth 
Light Dragoons', dating from c. 1789, which Lt-Col J. B. R. Nicholson reprinted 
in Tradition, 10, (1965), 2-3; 11 (1965), 30-3; 12 (1965), 30-1; 13 (1966), 
30-1; and 15 (1966), 28-9. 
49. This project did not come off, owing mainly to Duchess Sarah's obstinacy. 
As Molesworth complained, 'I have... in vain been dunning Her Grace for certain 
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had some interesting ideas on the formation of the army. 
50 
His military 
career prospered (although during the 1720's promotion was slow, Molesworth 
complaining in 1724 that 'all colonels are immortalized by my being next 
heir to a regiment'), since he became Irish C-in-C in 1751 and was made 
Field Marshal in 1757; but his success as a military writer was mixed. 
51 
His Short Course of Standing RuZes was hardly profound: Lt-Col Caroline 
Scott of the 29th Foot ordered the book in 1750 only 'to fill up my col- 
lection rather than of real use'; 
52 
and as anything more than an intro- 
ductory guide for the inexperienced, Scott judged it rightly. 
Another work which, like Molesworth's, was best suited to informing 
the inexperienced was Brig-Gen Adam Williamson's Maxims of Turenne, pub- 
lished in London in 1740 and reprinted there in 1744.53 Full of wise if 
disjointed commentary, Williamson's book was (he said himself) best read 
by young officers only after they had grounded themselves in the regula- 
tions and Bland's treatise. 'Let them put this book in their pockets', 
he wrote; 'it will take littl+ore room than their snuff-box, and if as 
often look'd into, will be of greater use to them; for every paragraph is 
a lesson. '54 Like Molesworth, Williamson had joined the army in 1702 and 
had served throughout Marlborough's campaigns. In 1722 he served briefly 
as Adjutant General, and was thereafter Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower. A 
brigadier in 1741, he was at the time of his death a lieutenant-general. 
Like so many of the soldier-authors of the eighteenth century, Williamson 
was granted permission to dedicate his work to the King; and in 1740 he 
presented copies of his Maxims of Turenne both to George II and the Duke of 
Cumberland. 
55 
materials, which are necessary to my first setting out'. HMC, Clements MSS 
(1913), pp. 354,359,405-6. 
50. Molesworth thought that recruiting would be eased if the authorities 
were 'to nominate the several Foot Regiments in His Majesty's Service, from 
the several Shires in Great Britain'. This would inspire the shires to vie 
with each other to keep the corps bearing their names complete; it would 
prevent desertion ('Since, should any, in that Circumstance, offer to go 
home, the whole Neighbourhood would be Piqued in Honour to detect and re- 
store them. '); and finally 'so strong an Emulation would be raised between 
(for instance) the Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire Regiments, and 
so on, that each would be cut to Pieces, before it would yield any Preference 
to its Neighbour'. (pp. 167-71). 
51. C. Dalton, George the First's Army, I (1910), 85; and HMC, Clements MSS 
(1913) pp. 377,405. 
52. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, # 98. 
53. Brig-Gen Adam Williamson, Military Memoirs and Maxims of Marshal Turenne; 
Interspersed with others, taken from the Best Authors and Observation, with 
Remarks (1740), was (as its title indicates), a series of general maxims deal- 
ing with all aspects of active operations, ably commented upon by Williamson. 
The work, like Bland's, was inspired partly by declining experience in the 
army: -'A cessation of Arms for twenty-eight years much unavoidably have been 
attended with the loss of most of our old Generals and Officers, and their 
Posts fill'd with many who never served abroad. ' (p. v). 
54. Ibid., vi. 
55. J. C. Fox (ed. ), The Official Diary of Lieutenant-General Aden Williamson, 
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The 1728 Regulations, and the treatises of Bland, Kane, Molesworth, 
and Williamson were the only major works concerning the training and drill 
of the horse and foot which were to appear in Britain prior to 1748. Of 
the more significant foreign treatises, only one - the Memoires of Lt-Gen 
the marquis de Feuquieres, first published at Faris in 1711 - was translated 
for the benefit of the British officer corps; 
56 
and there is no evidence 
that the British profitted by the translation, or were busy reading other 
foreign works. Not even Folard, whose major treatises appeared during the 
later 1720's, seems to have penetrated the British Army. 
In sharp contrast to this shortage of major treatises, however, was 
the plethora of manual and platoon exercises - some issued by authority and 
others privately published - which appeared regularly from 1716 through 
1746. The contrast is significant and, as we shall see, the concentration 
on these exercises is revealing of the condition of the peacetime army. Thus 
in 1716 a manual and platoon exercise was issued to the army generally; but 
it was exactly like that given out in general orders by Orkney in Flanders 
in 1711, and now simply reaffirmed. 
57 
Again, in 1723, a manual and platoon 
exercise exactly like that issued in 1716 was given out by Dublin Castle, 
and it was 'order'd to be used by all the Regimes in Ireland'S8 In 1735 
the exercise for the handling of grenades, as laid down in the 1728 Regula- 
tions, was illustrated in a book of engravings published in London. 
59 
Another engraver, Benjamin Cole, produced in 1745 a series of plates illus- 
trating the several 'positions of a Soldier under arms' according to the 
manual exercise in the 1728 Regulations; and Cole in 1746 brought out a 
fuller version, responding no doubt to the spur which Prince Charles Edward 
Stuart had given to public interest in military affairs. These several 
60 
Deputy-Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1722-1747 (1912), -5-6,103. 
56. Antoine de Pas, marquis de Feuquieres, Memoirs Historical and Military... 
Translated from the French with Preliminary Remarks... by the Translator, 2 
Vols., (1735-36). The anon. translator was careful to expunge French jingoism 
from this very important study on tactics and recent campaigns and, having thus 
rendered the work 'impartial', to fill it with the English equivalent. 
57. I have found only one copy of the 1716 exercise, in the MS commonplace 
book of an officer in Handasyde's 22nd of Foot (NAM MS #6807/205, pp. 1-4). 
The 1711 Flanders manual is to be found in BM Add. MS 29,477, f. 9. 
58. NAM MS #6807/205, pp. 11-14. 
59. The engraving and publication were the work of Bernard Lens, in his The 
Granadiers Exercise of the Grenade... (1735). This was reprinted in 1744; and 
it has since been reproduced, with an introduction, as part of the National Army 
Museum Historical Series (The Granadiers Exercise 1735 [1967]). The 1729 grenade 
exercise on which Lens based his booklet was itself taken directly from Flanders 
practice of 1711 (BM Add. MS 29,477, f. 10). 
60. These works of Cole were, The Gentleman Volunteer's Pocket Companion, 
describing the Various Motions of the Foot Guards, Drawn from an Officer Zong 
experienced in ye Military Disciplin... (1745); and The Soldier's Pocket- 
Companion, or the Manual Exercise of our British Foot as now practis'd... (1746). 
These are a clear illustrative accompaniment to the manual of 1728. 
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exercises differed hardly at all, one from another. 
61 
In 1740 however, 
Colonel (later Lt-Gen, Lord) William Blakeney devised a platoon exercise 
which was significantly shorter and simpler than that authorised by reg- 
ulation; this was to be used in the training of a new, four-battalion march- 
ing regiment (Spotswood's, later Gooch's), to be raised in America for 
service in the forthcoming expedition to Cartagena. As adjutant general to 
the expedition Blakeney went to America in June, 1740, to assist in raising 
this regiment; and since there would be little time for training Spotswood's 
in the intricacies of the regulation manual and platoon he drew up his own 
short, easier version. 
62 
This circulated in manuscript at this time in 
England where (according to a hostile critic), Blakeney was 'very much in vog 
among ye officers for his pretended transcendency in ye Manuel Exorcise - 
and got a Regmt. of Foot for the same'; 
63 
but Blakeney's exercise was never 
printed in Britain or Ireland although, as we have been (p. 95 above), it 
was frequently reprinted in the colonies for the militia and Provincials. 
64 
Neither was the English militia spared the mania for the manual and 
platoon. To note but two examples, among several: in 1717 William Breton 
published a lengthy manual and platoon, together with a description of the 
evolutions and the firings, some of which was based on the regular army's 
current practice but much of which was cribbed from an outdated, anonymous 
61. If we compare the platoon exercises laid down in the 1708 Regulations, 
in Orkney's 1711 Flanders orders (BM Add. MS 29,477, f. 9), in the Parker- 
Ingoldsby Irish drill of 1708 (Cornwall R. O. DD. R. H. 388, ff. 1-3), in the 
1716 Regulations (NAM MS #6807/205, pp. 1-2), in the Irish 1723 Regulations 
(NAM MS #6807/205, pp. 11-12), in Bland's 1727 Treatise of Military Discipline 
(pp. 19-25,72-3), and in the 1728 Regulations (pp. 6-49), we find that the 
words of command in the 1708 platoon and in the Parker-Ingoldsby platoon are 
identical, although the former version (which may contain misprints) con- 
sists of 68 motions for the soldier while the latter consists of 63; the 
Orkney platoon, the 1716, the 1723, the Bland, and the 1728 platoons, res- 
pectively, consist of 63,64,64,63, and 63 motions; all are virtually 
identical, except that the versions in Bland and in the 1728 Regulations make 
a slight change in two of the motions. 
62. On this unit, which was part of the regular army, see C. McBarron, et 
al, 'The American Regiment, 1740-1746', Military Collector & Historian, 21 
(1969), 84-6. On Blakeney's role in preparing Goach's, see Pargellis, 
Loudoun, 13. 
63. The critic was Brig-Gen James Douglass, who obtained an early version 
'at Court, from Coll. Blakney himself', before he sailed. Douglass kept the 
copy and appended his criticisms (BM Add. MS 27,892, f. 219). Blakeney was 
given a regiment (the 27th Foot), in 1737; he retained its colonelcy until 
his death in 1761 
64. Blakeney served in Flanders under Marlborough, and saw service again in 
the 1739-48 war. In 1756, with four battalions, he held out for seventy days 
in St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, when Richelieu besieged the place with 
16,000 troops. Blakeney was a veritable Uncle Toby, often developing drills 
during the 1740's. An adulatory biographer said of him that, during the 
long peace between 1712 and 1739, he 'had a Number of Things made of Paste- 
board, which the Wags of those Days called Puppets, by the Movements thereof 
he could represent all the different Postures and Exercise of a Battalion'. 
Anon., Memoirs of the Life and particular Actions, of... GeneraZ Blakeney... 
(Dublin & London, 1756), 16,7-8. 
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work of 1689.65 Much more useful was The Militia-Man, which came out in 
1740; the anonymous author of this tome recommended that all schoolmasters 
in the 'Charity Schools' of England should learn the manual exercise, so 
that they might teach it to their pupils who would, thereby, acquire early 
in life a dexterity in the use of arms. 'The humour will spread, and the 
boys of other schools will take to the same sport, and the Exercise will 
become as common play as cricket or foot-ball. ' The result would be to fill 
out the county militia battalions with eager 'veterans'. 
66 
There is, finally, no evidence of any pamphlet discussion of drill 
and training; and save for a few short manuscript compilations, and the 
occasional plans and suggestions circulated in correspondence between 
officers, it was from these relatively few sources - and from customary 
practice - that young officers entering the army during these long years 
of peace acquired their understanding of the drill. 
67 
The regulations and treatises which appeared during these years were 
by no means innovative. Their purpose was essentially conservative, their 
goal modest: on the one hand to codify and preserve the drill which the 
army had learned during its lengthy and successful experience of Flanders, 
and on the other to ensure that all the regiments should continue to 
practise this drill uniformly. Since all of the regiments which survived 
the post-Utrecht reductions were by 1712 well-acquainted with 'the dis- 
cipline practised in Flanders', these regulations and treatises though few 
in number should nevertheless have been more than sufficient to accomplish 
such modest ends. But were these ends accomplished? How successful were 
the drillbooks at retaining or imposing uniformity, and at assisting the 
army in keeping itself fully trained against the day when war might be 
renewed? The answers to these questions are to be found partly in the 
circumstances which occasioned the introduction of certain of these drills, 
65. William Breton, Militia Discipline. The Words of Cormnand and Directions 
for Exercising... (1717). The earlier work was that of Capt J. S., Military 
Discipline; or the Art of War... of Doubling, wheeling, Forming and Drawing 
up a Battalion or Army into any Figure, etc. (1689), itself only a reprint 
of Part II of Capt J. S., Treatise of Fortification and Military Discipline... 
(1688). This work was by 1688 already old-fashioned, full of elaborate pike 
drill reminiscent of the theory (hardly the practice) of the 1630's. A 
revised version of Breton's book was published in Boston, Massachusetts, 
so late as 1733, by which time it would have been of more use to antiquaries 
than the militia. 
66. Anon., The Militia-Man. Containing, Necessary Rules for both Officer 
and Soldier... (1740). 
67. Hence, in his text for young officers, The Cadet (1756), p. viii, Capt 
Samual Bever lamented the fact that most of his material had to be drawn from 
foreign sources: 'I wish I could have added a few English Names to the List 
of Authors; but I am sorry to say, that a disappointed Search for Books of 
this Kind in our Language, exonerates me from the Guilt of Plagiarism from mV 
Countrymen. ' 
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partly in the nature of the peacetime experience of the regiments, and part- 
ly in the army's record during the campaigns of 1740-48. 
It is important to remember that George II had ordered the preparation 
of the 1728 Regulations because 'every Colonel alters or Amends as he thinks 
fit'. It is also worth remembering that Bland, Williamson and the others 
had drawn up their works because a whole new generation unused to the exper- 
ience of Flanders from 1689 to 1712 had entered the officer corps since 
Utrecht. But it was not simply the waning of the memory of drill and tactics 
as practised under Marlborough, nor the vagaries of purchase and regimental 
proprietary "ownership" which throughout the century led to a particularist 
spirit among the regiments, encouraging "alterations and amendments", which 
made regulation necessary. Nor was it simply the presence of new officers 
which made the codification and regulation of established practice essential. 
It was rather that the multitude of factors operating in and upon the stand- 
ing peacetime army - those factors which we noted in Chapt. I above - were 
cumulatively so powerful as to derange any wholly uniform system of drill. 
The speed with which the friction of peace acted upon the army is extra- 
ordinary. George II in 1727 - that is, fifteen years after Queen Anne's 
wars had ended - was disturbed to discover variety in the army's exercise. 
But George I, so early as 1716, had observed the same thing in his forces. 
That King in 1716, as his son was to do after him in 1727, had had an uniform 
exercise drawn up for the army; but not only George II's observations on un- 
authorised "alterations and amendments", but those made by George I himself 
in 1718, show that success in imposing the 1716 Regulations was limited. 
68 
And the extraordinary thing about this was that the exercises of 1716, of 
1723, of Bland, of the 1728 Regulations, and the later engraving books and 
summaries differed hardly in the slightest from the exercises practised in 
the Flanders regiments by 1708, which were taught by Parker in Ireland from 
1708 to 1710, which were published by authority in 1708; and differed not 
at all from those given out in Flanders in 1711. So, despite the keen edge 
to which the army had been honed by 1712; despite the fact that the drill 
used in Marlborough's regiments had been carried from Flanders and intro- 
duced to the whole of the army in Ireland by 1710, and had been practised 
68. As the Secretary at War informed the Board of General Officers on 18 
Sept. 1718 (and in so doing described succinctly the reasons for attempting 
to enforce regularity), 'The Genl. Officers, who have lately been upon the 
Review of ye Troops, have Represented to H. M. yt. ye Exercise of ye Severall 
Corps differs One from Another, by which means there can not but happen great 
Confusion, in case They should be exercised, when upon Detachmts. or in Bri- 
gades; H. M. is therefore pleased to Order... ye Board... to draw up a Methodi- 
call Exercise to be practised throughout all His Forces, & proposes to Them 
ye Exercise of His Guards as a fitting Plan. ' (WO 4/21, p. 187). The Board's 
reply is lost; but since no new exercise was forthcoming it may be presumed 
that the 1716 exercise, as practised by the Foot Guards, was once more reaf- 
firmed. 
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everywhere by 1712; despite the fact that the manual and platoon 
exercises in use by 1708 and 1711 had been repeatedly given out by authority, 
in 1711,1716,1723, and 1728; despite, again, that a system of regular 
inspection of regiments had been introduced in 1716, and made annual from 
c. 1720; 
69 
despite the fact that by 1727 the army's firearms were very 
close to being built to an uniform design, and that from 1715 firearms pro- 
duction had been supervised under the Ordnance system of manufacture; 
70 
and 
finally, despite the fact that several regiments had been marched into en- 
campments in 1722 and 1723, there to drill together (on which more anon), 
none of these developments were powerful enough to overcome the friction of 
peace. Away from the wars, dispersed about the British Isles or about the 
Empire and suffering the effects of peacetime duty, the drill efficiency 
and regularity of the army began inevitably to slump. The system of drill 
and tactics laid down in the treatises and regulations prior to 1740, then, 
was a system to which the peacetime regiments could only aspire. The 
stilted nature of much of the drill and the clumsiness of the tactics pre- 
scribed, therefore, must in many units have seemed like the very essence of 
fluidity and flexibility. 
The army's drill efficiency deteriorated because, after twenty-five 
years of almost continual campaigning, the regiments were suddenly dis- 
persed, and were left in that condition for a period as long and undisturbed 
as the previous quarter-century had been eventful. After 1712, there was 
to be relatively little opportunity for carrying on training even at the 
level of one or two grand-divisions or squadrons, let alone regiments. The 
officers, the tacticians, and the central authorities clung to what had 
been practised under Marlborough; but the regiments themselves were unable, 
for the most part, even to do this. Dispersed, their only resource was to 
devote themselves to that part of the drill which a few troops or companies 
could practise with any profit - the simple evolutions, small-scale marches 
and manoeuvres and, with increasing frequency, the manual and platoon 
exercises. Firepower, the major tactical advance handed on to the army 
after 1712, was based on the successful performance of the complicated pla- 
toon-fire system; and since the smallest of units could practise at least 
the role of the individual platoon, the manual and platoon exercises became 
not just the main item in the peacetime training of the dispersed com- 
panies, but a fetish which was carried to absurd lengths. Since so much 
69. On this, see below ', P. 188 . 
70. By this system a quantity of parts and firearms sufficient to cater to 
the army's normal requirements was kept on hand, in stores, and the gunmakers 
were deprived of the opportunity to fleece the Treasury in time of crisis. 
Additionally, the Ordnance was able by this system to enforce sealed patterns. 
The system is best described in H. L. Blackmore, ibid., 39-42; in A. D. Darling, 
op. cit., 15-9; and in D. W.. Bailey, British Military Longarms, 1715-1815 (1971), 
9-12. 
104 
time came to be devoted to the manual and platoon - and indeed this is 
understandable, for what else could isolated companies attempt with any 
real profit? - the net result was a deterioration in most other of the 
essential elements of the drill. Even the cavalry, who were without their 
horses for many months of the year, spent much of what time there was 
available firing away blank cartridges in three ranks, booted and spurred. 
As expediency became seeming necessity, so the manual and platoon became 
the commonplace of training; these exercises were issued repeatedly, as 
we have seen, and the treatises and regulations came increasingly to dwell 
on the intricacies of the manual to the near exclusion of everything else. 
Almost the whole of the 1728 Regulations, both for the foot and horse, was 
devoted to these exercises. There were some who deplored this development. 
Brig-Gen Richard Kane, writing just prior to 1736, thought the 1728 Regula- 
tions 'a poor Performance', and was surprized that such a work 'should be 
skreen'd by Authority'; with its concentration on the manual and platoon, 
Kane wrote that these regulations allowed 'nothing relating to Action [to 
be] introduced into our Discipline'. Of the cavalry, he thought it 'pre- 
posterous... to see some of our English Jack-Boot-Men, with all their 
Accoutrements, perform an Exercise on Foot! Was this ever known to be of 
Use upon Action? Is it possible for young Gentlemen that never saw any 
thing of Action (of whom the Army in a short Time will be composed), to 
form an Idea of Action, out of this Book of Discipline? '71 Col(later Lt- 
Gen) Henry Hawley, writing in 1726, was equally nonplussed. 'If the Peace 
continues long, I may live to see the Foot of England carried in waggons 
from quarter to quarter, for what with their vast size and the idleness 
they live in, I'm sure they can't march. ' He thought the foot should be 
employed on road-work, rather than strewn about in billets; 'this would 
keep Officer and soldier out of sloth and idleness, 'twould keep them in 
good discipline, another and better sort of discipline than what is now 
erroneously so called, having them out twice a week to act over that silly 
thing called Manual Exercise'. Hawley thought that the cavalry would like- 
wise be better employed constantly patrolling the roads for highwaymen: 
thus 'the horses would be in better health, fitter for service, the men not 
grow so fat, know the use of their accoutrements, be kept sober and not 
such fops, with their curled locks and Holland stockings... '72 Writing in 
1740, Brig-Gen James Douglass denounced the practice too, arguing that the 
separation of the arms exercises into the slow manual and the speedy platoon 
was foolish, since the one was but the core of the other, practised at 
greater speed. 'If then you pass them under different denominations, the 
71. Kane, Campaigns, 109-10. 
72. Sumner, 'Chaos', 93. 
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Souldiers in time of action, will plunge into horid mistakes greatly to ye 
prejudice of ye Service. ' He concluded that 'ye superflous tearme Ploton 
exercise, ought never to be more heard off, but by all generals condemn'd 
as erroneous, and canceled out of all books of military exercise'. 
73 
But 
their's were voices crying in the wilderness, as the frequency with which 
manual and platoon exercises appeared, were practised, and were fussed over 
attests. 
This development was not without some fruits. By the mid-1720's the 
procedure of 'locking' the ranks was becoming common practice, a develop- 
ment which made for greater ease and concentration of fire, at the same 
time increasing its accuracy. 
74 
Metal ramrods began to be introduced at 
this time and, during the 1730's, the practice of priming the pans of fire- 
locks from small flasks was abandoned in favour of speedier priming direct- 
ly from the paper cartridge. 
75 
It is unquestionable that the rate of fire 
of the British foot was increased during this period from an average of two 
shots per minute to three, in sustained fire. And the clear perception of 
the overall efficacy of fire was not forgotten. Thus Kane was quite con- 
vinced that 'if a Body of Foot have but Resolution to keep their Order, 
there is no Body of Horse dare venture within their Fire'. Bland wrote that, 
'If Foot could be brought to know their own Strength, the Danger which they 
apprehend from Horse would soon vanish; since the Fire of one Platoon, given 
in due Time, is sufficient to break any Squadron'; and again, 'one battalion 
of well-disciplin'd Foot [given secure flanks] may despise the Attacks of a 
whole Line of Horse, while they continue their Attacks on Horse-back, and 
76 
oblige them to retire with considerable Loss'. 
The army, clearly, had taken Wynendaele to heart. But despite the 
endless attention devoted by the dispersed troops and companies to the arms 
exercises, Bland would have been bard put to find more than a handful of 
battalions of 'well-disciplin'd Foot' outside of London and Dublin. It 
was all very well for the Foot Guards' battalions, constantly in concen- 
tration in and about London and Westminster, to go through the whole of the 
complicated platoon-firings - 'Hyde Park discipline', as many appropriately 
and derisively styled it. Companies might know their arms exercises; but 
73. BM Add. MS 27,892, ff. 212-19. 
74. Bland, Treatise of Military Discipline, 72. On the origins and mech- 
anics of 'locking' see PP. 176-77 below, where basic training is dealt with. 
75. On metal ramrods, see A. D. Darling, op-cit., 21; H. L. Blackmore, op. 
cit., 46-7; and D. W. Bailey, op. cit., 15. Not until 1740 did a manual 
exercise appear which included priming from cartridges; in all previous 
regulations, priming was done from flasks. Cf. L. Rousselot's series of 
plates with accompanying texts, L'Aznee Franqaises (Paris, 1962-67), plates 
#19, #79, #93, and #99. 
76. Ibid., 91, and Kane, Campaigns, 123-5. 
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since platoon fire was delivered according to a pre-arranged and intricate 
sequence by platoons and 'firings' told off here and there down the full 
battalion line (as in Figs. 1-4, pp. 205-06 below), expertise by individual 
companies at the simple manual and platoon did nothing to guarantee the 
successful performance of the platoon-fire system - let alone major man- 
oeuvres - by the full battalion when at last it might be assembled. That 
this was so was made abundantly clear by the performance of the army in 
the wars of 1739-48. 
1748 - 1764: 
The generally poor performance of the army during the campaigns of 
1739-48 (especially so prior to 1746), made it clear that the old system of 
drill laid out in the 1728 Regulations was in need of considerable revision. 
This was to be carried out piecemeal during the years 1748-64, a fifteen 
year period which - in sharp contrast to the three decades preceeding it - 
was to see the appearance of a number of regulations issued by authority, 
and of a score of private publications some of which were excellent, and 
many of which illustrate a new spirit of professionalism loose in the army. 
Although the Duke of Cumberland had considerable forces under his com- 
mand in the Low Countries in 1748, negotiations for the peace were proceed- 
ing in earnest from the spring; there were, consequently, both sufficient 
forces available in concentration and plenty of opportunities to introduce 
and establish new drill procedures. Always deeply concerned with all mat- 
ters concerning drill and regularity, the Duke now set in train the revision 
of the British drill with the preparation and dissemination, that summer, 
of the 1748 Regulations, which all regiments of foot in the Low Countries 
were to 'Conform to & practice'. 
77 
These new regulations concerned them- 
selves only with the firings, with forming the square and wheeling the 
battalion line upon its centre, and with fine points such as the disposi- 
tion of officers and drums; and it was in the firings that the changes 
made were most significant, since the-telling off of the fire-divisions and 
77. These regulations were issued in MS to the majors of brigade, whose 
business it was 'to give An Exact Copy of the Same' to the adjutants of each 
of the regiments in their brigades. There are copies in the Cumb. Pprs., 
Pt. 4, II, ff. 61-2, and in the Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 05/6. Another copy 
(although easily overlooked, since it is untitled and undated), appeared 
in Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane (1757), 29-32. In the Kent R. O. Amherst 
MSS, 05/5, the practice of these revisions (together with the rest of the 
drill current at the end of the wir) is teautifully illustrated in the 
'Review ofthhe 2. Batt. of the 1s Regim. of Foot Guards by H. R. H. the 
Duke ye 26. of Sept. 1748 N. S. at Eyndhoven'. 
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the ordering of the sequence according to which divisions were to give 
fire, was now standardised on a method more easily practised than those 
laid down in the 1728 ReguZations and in Bland. 
78 
With the introduction 
of these changes all the British foot except those units in Ireland was, 
by 1749, practising the manual and platoon exercises, the evolutions, and 
the majority of its manoeuvres after the old 1728 drill; while the firings 
and several of its manoeuvres were being carried on according to the new 
1748 Regulations. 
The spread of the 1748 Regulations illustrates once again the powers 
and limitations of authority. The Duke as Captain-General commanded the 
forces on the Continent, and all of the forces elsewhere except those in 
Ireland. With him in the Low Countries in 1748 were three battalions of 
Foot Guards and nineteen battalions of marching Foot; and by 1749 four 
of these battalions (the 8th, 19th, 32nd, and 36th) were at Gibraltar, four 
were in Minorca (the 12th, 31st, 33rd, and 37th), three Guards battalions 
and four marching battalions (the 13th, 20th, 21st, and 23rd) were in Britain, 
six battalions were in Ireland (the 1/lst, 25th, 28th, 42nd, 44th, and 48th), 
while the last, Loudoun's 64th, had been disbanded. Thus by mid-1749 the 
full Minorca and Gibraltar garrisons were using the new system, and the Duke 
had made it general practice in Britain. 
79 
In Ireland meanwhile, the six 
battalions come home from the Low Countries continued to practice the new 
1748 Regulations; 
80 
and a seventh Irish corps (Hopson's 29th) was following 
these regulations too, since its lieutenant-colonel (a crony of the Duke, 
and of the Adjutant General in London) claimed that he 'had received Verbal 
Orders from such high rank as was sufficient to him, to make Hopson's... 
Stick Close to these fireings and Evolutions'. 
81 
Otherwise, it was not 
until 1756 that the new system now printed, modified, and issued generally 
'By His Majesty's Special Command', was adopted by the rest of the Irish 
foot. 
82 
78. The Duke was busy reviewing British and allied regiments in the Low 
Countries' camps throughout the spring and summer of 1748 (see Kent R. O. 
Amberst MSS, 05/1 - 05/8; and J. 0. Robson, 'Military Memoirs of Lt-Gen the 
Hon. Charles Colville', JSAHR, 28 (1950), 77-80). The new system of telling 
off the fire divisions seems likely to have been taken from the drill used 
in the Hanoverian foot: see Amherst MSS, 05/1, 'Review of the First Line 
of Hanover Infantry... at the Camp of Nestelroy the Second of July 1748 N. S. '; 
and note especially the telling off of the 1st bn., Hanoverian Foot Guards, 
and of the battalion of Druchtleben. 
79. Cumb. Pprs., Box 43, ##294. 
80. Ibid., Box 44, #99, pp. 10-18. 
81. Ibid., Box 44, #99, pp. 13-14. 
82. Proposals dated 15 Dec. 1750, in the Duke's papers, indicate that it 
was planned at the time to attempt to introduce the new system in Ireland. 
The plan was abandoned, presumably because the Duke's writ did not run 
across the Irish Sea. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #140, f. 3. 
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The drill of the cavalry was considered at this time, too. On 5 May 
1749 a board composed of colonels of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons met at the 
King's command in the Privy Garden, to consider and report on 'a Paper con- 
taining several Articles' relative to the organization, interior economy, 
and drill of their regiments. Their report was read at a meeting of 9 
May, and then laid before the King. 
83 
on the question whether they felt 
that there was 'any thing deficient or Superfluous in the present Dis- 
cipline of the Dragoons', their reply was in the negative, and they had 
'no Alterations to propose on that Head'. 
84 
That they should thus have 
replied is interesting, since the expertise of this board - with general 
officers of the experience of Honywood, Bland, Hawley, and Cope for members 
- was great; and six of the seven regiments which they represented had 
only recently been on active service against the French in the Low 
Countries. The Dragoon Guards and Dragoons on the British establishment, 
therefore, continued to perform their drill according to the 1728 Regula- 
tions; and indeed this is not surprising since, as we noted earlier, 
changes in the manoeuvres and tactics of the mounted arm were few after 
Marlborough's campaigns, since before the appearance of true light horse 
the tactical role of the cavalry was well-defined, its manoeuvres few, 
settled, and understood. 
85 
Beginning in 1755 a series of regulations and orders appeared which 
continued the revision of the drill begun in 1748. The first of these - 
issued by the Adjutant General in May 1755 to all regiments on the British 
establishment, by order of the Duke of Cumberland - was a collection of 
extracts from the general orders given out in the army in the Low 
Countries, between 1745 and 1748.86 Dealing for the most part with the 
myriad daily routine duties in the regiments on campaign, in the canton- 
ments, and upon the march, it was only in passing that training and drill 
83. WO 71/9, pp. 65-74. Gen Sir Philip Honywood (1st Dragoon Guards) 
acted as president of this Board, the members of which were Lts-Gen Henry 
Hawley (1st Dragoons), the Earl of Crawford (2nd Dragoons), Humphrey Bland 
(3rd Dragoons), Sir Robert Rich (4th Dragoons), Sir John Cope (7th Dragoons), 
and the Hon. Sir Charles Howard (3rd Dragoon Guards). These were seven of 
the eleven line cavalry corps then in Britain. 
84. WO 71/9, pp. 72-3. 
85. The manoeuvres practised by the Dragoon Guards and Dragoons, c. 1750, 
will be found in BM King's MS 239. This is a finely bound, 54ff MS book 
of well executed plans of the mounted evolutions and manoeuvres; and in 
the finely drawn plan ig the 'Review of the Brittish Cavalry By His Royal 
Highness the Duke ye 9. of July 1748. Camp of Nestelroy, New Stile' (Kent 
R. O. Amherst MSS, 05/4). There is nothing among these which differs from 
earlier practice. 
86. Reprinted by P. Sumner as 'Standing Orders for the Army - 1755', in 
JSAHR, 5(1926), 191-9, and 6(1927), 8-10 (cited hereafter as 1755 Standing 
Orders). These were reprinted in Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane (1757), 
57-70. 
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were touched upon; nevertheless these orders, which were to be 'looked 
upon as Standing Orders, and as such to be transcribed in the Regimental 
Book of each Regiment', helped considerably in systematizing routine through- 
out the army, as had Bland's text. In 1755 there was also drawn up at the 
Duke's bidding a set of 'Standing Orders to be Observed by the Whole Corps 
of Dragoons'. 
87 
Although the horses, tack and kit, and the routine duty 
of quarters, camps, and marches was included, much space in these dragoon 
orders was devoted to the mounted evolutions and manoeuvres, and to the 
dismounted evolutions and firings (after the 1748 Regulations, now intro- 
duced officially among the dragoons). 
These collections of standing orders were only preliminary, for in 
April 1756 there was issued 'By His Majesty's Special Command' an entirly 
new platoon exercise, to be observed henceforth (without 'the least Altera- 
tion in or Deviation from it') by all the regiments in Britain, Ireland, 
and the overseas stations and garrisons. 
88 
With notes on the posting of 
officers, nco's and drums in the battalion line, and retaining both the 
firings and the system of telling off the fire-units as laid down in the 
1748 Regulations, this new regulation represented the most significant 
official revision of the army's platoon exercise since the appearance of 
the 1708 arms drill. The 1756 Regulations cut the platoon exercise to a 
mere twenty-four motions; these were much more easily learned than the 
sixty-three of the old 1728 Regulations (still officially in use until now, 
but doubtless modified of late years according to the whims of the colonels 
and field officers of individual regiments), and when mastered would have 
added noticeably to the rate of fire which the battalions could keep up - by 
an additional round every two minutes, at least, a factor to be of no small 
importance on the open battlefields of the Seven Years' War. The new pla- 
toon exercise was practised by the sergeants and corporals of the 1st Foot 
Guards before being printed and issued to the whole of the King's forces, 
on 18 April 1756; and indeed the new drill was already being performed pub- 
licly by the nco's of the 1st Guards on the 24th of April. 
89 
The 1756 platoon was reprinted several times during the ensuing few 
years, but each time as part of a larger drillbook - the 1757 Regulations 
87. Reprinted with notes by P. Sumner as 'Standing Orders For The Dragoons, 
circa 1755', in JSAHR, 23 (1945), 98-106 (cited hereafter as 1755 Dragoon 
Orders). It is clear from their style and content that Hawley had a hand 
in their preparation. 
88. This was A New Exercise, To be observed by His Majesty's Troops on the 
Establishment of Great-Britain and Ireland (1756). 
89. This was reported in The London Evening-Post of 27 Apr; and that 
paper's report was copied by The Gentleman's Magazine (April, 1756). The 
reporter described the performance, which he watched in St. James's Park, 
as 'the Manual Exercise of the Prussians'; and (what with the easy 
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which now embraced all five elements of the drill. Prepared by the Duke 
of Cumberland, his Adjutant General Robert Napier, and by Lt-Col Alexander 
Dury of the 1st Foot Guards (of which regiment Cumberland was colonel), 
this new drill like the 1756 platoon before it was being practised in the 
months prior to its army-wide issue by the nco's of the 1st Guards. 
90 
Once 
satisfied, the Adjutant General on 25 June 1757 issued through his office 
this new, full regulation drill which laid down not only the 1756 platoon 
exercise, together with the firings and the system of telling off the fire- 
units as first described in the 1748 Regulations, but made regulation a new 
manual exercise, a new series of evolutions, 
91 
and added a few manoeuvres 
now to be practised as the regulation drill of all the regiments: 
92 
Slight- 
ly shortened editions (i. e., without the new manoeuvres) of these 1757 Regu- 
lations were issued thereafter; 
93 
and from 1758 marginal notations were 
included for the instruction of the dragoons, when performing the drill on 
foot. 94 These regulations, and the series of editions which followed, 
availability of that magazine), historians have assumed over since not only 
that he was correct, but (quite mistakenly) that he was refering to the full 
Prussian drill and not just to one element of it. It is quite possible that 
the Prussian platoon exercise (which was first privately published in 
English translation in 1754) was the inspiration of the 1756 English platoon: 
they resemble one another closely, although the English platoon exercise, in 
fact, resembles that composed by Blakeney in 1740 quite as much as it does 
the Prussian platoon exercise. 
90. Cumb. Pprs., Box 50,4f's 17,211; and Box 52, #64. 
91. Of the greatest significance in the development of manoeuvre technique, 
the 1756 Regulations considerably reduced the rank-and file-intervals 
(always learned as part of the simple evolutions), which had been used without 
change in the army since the days of King William, making possible for the 
first time true close-order drill at speed, on all occasions. 
92. There is no known extant copy of the 1757 ReguZations, as issued under 
the Adjutant General's signature on 25 June 1757. 
93. The 1756 edition was reprinted under the same title at New York, in 
1757, for the corps there; and in the same year it was reprinted in that 
catch-all, the Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane (1757), 71-8. Early in 1758 
the first of the subsequent eds. of the 1757 Regulations (containing manual, 
platoon, evolutions, firings, and notes) appeared as Manual Exercise As 
Ordered By His Majesty, For The Year 1758 (1758); later in the year another 
ed. (with marginal notes for the dragoons' training) appeared as New Manual 
Exercise, As Performed by His Majesty's Dragoons, Foot-Guards, Foot, ArtiZ- 
Zery, Marines, And by the Militia... Second Edition (1758), thus including 
explicitly the other arms which had already been practising the drill since 
1756. Copies were printed in Dublin and Limerick in 1758, with the Lord 
Lieutenant's orders of 18 Mar 1758 appended, ordering that these regulations 
be observed by all the foot and dragoons on that establishment. The latest 
copy which I have seen was The New Manual Exercise as Performed by His 
Majesty's Dragoons, Foot-Guards, Foot, Light Infantry, Artillery... Third 
Edition... (Dublin, 1760), in which the new light infantry companies were 
included. 
94. On 7 June 1757 LiIoniertswrote to1Cumberland from London, where he was 
soon 'to see the adjut. Sgg. & Corp. of the dragoons... go through the 
new Exercise in which Gen . Napier (the Adjutant General] tells Me they are 
very Perfect'. Cumb. Pprs., Box 52, #116. R. Whitworth, op. cit., 218, makes 
the common error of assuming that some new Prussian drill is being referred 
to, in this letter. 
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through 1760, were the culmination of Cumberland's programme of drill 
reform. 
The same new spirit of energy manifest in the work of the central 
authorities, during these years, infused the world of private military 
writers. Several important treatises appeared at this time, and the period 
is a notable one for the translation of foreign drillbooks. 
Of the private works which now appeared three especially - although 
devoted to quite different subjects - stand out because of the breadth of 
vision and the occasional brilliance which they displayed. Foremost among 
these was the Art of War by the comte Turpin de Crisse, first published at 
Paris in 1754 and at London in translation in 1761.95 Turpin's lengthy essay, 
which was a detailed study of the practical carrying-on of operations by an 
army in the field, was without doubt the best work available on that subject 
during the eighteenth century. Though he described war as he found it and 
was no*inventive, Turpin's style was spirited and intelligent, commanding 
respect; never formal or dogmatic, his descriptions of tactical dispositions 
and the conduct of operations was bound only by general rules admitting con- 
siderable flexibility. These qualities were the fruit of profound study; 
and the sophistication of his analysis of active operations, his firm appre- 
ciation of the importance of retaining the initiative, and his grasp of the 
importance of intelligence, security, and terrain not only in grand and petty 
tactics but on overall strategic planning, derived from that study. The 
exceedingly clear format, the realism, and the vigour of the Art of War made 
it an immensely profitable work for both field and general officers. 
96 
Broader in vision, if less expert in detail, was Thomas More Molyneux's 
Conjunct Expeditions, published in 1759 in the wake of the 1757 and 1758 
95. Lancelot, Count Turpin de Crisse, An Essay on the Art of War. Trans- 
Zated from the French ... by Captain Joseph Otwzy 2 Vols., (1761), was publish- 
ed in German translation at Potsdam in 1756, which speaks well for it. Turpin 
(who was a colonel of French hussars from 1747 until 1761, and a lieutenant- 
general by 1792), was a prolific author on military subjects, including 
translation and commentary on the works of several captains both ancient and 
modern. 
96. For example, John Forbes, James Wolfe, and Henri Bouquet all studied 
and recommended the work even prior to its translation. Forbes conducted 
his 1758 Fort Duquesne operations according to the tactical system known as 
the "protected advance", as laid down by Turpin - who had it from 
Montecucculi. Bouquet in his 1763-64 campaigns in the Ohio country practised 
a version of this too. George Washington (who became acquainted with the work 
while serving under Forbes), obtained a copy of the 1761 English translation, 
and recommended its study to fellow American officers at the time of the War 
for Independence. Beckles Willson, op. cit., 295; O. L. Spaulding, 'The 
Military Studies of George Washington', AHR, 29 (1924), 677-8; and K. L. 
Parker, op. cit., 254-69, and 292-342 passim. 
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raids on Rochefort, St. -Malo, and Cherbourg. 
97 
Presenting his work in two 
parts, Molyneux first of all wrote the history of the main amphibious op- 
erations from antiquity to the present, and having done so he drew lessons 
and analysed the evident implications. The general failure of most such 
expeditions, he concluded, resulted from several factors the chief of which 
was that there had never been any attempt to learn from past mistakes; con- 
sequently there had been developed no body of tactical doctrine, no proper 
equipment, and no special training procedures, so that nothing but continued 
ill-success could be expected to attend future amphibious expeditions. Hav- 
ing concluded this, Molyneux set out in the second part of his treatise to 
correct this situation by laying down overall operational procedures and 
plans, by describing special equipment which experience had shown to be 
needed, and by suggesting what training and tactics were appropriate for 
such a form of warfare. He argued that amphibious warfare, properly con- 
ducted, could achieve considerable results; and that Britain - with her 
huge navy, small army, and geographical position - should by her nature 
pursue this form of warfare. Molyneux's was by far the most thoughtful 
of those works which took this strategic line, and his analytical approach 
made his argument convincing; likewise his lengthy technical treatment of 
the special materiel necessary for such operations, and his suggestions on 
the technical handling of assault landings (though often ill-found), added 
to the solid impression which the book created. It was in fact to be of 
the greatest use to the army and marines, so often called upon in the Seven 
Years' War and in the American War of 1775-83 to take part in coastal raids 
and landing operations. 
98 
The third of these most impressive works was Lt-Col Campbell 
Dalrymple's Military Essay, a long and detailed treatise the overall aim of 
which was to "new-model" the army. 
99 
Like Saxe, Dalrymple knew his Greek 
97. Thomas More Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions: Or Expenditions that have 
been carried on jointly By the Fleet and Army, with a Commentary on a 
Littoral War (1759). Molyneux, as an officer of the regular army, had been 
on Mordaunt's 1757 Rochefort raid, which had been ill-conceived and badly 
carried out. 
98. Two other works, namely Lt John Maclntire's A Military Treatise on the 
Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea: Together with Short Instruc- 
tions for Detachments Sent to attack on Shore (1763), and Joseph Robson's 
The British Mars. Containing Several Schemes and Inventions... shewing more 
plainly, The great Advantage Britain has over other Nations, by being Masters 
at Sea (1763), appeared at this time and dealt with other aspects of am- 
phibious operations, and with service as marines. MacIntire's book was a 
sound, practical text on the training of Marines (and of regular foot ship- 
ped as marines), in the drill peculiar to action afloat. Robson's book, on 
the other hand, was filled with a fascinating collection of crackpot in- 
ventions designed for use in assault landings and the siege operations which 
might follow. 
99. Campbell Dalrymple, A Military Essay. Containing Reflections on the 
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and Roman history; and he felt that any full-scale remodelling would have 
to be based on a system of recruiting which, like those of antiquity, turn- 
ed not to mercenaries and pressed men but rather drew in 'citizens' educated 
from youth to valour, discipline, and self-sacrifice. 
1 
Nevertheless although 
impracticable in this respect the work was, otherwise, invariably realistic; 
and the great bulk of the work, which consisted of a detailed discussion of 
weapons, of clothing and accoutrements, and of basic and advanced training 
and drill, was always admirable and generally applicable in the British Army. 
Dealing equally with the horse and foot, he was most concerned that recruits 
in their training should be brought along with consideration; and he des- 
cribed in much detail the steps according to which basic training should be 
laid on. His ideas on advaned drill, similarly, were well-found. The Military 
Essay was a mine of useful information for regimental officers, experienced 
or otherwise; it was always interesting and often brilliant, a challenge to 
officers, and without doubt one of the half-dozen best treatises written in 
English during the eighteenth century. 
2 
Several other works appearing at this time added significantly to the 
store of drillbooks available. The sudden prominence of the Prussians 
after Mollwitz was reflected, during the 1750's, in the publication of the 
first of many subsequent English translation of their regulations. 
3 
Unlike 
the several regulations issued to the British Army, these official Prussian 
works dealt not only with the five elements of the drill but also with the 
complete interior management and discipline of the regiments, and with all 
of the routine duties of the officers. The most striking characteristic 
Raising, Arming, CZoathing, and Discipline of the British Infantry and 
Cavalry... (1761). Dalrymple was in 1761 lieutenant-colonel of the 3rd 
Dragoons. 
1. Dalrymple's suggestions - on the establishments of the foot, for 
example, pp. 25-8 - were sometimes taken from Saxe's Reveries, which ap- 
peared in English at this time (see below); and the book was clearly inspired 
by Saxe's example. 
2. Dalrymple was to be quoted with regularity by most British writers, 
henceforth; and as early as May, 1762, he was acknowledging 'the gracious 
manner' in which no less an expert than the Duke of Cumberland had been 
'pleased to receive my Book'. Cumb. Pprs., Box 57, # 216. 
3. The first translation to appear was the Regulations for the Prussian 
Infantry (1754), which was reprinted as Regulations for the Prussian In- 
fantry... to which is added The Prussian Tactick (1759); while in the mean- 
time there had come out the Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry (1757). 
These three translations were the work of Sir William Fawcett who, as in his 
1757 translation of Saxe's Reveries, undertook the work only to 'be of assis- 
tance' to his 'Brother Officers'. Henceforth during the eighteenth century 
there were always available up-to-date translations of Prussian regulations, 
as all the advertisements of the booksellers illustrate. 
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of these regulations - one no doubt already half-expected by British 
readers, aware of the machine-like discipline prevailing in the Hohenzollern 
service - was their sheer thoroughness; concise, pithy, clear and well 
organized, these regulations read like statute books. Several other works 
dealing in depth with various aspects of the Prussian service also became 
available at this time. 
4 
The French, too, were well represented in English translations at this 
time; and the best of their works, Saxe's Reveries, owed its appearance in 
English to the ongoing labours of Sir William Fawcett. The Reveries, of 
course, is one of the classics of military literature; and it can hardly be 
done justice in a few lines of summary. Infused throughout with an extra- 
ordinary spirit of innovation and reform - 'nothing is so disgraceful as 
that slavish adherence'to custom, which prevails at present', wrote Saxe 
5 
- 
it ranged widely from the raising, training, and petty tactics of his specia- 
lly designed "legions", to the major operations of the full army in the 
field; and at every stage bold new ideas, many of them brilliant and 
several of them practicable (as Saxe was to demonstrate with success in 
his campaigns and battles), marked his text, pointing the genius of their 
author. Free from the conventions of the age and deploring the clumsiness 
of the unitary army (and especially the static fire-fights of which so many 
battles largely consisted), he described a flexible new tactics based on 
retaining the initiative, on engaging in detail, and (above everything else) 
on the morale of his soldiers and the speed and handiness of their manoeuvr- 
ing. Where his ideas were practicable in the armies of the ancien regime, 
the British included, three especially stand out: firstly, his advocacy of 
small redoubts before and within the battle-line to break up the attacks of 
the enemy and to discourage him from launching major assaults upon your main 
position, while at the same time permitting you 'to introduce the method of 
engaging en detail, and of attacking in brigades', thus enabling you to fix 
4. The best of these was the Anon., New Regulations for the Prussian Inf- 
antry: Containing an exact Detail of the Present Field-Service... and recent 
Parts of the Foot-Exercise (1757). With several excellent plates, and de- 
voted entirely to the study of battalion drill and tactics in the field, 
this work was of the greatest utility to British officers in the advanced 
training of their units. Internal evidence indicates that this was not 
Fawcett's work. 
In 1762 Frederick II's instructions to his generals, written by the 
King in 1747, were translated into English and published as Anon., Military 
Instructions by the King of Prussia (1762); printed in limited numbers at 
Berlin in 1753 and captured by the Austrians in 1760, this book had already 
been printed by the Austrians and the French in 1761. From 1764 through 
1785, the London staff kept yearly summaries of the annual Prussian man- 
oeuvres (WO 30/45, MS book). 
5. Anon. Trans. (Sir William Fawcett], Reveries, or Memoirs upon the Art 
of War, by Field Marshal Count Saxe... (1757), v. This translation was rpt. 
at London in 1759, and again in 1776. 
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your enemy's attention at points 'to which you can always send fresh 
troops'; 
6 
secondly, his stress on the manoeuvrability of the infantry, to 
be attained by training the troops to march and manoeuvre in close order, 
7 
to a cadenced step; and thirdly his insistence that officers inspire their 
men, since morale is by far the most important element in war, where the 
fate of armies has often been determined by the sudden panic or sudden 
bravery of a handful of men. 
Capt Samuel Bever's short, popular guide for young officers, The Cadet, 
was likewise illustrative of the considerable influence which foreign mili- 
tary works were having at this time. 
8 
Essentially a collection of thoughts 
and maxims drawn from the writings of such prominent captains and theore- 
ticians as Vauban, Turenne, Folard, Saxe, Santa Cruz, Le Blond, and 
Puysegur, the aim of The Cadet was to distill the best from foreign-language 
works and, with a short running commentary, to make available this material 
for young British officers who might otherwise fail to become acquainted 
with it. Bever's chapters - most of which were devoted to the duties of 
each of the various ranks in the army - displayed a selection of material 
the choice of which was both judicious and economic. Though hardly deep, 
this little collection was a useful introduction of the service to young 
officers, and might also have stimulated them to further reading. 
The first two in what was to be a succession of works on various as- 
pects of the "petite guerre" appeared at this time, and again both were in 
translation from the French. 
9 
Both were excellent, dealing in detail with 
6. Ibid., 135-6,149-56, and passim. 
7. Marching in step, to a musical cadence, was probably the most widely 
adopted of the reforms suggested by Saxe (Ibid., 15-8); this device made 
possible speedy and flexible manoeuvring by ranks at close order, and was 
one of the most significant developments in the drill of the armies of the 
eighteenth century. On the cadenced step and the British Army, see below 
pp. 173-7s. In a famous passage, Saxe wrote that 'the manual exercise is, 
without doubt, a branch of military discipline necessary to render a soldier 
steady and adroit under arms; but it is by no means of sufficient import- 
ance in itself to engage all our attention'... 'The principal part of all 
discipline depends upon the legs, not the arms: the personal abilities 
which are required in the performance of all manoeuvres, and likewise in 
engagements, are totally confined to them. ' Ibid., 14. 
8. Samuel Bever, The Cadet. A Military Treatise (1756), came out in a 
rev. ed. under the same title, in 1762. Bever became in 1756 major of the 
46th Foot. 
9. These were Capt J. -L. Le Cointe's The Science of Military Posts, for 
the Use of Regimental Officers, who frequently command Detached Parties. 
In which is shewn the Manner of Attacking and Defending Posts... (and] the 
Construction of Field-Forts (1761); and John Muller's translation, with 
additional notes, of the Chevalier L. A. de La Mamie de Clairac's The Field 
Engineer (1760). A 2nd, rev. ed. of this latter work appeared in 1773, again 
by John Muller. Clairac (whose book was first published in France in 1749, 
and again in 1757), was 'an Engineer of high Rank in the French Army', as 
Muller described him, and had enjoyed 'a long Course of Experience'. 
116 
the considerable variety of the service likely to befall detached parties. 
Thus the speedy construction of small redoubts and breastworks; the prep- 
aration of farmsteads, country-houses, churches, and other isolated build- 
ings for defence; 
10 
the attack and defence of small villages, street-by- 
street and house-by-house; 
11 
the blocking of river fords, and of defiles; 
and a host of stratagems such as false attacks, the clever use of obstacles 
like abatis and chevaux de frise, the storming of entrenchments, and night 
marches, were dealt with too. Both works were rooted in experience, eschew- 
ing theory and dealing in a very practical vein with their subject-matter; 
and both - Le Cointe's especially - were designed not for trained engin- 
eers or senior officers so much as they were aimed at those junior officers 
who were most likely to find themselves in command of detached forces. 
12 
The reform of the English militia and the new vigour introduced into 
its affairs after the passage of the Militia Acts of 1757-58 was reflected 
in the appearance of drillbooks devoted to that service; but the best of 
these books were of use to the officers of the regular army in the basic 
training of their men, too, since the militia drills (on paper) tended to 
differ very little from the practice of the regular army. 
13 
Without doubt 
the most useful and popular such work in the army was William Windham's 
Norfolk Militia, which dealt at length with all five elements of the 
drill. 14 Addressing itself especially to the procedures by which the men 
could best be trained, it contained over fifty plates illustrating the 
Le Cointe (whose work was published in France in 1759), was a captain in 
the French horse, and had served in Piedmont and Flanders under the prince 
de Conti. 
10. Clairac on the defence of churches, for example is full of good 
advice. (pp. 41-5). 
11. Le Cointe's description of the detailed preparation of a village for 
defence is outstanding, as is his discussion of the tactics to be used in 
attacking such a place. (pp. 137-54,174-80). 
12. Clairac's was a practical guide but, moreso than Le Cointe's, it was 
sophisticated enough to be of use to engineer officers as well as officers 
from the line regiments. Indeed, Clairac 'considered, that though many 
have wrote upon the Construction of permanent Fortification, as well as 
upon the Attac and Defence of Places, yet little had been wrote in regard 
to the requisite Knowledge of an Engineer in the Field' ('Ed. '). Le 
Cointe, meanwhile, led off his text with some 35pp of practical geometry - 
sufficient for regimental officers otherwise unlettered in engineering, 
and necessary for a proper basic understanding of the essentials of the 
'science' of field-works and defences. 
13. See, for example the Anon., New Military Instructions for the Militia... 
(1760), virtually a word-for-word copy of the 1758 ed. of the 1757 Regula- 
tions. 
14. William Windham and George Townshend, A Plan of Discipline, Composed 
for the Use of the Militia of the County of Norfolk (1759), was rushed to 
the press late in that year, incomplete; the full edition (with title un- 
changed) came out at London in 1760. In 1768 the full, 1760 ed., was re- 
printed as A Plan of Discipline for the Use of the . 
Norfolk Militia... 
(1768). Townshend wrote the dedication only. 
In the introduction to his facsimile rpt. of von Steuben's Regulations 
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manual and manoeuvres; and these were the best plates yet to have 
appeared in any English drillbook. Another militia officer, Edward Fage, 
brought out his short but admirable Regular Form of Discipline which, like 
Windham's drillbook, was so clear and well-organized in its discussion of 
basic training that regular officers could hardly but have benefitted from 
it. 
15 
There were too, as we have seen, revised versions of Kane, Bland, and 
Blakeney being printed at this time; and though of limited practical use 
as regards drill and tactics the first two of these were still of some value 
to raw officers as guides to the routine of the service. 
16 
Finally, the last of the old profusion of privately prepared manual 
and platoon exercises came out at this time, the work of George Grant. 
17 
Grant's platoon was quite impracticable, despite the fact that its prep- 
aration had cost him 'a great deal of Pains and Study'; he slurred together 
too many of the individual motions of the exercise, finishing up with an 
exercise which still involved more motions than that which was to be issued 
by authority in 1764. Grant's, little book contained a number of interest- 
ing observations on training and tactics, nevertheless; and despite the 
fact that his text was hardly literate, still these observations may have 
been of some value to the few who troubled their heads with his written 
style. 
1764 - 1778: 
With the conclusion of the Peace of Paris the central authorities in 
London began, once again, the preparation of new drill regulations designed 
to incorporate the considerable tactical experience and change of the past 
decade. Two new sets of regulations were envisaged form the start and, 
although they were issued concurrently, the purposes of the two projects 
for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States (Philadelphia, 
1779), R. Riling notes that there were as many as nine imprints of the 
Norfolk Militia made in the American colonies between 1768 and 1774. 
15. Edward Fage, A Regular Form of Discipline for the Militia, As it is 
Perform'd by the West-Kent Regiment (1759). 
16. Among these, the Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane (1757) included much 
recent material on the encampments of the army, and on such varied topics 
as pay, honours, clothing, rank, etc., mostly drawn from orders given out 
by authority over the years c. 1740-57. 
17. George Grant, The New Highland Military Discipline, or a short Manual 
Exercise Explained... (1757). As its title indicates, Grant thought that 
his manual would be of most use in the Highland regiments, being new- 
raised units destined soon to be sent abroad. Grant's book is in facs. 
rpt., with an introduction by J. R. Harper, as The New Highland Military 
Discipline of 1757 (Ottawa, 1967). 
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were regarded as distinct. On the one hand a new arms exercise was to 
be prepared and given out, by the King's command, to be practised through 
the army generally. On the other hand the Horse Guards had a more im- 
mediate, particular concern: it planned to regularize the procedure carried 
out at the spring and autumn reviews of those regiments under its direct 
inspection and control - that is, the regiments doing duty in the kingdom 
of England. The first of these projects required the preparation and issue 
of new manual and platoon exercises. The second was more complicated, 
since it entailed the drawing up, the testing, and finally the issuing as 
regulations not only of orders standardizing the dispositions, the cere- 
monial and the drill to be practised by the horse and foot at the reviews, 
but also - and for the first time in the army's history - the issue of a 
lengthy series of manoeuvres described in detail. 
In the event, both projects were to meet with the most notable success; 
and indeed the success of the second project - that concerning review 
procedure and manoeuvres - was to be well beyond what had originally been 
intended, or even envisaged. The new manual and platoon exercises, first 
introduced in the British Isles in 1764 and issued abroad early in 1766, 
were to survive as regulation practice throughout the army for the next 
thirty years; and the new review procedure and manoeuvres, though designed 
for use only among the regiments in England and first introduced there, like- 
wise, in 1764, had by 1768 spread abroad unofficially and had come to be 
followed everywhere as standard practice. Two factors were chiefly respon- 
sible for this success: firstly, the new drill elements were framed and 
introduced with care, and were put to trial before being made regulation; 
and secondly the imperial distribution of the army, with its incident 
rotation of uni+. s to and from England, led to an increasingly widespread 
acquaintance with and adoption of these drill procedures designed originally 
only to ease the problems faced by the reviewing officers attached to the 
London staff. 
These various developments emerge clearly when the genesis of the 1764 
ReguZations (as the new manual, platoon, review dispositions, firings and 
manoeuvres, came eventually to be so called), is studied in detail. 
18 
Thus, 
18. With these regulations the old, separate section devoted to the simple 
evolutions was removed as a full element of the drill regimen. The aboli- 
tion of the old practice - which had survived from the days of the pike 
and matchlock - of drawing up and exercising in a line on a depth of six 
open ranks, a disposition which led to much filing, countermarching, and 
doubling of ranks and files, meant that most of the old evolutions need no 
longer be practised; and the adoption during the 1750's of close rank-and 
file-intervals, and of marching and manoeuvring in step to a musical cadence, 
likewise rendered them superfluous. Those few evolutions which were re- 
tained were now buried away in the manual exercise, and in the manoeuvres. 
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after 'the Party of an Adjutant and 3 Non Commission Officers from Each 
Regt' assembled at Greenwich early in June, 1764, had tested and acquired 
a uniform precision and timing at the new manual and platoon, these 
exercises were at the end of August printed and issued by the Adjutant 
General to all of the regiments of horse and foot then in the kingdom of 
England, to be observed henceforth as regulation practice. 
19 
Three weeks 
later, on 21 September, the Secretary at War forwarded copies of the same 
exercises to the C's-in-C in Ireland and North Britain, with the King's 
directions that all of the regiments under their command be provided with 
and practise the same. 
20 
On 13 September, meanwhile, the Adjutant General 
sent to all of the foot in England a list - abridged and 'without 
Explanations' or descriptive plans - of the new manoeuvres tentatively pro- 
posed; these were to be practised against the upcoming autumn reviews, 
scheduled for late October. 
21 
These "new" drill manoeuvres were chosen for 
standardization because they were considered a comprehensive selection from 
the overall body of manoeuvres then generally practised. Even this limited 
selection, although comprehensive, was more than a regiment would normally 
have time to perform at a review; as the Adjutant General informed the 
King on 10 October 1764, the reviewing officers 'having directions to 
Select any which they think most Proper, it will Appear, if the Regiments 
are Perfect in the whole'. Harvey pointed out that it was nobody's inten- 
tion 'to Confine the Regiments to the [manoeuvres] (in their future 
Discipline) which are Delivered, But to be at Liberty to practice any 
Others, that may perfect them in all the movements, which Exigencys of 
Service, or Marchings, may make Necessary, at the same time to be able, to 
perform all which are Delivered, with the Greatest Exactness'. 
22 
The last 
elements were issued on 10 October: on that day an enlarged, more detailed 
description of the new manoeuvres was sent out to the English foot, tog- 
ether with directions on the firings and on the new procedure which the 
foot was to follow when being reviewed; and on the same day all of the 
horse in England was issued with the firings, and with directions on the 
19. WO 4/1044, p. 1, 'June 8th, 1764', and 'August 1764'. The parties at 
Greenwich were from regiments in England. 
20. WO 4/1044, p. 1, '17th Septem. 1764'; and WO 4/75. B., pp. 216,220. 
The new platoon exercise was a slight improvement upon that in use since 
1756, reducing the motions from 24 to 21 by streamlining. the ramming pro- 
cedure. It was without doubt the speediest, the easiest-learned, and the 
most efficient platoon to be issued during the eighteenth century; it 
survived as regulation practice, unchanged, until 1792, when it was re- 
placed by an inferior exercise. Although a few of the motions in the 1764 
platoon were taken directly from the Prussian exercise of the 1750's, it 
was (like the platoon in the 1756 Regulations from which it mostly derived) 
an essentially English production. 
21. WO 4/1044, p. 1, '13 Septem. 1764'. 
22. WO 4/1044, pp. 2-3. 
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new review procedure which was to be followed by the mounted arm. 
23 
By mid-October 1764, therefore, the horse and foot in England had been 
provided with the review directions and with all the elements composing 
the new drill, although some of this material was regarded still as tenta- 
tive. The regiments in Scotland and in Ireland had the new manual and 
platoon. The Adjutant General, Col Edward Harvey, was now able to provide 
the King with a progress report in which he outlined the stages still to 
come. Once the reviewing officers had seen the regiments in England per- 
form the new drill and had submitted their review reports, Harvey proposed 
'to Receive any Alterations or Additions, which your Majesty may think 
Necessary'; and he likewise proposed, once the reports were in, to settle 
upon a final set of orders regarding review procedure 'to Lay before your 
Majesty for your Royal Orders... to which all Regiments are to Conform, with- 
out Deviation'. 
24 
The reviewing officers saw the several units in England 
between 22 October and 12 November, and found them performing the new drill 
(as Parslow observed), 'surprizingly well for the time they have had to 
practice'. 
25 
These were good results, the regiments appearing quite for- 
ward after only ten weeks of training; and with the winter now come Harvey 
was able to settle the revisions which seemed warranted. He accomplished 
this task to the King's satisfaction, and well in advance of the 1765 
reviews he was able to send to the regiments in England the revised drill 
and review orders. 
26 
It seems that no more faults were found during the 
course of the 1765 reviews, since only one slight alteration remained to be 
made (in the 'method of Drawing up a Battn' when on review); and that was 
given out in February 1766.27 
Thus the several drill elements issued late in 1764 had by the end of 
1765 passed through their trial period, and could now be extended by auth- 
ority, or otherwise. The extension of the arms exercises through the army 
generally was overdue in any case, what with half of the battalions of 
marching foot now serving abroad. 
28 
In January 1766 therefore the Adjutant 
General sent copies of the manual and platoon to the general officers or 
governors commanding all the forces in Minorca, Gibraltar, the West Indies, 
and North America, with the King's orders that these 'be Practised without 
Deviation, by all the Regiments of Infantry in the Service'. 
29 
These 
23. WO 4/1044, p. 2, 'October 1764', and '10th Octob. 1764'. 
24. WO 4/1044, pp. 2-3. Copies of all drill orders issued so far had, of 
course, been supplied to the reviewing officers (Majs-Gen George Augustus 
Eliott, John Parslow, and the Duke of Richmond) appointed that season to see 
all the regiments in England. WO 4/75. B., pp. 269-70, and /1044, pp. 1-2. 
25. WO 27/7, passim, for their reports. 
26. WO 4/1044, pp. 3-4. 
27. WO 3/24, p. 104. 
28. For distribution, see Appendix B. 
29. WO 3/23, p. 3. 
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orders were complied with immediately, Gen Thomas Gage responding from 
North America, for example, that 'all the Regiments under my Command shall 
be forthwith acquainted with His Majesty's Order, and be furnished with 
Copy's of the Book of Exercise'. 
30 
Meanwhile, provision had long since been 
made to supply the new review directions and manoeuvres to regiments arriv- 
ing home in England, in the normal rotation of the service; 
31 
and at the 
same time that process of osmosis which would see these directions estab- 
lished and practised, elsewhere, was already under way. Thus by mid-1766 
the rotation of regiments between England and Scotland had led to the 
definite establishment of the full 1764 Regulations there; and by the end 
of 1766 rotation between the British Isles, the West Indies, and North 
America, had led to the introduction of the full 1764 Regulations on those 
stations. Although the Minorca and Gibraltar garrisons remained fixed from 
early in 1764 until 1768, rotation then began and the full 1764 Regulations 
were carried to both of those places too. Finally, all of the horse and 
foot in Ireland were practising the full 1764 Regulations by 1768.32 
The 1764 Regulations were to remain the standard drill of the army, as 
a whole, until 1778; and during that period they were often reprinted and 
were widely available. Indeed no eighteenth-century drill was so widely or 
so frequently reprinted as were particular elements or the whole of the 
1764 Regulations; and this general availability of the new drill, soon 
spread abroad by regiments coming onto other commands and stations from 
England and serving among regiments already on these stations but as yet 
practising an older drill, both witnessed and helped occasion its army-wide 
adoption. Both the British and the colonial militias, as well as the reg- 
ular regiments, put pressure on the printers for copies; and so too did 
the augmentation of the forces with the coming of the 1775-83 war. The 
history of the various imprints made over these years illustrates not only 
the spread of the regulations, but also the tempo of events immediately prior 
to the outbreak of fighting, and the requirements of the loyalist Provincial 
Corps raised in America from 1776 onwards. 
30. C. E. Carter (ed. ), op. cit., II, 347; Gage to Harvey, New York, 30 
Apr 1766. 
31. The directive is in WO 4/1044, p. 39; and see ibid., 2-4; WO 5/53, pp. 
159,196-200,461; and WO 3/1, p. 37, on the supply of rotating regiments. 
32. It is clear from the 1768 Irish Inspection Returns (WO 27/14), that 
the full 1764 Regulations were by that date everywhere in use in Ireland. 
We have seen that'the new manual and platoon were made regulation practice 
there in Sept 1764; but at what point the review directions and manoeuvres 
were introduced is not clear. The loss of the Irish Army's records and 
Inspection Returns for the years 1765 and 1766 reduce us to speculation. 
The surviving Irish Inspection Returns for 1767 (WO 27/11) are laconic; 
but it seems likely that the full 1764 Regulations were in use in 
1767 
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The earliest printed version of the 1764 manual and platoon, which I 
have seen, was the New Manual, and Platoon Exercise: with an Explanation. 
Published by Authority (Dublin, 1764); this was printed by the 'Printer to 
the King's Most Excellent Majesty' on the orders of Dublin Castle after 
receipt of the Secretary at War's letter of 21 September 1764, mentioned 
earlier. The latest of the many official imprints of these arms exercises 
appeared as The Manual Exercise with Explanations as ordered by His Majesty, 
1778 (1778); and there were sizeable imprints made in the British Isles in 
1768,1770, and 1775. 
There were several imprints of the full 1764 Regulations to appear dur- 
ing these years, also. The earliest offical copy of the 1764 Regulations, 
which I have seen, was printed at London early in 176633 The latest was a 
private venture, appearing as Anon., The General Review Manoeuvres; or, the 
whole Evolutions of a Battalion of Foot... To which is annexed, The Manual 
Exercise (1779); several excellent plates illustrating the manoeuvres were 
included in this version, prepared doubtless for the militia officers then 
under canvas with their corps in the big camps. 
In North America, where so much of the army was to find itself during 
these years, the earliest known imprint of the full drill is The Manual 
Exercise, as ordered by His Majesty in 1764. Together with Plans and 
Explanations of the Method GeneraZZy Practised at Reviews and Field-Days 
(New York, 1766), which was certainly the work of Gage's command. A great 
number of 1764 manual and platoons, and also of the full 1764 Regulations, 
were printed thereafter in the North American colonies. There were as many 
as twenty-six American imprints between 1766 and 1780,34 printed as far 
afield as at New York (in 1766, '69, '73, '75, and '80), at Boston (in 1774 
and '80), at Philadelphia (in 1775 and '76), at Wilmington, Delaware (in 
1775), at Providence, Rhode Island (in 1774), at Lancaster, Pennsylvania 
(in 1775), and at Newburyport, Massachusetts (in 1774). Needless to say, 
this outburst of American imprints, c. 1774-75, boded no good for the British 
Army; and in the circumstances prevailing by 1774 the sincerity of emulation 
can hardly have seemed flattering. 
35 
33. There is in the BM a MS boo-. k of hand-coloured plates showing the review 
dispositions, and each of the manoeuvre Eh (BM Add. MS 28,856); entitled 'A 
Plan of a Review, as Performed by the 4. th(or 
Kings Own) Regiment, when 
Reviewed by His Majesty in Hyde Park, 17. July 1765', this is the earliest 
full version of the 1764 drill which I have seen, and may be compared with 
advantage with any of the later, printed copies. 
34. R. Riling (ed), Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops 
of the United States (1782) [rpt. 1966], 23. 
35. Printed in the 1774 Boston version of the full 1764 Regulations was a 
resolution of the Provincial Congress (held early in'the autumn of 1774, in 
response to the Coercive Acts), that 'the Inhabitants of this Province 
[Massachusetts]... in Order to their perfecting themselves in the Military 
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Prior to 1778, only a few additions and alterations were made by auth- 
ority, which may quickly be summarized. Thus, with the addition of a com- 
pany of light infantry to each of the battalions in 1771-72 the Adjutant 
General sent out a circular with instructions on the disposition of the new 
company when drawing up in battalion. 
36 
In May 1772 it was ordered that 
all of the horse should henceforth form their squadrons only two-rank deep, 
thereby abandoning the old practice of drawing up on three ranks which had 
been followed since the later seventeenth century. 
37 
During the following 
three years other measures were taken to simplify parts of the cavalry 
drill. After tests were conducted at the Adjutant General's wish, in 1773, 
the cavalry's foot evolutions were abridged; and in the spring of 1774 
the cavalry regiments were permitted to dispense at the reviews (as they 
had no doubt already done in regular training) with many of the old mounted 
evolutions first regularized in the 1728 ReguZations. 
38 In the summer of 
1775 Harvey sent all of these revisions across to the Irish C-in-C, ob- 
serving that 'Reforms are not bro't abt. in a Day'; and at that point they 
were enacted in the Irish horse too. 
39 
During this period, meanwhile, the number of private publications com- 
ing out continued to increase, reflecting - as had been the case after 
1748 - the spur given to the military literary world by the great wars of 
the mid-century. The notable increase in the number of regiments (and 
hence in the numbers and rate of intake of youthful and inexperienced 
subalterns40) composing the peacetime standing army after 1763, the variety 
of enemies encountered and the theatres recently campaigned in, and the 
wide imperial dispersal adopted at the war's end, were all factors whose 
influence is very apparent in the post-1763 private works. And the out- 
break of armed rebellion in the American colonies gave a new impetus to 
publication towards the close of this period. 
The need for works addressing themselves to the interior management, 
training, and discipline of the regiments, and which could serve as texts 
in the expanded post-war army, was met by several publications of varying 
quality. For the foot, the best was Capt Bennett Cuthbertson's Interior 
Management, which reflected a deep knowledge of regimental affairs. 
41 
Art', were to follow this drill. By that date the Massachusetts "patriots" 
were collecting arms and training openly; it is safe to assume, then, that 
the embattled farmer who a few months later fired the shot heard round the 
world, did so according to King's Regulations. 
36. WO 3/3, p. 48. 
37. WO 3/25, '12 May, 1772'. 
38. The testing was carried on in the 2nd Dragoon Guards, and the 2nd Drag- 
oons, both of which were in England in 1773 (WO 3/4, pp. 24,26). On the 
mounted evolutions, see WO 3/25, p. 65. 
39. WO 3/5, pp. 36-7. 
40. For these numbers, see above p. 48. 
41. Capt Bennett Cüthbertson, A System for the CorrtpZeat Interior Management 
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Aware that there were no texts available (except for Bland's, now quite 
outdated) addressing themselves to the establishment and maintenance of 
good order and discipline in the company or the battalion, Cuthbertson 
drew up his work to supply that gap; full of admirably organized chapters 
on all aspects of regimental administration and routine, the book was 
aimed at the hundreds of subalterns who had nowhere else to find all of this 
material collected together in one place. Included too was a section on 
the regular exercising and manoeuvring of the battalion which, though brief, 
was without doubt the best short essay on training to have appeared to 
date; 42 and Cuthbertson added a few pages of suggestions on the train- 
ing of a light company which, 'though not allowed on the Establishment' at 
present, he felt sure would be needed against the outbreak of another war. 
Addressed to the same topic as Cuthbertson's Interior Discipline but 
produced in an entirely different format was the Instructions for Young 
Officers, a collection of daily orders on routine regimental administration 
and training issued from 1748 to 1756 by James Wolfe, as major and lieuten- 
ant-colonel of the 20th Foot. 
43 
Although the anonymous editor who publish- 
ed these orders made no attempt at organization beyong setting them down 
chronologically, nevertheless this approach conveyed an immediacy and a 
realism ideal for young officers fresh from the regulations, or from the 
more turgid pages of Bland and Simes. Since these orders fairly breathe 
the admirable spirit of Wolfe and the 20th, portraying not only the details 
but also capturing the flavour of an extremely well-administered corps, the 
young officer could hardly but profit from the book. 
A considerably larger and more detailed work than either of the above 
was Capt Robert Hinde's Light Horse, which was addressed exclusively to the 
light dragoon regiments. 
44 
This was a very wide-ranging treatise taking in 
not only the regiments still existing, but also the light dragoon regi- 
ments recently disbanded, together with the light troops which had during 
the recent war been added to the regular dragoon regiments. All aspects of 
the light dragoon service - interior management, arms, training and drill, 
clothing, accoutrements, horses, and active service conditions - were dealt 
with at length; and both Hinde's choice of source material (often quoting 
from Campbell Dalrymple's Military Essay, for example, and from various 
and (Economy of a Battalion of Infantry (Dublin, 1768). Cuthbertson had from 
1755 to 1768 served as adjutant in the 5th Foot, thus acquiring through ex- 
perience most of his considerable knowledge of regimental management; and 
this he supplemented by studying 'the Practice of several excellent Battal- 
ions', foremost among which was the regime practised in the 20th Foot when 
under Wolfe's command. (pp. viii-xi). 
42. Ibid., 199-219. 
43. Anon. Ed., General WoZfe's Instructions to Young officers: also his 
Orders for a BattaZion... (1768). Cited under Wolfe, hereafter. 
44. Capt Robert Hinde, The Discipline of the Light Horse (1778). 
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regulations), and his personal commentary (based on his services with the 
21st Light Dragoons, 1760-63) were well taken, well organized, and clearly 
stated. Although concerned especially with the light dragoons, there was 
much in Hinde's treatise (notably his material on training) that was ap- 
plicable through the cavalry generally. No cavalry officer could fail to 
profit from a study of Hinde and, if used in conjunction with Campbell 
Dalrymple and the current regulations, little would remain to be learned 
about the mounted service. 
Among the works addressed to the subalterns with the regiments, the 
considerable quality of Wolfe's orders and of the treatises of Cuthbertson 
and Hinde stands in sharp contrast to the uninspired, but nevertheless bulky 
effusions, of Thomas Simes. Simes, whose works spanned the years 1767-1780, 
was without doubt the most long-winded drudge - and also the most bare- 
faced plagiarist - who ever served the British Army. 
45 
In spite of the fact 
that his works stretch slightly beyond the period presently under considera- 
tion, it will be convenient to summarize all of his work here. 
Simes' publications represented the most voluminous collection of basic 
material on regimental administration and daily routine to be prepared by 
anyone - private or public - during the century. With Bland's old treatise 
obsolete, and with no work of comparable detail and stature available to 
fill the gap, it was to Simes perforce that young officers now turned for 
basic, detailed guidance. But Simes, though prolific, enjoyed an undeserved 
popularity. Where Bland had been systematic, Simes' books were ill-organ- 
ized; where Bland had been experienced and substantial, Simes was third- 
rate; and where Bland had been original and had infused his text with judge- 
ment, Simes was at best merely derivative and at worst an outright plagiar- 
ist. 
46 
Of his five books the first three - The Medley (1767), The Guide (1772), 
and The Course (1777) - were massive but ill-organized compendia of material 
45. Simes produced five military works. The earliest was The Military Medley: 
Containing the most necessary Rules and Directions for attaining a Competent 
Knowledge of the Art... (Dublin, 1767). A 2nd, rev. ed. of The Medley ap- 
peared at London in 1768. His second work was The Military Guide for Young 
officers... (1772); a 2nd ed. of The Guide appeared at London in 1776, and a 
3rd in 1781. Next came A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of 
a Battalion... (1777). The Course was followed in 1780 by two works, namely 
The Regulator: or Instructions to Form the Officer, and Complete the Soldier... 
(1780), and his magnum opus, entitled A Treatise on the Military Science, 
which comprehends the Grand Operations of War... (1780). 
46. Plagiarism was most infrequent among English military writers; and 
Simes' propensities in that direction did not pass unnoticed. Thus John 
Williamson, in the 2nd (1785) ed. of his excellent Elements of Military 
Arrangement (1782), I, xiv, was moved to point out publicly that Simes 'has 
done me the honour... to copy almost the whole of my manoeuvres, without 
informing his reader whence he has taken them'. 
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dealing with all aspects of regimental administration and routine, together 
with reprints of all current regulations and reproductions of most of the 
regular printed administrative forms (such as muster rolls and the like) 
used throughout the army. All of this material was quite useful to young 
officers; and this (together with the outbreak of war in 1775) accounts 
for Simes' success. But even his unsystematic compilation of material was 
marred by the random and oft-repeated addition of chapters dealing with 
various aspects of active campaigning, most of them cribbed or copied 
directly from the works of such eminent authorities as Frederick II and 
Saxe. Nor did these first three publications of Simes differ much, one 
from another, in their contents; each was essentially a re-hash of the 
volume preceding it, though distinguished by a steadily improving format. 
Although his works were heavy-handed affairs, it must be admitted 
that they served their purpose of providing young officers with a fairly 
complete catalogue of their duties. Even Harvey, though unimpressed, 
acknowledged the trouble Simes had put himself to in 'Collecting Several 
Regulations & Forms of Returns etc & in publishing them together'; and he 
knew this to be of Some Convenience to Young Officers'. 
47 
But Simes 
thought that he had accomplished more than the mere 'collecting' which the 
Adjutant General acknowledged, the sales success of his publications having 
turned his head. This led him on to his last two works - one of which was 
useful and the other a crowning revelation of his vacuity. 
48 
In The Regula- 
tor (1780) Simes attempted to outline the duties of all ranks in a regiment 
and - although still unoriginal in content and fleshed out with the usual 
mass of administrative forms - he succeeded quite well at this; the format 
adopted in The Regulator was much more logical than had been the case in 
his previous works, and in consequence the book portrayed rather clearly the 
internal management, duties, and discipline of the regiment. 
49 
The second 
of these last works was the Military Science, his magnum opus; and un- 
fortunately it was his worst effort. Abandoning the drudgery of regimental 
affairs, he set out to essay the more sweeping, 'sublime' problems posed by 
the conduct of the strategy and grand tactics of an army in the field. To 
47. WO 3/5, p. 25. 
48. Simes had already made this apparent at the Horse Guards, if not as 
yet to the general public, when in June 1779 he wrote to Lord Amherst offer- 
ing to raise and lead '50,000 Moors' for the defence of Gibraltar. WO 34/ 
115, ff. 28-30. See also WO 3/5, p. 25; and WO 34/124, ff. 186-7. 
49. In The Guide (1777), 6, Simes had bemoaned the lack of professional 
qualification in candidates for commissions: as he wrote, 'I hope the time 
will come soon, when a particular description, by authority, of the duties 
required from each Commission in the Service, with a general view of every 
thing an Officer should be acquainted with, will accompany all Commissions'. 
The Regulator was no doubt devised as this 'particular description', since 
his insinuation that The Guide be used for this purpose had not been taken 
up. Simes' suggestion was sound. 
127 
this end, Simes produced what was little more than a blatant plagiarisation 
and unacknowledged revision of Turpin de Crisse's Art of War; and he 
added to this a lengthy section on the attack and defence of fortified 
villages lifted (likewise unacknowledged) from the 1761 English transla- 
tion of Le Cointe's Science of Military Posts. 
Although his work was uninspired, unoriginal, and repetitive, Simes 
because of the great energy which he devoted to his task and the sheer 
volume of his publication, contributed considerably during the later-1760's 
and the 1770's to the basic schooling of young officers. 
The value of a sound education for officers was a subject to which most 
authors had in the past addressed themselves, in passing; but now it was 
taken up in earnest by Lewis Lochee in his Essay on Military Education. 
50 
Convinced that 'in forming the British army, it has been too much the pre- 
vailing maxim, that practice is sufficient for the instruction of a soldier', 
he based his essay in a classic application of the socio-political theories 
of Montesquieu. Arguing the value of encouraging the cult of honour among 
the youth of the aristocracy and gentry, Lochee felt that the too-common 
idea that 'a suit of regimentals will hide all little defects' would give 
way to a desire for sound military knowledge. It was his belief, further, 
that all young officers should get a proper education in military matters 
prior to joining their regiments, since an honourable and educated officer 
corps would not only be expert in the field, but would raise the public 
estimation of the officer's role. 
51 
Similar views on the utility of military education were expressed by 
two other writers, both of whom were themselves officers. Both advocated 
a more old-fashioned approach to education than that espoused by Lochee. * 
Lt John Clarke, in his annotated translation of the Military Institutions 
of Vegetius, 
52 
stressed the relevance of ancient warfare to modern practice, 
thinking it to be 'essentially requisite' for officers to be well-grounded 
in its study. All of the modern great captains had acknowledged their 
debt to antiquity; and indeed current drill - 'so nearly copied from 
Antiquity' - and much of modern tactics could be broadened from such study. 
"Xenophon, Polybius, Caesar, and Vegetius, will always afford sufficient 
Employment for a military Man. '53 Maj Robert Donkin, meanwhile, argued the 
same need in a rambling work published at New York, during the War for 
50. Lewis Lochee, An Essay on Military Education... (1773). Lochee was 
master of a 'Military Academy' in Little Chelsea, which had a fair follow- 
ing in the 1770's; and he was the author of several mathematical works. 
51. Ibid., 18-21. 
52. Lt John Clarke, Military Institutions of Vegetius... With a Preface 
and Notes (1768). 
53. Ibid., vii-xi, passim. On other translations from antiquity, see 




More especially, Donkin's Remarks were aimed at the new- 
modelling of the British Army which, like all other contemporary armies, 
he felt to be defective in basic organization, recruitment, training, and 
morale. Basing his views on his studies of the Roman armies of the Republic 
- the true strength of which lay in discipline, obedience, a love of 
glory, the confidence which officers and men had in one another, and the 
spirit of competition between men and between units - he wished to re- 
model the British Army so that these most excellent military virtues might 
once again be encouraged. Fostering a sence of honour among the of- 
ficers 
Aadopting 
short-term enlistments, would help to achieve these ends. 
In an army so constituted re-inlistments would be common, while discharged 
men would flood the countryside spreading tales of the glory and rewards of 
service. 
55 
The recent experience of light infantry, of ranging corps, and of the 
light legions both in the Americas and Germany was preserved and dissemin- 
ated in a number of publications, after the 1763 peace. Donkin's work, 
noted above, gave to the tactics of the petite guerre a lengthy and very 
sound section clearly inspired by the Journals of Robert Rogers and, of 
course, was an appropriate subject at the time and place where Donkin pub- 
lished. 
56 
Maj Robert Rogers' Journals had been published in 176557. Although a 
straight narrative of the reconnaissance patrols and raids carried out by 
his corps of Rangers during the North American campaigns of 1755-1761, 
the account was extremely vivid, and conveyed clearly the nature of the con- 
tinual and often savage petite guerre carried out along the frontiers of 
New France. An invaluable section dealt with rules for training regular 
soldiers to 'the ranging-discipline'; 
58 
and this, together with the nar- 
rative, provided officers with^exceedingly clear impression of ranging 
tactics and of the intelligence value of the ranging service. In short, 
Rogers' Journals conveyed a striking realism and a most consummate pro- 
fessionalism, and any officer reading them would profit greatly should he 
54. Maj Robert Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks (New York, 1777). 
Donkin's text shows him to have been exceedingly well read, but is itself 
rather slight. 
55. Donkin argued that Britain, as a naval power, had no business in Conti- 
nental campaigning. He would therefore disband all the heavy cavalry, and 
retain only eight regiments of light dragoons (four each in Britain and 
Ireland) for duty in aid of the civil power. He would organize the foot in 
100 battalions, each on a peacetime strength of 500 rank and file - an est- 
ablishment which could be augmented in time of war. He envisaged an imperial 
army: he would station 16 of these battalions in Britain, 24 in Ireland, 10 
in the Mediterranean garrisons, and 50 in the Americas. Ibid., 204-10. 
56. Ibid., 222-264. 
57. Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account 
of the several Excursions... upon the Continent of North America... (1765). 
58. Ibid., 56-70. 
129 
be assigned to petite guerre duties. 
A similar but shorter narrative of actual operations, this time car- 
ried out by regulars taught to fight as true light infantry, was William 
Smith's Ohio Expedition. Describing the brilliant campaign conducted by 
Col Henri Bouquet against the Indians of the Ohio country in 1763-64, 
there was attached to the narrative an excellent appendix (the work of 
Bouquet himself) describing in detail the equipment, training, and tactics 
to be used by light infantry engaged with irregulars in an enclosed country. 
59 
Taken together, the narrative and the appendix provided a fine description 
of the tactics of a highly trained light corps, invaluable like Rogers' 
Journals to the officers of the light companies in each of the battalions 
of foot. 
Yet another excellent work dealing with aspects of the petite guerre - 
this time a full treatise, the best on the subject to appear in the eight- 
eenth century - was Roger Stevenson's Instructions for Officers Detached. 
60 
Taking the view that small detachments of regulars and "partisan corps" 
(ie., light legions of the type seen in most European armies during the 
1740-48 war, and more commonly during the 1756-63 war) could by themselves 
conduct small operations of the greatest utility to their larger parent 
armies, Stevenson felt that all officers should. be familiar with the tactics 
of the petite guerre. The bulk of his text was devoted to forming a part- 
isan corps, and to the duties which it would have to perform - reconnais- 
sance, attacking and defending posts, fortifying villages and buildings, 
raids, ambuscades, and skirmishing. 
61 
His chapters on the fortification 
and security of posts, 
62 
and on their attack and defence, 
63 
were notably 
outstanding; and the whole was clearly stated, making the tactics of the 
petite guerre easily accessible to officers. 
Lt John Pleydell's FieZd Fortification 64 continued and expanded upon 
59. William Smith, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the 
Ohio Indians in MDCCLXIV... (1766), was a reprint of a work which appeared 
first at Philadelphia in 1765. The London ed. had several fine plates il- 
lustrating tactical dispositions - as had the French translation published 
at Amsterdam in 1769. Bouquet's text fills pp. 37-59 of the London ed.. 
60. Roger Stevenson, Military Instructions for Officers Detached in the 
Field: Containing a Scheme for forming A Corps of a Partisan... (1770). A 
2nd, rev. ed. came out in London in 1779, while the original was reprinted 
- for obvious reasons - at Philadelphia in 1775. Stevenson was a regi- 
mental officer of some experience. 
61. Stevenson had much of his material on minor fortification from Lt John 
Pleydell's Field Fortification, on which see below. He recommended it to his 
readers. 
62. Ibid., 28-53. 
63. Ibid., 89-144. 
64. Lt J. C. Pleydell, An Essay on Field Fortification; Intended Principally 
for the Use of Officers of Infantry... (1768). Pleydell, a subaltern in the 
12th Foot, claimed that his text was a translation 'from the original 
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the subject taken up earlier in the Clairac and Le Cointe translations - 
to which, indeed, it owed much. 
65 
The best work on this subject to date, 
it nicely complemented Stevenson's work on the petite guerre and was, as 
Pleydell described it, designed for officers of infantry all of whom might 
upon campaign be obliged to construct redoubts or to defend buildings, 
villages, bridgeheads, and other posts, all 'without the assistance of an 
engineer'. The approach was practical, since he realized that the elaborate 
mathematics and geometry of military engineers were subjects 'too dry for 
every one to relish'; and indeed there was no need of 'handling the scale 
and compass... [nor] of problems, nor tiresome calculations, in order to 
learn the art of putting all kinds of posts into a proper state of de- 
fence'. 66 Practise, common sense, and study were the essential pre- 
requisites; and Pleydell dealt with the subject in such great detail, and 
with such ingenuity and inventiveness, that a thorough study of his treat- 
ise would prepare any intelligent officer to carry on the defence of posts 
and field fortifications competently indeed. 
Among the works dealing with regular linear tactics published at this 
time, the foremost was Maj-Gen Henry Lloyd's War in Germany; one of the most 
outstanding discussions of warfare to appear during the century, it was un- 
questionably one of the best pieces of analytical military history to be 
written in the English language. 
67 
Dealing in great detail with the cam- 
paigns and battles of 1756-59, analysing and criticizing their conduct, 
Lloyd drew from these studies valuable principles of war. 
68 
He was at pains 
to stress the signal importance of study: beyond the understanding of one's 
duties he felt that knowledge of the history and theory of war, of mathe- 
matics, geography, and of the history, political and social constitution, 
and national character of one's adversaries, was essential for the proper 
conduct of operations. Any intelligent field or general officer would have 
profitted considerably not only from Lloyd's principles and conclusions, 
but likewise from his minutely detailed and realistic accounts of battle 
tactics. 
Manuscript of an Officer of Experience in the Prussian Service'; but in 
fact it was almost certainly his own work, the reference to its Prussian 
origins merely window-dressing. 
65. Parts of Pleydell's work were based closely on Clairac's, although 
Pleydell expanded greatly upon what Clairac had written. For example, cf. 
the directions for the defence of a churchyard in Pleydell, 94-118, and in 
Clairac, op. cit., 41-5. 
66. Ibid., viii, passim. 
67. Maj-Gen Henry Lloyd, History of the Zate War in Germany; between the 
King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and Her AZZies..., I, was first 
published at London in 1766. A new ed., with both I and II, appeared at 
London in 1781. In 1790 a new imprint of I and II appeared at London. 
68. Notable are his conclusions on Leuthen (I, 138-9), and his concept of 
a strategic 'line of operations' (II, 87-95), later influencing Jomini. 
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Compared with Lloyd's War in Germany the other works on drill which 
appeared at this time were second-rate. The anonymous English translation 
of Leroy de Bosroger's Elementary Principles of Tactics had a certain limited 
following in the British Army, a few units (as the Inspection Returns illus- 
trate) practising manoeuvres of his invention. 
69 
Bosroger's ideas - since 
he was a firm partisan of the column of attack, believing not so much in its 
physical weight to deliver shock but rather in its moral superiority over 
the line - were not at any rate in the British tactical tradition; and 
this was fortunate, since his manoeuvres were overly geometric, and im- 
practicable in action. 
70 
More immediately useful was the "German Officer's" 
Manoeuvres Upon Fixed Principles, which was published in 1766.71 This small 
drillbook laid out a series of manoeuvres for the battalion most of which 
were described in the 1764 Regulations, but which were here performed in a 
fashion more sophisticated than that laid down in the regualtions. Although 
only a well-trained British battalion could have performed them, they were 
an alternate and a superior system by which the army's new manoeuvres could 
be carried out. 
72 
Less useful than the "German Officer's" work but of more 
value than Bosroger was Maj William Young's Practical Observations, a lengthy 
(if light) work describing not only linear drill and tactics in the field, 
but also field fortification and aspects of the petite guerre. 
73 
Although 
Young was experienced, having recently served in Germany as major of brigade 
to 'the Corps of Grenadiers and Highlanders', there was nothing in his work 
that could not be had more profitably elsewhere. 
A final publication appearing at this time was the Rudiments of War, 
a compilation of orders mostly given out in the army since 1702 by the com- 
manders of forces campaigning in Flanders, Germany, and Scotland. 
74 
Dealing 
most especially with administrative matters, drill was touched upon only 
in passing. The Rudiments of War was a well-written and extremely useful 
69. Anon. Trans., The Elementary Principles of Tactics; with New Observa- 
tions on the Military Art... translated by an Officer of the British Army 
(1771). The original was first published at Paris in 1768. 
70. Bosroger included, for example, directions on forming "the wedge", of 
which there were 'open' and 'full-centre' varieties. These were triangular, 
arrowhead-shaped formations, the leading point of which was to be driven 
through the enemy's lines! Ibid., 184-5. 
71. German Officer, Manoeuvres for a Battalion of Infantry, Upon Fixed 
Principles... (1766). Attached was a series of seventeen excellent plates 
illustrating the manoeuvres. 
72. Where the 1764 Regulations relied on filing for most movements, those 
of the "German Officer" were better tactically because they preserved a front 
by marching the lines obliquely; and they were more speedily performed than 
was possible by filing. 
73. Maj William Young, Manoeuvres, or Practical Observations on the Art of 
War... 2 vols., (1771). 
74. Anon., The Rudiments of War: Comprising the Principles of Military 
Duty, in a Series of orders issued by Commanders in the English Army... (1777). 
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guide for officers who had not as yet gone on active operations, and its 
appearance in 1777 was therefore timely. 
75 
1778 - 1788: 
By the later 1770's the manual and platoon exercises, the firings, 
the review procedures and the manoeuvres, as laid down in the 1764 Regula- 
tions, were still being followed everywhere in the army; and additionally 
a large number of useful manoeuvres retained from previous practice, or 
taken from the private drillbooks whether English or foreign, were every- 
where in use. The core manoeuvres, however - those of the 1764 Regula- 
tions, which all regiments were to know and practise so that regularity 
would be assured in the brigades and the line - were by this time in need 
of wholesale revision since (as the several private works being published 
at this time illustrate), the theory and practice of drill and tactics were 
advancing at a rapid pace. 
To attempt to introduce any significant revision in the army's drill 
regulations at a time when more than half the regiments of foot were away 
on active operations, in a theatre as distant and as vast as the West 
Indies and North America, would have been a virtually impossible under- 
taking; but with the active intervention of the French in 1778 and with 
the possibility of invasion by an army now known to be very capable and well 
trained, imminent, some revision of the drill practised by that part of the 
British Army now in the most critical situation - that is, the regiments 
in England - had immediately to be implemented. In the short term this 
policy must inevitably result in the practise simultaneously within the 
army of two different sets of drill regulations; but since the 1764 
Regulations were to be only partially revised (thus easing the problem of 
standardising drill everywhere, once conditions became more settled), and 
since the forces in Britain must at all costs be prepared to meet the 
thoroughly up-to-date regiments of France, revision was immediately taken 
in hand. 
75. The bulk of the Rudiments of War was taken, often verbatim, from the 
MS treatise 'British Military Orders', written c. 1750 by Lt-Col John 
LaFaussille of the 8th Foot. LaFaussille had not published his work, but 
occasional references to it in the 1750's indicate that it circulated in MS 
(indeed, in 1752 he sent a copy to the Adjutant General) (Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, 
II, ff. l-62). It consisted chiefly of orders given out in the army in the 
Low Countries and Scotland during the campaigns of 1742-48. The anon. 
author of the Rudiments of War, although he did not acknowledge LaFaussille 
(d. 1763) by name admitted that he had much of his material from the MS book 
of an officer who had served as a major of brigade during the Austrian 
Succession War; he himself added a number of orders of more recent vintage, 
and re-arranged LaFaussille's text and format. 
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The concentration of troops in the camps formed across southern England 
during the spring of 1778 presented Amherst and his staff with an ideal 
opportunity for the speedy and effectual introduction of the revised drill. 
76 
Early in June 1778 the several general officers commanding the camps were 
sent by Amherst's staff manuscript copies of a list of nine lengthy manoeu- 
vres, to be given out to the regiments under their command. 
77 
These new 
manoeuvres, together with the manual, platoon, and firings laid down in 
1764, were practised by all of the foot encamped that summer in England. 
During the winter following, the new regulations were revised and augment- 
ed in light of the summer's experience; and in the spring of 1779 the 
final revised version of these 1778 Regulations consisted of a detailed des- 
cription of the disposition of all ranks when drawn up for review, together 
with a summary-of the ceremonial and drill to be followed at reviews. Of 
the elements of the drill proper, the manual and platoon laid down in the 
1764 Regulations were retained, and so too were the system of telling off 
and the firings of 1764.79 The series of manoeuvres given out in the 1778 
camps was repeated in these regulations, but to these were added - for the 
first time in any British drill regulations, so far as the light companies 
were concerned - detailed and specific instructions on the movements to be 
carried out by both flank companies while the body of the battalion was 
going through the main manoeuvres. 
80 
Two further refinements, never before 
laid down in the regulations, were the fixing of the speed of march at the 
slow and the quick step, and orders on the use of the 'musick' and drums 
when the battalion was manoeuvring. 
Despite the fact that the manual, platoon, and firings already in use 
were retained, nevertheless the revised review procedure, the excellent 
new series of core manoeuvres, and the careful concentration on several 
significant items of detail all combined to make the 1778 Regulations a con- 
siderable improvement upon any previous practice. Unfortunately however, 
the peculiar circumstances prevailing at the time these regulations were 
introduced - and the deplorable condition to which so much of the army 
had been reduced by 1783 - were to have the most deleterious effect upon 
76. The camps form the subject of Chapt. VI below. 
77. There are copies of these in WO 3/26, pp. 12-5, and in WO 34/242, ff. 7-9. 
Since each of several of these manoeuvres consisted of an involved series of 
movements, their actual number (as had been the case with the manoeuvres 
laid down in the 1764 Regulations) might be thought of as twelve or fourteen. 
78. Copies of the final version of the 1778 Regulations will be found in 
WO 3/26, pp. 29-32,169; and in WO 34/258, MP. H/10. 
79. Firing by "wings" (ie., half the battalion's frontage), which had not 
been mentioned in the 1764 Regulations, was included in the 1779 Regulations. 
This was no innovation, but rather a belated recognition of practice long 
since customary. 
80. The flank company manoeuvres were reprinted, verbatim, in John Williamson's 
Elements of Military Arrangement, 1 (1785), 150-3. 
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the success of the new drill. Amherst's writ as "General-on-Staff", 1778- 
1782, did not run beyong Britain on matters of drill; and his successor 
Conway (1782-83) took no further drill measures in hand. The 1778 Regula- 
tions were therefore issued only to units in Britain, during the American 
War; and by the end of the war a total of twenty-one battalions had been 
issued with the new regulations, twenty of these learning the 1778 drill 
while in the camps of southern England. 
81 
With the coming of the 1783 
peace and the considerable incident reductions and troop-movements, sev- 
enteen battalions trained in the new regulations survived and were to be 
found in Britain, Ireland, Gibraltar, the West Indies, and India. But 
where the practise of the 1778 Regulations was taken up for the first time 
after 1783 by several regiments returning to the British Isles, from 
abroad, several of the surviving seventeen battalions taught the drill prior 
to the peace abandoned it when they found themselves out of Britain, under 
new commanders. Thus, after 1783, six of the battalions trained in the 
1778 Regulations in the English camps joined the new Gibraltar garrison; 
and there, under Gen Eliott, the 1764 Regulations were once again made the 
order of the day. As we have seen, more than half of the battalions in 
Britain and Ireland during the years 1783-86 had come home in so shattered 
a condition as to be scarcely capable of performing the 1764 drill, let 
alone learning anything new. By 1785 qnly a handful of regiments - less 
than a dozen - were still following the 1778 Regulations, in the British 
Isles; and by 1786 half of these had given it up. By 1788 only three 
regiments were attempting it. At least thirteen regiments returning home 
after the peace, and in better shape than most, adopted the 1778 drill 
once settled into Irish or British quarters: but their attachment to the 
new drill did not last for long. Of the regiments reviewed in 1788 only 
the 7th and 35th in Britain, and the 69th in Ireland, showed the 1778 drill 
- and then in a modified form. 
Thus the uniformity of drill which had been maintained with such un- 
remitting effort for nearly a century past had, by the mid-1780's, come 
undone. From 1783-84 onwards the great majority of regiments - in Britain, 
Ireland, Gibraltar, India, the West Indies and the Canadas - were practis- 
ing a drill regimen the elements of which were disparate. 
82. 
Although the 
manual, platoon, and firings of 1764 were still being followed by the horse 
and foot, great variety prevailed in review procedure, in the all-important 
manoeuvres, and in a host of details - length of pace, manner of drawing 
up, number of ranks, rank- and file-intervals, speed of movement and of 
81. On regiments encamped, 1778-1782, see WO 5/60, p. 430 through /64, 
p. 249, passim. The review reports submitted on these corps are in WO 27/42 
through /49, passim. 
82. Cf. the regulations, and the Inspection Returns in WO 27 for these 
years. 
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exercise - which collectively ensured that the training of the individual 
regiments and their finished drill and tactical abilities, should vary 
quite considerably one from another. In the foot a hotch-potch of manoeuvres 
characterized the review performances, after 1783: many corps practised a 
combination of manoeuvres some drawn from the 1764 ReguZations, 
83 
some from 
the 1778 ReguZations, 
84 
and some from the ever-increasing store of custom- 
ary manoeuvres drawn from a variety of sources; 
85 
other regiments were 
practising systems entirely of their own invention; 
86 
and'a few regiments 
adopted foreign manoeuvres wholesale, throwing regulation off entirely. 
87 
The situation was most confusing in the infantry where by the mid-1780's 
irregularity was the rule; and by the later-1780's individual regiments 
were in the great majority of cases well-enough trained, but few were train- 
88 
ed alike beyond the manual and platoon. 
In the horse the situation was better. Where the manual and platoon, 
the dismounted firings and simple dismounted manoeuvres had always been 
drawn from the general regulations, the cavalry had continued to practise 
such of the mounted evolutions from the old 1728 Regulations as seemed 
appropriate, and mounted manoeuvres remained little-altered from old pract- 
ice long since customary. The vogue for "light" cavalry which set in during 
the 1760's, however, and which continued apace during the 1775-83 war, was 
a development unsettling to the old system of mounted manoeuvres; and in 
consequence the cavalry, no longer certain how to proceed, began clamouring 
for regulation drills. 
89 
By the mid-1780's official response to these pleas 
had once again encouraged regularity. 
90 
The irregularity which characterized the drill of the army - particu- 
larly of the foot - during the years 1783-90, was due to four main factors 
operating coincidentally. The widespread ruin among the battalions coming 
home after the peace left one-third of the foot disabled until 1785-86; 
91 
83. Eg., 63rd Foot at Glasgow, in 1786. (WO 27/56). 
84. Eg., 49th Foot at Waterford, in 1786. (WO 27/58, Pt. l). 
85. Eg., 7th Foot at Musselburgh, in 1786. (WO 27/56). 
86. Eg., 17th Foot at Chatham, in 1788. (WO 27/61). 
87. Eg., 38th Foot at Plymouth, in 1789. (WO 27/64). 
88. See typically, the excellent performance put on by the 7th Foot at 
Edinburgh, in May 1789. WO 27/64. 
89. Complaints on this score began in 1775 (WO 27/35,2nd Horse and 5th 
Dragoons), and were repeated in 1778 (WO 27/41,8th Light Dragoons). 
90. Comparison of the heavy cavalry manoeuvres shown at all of the reviews 
held from the early 1750's through to the early 1790's points up the absence 
of innovation and the fundamental importance of the practice of customary 
manoeuvres, in that arm. 
91. By 1784,26% of the men with the foot at home were recruits, while the 
regiments stood at only 71% of authorised establishments (see Chart 2, p. 66 
above). The condition of the regiments will be evident from ten quartered 
in Britain in 1784, selected at random from those which came home to Britain 
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among these units rebuilding took precedence over regularity. Secondly, 
there was a general uncertainty - unrelieved by authority - about what in 
fact constituted the proper regulation manoeuvres. The manual, platoon, and 
firings as laid down in 1764 were followed, quite properly; but among the 
many manoeuvres which the regulations of 1764 and 1778 described, and the 
great many more which customary practice increasingly allowed, there could 
be no such certainty as to how to proceed. A third factor was the appear- 
ance during this period of several private drill books devoted to tactics 
and manoeuvres, drawn heavily from recent French and Prussian theory and 
practice; these offered tempting alternatives to the current British con- 
fusion, and were adopted in several corps. Finally and, considering the 
fact that strong central direction could have overcome the second and third 
of these problems, harmful also was the absence during these years of a 
commander-in-chief in London. Between Conway's departure in 1783 and the 
reappointment of Amherst in 1793, the army was left in the hands of civil 
authority, which saw to its administration but left professional matters to 
the regiments. The Horse Guards staff alone had no authority to impose 
regulations; and in consequence (under Sir William Fawcett, now Adjutant 
General) they turned to the King, and in 1786 the first steps were taken 
to restore drill order. 
Restoring regularity, and at the same time preparing a wholly new and 
sound system of drill which would sweep away the many surviving cobwebs, 
was not to be the work of a day. The first steps were taken in 1786, when 
an interim regulation was prepared. 
92 
Issued in mid-April 'By His Majesty's 
Command' and sent to all of the regiments of horse and foot serving at home 
and abroad, these 1786 Regulations were designed chiefly for the use of the 
in 1783: (WO 27/51, passim). 
22nd: 16% recruits; 49% of Estab. (seen at Chatham, 18 June). 
23rd: 8% it ; 30% " it . (seen at Doncaster, 14 May). 24th: 50% of ; 68% "". (seen at Edinburgh, 7 July). 
27th: 59% it ; 33% "". (seen at Kidderminster, 7 June). 
28th: 22% ; 55% "". (seen at Claydon, 22 May). 
38th: 17% it ; 60% "". (seen at Stafford, 5 June). 
40th: 24%' ; 52% .". (seen at Plymouth Dock, 27 August). 
43rd: 27% it ; 48% "". (seen at Hilsea, 2 August). 
62nd: 42% of ; 59% "". (seen at Dundee, 20 September). 
63rd: 10% it ; 40% "". (seen at Bury St. Edmunds, 3 May). 
92. This was issued as By His Majesty's Convnand... GeneraZ Regulations and 
Orders for his Majesty 's Forces (1786). The interim nature of these regula- 
tions was clearly spelled out in the text remove the various Defects in 
Discipline... is a Work, that will require both Time and Perseverance to 
accomplish - as well as a much more particular and extensive Plan of 
Reform, and Regulation than the present one: - But, as some Undertaking of 
this Kind appears now to have become so indispensably necessary, that it 
cannot be any longer delayed,... the following General Orders and Instruc- 
tions, as leading to the Attainment of the important Object in Question 
[are to be followed]. ' (pp. v-vii). 
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foot. The manual, platoon, and firings, according to the1764 Regulations, 
were left unchanged; the basic training of the recruit (here explicitly 
addressed for the first time in British regulations), the dispositions to 
be observed when on review (including definite directions on rank- and file- 
intervals, length and speed of pace), and the overall review procedure 
(with detailed orders on the mechanics of marching, wheeling, and the form- 
ing of lines and columns), were the subject of this regulation. Although 
the actual manoeuvres were not laid down, the techniques of movement were 
standardised; and this went a long way towards restoring basic order in 
the foot's training, and in preparing the ground for the introduction of a 
full regulation drillbook for the infantry. 
The spring following, in April 1787, a similar interim regulation was 
issued to the whole of the cavalry; dealing with the review procedure, the 
dispositions, and with the mounted evolutions and manoeuvres, the essentials 
of regularity in the drill of the horse (as of the foot) were now once 
again established. 
83 
Both of these interim regulations were quickly put in practise, and 
thus the ground was prepared for the major drill regulations which were 
shortly to appear. 
94 
Meanwhile, several private publications had come out 
during these years, some of which were to have a notable influence and one 
of which was to be the basis of the army's regulation drill for the next 
half-century. 
Banastre Tarleton and John Graves Simcoe, lieutenants-colonel who com- 
manded the British Army's first true light legions, both published at this 
time lengthy accounts of the operations of their corps during the late war. 
Simcoe's Queen's Rangers, 
95 
describing in great detail the terrain and 
tactics employed by his force on the outpost duty and the petite guerre, 
was without doubt the best narrative account of the operations of a mixed 
light corps to appear in English during the century. The dedication, the 
93. This was the Heads of Review Exercise for a Regiment of Dragoons, issued 
under Fawcett's signature of 21 April 1787. This was a summary only (ie., 
'Heads'), since the cavalry when dismounted were to follow the 1786 Regulations 
already issued. 
94. The mid-April issue of the 1786 Regulations came too late for their 
disemmination in Ireland that year, prior to the reviews; but in Britain 
several regiments were quick to begin their training after them. By 1787 
the army everywhere was following these regulations, and continued to do 
so until they were superceded (WO 27/39, /61, /62, and /63). 
The 1787 Regulations, for the horse, were being practised as early as 
May 29 in England, (WO 27/59, and /58, Pt. 2). As with the 1786 Regulations, 
those of 1787 continued to be followed by all regiments of horse hence- 
forth (WO 27/63, /64, /66, /68, /69). 
95. Lt-Col John Graves Simcoe, A Journal of the Operations of The Queen's 
Rangers, From the End of the Year 1777, to the Conclusion of the Late 
American War... (Exeter, 1787). 
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professionalism, and the mutual confidence of officers and men so apparent 
in this journal, were remarkable; and they cannot have failed to be of 
assistance to British officers soon to be engaged with French light forces 
similarly inspired. There was an abundance of excellent material on the 
training and tactics of light troops, both horse and foot, to be gleaned 
from Simcoe's work. 
96 
Much less immediately useful as a guide to the detail 
of the petite guerre, but still a work not to be overlooked on the subject 
was Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, which appeared at the same time as 
Simcoe's book. 
97 
More in the nature of a general history of operations than 
a detailed account of the conduct of a particular unit, Tarleton's work con- 
tained nevertheless a good account of the campaigning of his British Legion 
-a corps second only to the Queen's Rangers in its successful pursuit of 
the petite guerre. 
Where the accounts of Simcoe and Tarleton were most useful only 
to officers of experience and judgement, John Williamson's Elements of 
Military Arrangement was on the other hand designed particularly for the 
youthful, inexperienced subaltern 
?8 
Williamson's Elements of Military 
Arrangement was a latter-day Treatise of Military Discipline, similarly 
organized and intended to serve the same purpose; and nowhere among the 
texts devoted to the routine of the service can developments in drill dur- 
ing the century be more clearly seen, and appreciated, than in the com- 
parison of Bland and Williamson. 
99 Aware that the number of books devoted 
to military subjects had 'of late years been multiplied to an almost infin- 
ite degree, so that the bookseller's shelves seem to groan under their 
weight', Williamson pointed out that there was, even so, still nothing 
available that would give a young officer a clear and comprehensive des- 
cription of his duties, and of the regulations according to which the drill 
should be carried on. What was obviously needed was 'a system of regula- 
tions, established by authority, like that among the Prussians, for the 
96. Prefixed to the presentation copy in the King's Library (BM), is a 
12pp MS letter addressed by Simcoe to George III, in which he advocates the 
re-raising of similar light legions, now that the French have them. This 
letter is itself an excellent summary of the organization, training, and 
tactics of such units. 
97. Lt-Col Banastre Tarleton, History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in 
the Southern Provinces of North America... (1787). Tarleton's work was marred 
by its repeated attempts to discredit his chief, Cornwallis - which, con- 
sidering Tarleton's performance at the action of the Cowpens, can hardly be 
credited. 
98. John Williamson, The Elements of Military Arrangement, and of the Disc- 
ipline of War; Adapted to the Practice of the British Infantry... 2 Vols., 
(1782). A 2nd, rev. ed., appeared in 1785, under the same title; and my 
quotations are from this. 
99. Like Bland, Williamson dealt at length with the duties of officers at 
each rank, with the organization and drawing up of a battalian, and with all 
of the elements of the drill as currently practised in the army. Included 
too was the routine of guards and pickets, of parades, encampments, garrison 
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exercise, discipline, and whole detail of the service'. 
1 
In the meantime 
Williamson supplied the want, and insofar as drill was concerned his text 
was of the greatest utility. He laid down in detail the manual, platoon, 
and firings after the 1764 Regulations; and aware of the current confusion 
among the regiments as to what were the regulation manoeuvres, he printed 
both those of the 1764 Regulations and of the 1778 Regulations, together 
with part of the drill taught in Howe's 1774 light infantry camp (on which, 
see below). Nor were these the only manoeuvres described in his book: 
fully aware that 'the number of different [customary] movements has been so 
multiplied, that some regiments can perform above two hundred', he added a 
long section dealing with most of the whole stock of the army's customary 
manoeuvres, including several taken from the Austrian, Prussian, and French 
services. 
2 
Williamson's textbook was, then, quite excellent, up-to-date, 
and timely; and where the drill of a regiment was concerned it was a trove 
of material. 
Most of the. rest of the works appearing at this time were concerned 
almost exclusively with drill and tactics, illustrating the increasing con- 
cern with speed and flexibility on the battlefield which typified European 
military theory as the century drew to an end. Translations of foreign 
treatises abounded but, curiously, it was to be the drillbooks of British 
tacticians deeply versed in Continental practice which had the most immediate 
and practical impact. That is not to say that the translations were ignored. 
The Craufurds' translation of Johann Gottlieb Tielke's Remarkable Events3 
was advertised by none other than the Adjutant General who, in a circular 
already mentioned, solicited subscribers to work 'the merit of which is too 
well known, & too universally acknowledged to require any Comments upon its 
Excellence from me'. 
4 
Without doubt the most sophisticated discussion of 
the relation of ground to tactics - an aspect of tactical thinking now 
gaining increasing attention, and one which Wellington was to apply so 
effectively in the near future - Tielke analysed in great detail the 
duty, campaigning, and even military law. The success of the Elements of 
Military Arrangement, concerned as it was with the basic instruction of 
officers, underlines the poverty of the works of Thomas Simes. 
1. Ibid., I, x-xi. 
2. For these several manoeuvres, see Ibid., I, 133-74. He added a summary 
of the basic manoeuvres which might be practised with profit by a single 
company, most useful in an army so subject to long-term dispersal (pp. 117-33). 
3. Capts C. & R. Craufurd [trans. ], An Account of some of the Most Remark- 
able Events of the War between the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians...; 
And a Treatise On... the Military Art, 2 Vols., (1787-8). The original German 
ed. had appeared at Freiburg in 1776. Tielke, an officer in the Saxon Army, 
had previously (at Leipzig in 1769) published an outstanding treatise en- 
titled The Field Engineer, which was translated into English in 1789. 
4. (WO 3/27, p. 3). 
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battles of Zorndorf (Aug 1758) and Maxen (Nov 1759), and used these actions 
to illustrate the influence of topography. 
5 
Another foreign treatise widely known in the army was Isaac Landmann's 
translation of Maj-Gen Friedrich von Saldern's Elements of Tacticks. 
6 
An 
Inspector General in the Prussian service from 1763 to 1785, where he 
enjoyed a considerable reputation as a tactician, von Saldern was chiefly 
concerned with establishing certain basic, technical principles of foot 
movement which, when learned, would serve as the basis for performing the 
msot complicated manoeuvres with speed and precision. In his basic 
principles he was to be followed closely by Fawcett, when he framed the 
1786 Regulations, 7 and later by David Dundas in his celebrated drillbook; 
and many of these principles were borrowed by Saldern from the best of con- 
temporary French theoreticians, and from current Prussian practice. At this 
basic level Saldern wrought well; but unfortunately for his reputation he 
was given to constructing the most involved of advanced manoeuvres, dif- 
ficult enough to perform on the Potsdam parade-grounds and impossible in 
any battlefield situation; and it was these which appeared large in the 
Elements of Tatticks, dimming the excellent metal upon which they were 
based. 
8 
Less noticeable in impact were a Lt Douglas' translation of the comte 
de Guibert's General Essay on Tactics and Maj Thomas Mante's translation of 
Joly de Maizeroy's System of Tactics, both of which appeared in London in 
1781.9 Maizeroy's ideas, often confused in their statement, were hardly 
calculated for success in the British service; and they had little in- 
fluence on French practice. His denigration of firepower and of the 
influence of weapons upon tactics rendered his ideas inapplicable, however 
provocative. Guibert's views - and his essay was widely thought of as one 
of the most brilliant on its subject in the century - seem on the other 
hand to have been partly overshadowed and lost sight of because of the 
5. Tielke attributed Finck's defeat at Maxen to his improper use of 
ground - ground which Daun had used with consummate skill. 
6. Von Saldern's Elements of Tacticks, and Introduction to Military 
Evolutions for the Infantry... (1787), was first published at Dresden in 
1784. Landmann was Professor of Fortification and Artillery at the RMA, 
Sandhurst. 
7. In his preface, consequently, Landmann could point out that 'the rules 
and principles here laid down do not essentially differ from the regulations 
lately published by royal authority, to establish uniformity amongst the 
troops of the British army'. Ibid., viii. 
8. For a typical jibe at Saldern see P. Paret, Yorck and the Era of 
Prussian Reform (Princeton, 1966), 44. Several British battalions were 
practising manoeuvres taken from Saldern's drillbook, c. 1789. 9. Lt Douglas (trans. ) - J. A. H., comte de Guibert, A General Essay on 
Tactics. With an Introductory Discourse... 2 Vols., (1781). Guibert's work 
was first published in 1772, and Douglas' trans. was of the 1773 Liege ed.. 
Mante's trans. of Joly de Maizeroy's A System of Tactics, Practical, 
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influence in Britain of the Prussian school, at this time. 
10 
Unquestionably the two works the impact of which was most widely felt 
in the British Army of the period were those of Lt-Col William Dalrymple 
and Col (later Gen Sir) David Dundas. Dalrymple's Tacticks11 was the fruit 
of long service experience, of wide reading among the most modern French 
and German theoreticians, and of four seasons recently spent in the English 
encampments. 
12 
It was Dalrymple's concern to standardise the army's man- 
oeuvres and to do so upon sound technical rules of basic movement, aware 
as he was that of late the British Army, compared with foreign armies, had 
'not made an equal progress in its Regulations and Tacticks'. 
13 
The result- 
ing treatise was unique among all of the English works which had appeared 
to date. 
The Tacticks was unique both in content and in presentation. After 
devoting a short section to a proposed remodelling of the tactical sub- 
divisions within the British battalion, the rest of the work (dealing with 
the principles of movement, and then with manoeuvres) was laid out in the 
style of the French military ordonnances, proceeding from basic training 
and moving on to deal progressively with more advanced manoeuvres. 
14 
The 
mechanics of movement which he taught (pivot-files, points of bearing, 
alignments and the like), were quite new to British drillbooks, and Dalrymple 
advanced them as the basis 'upon which the field discipline of the army 
might be regulated'; only with these basics could 'an Uniform Tactical 
System be established, and the whole army trained upon the same plan'. 
15 
Dalrymple had a clear grasp of tactics, and each of the manoeuvres 
which he put forward was accompanied not only by excellent explanatory 
plates, but by descriptions of actual battle situations in which they might 
be used. He scattered numerous sound tactical observations and principles 
throughout his work, and let slip no opportunity to advocate constant 
peacetime training in realistic situations, and upon varied terrain. Like 
Dundas, he felt that the army's service in America during the Seven Years' 
Theoretical, and Historical 2 Vols., (1781), was of the 1st, Paris ed. of 
1766. 
10. R. Glover, Preparation, 203. 
11. Lt-Col William Dalrymple, Tacticks (1781), was reprinted at Dublin in 
1782. 
12. Dalrymple, as lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Foot, 1778-1782, camped in 
1778 at Coxheath, in 1779 and 1781 at Warley, and in 1780 at Tiptree. 
13. Ibid., vii. 
14. Dalrymple himself pointed out that much of his inspiration came from 
the ordonnance of 1776, for the French foot. 
15. Ibid., viii. His basic training section covered pp. 18-56,73-6. These 
mechanical 'principles' of Dalrymple's were included (in a less sophisticated 
but more practicable fashion, as was proper) in the 1786 Regulations; the 
technical spirit which infuses those regulations is likewise due to the in- 
fluence of Dalrymple, and had not distinguished previous British regulations. 
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War and the War for Independence had led to a significant decline in the 
solidity - and in the appreciation - of British heavy infantry. Three 
ranks had given way to two, in most battalions, and file intervals were 
dangerously open; heavy fire and solidity had been sacrificed for the sake 
of speedy movements. This might suit colonial conditions; but if such 
dispositions and tactics were attempted in Europe, the British battalions 
would be crushed by the enemy's heavy infantry and cavalry (absent, in 
America). He also regarded current French views on the use of columns for 
shock action as erroneous: 'In a neighbouring nation, there has been much 
controversy about formation; I shall venture to say, that our Tacticks 
must be subservient to the arms, not the arms to the Tacticks; and I am of 
opinion, that impulsion by close combat, in the manner of the antients, is 
inconsistent with our present mode of arming. '16 He thus reaffirmed the 
traditional British belief in the supremacy of heavy fire; and he went on 
to support these views by making what can properly be described as the 
classic, reasoned statement of the tactical belief that fire must previal 
over shock. 
17 
The other of these two most influential works was Col David Dundas' 
Principles of Military Movements, which came out in 1788 and which was to 
enjoy an immediate success - so much so, in fact, that by 1792 a slightly 
revised version was to become the regulation drillbook of the army. 
18 
Dundas' success was due principally to two things: firstly, he laid bare 
the extent of the tactical weakness and the irregularity of drill prevailing 
in the army, the result of the confused profusion of regulations which had 
come out since the later-1770's, and of the increasingly widespread in- 
fluence of an unsound tactical doctrine whose origins could be traced to the 
earlier 1760's; and secondly, he laid down a new system of drill and tactics 
the comparative sophistication of which seemed, to the most influential 
general and staff officers at the Horse Guards and at Dublin Castle, to 
warrant its immediate adoption throughout the army. 
Dundas ascribed the army's drill weakness to four causes, which were 
mutually contributory. The main problem was the lack of a single, fully 
16. Ibid., x. 
17. Ibid., 112-4. 
18. Col David Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly Applied to 
Infantry. Illustrated by Manoeuvres of the Prussian Troops, and by An Out- 
line of the British Campaigns in Germany, During the War of 1757... (1788). 
A 2nd ed. came out at London in 1795. 
19. Dundas admitted that there were 'many proper and excellent regulations 
and customs existing in the British service; but it is difficult to know 
which are obsolete, and which are in force. They are no where collected 
under one view', and were often lacking in detail. Many regulations (those 
of 1778, for example) 'have been framed at various times, (only] to remedy 
the inconveniences of the day'. Ibid., 15. 
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detailed set of regulations dealing not only with the usual drill elements, 
but defining also the basic mechanics of movement - the 'principles of 
movement' of the sort described by William Dalrymple and von Saldern. 
Once a single detailed regulation was given out, laying down the common 
principles and technique of movement to be taught throughout the army at 
the level of basic training, regularity in the advanced manoeuvres could 
easily be achieved. It was Dundas' opinion, secondly, that a system which 
did not allow for regular peacetime concentrations of regiments for the 
purpose of brigade training must, in the long run, not only make such man- 
oeuvres difficult to carry out but must also encourage the most unrealistic 
excesses among the isolated, individual regiments. 
20 
To prove this con- 
tention, Dundas had merely to point to the often extravagant review demon- 
strations put on by regiments during the 1770's and 1780's. It was quite 
common for regiments at their annual reviews, c. 1770-1780, to show the 
reviewing officers a series of mock movements intended to represent solu- 
tions to various tactical. problems confronting them. In many cases these 
representations were quite realistic, and the corps showed themselves well 
trained; but often, the mock situations were such as would never have been 
encountered by a single regiment upon active service, and a training regi- 
men designed to prepare the regiment to meet such unlikely eventualities 
was at least impractical and at worst deceptive. Typically at these un- 
realistic reviews the battalion would take upon itself the role of a full 
brigade or wing; the flank companies detached and went through all manner 
of skirmishing, flanking movements, and assaults, while the battalion- 
companies broke into penny-packets and, rather than manoeuvring as a solid 
and steady firing-line, either acted as a reserve to the busy and mobile 
flank companies or joined with them in rushing about the field. These 
procedures were hardly calculated to forward the battalion in its essential, 
proper, and decisive wartime role, that of a component in the larger brigade 
or line, conforming with its solid, linear manoeuvres; and that, of course, 
was Dundas' point, for how were dispersed regiments to appreciate their role 
as cogs in a larger machine, when for years on end in peacetime they were 
isolated from their fellows? 
21 
Thirdly, Dundas noted several of the def- 
iciencies in current practice which had developed during the army's service 
in the Americas where, from 1755 to 1763 and again from 1775 to 1783, a 
large part of the foot had been involved in operations against enemy forces 
20. Dundas admitted that a great many corps were individually well trained, 
but according to different regulations and systems. General officers could 
hardly manoeuvre large bodies composed of 'such jarring materials'. 
21. Examples of regiments performing in this fashion appear in the returns 
made every year, c. 1770-88 (WO 27/18 through /63, passim). See, for example, 
the reviews of the 37th Foot at Fort George Ardersier, on 1 June 1773 
(WO 27/27); of the 19th Foot at Edinburgh, on 5 June 1773 (WO 27/27); 
the 2nd Horse at Thurles, on 31 May 1774 (WO 27/32); and of the 7th Dragoons 
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entirely or virtually bereft of cavalry. Loose formations had resulted, 
there being no need to look to the means of resisting speedy and prowling 
horse coming down suddenly upon a flank, or out of the black-powder smoke- 
screen; and this circumstance especially, Dundas wrote, 'has much tended 
to introduce the present loose and irregular system of our infantry'. 
Finally, Dundas attacked the fad for light infantry and light tactics which 
had grown up during the American wars, and had further been encouraged by 
the spread of light troops on the Continent since the appearance of the 
grenz regiments in the Hapsburg service. Although aware of the necessity 
for good light troops, Dundas believed that the-light company had come to 
play too important a role in the battalion's training; the light infantry 
had come to seem more useful than the heavy, which was absurd; and its con- 
stant place in the limelight at reviews - where too often it acted not in 
assistance to the body of the battalion, but rather at its expence 
hindered the training of the whole regiment. 
22 
Such was Dundas' summary of the evils and shortcomings in the army's 
drill, by the later-1780's. The result he described as 'our very thin and 
extended order to make more show; an affected extreme of quickness on all 
occasions;... the forming and breaking on the move, the easier to cover and 
conceal lost distances and accidental lines, which otherwise would be ap- 
parent;... the different and false composition of columns', etc.. Most regi- 
ments drilled on a depth of two ranks only, and at open rank- and file- 
intervals, both of which created weak and irregular lines; in a word, 'all 
idea of solidity seems lost', and 'our present and prevailing modes are 
certainly not calculated either to attack or repulse a determined enemy, 
but only to annoy a timid and irregular one'. 
23 
It was these problems which 
he set out to cure with his principles of movement, and his system of 
manoeuvres. 
After an excellent initial discussion of the training of officers and 
men in the basic principles of movement, Dundas devoted the bulk of his work 
to the intricacies of battalion manoeuvres, and to those of the larger line. 
Much of his material on the basic mechanics of movement was inspired by 
current Prussian practice, which was all to the advantage of British drill 
at Inveresk, on 21 June 1780 (WO 27/45). 
22. 'The showy exercise, the airy dress, the independent modes which they 
have adopted, have caught the minds of young officers... The battalion 
[-companies] have been taught to undervalue themselves, almost to forget 
that, on their steadiness and efforts, the decision of events depends; 
and that light infantry, yagers, marksmen, riflemen, etc, etc, vanish before 
the solid movements of the line. ' Ibid., 12. 
23. Ibid., 9-14 passim. 
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at this time. 
24 
His system was no more "Prussian" than was Guibert's, 
however, despite his detractors' views; 
25 
and in his promotion of sound 
drill mechanics he repeated much that had already been introduced to English 
readers not only in von Saldern's treatise but in William Dalrymple's, of 
1781, and by authority in the 1786 Regulations. Though Dundas' text was 
lengthy, its contents were no more formidable than those of contemporary 
French infantry ordonnances; he presented his ideas with clarity, and 
simply; the whole is easily comprehended, his basic principles were few, 
simple, and clear, and his drill (as events were shortly to prove) required 
no more than good practise to be properly performed. 
26 
1788 and Beyond: 
The regulations issued to the horse and foot in 1786 and 1787 had been, 
as we have seen, stop-gap affairs, interim regulations designed only to 
arrest the rapid deterioration in drill uniformity. The major new sets of 
drill regulations thus presaged, and indeed shortly to appear, were to 
prove to be extremely successful - more than merely a new codification of 
procedure. The 1792 Regulations for the foot and the 1796 Regulations for 
the horse were to enjoy a long success in the army, the 1792 Regulations 
surviving as the foundation of British infantry drill down to the Crimean 
War. But neither of these regulations, nor the several rules and orders 
issued in conjunction with them or as supplements to them, can fully be ap- 
preciated if they are conceived simply as the last in the series of major 
drills issued by authority to the eighteenth-century army: they were rather 
only an initial part of the general reform of the army conducted under the 
auspices of the Duke of York (as Commander-in-Chief from 1795 to 1809, and 
from 1811 to 1827), as Britain struggled with the changes made necessary by 
the unprecedented scale and nature of events in Europe. 
24. Dundas often travelled on the Continent, studying directly the drill of 
foreign armies - in 1774, for example, touring the garrisons of the Low Coun- 
tries, the lower Rhineland, and northern France, taking detailed notes on the 
drill of the Austrian regiments at Brussels, the Prussian battalions at Wesel, 
and on the large garrisons of Dutch at Maastricht, Namur, Nijmegen, The Hague, 
and Bergen op Zoom, and of French, notably at Metz and Lille (BM King's MSS 
240, ff. 1-30). He also attended the annual Prussian manoeuvres (in 1785, 
for example, and again in 1788), an experience which he found invaluable; and 
he acknowledged too the importance of Saldern's treatise in the formation of 
his ideas. William Dalrymple's drillbook clearly played an important part 
in Dundas' studies. 
25. For a good overall appraisal of Dundas' drill, and rebuttal of the 
usual criticiams, see Glover, Preparation, 118-21 and passim. 
26. Dundas attached to his treatise a 70pp abstract of the whole, for the 
benefit of regimental officers; it was intended as a guide for training pur- 
poses once the contents of the full treatise had been digested. Included in 
the abstract was a plan or 'form of review, and movements necessary for the 
practice of a single battalion, and of a small corps'. In this review plan 
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The general reform of the army has been considered elsewhere, 
27 
and 
here we need only address ourselves to the preparation and introduction of 
the series of regulations which were to restore the uniformity of the army's 
drill, which were to ease training, and which were to see the army through 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 
As we observed earlier it was Dundas' Principles of Military Movements 
which was to serve as the basis of the new regulations. At the time of its 
publication Dundas was well placed to forward his work, since he was him- 
self serving on the Irish staff and was a friend of that other author and 
tactician Sir William Fawcett, the Adjutant General in London. 
28 
In addi- 
tion to Fawcett, Dundas' drillbook had impressed the Marquis of Buckingham 
(who was Lord Lieutenant in Dublin), Lt-Gen the Earl of Ross (who in 1788 
was temporary commander of the forces in Ireland, in the absence of the 
C-in-C, Lt-Gen Sir William Pitt), and Gen Lord Heathfield, a most influen- 
tial senior general officer in London, ex-Irish C-in-C, and recent victor 
at the defence of Gibraltar. It was with their support - and to their's 
was soon added that of the King and the Duke of York, who was at this time 
colonel of the Coldstream Guards - that Dundas' drill was tested, revised, 
and made regulation. 
The Dublin garrison was handy and appropriate for the task now taken 
in hand. In the spring of 1788 the Earl of Ross, working with the Marquis 
of Buckingham, brought in several weeks ahead of the normal schedule the 
five regiments told off to form the new Dublin garrison for 1788-89; 
29 
and 
these, camped in Phoenix Park together with the five regiments of the old 
garrison not yet dispersed into county cantonments but held over some 
weeks for the purpose, were drilled intensively by Dundas to an abridged MS 
version of his drillbook. 
30 
By mid-summer Dundas' exertions were in 'so 
fair a way' under 'the Countenance' of Buckingham that Fawcett, paying close 
attention from London, was planning a meeting with Lord Heathfield in order 
to draw up a regulation drill based on the abstract Appendix to the 
Principles of Military Movements. 
31 'We must go hand in hand together in 
the formation of this System', wrote Fawcett to Dundas, hoping (prematurely) 
(which was immediately useful, since it followed closely the accustomed 
pattern of the army's reviews), Dundas reduced his system to eighteen com- 
prehensive manoeuvres, for training purposes. 
27. Glover, Preparation, is best. See also A. Burne, The Noble Duke of 
York (1949). 
28. Dundas was Irish Q. M. G.., 1778-early 1789; and from then until 1793 he 
was Irish Adjutant General, a post more appropriate to his training duties. 
He was in 1790 promoted major-general. 
29. Sir R. Levinge, Historical Records of the 43rd Regiment (1868), 85. 
30. The Morning Chronicle, and London Advertiser (July 21,1788), carried 
a report on the training from a Dublin correspondent 
31. WO 3/8, pp. 27-8. This was not done. 
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that with Heathfieid's aid both the Dublin and also the Gibraltar garrisons 
could serve as 'the Schools for teaching and inculcating the true princi- 
ples, for the General practice of the whole Army'. 
32 
By early autumn, the 
Lord Lieutenant had prepared a series of 'Observations' on that summer's 
review reports; and in it he ordered the Earl of Ross to notify those 
units trained in the Dublin system to make no 'Deviations... respecting 
the Manoeuvres and Practice pointed out to them'. 
33 
With the reports on Dundas' 1788 experiments favourable, another major 
step was taken: Lt-Gen Sir William Pitt, who by early 1789 had taken up 
once more his duties as Irish C-in-C, was ordered on 12 May 1789 by the 
King to continue drilling the Dublin garrison - 'a very proper Instrument 
in your Hands, for correcting those Errors and Abuses, which have crept into 
his Service, and for introducing that fundamental Reform, which is evident- 
ly so much Wanted' - according to Dundas' system; 'and by the Aid of those 
Experiments, which you will be enabled to make, with such a Body of Troops 
under your Eye, endeavour to form some fixed and general System... for the 
established practice of His (Majesty's] Whole Army'. 
34 
Pitt was ordered 
to carry on this work hand-in-hand with Dundas, and to report to the King 
on their progress. 
The Lord Lieutenant, Pitt, Dundas, and the Irish staff now took the 
bit between their teeth, for not only did they continue the 'Experiments' 
with the Dublin garrison but on 1 July printed up and distributed as of- 
ficial drill the 1789 Regulations, to be observed by all the regiments on 
that establishment. 
35 
The 1789 Irish Regulations were, in effect, an abridged version of 
Dundas' Principles of Military Movements, dealing at great length with 
basics (length and speed of pace, intervals, rules for marching, etc), and 
with the training of small squads, then of individual companies, and finally 
of the full battalion. Attention was paid to the instruction of both 
officers and recruits; and included also was a lengthy section (with fine 
plates) on the advanced manoeuvres of the battalion. A summary description 
of review procedure was appended; and so too was the list (with short 
descriptions) of the eighteen comprehensive manoeuvres down into which 
Dundas boiled his system, for training purposes. As yet, the 1764 manual, 
32. Ibid., pp. 27-8. The Gibraltar garrison was not so employed, in the event. 
33. WO 35/16, pp. 72-5. See also WO 27/63, on the 58th and 63rd. 
34. WO 3/27, pp. 50-51. On 24 May the Lord Lieutenant received similar orders 
(WO 3/8, pp. 167-8). This was to a large extent Fawcett's doing. 
35. Properly, Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Movements 
of the Army in Ireland (Dublin, 1789). An improved ed. was sent out on 
1 Oct. 1789, under the same title. Copies were sent across to Fawcett, who 
on 31 July presented one to the Duke of York. WO 3/8, pp. 188-9. 
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platoon, and firings were still followed unchanged. 
By mid-November 1789 the progress reports forwarded to London by Pitt 
had so impressed the King, that he ordered Pitt to have those regiments 
destined to form the following year's Dublin garrison to practise the new 
drill well in advance of their arrival at that place - 'so that no Time 
may be lost bringing them forwards'; and Fawcett added that, if another 
year's testing should show the new drill to be excellent, 'then His M. will 
then take it into His Royal Consideration how far it may be expedient to 
extend the Use and Adoption of them still further in his Army'. 
36 
The full army in Ireland had, since mid-1789, been following as 
regulation practice Dundas' Dublin drill; and in April 1791 ('after a full, 
and very satisfactory Experience of two Years of the new Regulations... 
which have been diligently practised by the Garrison of Dublin'), the King 
ordered the Lord Lieutenant 'Officially' to extend 'the said new System of 
Discipline, throughout the whole Army, in that Kingdom'. 
37 
By the beginning of 1792 the new drill was thought ready to be issued 
generally. In February, three Irish battalions embarked to relieve regi- 
ments long at Gibraltar; and since they carried with them the new drill 
the Gibraltar command was ordered to 'make ... Tryal of their modes of 
forma- 
tion and movement', and to report upon the same. 
38 
Meanwhile, Dundas him- 
self had been ordered to London; 
39 
and early in March a committee composed 
of Dundas, Fawcett, Col Fox (of the 38th Foot, a regiment very experienced 
in the new drill), Lt-Gen the Earl of Harrington, and the Duke of York, met 
at 'H. R. H. The D. of Y. 's' under the 'immediate Superintendance and Direction 
of H. R. H. The D. of York', to discuss the preparation of these regulations 
for the army generally. 
40 
The new 1792 Regulations were issued, at last, on 1 June 1792.41 
Previously, on 23 March, a long list of general orders had been sent to all 
regiments in Britain laying down several of the basics so that they might 
lose no time in acquainting themselves with these, prior to receiving the 
36. WO 3/9, pp. 12-3. That the Irish command and staff had already extend- 
ed the new drill beyond Dublin, and had made it regulation practice through- 
out the Irish Army - as was their right, since the King had not disallowed 
this - was not yet 'officially' recognized in London. 
37. WO 3/10, pp. 8-9. 
38. Ibid., pp. 100-02. 
39. Ibid., pp. 110-11. On 4 Feb Fawcett informed Dundas that 'I yesterday 
took The K[ing]'s Pleasure] upon the Subject of forming a Small Board of 
Officers, for the purpose of drawing up from Your General System of Military 
Discipline, some such Abridgement, as might be fit for the immediate pract- 
ice of our Infantry on this Establishment'. Ibid. 
40. Ibid., pp. 135-6. 
41 These were, properly, Rules and Regulations for the Fornaticns, Field- 
Exercise, and Movements, of His Majesty 'a Forces (1792). 
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full printed regulations; 
42 
and additionally, on 20 April wholly new 
manual and platoon exercises were issued to the army generally, replacing 
at last the arms exercises practised since 1764.43 
The 177Z Ye-, jubtHdo5 were, by and 
large, a condensed version of the 1789 Irish drillbook with some added 
stress put upon the basic training of recruits, and upon the drill which 
dispersed companies could practise. By late June 1792, all of the regi- 
ments in Britain, Ireland, and - where they had been received - on the 
overseas stations and garrisons, were busily practising the new regulations; 
and so the Adjutant General could on 26 June inform a correspondent that the 
regiments were all learning the new drill, which 'must of course occupy 
them pretty close, for some time to come'. 
45 Progress was quick, however; 
and from 23 July to 8 August six regiments (the 10th and 11th Light Dragoons, 
and the 2nd, 3rd, 14th, and 29th of Foot) formed a special camp on Bagshot 
Heath near Camberley, under the command of the Duke of Richmond, where they 
put on a display of manoeuvres and mock combat before George 111.46 
By the end of the year 1792, therefore, the whole of the regular army 
had been supplied with the new regulations; 
47 
and although the confusion 
and blundering of the next few years were to retard somewhat the full use 
of the new drill, in practice, it was essentially the 1792 Regulations which 
42. A copy is in WO 3/27, pp. 101-06, 'General Orders'. 
43. Printed and issued as, By His Majesty's Cormnand. The Manual and Platoon 
Exercises (1792). The new manual was much shorter than the old, striking 
many movements now considered as outmoded ceremonial. The new platoon was 
very little different from that of 1764. The platoon was simplified slightly 
(for its wording was a trifle ambiguous, in the 1792 version) with the ap- 
pearance of The Manual and Platoon Exercises, Etc., Etc. (1804), which in- 
cluded a precis of the full 1792 drill and also a list of the firings per- 
formed by the wings of the battalion acting independently of one another. 
44. Gibraltar was supplied on 8 June (WO 3/10, p. 175). Further afield, 
the 2/60th when reviewed at Montreal on 1 Sept., was reported drilling 
'agreeable to the former Regulations, the Regiment not being yet drilled to 
the new ones'. The new regulations (or knowledge of them, at least), had 
arrived there. On 30 Oct. the 4th Foot was seen at Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
where it was following the new 1792 Regulations; and so too was the 21st 
Foot, seen there on 26 Oct. WO 27/72. 
45. WO 3/10, p. 186. 
46. On this camp, see Chapt. VI below, passim. As early as 4 Feb. 1792 the 
3rd Foot, in England, had been informed that it was the King's wish to see a 
battalion 'go through the Exercise and Manoeuvres, ordered last Spring to be 
performed ... by the several Regiments which composed the Garrison of Dublin'; 
and the 3rd, consequently, had been selected to 'proceed without delay to 
practise the said Exercise'. A copy of the 1789 Regulations was rushed down 
to the 3rd; and the lieutenant-colonel of the 38th, a regiment trained in 
the Dublin garrison, was ordered to assist the 3rd in preparing for the royal 
review. The 3rd was seen by the King and the Duke of York a few weeks later, 
at Windsor. WO 3/10, pp. 109-10,124-6. 
47. By the end of the year and on into 1793, copies of the new drill were 
being distributed to the militia too. WO 3/27, pp. 122-4,161. 
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saw the British infantry through the later part of the great war against 
Revolutionary France, and through the whole of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Revised editions, abridgements, and commentaries were to appear occasionally 
during the two decades following upon 1792, published both by authority and 
privately. Official editions (some of them revised) of the 1792 Regulations 
were brought out at London and at Dublin in 1794,1795,1798,1801, and 
1803, all under the same title as the original. 
48 
From as early as 1795, 
the Duke of York as C-in-C ordered that 'every officer of Infantry shall be 
provided with a copy of these Regulations'; and his order was printed in 
subsequent editions. 
49 
In 1804 General Orders were issued 'in further 
Explanation' of the 1792 Regulations, where certain officers and regiments 
had been observed by the Duke of York to be either misinterpreting, confus- 
ing, or deliberately deviating from the prescribed drill. 
50 
Most editions of the 1792 Regulations were, admittedly, lengthy and 
technical affairs; and so in 1801 a shortened, simplified version was 
printed by authority for the use of subalterns and nco's, on the theory 
that 'unless the training and instruction of Officers and Non-commissioned 
Officers individually and collectively keeps pace with that of the men, all 
attempts at improvement must be ineffectual'. 
51 
Private writers had already 
anticipated this step; and several of them brought out simplified versions 
of the review procedure, and of the eighteen comprehensive manoeuvres, 
originally abstrated by Dundas and included as an appendix to his Principles 
of Military Movements. 
52 The beat of these was Smirke's Review of a 
Battalion, first published in 1799 and in its fourth edition by 1806.53 
Concise, handy and competent, Smirke's little book consisted of a long 
series of plates - without doubt the finest plates to appear in any British 
drilibook of the century, a fact which must in itself have accounted for the 
several reprints - which, with the attached commentary, very clearly 
48. One edition, by authority, was printed as far afield as Quebec City, in 
1804. 
49. Eg., Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercises, and 
Movements, of His Majesty's Forces. A New Edition (1798), iv. 
50. Published as General Orders and observations on the Movements and Field- 
Exercise of the Infantry (1804). In these, (p. 5), H. R. H. directed 'the 
strictest conformity thereto to be observed in every particular of execution'. 
51. Ibid., 9. This was the first time that any drill publication had been 
officially and explicitly prepared not only for the officers but for the 
nco's as well, the Duke of York 'feeling the propriety and necessity' of such 
a step. Another ed. of this simplified version was published by authority in 
1807, with the manual and platoon exercises attached. 
52. This abstract had been reprinted in each ed. of the 1792 Regulations. 
Cf. the Principles of Military Movements (2nd, 1795 ed. ), 'Appendix', 57-61, 
and the Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise, and Move- 
ments of His Majesty's Forces (1801), 261-8. 
53. Robert Smirke, Review of a Battalion of rnfantr;,,, including the Eighteen 
Manoeuvres... (1799). 
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illustrated the review procedure and the eighteen most-important manoeuvres 
practised under the new regulations. An equal boon to regimental officers 
was the XVIII Manoeuvres, prepared by Capt. Dominicus and even handier to 
use than Smirke's book. 
54 
The XVIII Manoeuvres was a pocket reference, with 
a few pages of text describing the essential principles of movement and with 
fine little fold-out plans illustrating each of Dundas' comprehensive man- 
oeuvres. These and similar works were all very useful to the officers with 
the regiments; and since the drill regulations of the French infantry, as 
used throughout this period, were soon available also in an excellent an- 
notated English translation, the foot was now very well provided for. 
55 
Meanwhile, the influence of Dundas' drill and the Duke of York's 
reforms had spread to include the British cavalry. Where the 1786 Regula- 
tions for the foot had been merely interim, so too had the 1787 Regulations 
for the horse, as we have seen. The attention of the authorities, however, 
had since 1788 been directed almost entirely to the preparation of the new 
foot drill; and the outbreak of war with France in 1793 caught the cavalry 
with an as yet unreformed drill for their mounted evolutions and man- 
56 
oeuvres. 
Fifteen regiments of cavalry, eleven from the British establishment and 
four from the Irish, served with the Duke of York's army in the Low Countries 
during the campaigns of 1793-94, which ended with the disastrous withdrawal 
of the Austrians and the difficult retreat of the British into northern 
Germany, seeking to evacuate the Continent. 
57 
It was while in north Germany 
in late 1794-early 1795 that Dundas, now a lieutenant-general and in command 
of the cavalry, once again took matters in hand by imposing upon all of 
these regiments the system of drill which he had used in the 15th Light 
54. Anon. (Capt George Dominicus], General Dundas' XVIII Manoeuvres (1798). 
The work was reprinted in 1799. Dominicus was an officer in one of the new 
patriotic units raised in the City, namely the 2nd Royal East-Indian Vol- 
unteers. East India KaZendar, 1799, xii. 
55. In 1803, John Macdonald published his translation of the Ordonnance of 
1791 as Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of the 
French Infantry. With... References to the British, and Prussian Systems 
of Tactics... 2 Vols., (1803). Macdonald made marginal notations throughout, 
directing British readers paragraph by paragraph to the comparable sections 
of the 1792 Regulations, for purposes of comparative study. His copious 
footnotes were full of sound tactical observations, repeatedly drawing the 
attention of his readers to the virtues and ills of current British practice, 
vis-a-vis these French regulations. Macdonald showed himself one of the most 
informed and incisive tacticians in Britain; and his later translation from 
the French, the Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry on Actual Service... 
(1807), reaffirms this judgement. 
56. Midway through 1792 the King had directed that the new manual and 
platoon exercises, together with copies of the full 1792 Regulations, be 
sent to every regiment of cavalry in the army; these they were to follow 
henceforth for all of their dismounted drill. 170 3/10, p. 193. 




and had modified to correspond (where possible) with the plan 
and tactical principles of his Principles of Military Movements. Dundas 
had these regulations - 'a small, but excellent Collection', as Fawcett 
described them59 - which dealt almost exclusively with manoeuvres, printed 
up in Germany and distributed to the regiments serving there; and a few 
copies were dispatched to Fawcett. 
60 
At the same time that Dundas was attempting to establish an uniform 
drill among the cavalry regiments in Germany, a set of standing orders (in 
the vein of those of Molesworth) 'drawn up for the Use & Practice' of the 
2nd Dragoon Guards, originally, was being prepared for publication by auth- 
ority in London; these were 'to be forthwith sent to all the Cavalry Corps 
at Home, to be Observ'd & follow'd by them, till further Orders'. 
61 
These 
standing orders - the compilation of Lord Pembroke, of that corps - were 
delayed in their final preparation due to problems with revisions; 
62 
and 
the upshot was that both Dundas' cavalry drill and the regulations used in 
the 2nd Dragoon Guards were, on 1 October 1795, printed together as a single 
regulation and issued as such to the whole of the British cavalry. 
63 
Half 
the text of these 1795 Regulations, consequently, was devoted to regimental 
administration, routine, and duties; and however useful in establishing a 
general system of interior management, this format made these regulations an 
interim affair insofar as drill was concerned. 
Over the winter of 1795-96 Dundas, now returned with the army from the 
Continent, prepared the text of a more complete cavalry drill; and in the 
spring of 1796 this was fully tested in a cavalry camp formed near 
Weymouth, at which Gen Sir William Pitt again took command with Dundas as 
his second. 
64 Good progress was now made; and on 17 June 1796 the full 
cavalry drill, the 1796 Regulations, was finally issued to the whole of the 
British horse. 
65 
As with the 1792 foot regulations, the 1796 Regulations 
for the cavalry were issued in revised editions and abridgements over the 
next several years - in 1797,1798,1799, and 1808; and (as with the foot 
regulations), all cavalry officers were ordered by the Duke of York to 
58. Glover, Preparation, 135. 
59. WO 3/14, p. 149. 
60. Ibid., pp. 43,101, '143,149. 
61. Ibid., p. 43. 
62. Ibid., pp. 89-90,100-01. 
63. These were, By His Majesty's Command. Rules and Regulations for the 
Cavalry (1795). The Duke of York's warrant is on Al. 
r. See WO 3/14, p. 259, 
for Irish issues. 
64. WO 3/15, pp. 114,129-30,146,153. Camped at Weymouth (where George 
III attended the trials), were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Dragoons, together with 
the 11th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons. 
65. Properly, Instructions and Regulations for the Formations and Movements 
of the Cavalry (1796). 
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supply themselves with copies. 
66 
The first of the official abridgements of the 1796 Regulations was pre- 
pared in 1798 by Maj (later Maj-Gen) John Gaspard Le Marchant, of the 16th 
Light Dragoons - and lately of the 2nd Dragoon Guards, where he no doubt 
had a hand in preparing Lord Pembroke's section of standing orders for the 
interim 1795 ReguZations. 
67 
During his service in the Low Countries, 
1793-94, Le Marchant had made a study of the superior swordsmanship of the 
allied cavalrymen; and during the spring of 1795 (part of this time spent 
at Weymouth camp), he began the preparation of a manuscript drill for 
teaching good swordsmanship (and with it the proper mounted seat) to the 
British cavalry. A Board of General Officers approved the manuscript, which 
was finished by the following summer; and Le Marchant then began several 
months of touring Britain, teaching the new sword exercise to detachments 
sent from the several regiments. 
68 
Late in 1796 his drill was printed and 
issued to all regiments as regulation practice; and early in 1797 the 
Duke ordered every cavalry officer to obtain a copy. 
69 
The 1796 Sword 
Exercise was a brilliant piece of work, and a proper complement to the 
otherwise complete 1796 Regulations. 
We might add, finally, a note on the specialized training of light in- 
fantry units, which got under way just beyond the close of our period. We 
noted above that light infantry companies had been formed in the battalions 
serving in the Americas, c. 1758-64; and we have seen too that, although 
these had been reduced with the coming of the 1763 peace, much of the ex- 
perience of the light service had been preserved in the army's customary 
practice, and in the private publications appearing thereafter. In 1771-72, 
light companies were once again raised in all of the battalions, this time 
66. Ibid., 2nd ed., 1797), v. 
67. The abridgement was An Elucidation of the Several Parts of His Majesty's 
Regulations for the Formations and Movements of Cavalry (1798), a handier 
version of the main cavalry manoeuvres, reaching its 4th ed. in 1808. On 
Le Marchant, see T. H. Thoumine, Scientific Soldier: A Life of General Le 
Marchant, 1766-1812 (1968), 59. 
68. On its preparation (which included the design, manufacture, and issue 
of a new pattern sabre throughout the light cavalry), and on Le Marchant's 
training tour, see R. H. Thoumine, ibid., 40-52. Le Marchant was assisted on 
his tour by 20 troopers of the 16th Light Dragoons, specially schooled in 
the new exercise. A similar tour was carried on in Ireland by one of Le 
Marchant's subaltern assistants. See also WO 3/15, pp. 230-1; /17, pp. 17-9, 
103,119-20; and /29, pp. 121-87, pasim, on the tour. 
69. Printed as Rules and Regulations for the Sword Exercise of the Cavalry 
(1796). Containing excellent plates illustrating the trooper's seat, and the 
various cuts, thrusts, and parries (mounted and dismounted), this was an 
admirable drill, clearly described. It was reprinted several times, includ- 
ing once at Edinburgh in 1803; and a pocket-sized abridgement or Explana- 
tion of... The Six Cuts came out in 1800, and was reprinted in 1803. 
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permanently; and in 1774 the first specialized schooling of these companies 
in the discipline of light infantry proper was held at Howe's Salisbury 
camp 
70 It was not until the army experienced the effectiveness of French 
light tactics in the 1793-94 Flanders campaigns, however, that authority was 
at last stimulated to major efforts, army-wide. 
71 
In 1797 printed copies of 
the short light infantry drill, taken from the 1792 Regulations, were dis- 
tributed by the Adjutant General's office to all regiment; 
72 
and in 1798 
there was issued from the Horse Guards a full light infantry drillbook to 
be followed henceforth as regulation. 
73 
A succession of privately published 
light infantry studies appeared during the 1790's and beyond; and with Sir 
John Moore's special training programme in the 1803-04 Shorncliffe camp, and 
the conversion of certain old battalions some into light infantry regiments 
and some into rifle regiments, a true light infantry was at last fully estab- 
lished in the British Army. 
74 
-0 
70. On which, see below pp. 218. 
71. The 1792 Regulations (as had the Principles of Military Movements), 
devoted some lOpp to the special drill of the light company, but this was 
scarcely sufficient. 
72. WO 3/31, pp. 28-9. 
73. This was the Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light In- 
fantry, and Instructions for their Conduct in the Field (1798), an official 
publication translated by Fawcett from the 1797 German work of Col de 
Rottenburg. These 1798 regulations were reprinted at London and Dublin in 
1803 and 1808. 
74. On Moore's drill and Shorncliffe, see J. F. C. Fuller, Sir John Moore's 
System of Training (1924), and C. Omani, Sir John Moore (1953). Fuller's 
British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (1925), is to be avoided, 
since it is unhistorical, inaccurate, merely a vehicle for his tactical 




The "basic training" of the private soldier as it was conducted in the 
British Army throughout the period under consideration was laid on in two 
phases, the first of which - designed solely for recruits - was merely 
introductory while the second - aimed at more practised soldiers - was 
endless; and the term must be understood as embracing both. At the initial, 
introductory phase the new recruit was taught what was variously referred to 
as the 'material exercise of a soldier'or the 'first Rudiments or Ground 
Work of a Soldier', whence - having been made familiar with most of the 
skills which would be required of him in the ranks - he graduated to the 
exercise of the 'mechanical part of a soldier's business' or the 'mechanical 
parts of war', which constituted the second phase. 
I 
Although the press of war made for some exceptions, characteristic of 
the initial or 'material' phase of the basic training programme was the care 
lavished on the instruction of the recruits, who were brought along accord- 
ing to what was called the 'method proportionably gradual' or the 'progres- 
sive' method. By this method the recruit was 'drilled regularly through 
[the] several Classes of Exercise', learning one skill before he was in- 
structed in the next, and so 'carried on progressively' until he was fit to 
be put into the ranks. 
2 
Basic to the success of the progressive method 
were patience and, indeed, kindness on the part of the drill instructors to 
their newly-listed charges; and these were virtues the utility of which the 
writers of drillbooks, when discussing recruit training, constantly reminded 
their readers. 
3 
Although the ongoing or 'mechanical' phase of basic training was end- 
less, the time required to complete the initial phase could only be rough- 
ly estimated because of the great irregularities of unit dispersal both 
within the British Isles and about the overseas stations and garrisons. 
As a general rule, recruits taken into the foot regiments stationed in the 
1. The phrases are from, respectively, James Wolfe, op. cit., 34; John 
LaFaussille, in the Cumb. Pprs., ? t. 4, II, f. 3; John Williamson, op. cit., I, 
viii; and William Dalrymple, op. cit., 21. 
2.1786 Regulations, 2; and David Dundas, op. cit., 35. 
3. See, for example, Edward Fage, op. cit., 3, and William Dalrymple, op. 
cit., 18. Even the Prussian regulations ordered that a similar approach be 
adopted (Regulations for the Prussian Infantry (1759 trans. ], 120). 
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Mediterranean garrisons, in the big Irish quarters like Dublin and Cork, 
and into the Horse and Foot Guards in London and Westminster, were brought 
along much more rapidly than could be those entertained by the more widely- 
dispersed marching regiments; and recruits taken into the line cavalry in 
both kingdoms (although those in Irish corps found their quarters more 
settled than those in Britain), had considerably more to learn during their 
initial training than had simple infantrymen to master. Recruits taken into 
the additional companies of regiments serving abroad might receive less in- 
itial training than others, or they might be put through a "crash course", 
depending upon the demands being placed upon these companies by their parent 
corps. Similarly, men who passed through the general recruit depots at 
Chatham, Tilbury, and kinsale might get more or less initial training, de- 
pending upon the need for replacements abroad. Given this variety, it took 
from several weeks to a few months for the recruit to acquire some pro- 
ficiency at the skills which made up the initial phase of his training. 
4 
As we shall see, much of the overall training-time available to the 
army was taken up by basic training; and since it occupied so considerable 
a part of the army's time a detailed summary of the skills taught at that 
level will be appropriate here, before turning to an analysis of the sig- 
nificance of the programme. It is clear that, by 1715, most of the basic 
skills taught for the rest of the century had already become established as 
standard practice in all of the regiments; and it is clear too that these 
skills were being taught to the recruits, during their initial training, 
according to the progressive method. According to the lights of the officers 
immediately in command the time devoted to individual aspects of training 
varied from one corps to the next, and so too did the schedule according to 
which the various skills were introduced to the recruit as he passed through 
his initial instruction; but nevertheless these variations were not so sig- 
as to alter the content or the nature of the material taught in the several 
regiments. 
5 
During most of his initial training the recruit was instructed indivi- 
dually; and only as he mastered certain aspects of it, or when he had be- 
come acquainted with and mildly proficient at several skills, was he atta- 
ched to small and then increasingly larger groups of recruits, to practise 
these skills in company and in unison with others. 
The recruit was first taught to be 'master of his person', throwing off 
4. For a more accurate estimate of the training-time of whole regiments, 
again contemporary, see below pp. 186-88. 
5. Only with the 1786 Regulations and those following thereafter did auth- 
ority seek to impose army-wide uniformity in this matter - doubtless un- 
successfully. 
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the carelessness of civilian carriage and adopting the stiff self-possession 
of military bearing. Next, having learned the simplest postures, he pro- 
ceeded to the simplest of the evolutions - dressing to his front and flanks, 
and making the various turns on the spot. Instruction at marching now 
began; and the greatest stress was put upon marching, naturally enough in 
an era of linear (and increasingly close-order) tactics. The techniques of 
movement became steadily more sophisticated as the century wore on, de- 
manding precision, and basic instruction at marching reflected these de- 
velopments. Until the early 1750's the recruit was taught only to maintain 
his proper posture and bearing, to take paces either 'long' or 'short', and 
to step out either 'quickly' when marching in column, or 'softly' when on 
parade, when manoeuvring, or when advancing in line; and these times and 
distances were measured only against the scale of what was customarily 
practised within each regiment. The mid-century was in most respects a 
watershed in the development of marching technique - and, by direct exten- 
sion, of manoeuvrability and tactical sophistication. Marching style - 
that is, the manner in which the legs were lifted and put down - only as- 
sumed a regular fashion in the army at the mid-century, after 1748, with 
the adoption of the 'Prussian step': taken from the stiff-kneed marching 
style introduced in Prussia during the reforms of Frederick William I's 
reign, this was to be a notable innovation and was to remain the style after 
which British infantry performed linear drill until late in Victoria's 
reign. 
6 
The Prussian step made for great precision at speed; and indeed 
a rate of 120 such paces per minute was considered, for the experienced 
soldier, 'nothing more than an easy walk'.? Length and speed of pace were 
not regulated until the 1778 and 1786 Regulations took these up; prior to 
then, these had been regimental matters, left to the judgement of the field 
officers and adjutants; but it is clear that there was an informal consen- 
sus operating in the army on these important points from at least the mid- 
century. 
8 
Having learned to march singly, the recruit then practised 
6. William Dalrymple's description (op. cit., 22) is quite clear; and see 
also William Windham, op. cit., Pt. II, 20-2; and John Macdonald, French 
Infantry Regulations, I, 21. 
7. William Dalrymple, Ibid., 23 n. 1. 
8. A quick pace was used when manoeuvring in action or when trying to 
gain ground; and a slow pace was used invariably for parades and reviews, 
and for passing rough ground when advancing in line in action. A third, 
very rapid pace was used for the bayonet charge. On these, see 
WO 3/26, pp. 32,169.; WO 3/26, p. 153 ; and the 1786 Regulations. 
Occasional examples of the paces practised in the regiments, prior to these 
regulations, appear in the review reports; they indicate that disparity was 
not great but was noticeable, and also point an informal consensus. Cf. the 
1/1st, 18th, and 25th of Foot for 1777, in WO 27/36. 
The 1786 Regulations were the first to attempt to establish a standard 
pace. Recruits were taught to accustom themselves to a standard pace by 
practising their marching on long stretches of ground measured off accord- 
ingly, and marked with tapes or lines. 
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marching in unison with others first in a file, then in a short rank, and 
then in squads composed of increasingly larger numbers; here, marching in 
step was perfected and the maintenance of proper rank- and file-intervals 
was taught. 
From the Restoration through to the mid-eighteenth century British 
soldiers performed the evolutions and most of the simpler parade manoeuvres 
in step and - when deployed in line before the enemy - made minor man- 
oeuvres by closing up the ranks and moving in step, as they did on parade; 
but on all other occasions marching in step was not attempted and the in- 
tervals between the ranks were kept open to avoid confusion, no means of 
maintaining precision of distance and pace having as yet been devised. 
Before the introduction of the musical cadence - and thus of the all- 
important close and regular rank-intervals which that aid made it possible 
to keep up over lengthy periods, and at speed - marching in step had per- 
force been performed very deliberately, with an almost funereal solemnity 
and under the close supervision of the nco's. 
9 
It was not until the later- 
1740's that the drums, and more particularly the new fifes, began to be 
used in some regiments to set a marching cadence; and not until the end of 
the Seven Years' War had marching in step to a musical cadence, with all of 
the tactical advantages which this made possible, become standard practice 
in the army. Once the great advantages of speed, precision, flexibility, 
and simplicity which the cadence and the resulting closed ranks made 
possible had become apparent, however, it was found that the music itself 
was sometimes a distraction, sometimes (in action) inaudible, and the 
cadence difficult for the drummers and fifers to maintain. By the mid- 
1770's, therefore, the musical cadence was not used in the field, but was 
retained for training purposes: by the music the recruits accustomed them- 
selves to the standard pace and time, now all-important as a foundation of 
close-order manoeuvres. 
Having learned the evolutions, how to march at the various steps both 
forwards and obliquely, and to wheel and file in small squads three ranks 
deep, the recruit was next given his firelock; and once familiar with its 
mechanism he was slowly taken through the elaborate manual of arms. The 
greatest stress was put on the manual since it was generally deemed the most 
important part of the training of the soldier. Taught first to carry his 
firelock on his shoulder, and then to rest, to order, and to sling the 
weapon - all rudimentary motions, taught first so that the recruit could 
continue to practise marching and the evolutions - he then went on to learn 
the whole elaborate performance of clubbing, securing, presenting, etc., a 
9. On the cadenced step in the British Army, see Addendum to this chapter. 
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series which included bayonet drill10 and the crucial loading and firing 
motions. Loading and'firing were taught to the recruits individually at 
first, and then in unison with others in increasingly larger numbers; and 
while still practising these motions within the confines of the manual 
exercise no powder was used, and the whole was carried on slowly. Before 
passing on to the platoon exercise, where the loading and firing motions 
were done much more quickly, the recruit would be taught elementary marks- 
manship. 
Virtually all of the eighteenth-century (and later seventeenth-century) 
drillbooks stressed the importance of at least some larget practice; 
11 but 
prior to 1786 it was only in wartime that this aspect of training could 
be pursued to any advantage. The quantity of lead shot issued to the 
regiments in peacetime12 was quite insufficient for target practice, which 
was therefore infrequently attempted; the recruits (like the rest of the 
rank and file) had to be content with firing off blank cartridges, or 
'squibs', in simulated platoon fire. 
13 
This official cheeseparing on the 
ammunition supplied in peacetime was rectified only in 1786, when issues 
were greatly increased; but it was possible to justify the policy by stick- 
ing to the letter of tactical theory. Since controlled volley-fire was con- 
sidered more important than individually aimed fire - and the peacetime 
issue of ball is a clear measure of just how much importance was attached 
to volley fire, over aimed fire - it was upon volley fire, in platoon, 
that peacetime training was concentrated. Squibs provided a sufficient de- 
gree of realism, for this purpose. Poor fire accuracy was to some extent 
inevitable anyway, given the state of eighteenth-century military arms 
10. Bayonet drill was, curiously, rather neglected in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. Buried away in the manual exercise, it was performed in a most 
unrealistic fashion; and the command in use - 'Push your Bayonets! ' - 
betrays both its origin and underdevelopment. Nof until 1805, when Capt 
Anthony Gordon published his systematic Science of Defence, for the Sword, 
Bayonet, and Pike, in Close Action, was the subject treated in depth by 
anyone. Many writers lamented this lapse, recognizing the efficacy of the 
weapon against both horse and foot: Bennett Cuthbertson, for example, 
writing in 1768 (op. cit., 210) thought it an 'essential matter, for Soldiers 
to be perfectly well acquainted with their use', and deplored the fact that 
British troops in training were seldom even 'permitted to fix them, but on 
certain occasions'. From Marlborough's campaigns onwards it was the touch- 
stone of British tactical thinking that heavy fire was all-important; and 
so it was doctrine, perhaps, as much as indifference, which dictated the 
army's approach. As Campbell Dalrymple wrote (op. cit., 56), 'human nature 
will always shrink [in the face of heavy fire], and never dare to approach 
within push of bayonet'. 
11. A refrain begun in the 1686 Regulations, 264, where it was observed 
that " Tis very necessary for all Captains... to practise their men to Shoot 
at a Mark, which is extream useful. ' 
12. On quantities of ammunition issued, see Addendum to this chapter. 
13. When powder was scarce, flints were saved from wear by using wood or 




In 1779 a battalion of the excellent Norfolk Militia, stand- 
ing on three ranks, fired two volles at a target 70 yards distant and 
measuring about 2 feet by 80 feet, supported on poles. Firing 632 shots, 
the battalion scored 126 hits, for a score of 20%. In 1755 a section of 
the Prussian Foot Guards, trying a similar test shoot, scored only slightly 
better. Better shooting was to be expected from Guards, than from militia; 
but the Norfolk's colonel thought that his results were proof that his men 
shot very well. 
15 
A regular marching battalion of British foot (if we can 
assume them to lie somewhere between the Norfolk Militia and the Prussian 
Guards), might score 25% hits, in target practice, at 75 yards. 
16 
Still, 
marksmen there were, especially among the light companies - marksmen who 
developed their ability by acquainting themselves thoroughly with the 
peculiarities of their pieces, an activity the opportunity for which was 
not afforded the majority of British soldiers. 
17 
The platoon exercise, like the manual, was taught to a few men at a 
time, beginning first with a single file and then increasing these numbers. 
A recruit was taught the exercise in each of the three ranks; and he learn- 
ed to perform at top speed and to only four commands the full loading and 
firing procedure. Along with speed, he had to learn to synchronize his 
reloading motions with those of his comrades in the platoon fire-unit; 
and in order to insure his expertise he was put through it endlessly, 
'locking up' and kneeling. 
18 
Beyond a few other, simpler skills - learning the drill signals play- 
ed by the musicians, perhaps some rudimentary practise with their short 
hangers or swords, 
19 
and the handling of grenades by the grenadiers20 - 
14. On this technological limitation, see A. R. Hall, BaZZistics in the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1952); and see also A. R. Hall, 'Science, 
Technology, and Warfare, 1400-1700', in M. D. Wright and L. J. Paszek (eds. ), 
Science, Technology, and Warfare. The Proceedings of the 3rd Military History 
Symposium, U. S. A. F. Academy, 1969 (Washington, D. C., 1970), 3-32 passim. 
15. WO 34/114, f. 123; and . 
P. Paret, op. cit., 14-5. 
16. See also Glover, Preparation, 140-1, and C. Ward, The War of the 
Revolution (New York, 1952), I, 44-50, for interesting figures. It has been 
estimated that, in the running fight between Concord and Boston in Apr. 1775, 
American militia discharged 75,000 rounds in order to hit 247 British 
soldiers. At Vittoria in l113, perhaps 459 musket balls were fired by 
Wellington's army for every French casualty. 
17. On aimed fire, see Addendum to this chapter. 
18. On locking, see Addendum to this chapter. 
19. None of the drillbooks mention the use of hangers, although they were 
worn in the battalion companies until 1768 and by the grenadiers until 1784. 
20. No regulations after 1728 carried any special grenade exercise, an 
exercise which until then had been a feature of the drillbooks. The 1735 
Granadiers Exercise was prepared for the 1st Foot Guards; and the 1722 
camps saw paper grenades issued to the troops: both of which indicate their 
continued use early in the century. There are occasional examples of 
grenadiers using them at the regimental reviews held later in the century 
(eg., by the 2/1st Foot in 1769 and in 1777, and by the 25th in 1777 - 
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little else save discipline and obedience was taught to the men at the basic 
training level. 
It was these skills, then, practised singly and then in combination, 
which made up the basic training programme of the foot. Most of these 
same skills were practised by the cavalrymen, too, as part of their train- 
ing for dismounted service; but the concentration in the basic training of 
the trooper lay, naturally, with the skills peculiar to the mounted arm. 
The recruits taken by the cavalry were usually men of better character and 
intelligence than those enlisted by the foot; and they needed to be so 
because, as the 1755 Dragoon Orders put it, the trooper had 'a multiplicity 
of things to do more than a Foot Soldier, and ten times more Arms, Accoutre- 
ments, etc', to be master of. 
21 
The trooper was first taught how to care for his horse (a task which, 
for the seven or eight months of the year during which the'horses were 
with the regiments, took up several hours daily), and he was made familiar 
with the many items of his tack. The horses imposed a set of conditions 
upon the cavalry which circumscribed training in a manner wholly unknown 
in the foot. For upwards of four months every year, the cavalry regiments 
had to turn their horses out to grass; 
2 
and the effect of this upon the 
cavalry was to oblige them to practise the dismounted drill for a third of 
the year. During the better part of the year, however, when the horses 
were with the regiments, the troopers were obliged to devote a good part 
of every day to cleaning tack and stables, and to caring for and exercis- 
ing their mounts. This took up about 7 hours daily in the summer, 52 hours 
daily in the winter. In the 5th Dragoons during the 1730's, for example, 
the daily summer timetable for these duties ran from reveille (about 
4: 00 AM) to 8: 00 AM, and from 5: 30 PM to 8: 30 PM; in winter, these duties 
were carried out each day from 8: 00 AM to 12: 00 noon, from 4: 00 PM to 
5: 00 PM, and from 7: 00 PM to about 7: 30 PM. 
23 
Variations on this routine 
were followed in all the mounted regiments, every day. 
While familiarizing himself with horse and tack, the cavalry recruit 
was also undergoing the 'material' training of the foot soldier; and once 
through this phase he was taught to ride. Riding instruction was carried 
WO 27/15, /36, and /36 respectively). Corps serving in the fortifications 
- at Gibraltar, at St. Philip's Castle in Minorca, at Charles Fort 
Kinsale, at Fort George Ardersier, and at Quebec City and Halifax - must 
occasionally have practised handling grenades as part of the tactics for 
defending the works. 
21. JSAHR, 23 (1945), 99. 
22. On this, see below P. 206. 
23. Molesworth, op. cit., 118-25; and cf. the Standing Orders for the 15th 
Light Dragoons in J. B. R. Nicholson, arts. cit., passim. 
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on initially in riding houses or enclosures, where the recruits were started 
upon 'old Horses, that are quiet and ready at their Business'. 
24 
Once the 
troopers had acquired their seats at the various gaits and had learned to con- 
trol their animals they began individually, and then in larger groups, to be 
taught simple and essential mounted evolutions like opening and closing the 
rank- and file-intervals, wheeling on the flanks or centre of a rank, and 
passaging. 
25 
When able to ride the young trooper was usually assigned a 
'recruit horse', which had already been broken by the Riding Master and his 
rough-riders26 - and together man and horse advanced, practising the basic 
evolutions and movements at different gaits. 
Once he knew the foot drill and had become a competent horseman, and 
once his mount had become 'ready at its Business', the trooper was instructed 
in the use of his firelock (or carbine) and pistols, when mounted. 
27 
But 
these of course were secondary arms, and much the greatest stress could now 
be put upon swordsmanship. Curiously, no manual of military swordsmanship 
was issued to the army until 1796, when Le Marchant prepared his exercise; 
but the civilian school would already have provided most of the officers 
with ample experience of fencing, just as it was a source of many technical 
treatises on swordsmanship. There is no evidence of a settled style or 
school - beyond the shape and weight of the blades, of course, those de- 
signed for the heavy cavalry being best employed at giving point, and those 
for the light cavalry for slashing - and prior to the Le Marchant reforms 
we must draw on descriptions of foreign military training. Thus the 
kurasiers in the Prussian service were trained to attack, from the saddle, 
'Paste-board images, made, and erected to represent an enemy'; and the down- 
ward cut delivered with main force while standing in the stirrups was most 
recommended. 
28 
Le Marchant's system reduced swordsmanship to sound princi- 
ples: the troopers were taught six offensive cuts, eight parries to protect 
man and horse, and a cut-and-guard against infantry. The trooper learned the 
24. Molesworth, ibid., 142-9. The recruits were taught to ride under the 
direction of the Riding Master and his assitants; and an officer , an nco 
and an experienced trooper usually assisted at the riding house. 
25. The regulation Standing Orders in Farther Explanation of Regulations 
for the Formations and Movements of the Cavalry, of the Year 1796 (1799), 
346, suggested that the 'principles of all cavalry evolutions, and movements, 
may, to great advantage, be practised, and learnt on foot', with the men 
drawn up in such a manner as to simulate 'the cavalry formations'. 
26. Young 'recruit horses', like raw troopers, were to be brought along 
carefully and with affection, 'by gentle Degrees, so as never to disjust a 
young Horse, by being too rough with him'. Molesworth, op. cit., 146. See 
also Robert Hinde, op. cit., 11-23. 
27. Once again, both man and horse had to be trained, for the horses had 
to become accustomed to the whirling of the swords, and to the noise and 
smoke of firearms. On this, see Robert Hinde, op. cit., 26, and Le Marchant 
in the 1796 Sword Exercise, 60-61. 
28. Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry (1757 trans. ), 58. 
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drill on foot, at a dummy target chalked off against a wall; and later, on 
horseback, he attacked 'mellons attached to the ends of willow wands', or 
practised giving the point by thrusting at small metal rings. 
29 
It was these skills, then, which constituted the 'material' training 
of the soldier; but as we observed at the outset, the recruit's introduc- 
tion to and individual mastery of these skills constituted only the initial 
phase of the basic training curriculum. The second phase, begun immediately 
upon the conclusion of the first, consisted of endless drill - to the end 
that the skills acquired in the initial phase should through constant mech- 
anical repetition be honed to a level of perfection verging on the con- 
ditioned reflex. Where the initial phase had been relatively short-lived 
- several weeks to a few months - it was one of the chief peculiarities 
of the British Army's peacetime training system that much the greatest part 
of the time available overall, for training of any sort, should be devoted 
only to the ongoing or 'mechanical' phase of basic training. For the 
private soldier no matter how experienced drill at the level of the basics 
was the most constant feature of army life. And it must be emphasized 
that this endless basic training was carried on at the great expense of 
more advanced training. 
Although there was, as we shall see, an overriding structural factor 
which largely accounted for the endless practice in the army of the simple, 
'mechanical' phase of basic training, there were other important factors 
which were contributory, if clearly subsidiary. Significant among these 
was the view -a view not only popularly conceived but also buttressed by 
the physiology of the Enlightenment - that 'national character' or temp- 
erament was an important factor underlying military potential, a determin- 
ant which the tacticians considered when drawing up their schemes. Thus 
Henry Lloyd, in a lengthy discussion of the subject clearly inspired by 
Montesquieu, described the 'moral and physical principles [which] formed 
national characters, whose influence is seen... in every army'; and he gave 
it as his opinion that the English, although they were 'neither so lively, 
as the French, nor phlegmatick as the Germans', nevertheless were 'some- 
what lively and impatient' . 
30 
Humphrey Bland too noted that most observers 
regarded English troops as lacking the 'Sang Froid' of the Dutch, who had 
a 'greater Proportion of Phlegm in their Constitution than the English, by 
which their Minds are not so soon agitated as ours' . 
31 
It was Bland's 
29.1796 Sword Exercise, passim. Le Marchant taught (and stressed the imp- 
ortance of) a secure seat for mounted swordplay. His extremely deep seat 
(ibid., 65-6) seems inappropriate to strong downward cuts, heretofor the 
forte of heavy horse. 
30. Henry Lloyd, op. cit., I, E3. - F2. 
31. Bland, Treatise of Military Discipline, 145-7. 
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experience that controlled platoon fire was something which the English 
were only 'With Difficulty brought to, from a natural Desire and Eagerness 
to enter soon into Action'. 
32 
These attitudes were typical; and as late 
as 1803 John Macdonald, whose appreciation of the fundamental relationship 
in tactics of mobility, armament effectiveness, and firepower was acute, 
still stressed the need to fit tactical theory and formations to the pec- 
uliarities of national character. 
33 
The impression is that a great many officers had an exceedingly low 
opinion of the humour and disposition of the other ranks in general, in the 
British Army; and although opinion and prejudice thrived on a plane dis- 
tinctly lower than that on which were advanced theories of national temper, 
nevertheless their effect on the training of the troops was quite important. 
Wellington's pronouncement, that the ranks of the army at the end of our 
period were filled with 'the scum of the earth', 'enlisted for drink', is 
well known. At the beginning of our period Lt-Col John Blackadder of the 
26th Foot was using similar words: for him, the army was composed of 'a 
parcel of mercenary, fawning, lewd dissipated creatures, the dregs and scum 
of mankind'. Midway through the century, James Wolfe remarked repeatedly 
on the 'disobedient and dastardly spirit of the men', whom he described as 
'vagabonds that stroll about in dirty red clothes from one gin-ship to 
another-dirty, drunken, insolent rascals'; and referring to their 
Monogahela behaviour, wondered if 'ever the Geneva & pox of this country' 
operated 'more shamefully, & violently upon the dirty inhabitants of it, 
under the denomination of Soldiers? ' More temperate - and more typical 
- was the opinion held by Lt-Col James Murray of the 15th Foot; in 1757 
he took it upon himself to add to the mens' tricornes 'a Hatband and Tassel 
a la Hanoverien', advising his colonel that 'tho it may appear to some a 
little of the coxcomb, I am of oppinion there is no danger of making an 
English Soldier too much so, on the contrary I have ever found it almost 
impossible to conquer the Cloonesh Disposition so remarkable in the lower 
34 
sort of People in this Island'. 
If British troops were to be brought to perform their drill properly 
in the field, both of these factors had to be contended with: the clownish 
disposition of the 'lower sort of people' had to be disciplined, their 
'national impatience' bridled and dulled. The sure means of effecting both 
32. Ibid., 67-8,80. 
33. John Macdonald, French Infantry Regulations, I, xxv. 
34. Blackadder, quoted in R. E. Scouller, op. cit., 253; Wolfe, in R. Wright, 
The Life of Major-General James Wolfe... (1864), 418, and in Public Archives 
of Canada M. G18, L5, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 391; Murray, in Kent R. O. Amherst 
MSS, 013/4. 
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goals, it was thought throughout our period, was to subject the soldier 
constantly to the repetition of a set of essential mechanical skills - 
ongoing basic training - thus reducing his natural spirit and encouraging 
the automaton. 
This approach was further reinforced (as Professor Paret has pointed 
out) by the fact that the principles underlying strategy and tactics were 
'mechanistic in character'; only at the close of the century were 
"psychological" principles to be deduced. As Kessel put it, the tactics 
of the period sought to exclude chance in favour of control, rather than 
attempting to take advantage of uncertainty by encouraging in the men a 
spirit of initiative or individualism. 
35 
A complete and docile obedience, 
and automaton-like reflex responses to commands, were the touchstone of the 
other ranks; and endless repetition of a few basic skills, together with 
an iron discipline, seemed to ensure both. Finally, nothing like the wide 
range of skills needed by the modern private soldier was required of his 
eighteenth-century counterpart. All of these larger considerations, then, 
contributed to the character of the army's basic training. And a last 
factor, common to all standing armies since their inception but one given 
significant stress in the eighteenth century, was the urge on the part of 
the officers and nco's to maintain make-work programmes, to drill the men 
for its own sake - 'to preserve the men from idleness'. 
These secondary factors aside, however, there remained one fundamental- 
ly significant factor which in itself largely accounted for the army's end- 
less practise of the 'mechanical' phase of basic training - and that over- 
riding factor was the friction of peace. It was the friction of peace which 
determined the pattern of regiment&.. concentration and dispersal, the 
pattern of regimental quartering, and the pattern of regimental movements; 
and the individual regiments subject to these conditions were, as we have 
seen, commonly to be found in states of considerable dispersal. Each of 
the component parts of a dispersed regiment - companies, troops, detach- 
ments - was small; and for however long the regiment remained dispered 
nothing more sophisticated than basic training could be attempted. Once 
the recruit had passed through the initial phase of basic training and had, 
among his more experienced fellow-soldiers, become accomplished at per- 
forming his basic skills in the ranks of his troop or company, he had 
reached a plateau on which his training experience levelled off; and until 
the day came when his own unit was joined with other troops or companies 
35. Such generalizations are well-established; and Parat's summary (in his 
op. cit., 213-6) of these salient features of eighteenth-century tactics is 
one of the best available. E. Kessel, 'Die Wandlung der Kriegskunst in 
Zeitalter der franzosischen Revolution', in Historische Zeitschrift, 148 
(1933), 275, is quoted in P. Paret, op. cit., 211. 
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his training languished at that level, and consisted solely of endless 
drilling at the basics just described. The small, dispersed bodies - 
bodies of fewer than three or four companies in the foot, or fewer than two 
or three troops in the horse, depending upon establishment strengths - 
simply could not attempt with profit anything more complex than these 
mechanical basics; numbers, sheer numbers, were an essential prerequisite 
for the satisfactory and realistic performance of the advanced intricacies 
of the firings and manoeuvres. Field days, mock fighting, review present- 
ations - even simple technical operations like equalizing the timing and 
step within the regiment - none of these things were possible except in 
concentration: among the foot, two grand-divisions at the very least and 
preferably three or all four were essential, for proper advanced training; 
and at the very least one and preferably all three of the squadrons forming 
the cavalry regiment must be concentrated. 
36 
We might add, too, that even when some higher levels of concentration 
had been achieved within the regiment, time was still devoted to the mech- 
anical phase of basic training: major manoeuvres and complicated firings 
could not be performed at the drop of a hat, whatever the level or period 
of concentration might be; while on the contrary, during the whole of the 
time in which a regiment lay dispersed it was quite impossible to practise 
anything other than the basics. 
37 
Thus, endless basic training was a 
structural feature of eighteenth-century army life, bound to remain so for 
as long as the friction of peace persisted. The equation was a simple one, 
part of the very nature of linear tactics performed both in training and in 
the field by closed administrative units - the regiments - which were also 
the main permanent tactical units: the more men available in concentration, 
the more advanced the training that could be attempted. 
To a system which stressed so much basic training the importance of the 
nco's was naturally great, and they were consequently quite numerous. Their 
numbers were hardly effected by the war-end reductions of regimental estab- 
lishments; and despite the fact that the strength of a regiment serving in 
Ireland might be only one-third that of a sister regiment serving in Britain 
or abroad, there was no such disparity in the numbers of nco's. Experienced 
nco's - 'the nerves and sinews of the corps' - were simply too valuable to 
36. The levels of concentration within the regiment, and the levels actua- 
lly prevailing are pointed out in Appendix A. 
37. The figures on dispersal in Appendix A- essentially, those in the 
"M & D" column - are a measure of the time available during which nothing 
more sophisticated than basic training could be carried on; and as we have 
pointed out, part of the time represented in each of the other columns would 




As establishments varied there were occasionally four, sometimes 
five, and usually six nco's with each company of foot serving in Britain or 
overseas, while in Ireland there were usually four or five per company. In 
the cavalry, the troops of Horse and Dragoon Guards normally had three or 
four nco's apiece, in Britain, and two or three in Ireland; while each 
troop of Dragoons and Light Dragoons in Britain usually had four or five 
nco's, while an Irish troop usually had three or four. Despite considerable 
variations in regimental establishments, the ratio of nco's to private men 
was always high: among the Horse, Dragoon Guards, and Dragoons, there was 
usually 1 nco for every 7 to 10 troopers; among the Foot Guards, 1 nco 
for every 8 to 12 privates was the rule. In the marching Foot - in 
Britain, the Medierranean garrisons, and the Americas - there was usually 
1 nco for every 7 to 12 privates; and in the Irish regiments 1 nco was to 
be found for every 6 to 8 men. 
39 
There were more nco's to private men in 
the British Army than there were in the Prussian Army. 
The nco's were chosen by the commanding officers of regiments from 
among their most experienced men, recommended by the captains; the ser- 
geants were 'to carry a good command among the Men' and, in the Coldstream, 
'when any Vacancy happens among the Sergeants, the eldest Corporal [was to] 
succeed on Trial for three Months. and if he does not fulfill the Duty, the 
next will be appointed'. 
40 
Corporals in the foot were appointed for their 
character and long service; and the 1755 Dragoon Orders declared that a 
dragoon had to serve 'remarkable well for four Years' prior to being 
promoted corporal, and corporals had to have three years' service as such 
before being made sergeants. 
41 
As far as the basic training of the young officer was concerned, there 
was of course no formal provision whatsoever during the eighteenth century; 
not until 1801, under the reforming auspices of the Duke of York, was the 
Royal Military College founded, and it was several years before the officers 
38. John Williamson, op. cit., I, 44. The nco's were always the subject 
of special attention in the review reports. Those of the 20th Foot in 
Oct. 1753, for example were described as 'Alert in their Duty without the 
smallest Confusion Noise or Bustle'; and those in the 38th Foot in May, 
1787, appeared 'very Soldier like, & keep up a strict Discipline'. WO 
27/3 and /59. 
39. WO 24/84 through /558, passim. The most striking ratio of nco's to 
private men (1: 5) prevailed in the Dragoon regiments in Ireland, 1749-55. 
Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #124. 
40. Anon., Camp Discipline & Kane (1757), 83. See also Clode, II, 123-4. 
41. JSAHR, 23 (1945), 103. The 1755 Standing Orders for the Dragoons 
added that 'No Dragoon shall be made a Corporal merely because he can 
write a good hand, as has hitherto been the Custom'; the nco's were to 
be 'compleat Soldiers and not simple Scribblers'. 
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trained there began to make a mark in the army. 
42 
Most young officers, 
having just purchased their first commissions, joined their regiments with 
no more experience than that gained from a few guidebooks - those of Bland, 
Simes, and the rest. Like the other ranks, the officers got their basic 
training on the job, as it were; and the intensity and quality of that 
training depended in large measure on the spirit prevailing in each regi- 
ment, on the attendance or otherwise of fellow regimental officers to their 
duties, on the leadership and pressure exerted by the regiment's field of- 
ficers, and also on the character and inclination of the young officer him- 
slef. As we have seen, the great majority of regimental officers were 
career officers, men who could for the most part be depended upon to learn 
the basics; and since the young officer's introduction to training was, 
most often, to the basic training being carried on in the isolated troop or 
company to which he found himself attached, it was to the basics that he 
found himself devoting the largest part of his time. 
Arrived with his troop or company, the young officer devoted himself 
to studying the current drill regulations, while at the same time he attend- 
ed the mounting of guards, parades, and the drills. With the assistance of 
brother subalterns or of a senior nco, he learned how to perform the manual 
and platoon exercises of the firelock or carbine, 
43 
and the great variety 
of movements, commands, and posts which it was the subaltern's duty to learn, 
to perform, or to occupy when the unit was carrying on its basic training 
exercises. If he were wise he would refer repeatedly to his primers, and 
keep a commonplace book in his pocket 'ready for any remarks' and contain- 
ing extracts taken from the regulations. 
44 
He would also study the regi- 
mental orderly- and records-books, if these were available, to acquaint 
himself more intimately with the discipline, training schedule, and interior 
economy of the corps. 
45 
42 There were a very, few, small private academies in Britain; and a very 
few young men attended these, or better establishments on the Continent. 
On the early years of the RMC and its origins, see R. H. Thoumine, op. cit., 
61-146, and Glover, Preparation, 192-6 and passim. 
43. In a letter to a young officer, about to set out to join his regiment 
for the first time, James Wolfe advised that knowledge of the manual would 
'readily bring you to understand all other parts of your duty, [and] make 
you a proper judge of the performance of your men'. R. Reilly, The Rest to 
Forture: The Life of Major-General James Wolfe (1960), 148-50. 
44. Ibid., 149. 
45. The regimental books, are those which contain the general orders, reg- 
ulations, etc., the returns of the regiment, of men inlisted and discharged, 
proceedings of regimental courts martial, returns of arms, ammunition, cl- 
oathing, etc., and all that relates to the operations and oeconomy of the 
regiment. ' (John Williamson, op. cit., II, 15 n. 17). The reviewing officers 
made a point of checking to see that corps kept these books up-to-date, 
since much relating to training and drill was entered in these from 
circulars sent out through the Adjutant General's office. 
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It was the young subalterns responsibility, therefore, to make himself 
master of the same basic-training skills which were drilled into the men; 
every officer 'must be taught every individual circumstance necessary to a 
recruit', first individually and then in 'squads of officers [which] should 
be occasionally marched and exercised by a field officer'. 
46 
The series of 
general orders issued in 1755 enjoined officers 'newly appointed' to 'attend 
the Parade every morning'; and they were to 'inform themselves of every 
article of their Duty... by asking Questions' of their superiors. All field 
officers and captains were ordered to 'teach their Subalterns their Duty, 
and see they do it by fair means, and tell them their faults and Omissions... 
and let them know they are not to have their Pay to be Idle'. 
47 
Although they were able to read widely in the broader, more advanced 
spheres of training and tactics, the young subalterns like the private men 
spent much of their training time fiddling with the simplicities of basic 
training, caught up as they were in the dispersed conditions prevailing in 
the peacetime army. 
Such was the system of basic training practised in the British Army, 
in peacetime, throughout our period. In wartime the system was either con- 
tinued in this fashion or was speeded up, as the exigencies of the military 
situation might require. Where the regiments in the field were sometimes 
sent replacements innocent of all but the most rudimentary instruction, 
this was a relatively rare and certainly a desparate expedient, since 
untrained and undisciplined men were a dangerous liability in the era of 
precise linear tactics, and of murderous close-range volley-fire. It was 
for this reason that drafing was so much resorted to, since it provided 
the regiments in the field with trained men, whatever its effects might be 
upon those finding the drafts at home. And it was for this reason too that 
regiments serving abroad, in wartime, formed 'additional companies' at home 
- companies in which the recruits could be processed through the 'material' 
phase of their basic training before being shipped abroad. 
The practice of the 1775-83 war was typical. From late in 1775 'ad- 
ditional companies' (two each) were formed in the British Isles to feed 
parent regiments serving abroad. These companies, each commanded by of- 
ficers taken off the half-pay list and settled in at some promising 
'Recruiting Quarters', outfitted their recruits and sent them to the 'Depots' 
46. David Dundas, op. cit., 35. Dundas added, viii, that 'a practical and 
ready knowledge of the detail, and execution of all possible movements of 
the troops, ought to be the first and leading study of all ranks'. Most 
other authors concurred: Bland for example, in his Treatise of MiZitary" 
Discipline, 115; William Dalrymple, op. cit., 51; Molesworth, op. cit., 
162; and Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 203. 
47. JSAHR, 5 (1926), 198; and JSAHR, 23 (1945), 104. 
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or 'Stations' - at Chatham for the companies recruiting in England, at 
Stirling Castle for those in North Britain, and at Charles Fort Kinsale 
for those in Ireland. Here, subalterns and nco's detached from the addi- 
tional companies and under the orders of field officers specifically 'ap- 
pointed for the purpose of training and exercising the Recruits', assembled 
at the depots, brought the men along as quickly as possible, drilling them 
intensively. 48 To speed the process (as the Secretary at War informed the 
colonels and agents of regiments serving in the American theatre), 'Recruits 
passed at the several Stations by Field Officers who will have instructions 
to inspect them, will be deemed as approved by the Regiment'. 
49 
And then, 
having been 'disciplined sufficiently to serve in the Ranks on joining their 
respective Corps in N? America', they were shipped abroad. 
50 
The system of basic training practiced in the British Army, although it 
was successful enough in the short-run preparation of the soldier-recruit 
or the young subaltern, was in the long run often counter-productive, and 
occasionally pernicious. Endless drilling in small units, at nothing more 
sophisticated than the basics, tended to produce a certain myopia among the 
regimental officers, most especially among the captains and subalterns seldom 
able to see beyond their own companies or troops. Dispersed, their only re- 
source was to devote themselves to that part of the drill which one or a few 
troops or companies could practise with profit - the basic skills, the 
simple evolutions and movements and, with increasing frequency, the manual 
and platoon exercises. The drill regulations issued to the army prior to 
those of 1786 could hardly have been better designed to contribute to the 
stress on basics, devoted as they were to the most detailed descriptions of 
the manual and platoon exercises, and the simple evolutions; and thus the 
regulations - in their style, their context, and in the subjects stressed 
- took dispersal for granted, assumed it. Not until 1764 did the regula- 
tions include anything more-sophisticated than the arms exercises, evolu- 
tions, the battalion firings, defiling, and forming the square; and not 
until 1792 was the drill of units larger than the regiment so much as men- 
tioned. Pride of place went to the manual and platoon in all of the regu- 
lations issued prior to those of 1778. The stress on the basic elements was 
reinforced, too, by their frequent reprinting and re-issuing under separate 
covers, separated from the other, more advanced elements included in their 
original issue: even the laziest of officers, after all, would need his 
48. On the supply of arms and ammunition from the Ordnance to these depots, 
see WO 55/370, 'War Office, 14th November 1776'; /417, pp. 274,279,288, 
290,298; and /418, pp. 55,71,124,132,164. 
49. WO 4/98, pp. 249-54. 
50. Ibid., p. 249. 
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copy of the manual and platoon. As we observed earlier in our discussion 
of the trends in eighteenth-century English military publication, the 
striking frequency with which official and privately-produced versions of 
the manual and platoon appeared, from the very beginning of the century, 
indicates that these arms exercises had become and remained not only the 
staple of training but a fetish. Only a few officers - Hawley in 1726, 
Kane in 1736, Bever in 1756, Cuthbertson in 1768, Hinde in 1778 - de- 
claimed against the unrealistic repetition and waste of time involved in 
'having [the men] out twice a week to act over that silly thing called 
Manual Exercise'; 
51 
and where it was 'silly' in the infantry it was 'pre- 
posterous' (to use Kane's word) amongst the cavalry. 
That a degree of myopia should afflict the captains and subalterns is, 
perhaps, understandable; but this was a myopia which effected not only the 
officers with the troops and companies but also the greater part of the 
officers of field and general rank, for it was they who were responsible 
for each regiment's overall training, they who prepared and sanctioned the 
regulation drillbooks, and they who reviewed and reported upon the state 
of training in the corps. The general officers regularly revealed them- 
selves in the inordinate attention they paid to simple mechanics, even to 
trifles, in their review reports; and this was a tendency not just of the 
pedants among the general officers, but one which appeared too among the 
most experienced. An example will suffice. In the reports which he sub- 
mitted upon the regiments reviewed by him in 1754, Lt-Gen James Cholmondeley 
dwelt upon the intricacies of the manual and the firings to the near ex- 
clusion of everything else. Of one regiment, he reported their manual 'very 
fast and in good time'; their firings, all done 'well', were performed 
standing, advancing, and retreating, both by individual platoons and by 
platoons told off in firings; and their vollfies were fired 'very well'. 
With another regiment he was less pleased: they made 'several Mistakes in 
the Manual'; when firing they didn't 'lock well or Level well'; they 
loaded slowly, and the timing of the platoon-fire was off. Cholmondeley's 
comments, in themselves, were not out of the ordinary; but what was pecu- 
liar was that his fascination with the intricacies of the manual and the 
battalion firings had led him, in the first of these two reports, to praise 
the drill on foot and in battalion line of a regiment of heavy cavalry, for 
all the world as if it was an infantry corps as the second of the two re- 
ported on actually was. 
52 
51. Hawley, in Sumner, 'Chaos', 93; Kane, Ccmrpaigns, 109-10; Samual 
Bever, op. cit., 49-50; Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 206-07; and Robert 
Hinde, op. cit., 40. 
52. WO 27/3. These were the 1st Dragoon Guards and the 3rd Foot. 
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Endless training at the basics - 'tossing of the firelocks', as 
Campbell Dalrymple contemptuously described it53 - was in the first instance 
an activity induced by the physical realities resulting from dispersal. But 
a training system can only be as good as the broad vision which accompanies 
it, and unfortunately for the British Army 'tossing of the firelocks' tend- 
ed to dull the officers as much as it rendered the men docile. Activity 
induced by necessity came to seem a virtue: the efficacy of smart practice 
at the basics was overestimated; and the fact that the 'material' and 
'mechanical' training of a soldier was undertaken merely in order to prepare 
him for instruction at advanced drill and tactics, was obscured. Hence dis- 
persal, and the training atmosphere which it engendered, leant an unwarranted 
weight. to the value of lengthy basic training; and this could only be at the 
expense of a sound overall appreciation of advanced training, and capability 
at advanced tactics. Time spent on basic training was time lost on advanced 
training. In consequence, the basic training of the army was counterproduc- 
tive and - as we shall see below in our discussion of wartime training in 
the field, and of the tactics actually attempted by British regiments in 
action - it was often pernicious. 
53. Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 165. 
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ADDENDUM 
Marching in Step: 
Professor Michael Roberts, in his paper The Military Revolution, 1560- 
1660 (Belfast, n. d. ), 11 n. l, quite rightly noted that 'the matter of 
marching in step needs proper investigation', stressing that the question 
is a very material one in the history of tactics. 
Close scrutiny of the English drillbooks from the Restoration through 
to the 1760's leads to the conclusions described in our text above. Remarks 
such as 'The Souldiers must always begin to March with their left foot first, 
which is observed to conduce most to keep the Ranks-even' (1682 Regulations, 
85-6), are a commonplace in the later Stuart drillbooks, and they remained 
so until the 1750's; but these remarks are always confined to sections deal- 
ing with the simple evolutions, countermarches and - among the manoeuvres - 
to those occasions when the ranks had been closed up tight prior to wheel- 
ing or to advancing a short distance in line, both of which were performed 
very slowly and with much dressing. Paces were counted out by the men, and 
music was never used on these occasions to set a cadence. Whenever the rank 
intervals were opened - as they had to be to perform most movements and 
marches - marching instep was clearly laid aside; and the nco's, who 
'have no place assigned them in Marching', were 'to be moving up and down, 
to observe that the Ranks and Files be at their due distance' (Ibid. ), 
there being no other means known of accomplishing this. 
The best and most influential of the early eighteenth-century writers, 
Humphrey Bland, had no notion of the cadenced step; he drilled and man- 
oeuvred his troops, in his 1727 Treatise of Military Discipline, at open 
rank intervals just as his predecessors had done. Bland likewise described 
the slow and careful movements performed in step at the simple evolutions; 
but when he suggested extending movement made in step to include some 
others of theevolutions he admitted that this would 'appear so difficult, 
that it will deter a great many from attempting it'. He added that the 
'common Objection against it, is, that it looks too much like Dancing'; and 
he felt obliged to argue that with 'Time and Practice' it would come to ap- 
pear 'easy and genteel' (Ibid., 12-3). Nor did the experienced and pro- 
fessional Richard Kane, writing in his Ca2rpaigns shortly before 1736, con- 
ceive of using music to set a marching time - and this despite the fact 
that he gave over six pages (pp. 115-20) to the proper 'use of the Drum in 
Action', a 'Thing, hitherto overlook'd by all'. He used it for signals, as 
did his contemporaries. 
The first appearance of the fife in the army - and of the notion of 
cadenced marching and manoeuvring - was noted by Francis Grose in his 
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Military Antiquities... of the English Army, 2 Vols (1786-88), II, 248-9. 
He wrote: 'The fife was for a long time laid aside, and was not restored 
till about the year 1745, when the Duke of Cumberland introduced it into 
the guards; it was not however adopted into the marching regiments, till 
the year 1747: the first regiment that had it was the 19th, then called 
green Howards, in which I had the honor to serve ... Fifes afterwards, 
particularly since the practice of marching in cadence, have been much 
multiplied. ' During the 1750's, several references to the slow but steady 
spread of the instrument can be found: in July 1750, for example, the 
reviewing officer who saw the 20th Foot in Scotland noted the absence of 
'3 Drummers at Berwick learning the Fife' (WO 27/1). By the late 1750's 
and early 1760's experienced and learned observers could still express 
surprise and excitement upon seeing the efficacy of the cadenced step. 
During the summer of 1759, William Windham saw the 67th and 72nd of Foot at 
Hilsea drilling 'to the sound of the fife; keeping the most exact time and 
cadence'; and, he added, 'The effects of the musick in regulating the step, 
and making the men keep their order, is really very extraordinary; and 
experience seems fully to confirm Marshal Saxe's opinion; who asserts, that 
it is the best and indeed the only method of teaching troops to march well' 
(Norfolk Militia [1759], Pt. II, 61). As late as 1763, Lt John Maclntire in 
his Marine Forces, 172-7, was still obliged to devote many pages to explain- 
ing and justifying the new concept of marching in step to fife and drum. 
'Marching in Cadence', he wrote, 'was followed by the Romans, and has been 
revived by the King of Prussia, and{is now practised by some of the British 
Troops' (note, 'some', not yet all). McIntire had not only to invoke the 
Romans and Frederick II to impress his fellow British officers, but Marshal 
Saxe too, who 'plainly shews the Absurdity of our common Method of marching'. 
See also Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 52-4, and Fawcett's trans. of Saxe, 
op. cit., 15-8. The reduction of rank intervals and the consequent expansion 
of tactical horizons can be followed in the regulations and private publi- 
cations of the later-1750's and 1760's 
We noted that the musical cadence, once adopted, became fairly quickly 
a training aid only. Typical of the difficulties which could result were 
those seen at a review of the 25th Foot, held at Winchester on 18 June 1777. 
The reviewing officer noted that the corps' timing was slow (at 64 paces to 
the minute in the slow march, and 94 at the quick); and he found that 'the 
Men got into a run whilst the Fifes were playing a regular redoubled time 
which did not govern their steps', and that consequently the battalion 
'sometimes opened & floated a little' (WO 27/36). 
Amherst's 1778 Regulations, recognizing these problems laid it down 
that henceforth all infantry manoeuvres were to be performed by vocal commands 
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only, and that 'Drums should be used as little as possible in manoeuvring 
of Regiments & Musick [ie., bands] never'. All subsequent regulations 
concurred. 
A 4. A ýý Ye 
It is interesting to note that none of the plates attached to the 
various drillbooks, illustrating the posture of the soldier at 'Present' 
and 'Fire', show him actually taking aim down the barrel of the piece; 
he is, instead, invariably shown with the butt of his firelock pressed 
to his shoulder but with his head held erect. Nor do front-rank men, 
kneeling, support the weight of the piece by placing the elbow on the 
knee. George Grant, op. cit., 7, noticed this in 1757; and in his drill- 
book (op. cit) he remarked quite correctly that 'Any Commander that desires 
his Men to hold up their Heads"when they fire... was never a Marksman him- 
self; and in such Case, you may set Blind Men a Fireing as a Man that can 
see'. Writing in 1751, the experienced lieutenant-colonel of the 8th Foot 
stated that he wished that British troops 'were accustomed to take Aim 
when they Present, no Recruits want it more than Ours, few of them having 
fired or even handled Fire Arms before enlisted; the explanation of the 
word Present in the Manual Exercise, is very different in my opinion from 
what Men shou'd do when Firing at an Ennemy, this gives them a Habit of 
doing it wrong, and I have room to believe that the Fire of our Men is not 
near so considerable as it would be, were any pains taken to mike them good 
Marks men' (Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, II, f. 5). There were no rear sights on the 
longarms issued to the eighteenth-century army; and the bayonet lug near 
the muzzle, which served as a guide, was no longer visible once the Bayonet 
was fixed. The directions on 'presenting', in all of the regulations, 
were no more specific than the plates; at best (as in the 1764 Regulations) 
they offered simple and unsatisfactory descriptions. As late as 1807 the 
wise John Macdonald, in his annotated trans. of Conduct of Infantry on Actual 
Service, penned a 50 pp critique of the current British regulations, calling 
among other things (I, lxviii) for the addition of a good section on target 
shooting. 
The value of target practice with ball ammunition was sometimes 
stressed - although marksmanship was not necessarily the priority. Thus 
the lieutenant-colonel of one battalion said 'firing ball at objects 
teaches the soldiers to level incomparably, makes recruits steady, and 
removes the foolish apprehension that seizes young soldiers when they first 
load their arms with bulletts'. (J. T. Findlay, op. cit., 271). By the early 
summer of 1757 the 15th Foot, moving towards Barham Downs camp, was profit- 
ing from large wartime issues. 'We have three field days every week', 
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reported its lieutenant-colonel, 'Seven rounds of powder and Ball each, 
every Man has fired about eighty- four rounds, and now load and fire Ball 
with as much coolness and allacrity in all the different fireings as ever 
you saw them fire blank powder' - and this 'hitherto without the smallest 
accident'. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 013/4. 
Locking: 
During the 1720's, the British foot began to 'lock' up their ranks 
for firing - that is, the front rank knelt down, the second moved slightly 
to its right, and the third moved a half pace, thus making of each file an 
echellon with the firelocks of the two rear ranks levelled through the file 
interval. Locking was considered important (as witness the repeated comments 
of the reviewing officers throughout WO 27), because it not only made firing 
by the rear ranks easier and safer, but made possible the use of narrow file 
intervals and thereby effectively increased the volume of fire being de- 
livered on any chosen frontage. 
Most authorities argue that Marlborough's battalions 'locked' their 
ranks for firing - most recently, E. Belfleld in his Oudenarde, 1708 (1972), 
7; D. Chandler, in his Marlborough as Military Commander (1973), 92, and 
again in his The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough (1976), 118-9. The 
earliest contemporary reference to locking which I have seen, however, was 
made by Bland in his 1727 treatise. The 'discipline practised in Flanders', 
which Ingoldsby had Parker introduce into Ireland in 1708-10, did not teach 
locking but simply had the centre rank stoop low so that the muskets of the 
rear rank would clear their heads (Cornwall R. O. DD. RH. 388, ff. 11,13, and 
passim. ). Marlborough's orders given out through Orkney, as late as 1711, 
make no mention of locking (BM Add. MS 29,477). Brig-Gen James Douglass, 
writing in 1728, described Flanders practice as 'ye wholl Body at ye word 
Make Redy: kneels stoups and Stands', and that no doubt was how Marlborough's 
men fired (BM Add. MS 27,892, ff. 209-55 passim). 
Ammunition Issues: 
Powder (which was manufactured at both private and government mills, 
and issued from the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich), was issued in sizeable 
quantities. 
54 
From 1715 through to 1755 the marching battalions in Britain 
54. The statistics on the quantities of powder, flints, and ball which ap- 
pear here have been collected from the following sources: WO 3/26, pp. 165- 
6; WO 4/130, pp. 382-4, /83, p. 364, /87, p. 60 (plus /88, /89, /92, /93, 
/94, /125, and /137, passim); WO 55/348, pp. 10,15, /411, pp. 140-1,163-4, 
/416, pp. 127,155,174,193; Notts R. O. Staunton of Staunton MSS, DDS. 49/ 
10; Berks R. O., D/E. L1.05, f. 45; and Capt G. Smith, An Universal Military 
Dictionary (1779), 36-7,58,254. In wartime much larger quantities of am- 
munition were issued, so that it was then possible to carry on adequate 
musketry training, unlike in peacetime. Irish statistics are not available, 
but it is clear that Irish corps got ammunition proportionate to that issued 
to corps on other establishments. 
177 
each got in peacetime sufficient powder for 45,000 firelock charges (priming 
included) per annum; from 1764 through 1768 the issue was down to 31,500 
charges per battalion p. a.; during the peacetime years between 1769 and 
1786 the issue was back up at 42,000 charges p. a.; and from 1786 the scale 
was 35,000 charges per battalion, p. a.. These variation reflected both 
changes in the establishment strengths of the battalions and government 
efforts to cut costs; but the issue, though not princely, was enough to 
provide every infantryman with powder enough to fire from 60 to 120 
charges annually, the variation again depending upon establishments. Flints 
were issued in the same proportion, to the foot, that is an average of about 
1400 per battalion p. a. during the peace years from 1715 to 1755, and in 
varying quantities thereafter; this was sufficient to provide each infantry- 
man with 2 flints per year and, since these could be reversed when worn 
and new striking faces knapped, that was just sufficient to fire off the 
60-120 charges of powder. The quantities of powder and flint issued to 
the cavalry were more varied, since establishments in the Horse, Dragoons, 
and other mounted types were not alike, and because establishment strengths 
within one type varied too. Issues were sizeable, however, since not only 
muskets or carbines but pistols too had to be provided for. Until 1726 the 
ordinary dragoon regiment got enough powder per annum for about 7000 charg- 
es for their firearms and, from 1726 to the century's end, enough for about 
24,500 charges per year in peacetime. 
55 
The heavy Horse regiments each got 
enough powder for about 14,000 charges per year throughout the century, in 
peacetime. Flints were issued at the rate of about 3 carbine flints per 
man and 3 pistol flints per man, each year, to cavalrymen of all types. 
The government, then, cannot be said to have stinted on the quantity 
of its annual peacetime issues of powder and flints. It was rather upon 
lead shot that government fixed, to save money. Each year in peacetime, 
from the outset of our period until so late as 1785, the annual issue of 
shot to each battalion of foot in Britain, the Mediterranean garrisons, 
and the Americas, was a fixed 1 cwt. - sufficient, depending upon estab- 
lishment strengths, to provide each infantryman with from 2 to 4 musket 
balls per year. Only in 1786 was the annual issue of shot increased - 
by 800%, so massive an increase as to point the sudden and extraordinar- 
ily late awareness of the evils of cheeseparing. In the cavalry, an 
average of 2 pistol balls and from 6 to 10 longarm balls were issued an- 
nually to each dragoon, and an average of 3 pistol balls and from 7 to 13 
longarm balls went to each trooper of Horse, and to each dragoon guard. 
55. Early in 1726 each dragoon regiment in Britain had its annual powder 
supply raised from 2 to 6 barrels, in belated recognition of the fact that, 
as dragoons, they had often to practise the firings on foot. WO 55/348, pp. 
10,16. 
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Peacetime musketry drill - firing blank cartridges or 'squibs' - was 




ADVANCED TRAINING : PEACETIME 
Basic training was directed, essentially, to the practise of the first 
three elements of the drill regimen - the manual, platoon, and evolutions 
- and to the necessary attendant skills all of which formed the funda- 
mental building-blocks upon which were grounded the other, more difficult 
elements of the drill. It was these last elements - the detailed firings 
and manoeuvres - which at various levels of realism and sophistication 
comprised the advanced training carried on in the regiments in peacetime. 
While basic training could be carried on in dispersal, however, ad- 
vanced training could not be. It was only when the individual troops or 
companies found themselves in states of concentration sufficient to form 
squadrons and grand-divisions that practise of the firings and manoeuvres 
could be attempted; and where it was possible these elements were pract- 
ised not only on parade but on field days, on route marches, and in mock 
fighting where not only the "hatmen" of the battalion-companies were put 
through their paces but the flank companies too, acting out their role as 
satellites to the body of the battalion, practised their specialist duties. 
The general dispersal of the army has been our constant theme, to 
this point. Save for the shakedown days preceding the annual reviews - 
days during which the troops or companies of the dispersed regiments were 
concentrated in review quarters, there to practise intensively their ad- 
vanced drill against the upcoming review; or days during which the regi- 
ments in the fortifications and the garrison towns gave over the normal 
routine of garrison duty and called in their outlying detachments, in order 
to devote themselves likewise to their advanced field drill and tactics - 
full regimental concentration was, as we have seen, infrequent, and espec- 
ially so for purposes of advanced training. Although there were considerable 
limitations on what a mere squadron or pair of grand-divisions could profit- 
ably perform, and although they could not hope to approximate many of the 
more advanced manoeuvres and firings, still whenever possible the officers 
of the troops and companies come together at these lower levels of concen- 
tration were 'to instruct the Men in something useful, and not confine 
themselves entirely to the Manual Exercise' as was all-too-frequently 




For the most part, companies or troops which found themselves in the 
lower levels of concentration devoted the bulk of their time to practising 
those parts of the linear manoeuvres most likely to be required of them when 
in full regimental strength. Prior to the appearance late in the century of 
universal rules and techniques of movement derived from the increasingly 
"scientific" schools of tacticians - pivot-files, for example, came in dur- 
ing the 1780's - the squadrons and grand-divisions performed their various 
marches, wheels by divisions, wheels upon the centre and the flanks of the 
line, and so forth, all the while concentrating upon the considerable number 
of technical devices necessary to perform linear manoeuvres speedily and 
without confusion. The customs of each regiment counted for much here, as 
in the speed and length of pace each employed; but it was difficult for 
dispersed companies and troops to act alike. Because of the 'dispersed 
condition of quarters, that allow but very little time to practice', a lead- 
ing British tactician pointed out the very great difficulty of so much as 
manoeuvring several files in line; and he noted that large numbers of foot 
found it difficult merely to advance in line over rugged ground 'without 
confusion'. 
2 
Hence the simplest aids to linear movement - lines of bearing, 
markers, dressing to the flanks and centre, timing - had all to be assid- 
uously practised were the troops or companies not to run afoul of one another 
when they joined in squadron or grand-division, or the squadrons or grand- 
divisions not to jostle when the full regiment formed. All ranks had to 
devote a great deal of time and attention to these routine mechanics of 
manoeuvre, just as they had to practise the manoeuvres themselves; and the 
greater the number of troops or companies concentrated, so the greater was 
the time given over to perfecting these all-important technical aids, with- 
out which they could not move as an articulated whole. At the same time, 
two or three grand-divisions of foot could be told off into platoons or 
other fire-units, and attempts could be made at orchestrated, synchronized 
platoon-fire or alternate fire. 
3 
The cavalry, if numbers were sufficient, 
might tell off the squadron or squadrons into smaller manoeuvre-units, and 
practise passing through woods or closed country, charging alternately by 
1. Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 206. 
2. Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 36. 
3. These systems of fire control succeeded one another. The first - 
known as "platoon firing" or firing by the "chequer" - had been the forte 
of Marlborough's battalions, was in general use until the mid-1750's and 
remained regulation practice until 1764. It was replaced by the "alternate 
firing" system, which remained in use until well beyong our period. Both 
required intensive training. For a detailed description, see Addendum 
to this chapter. 
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divisions supporting one another, extending the front of the line by red- 
ucing the depth of rank and forming on the flanks, or skirmishing if they 
were a light regiment. 
4 
This was all very prosaic, but commonplace; it 
was the essential stuff of advanced training in peacetime, it was the 
most widely practised part of linear drill, and any practice that was 
less than perfect would be a threat to the security of the line of battle. 
There were of course more useful and sometimes more realistic ways of 
practising the firings and manoeuvres, than what was afforded by parade- 
ground drilling. Where the numbers concentrated were sufficient for the 
purpose (and where waste-land was available, or at least where the local 
inhabitants were unlikely to complain, both of which were factors seriously 
affecting the army's advanced training5), day 'excursions' on which the men 
were 'marched some miles into the country-and in their progress manoeuvred 
according to the different situations of the ground', were laid on. 
6 
Good 
march discipline was to be maintained on these occasions, 'without the aid 
of music', and the column 'taken intentionally' across 'Hedges, Ditches, 
Rivulets, etc'. 
7 
If the concentrated troops or companies were sufficiently 
adept at their linear manoeuvres, field days were laid on; and 'sham 
fights' were held on these occasions. Field days had the 'advantage to 
officers, in reducing to reality, in some measure, what they have been 
practising'. Realism was to be the keynote on field days: squib cart- 
ridges were issued, packs were donned, and detachments were sent out to 
'form Ambuscades; to take possession of Church-yards, Bridges, Defiles and 
Heights; that the methods may be shewn, for evading the first, and forcing 
the others'. Entrenchments and field works were thrown up, attacked, and 
defended, when ground can be obtained'. 
8 
The flank companies' specialist training was best conducted, too, in 
the higher levels of concentration. The grenadiers throughout our period 
acted either as a tactical reserve to the battalion or formed the head of 
the battalion column, when manoeuvring; and when the battalion line was 
4. It should be noted that, for upwards of four months per year the 
cavalry horses were nowhere near their regiments, but rather were 'turned 
out to grass'; and during these months it was the foot drill upon which 
most of the cavalrymen were obliged to concentrate. On horses at grass, 
see Addendum to this chapter. 
5. On this important point, see below , p. 
aia. 
6. Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 205. 
7. William Dalrymple, op. cit., 60-3; and Ibid., 205. 
8. Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 205-8; and Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 
206-7. John Williamson, op. cit., 180, stressed the importance of field days 
carried on in varying terrain - 'varied to every situation in which they 
may find themselves on real service'. He pointed out that several of the 
army's customary and regulation manoeuvres were seldom attempted on regular 
drill-fields, since they were 'useful only in particular circumstances of 
ground and position'. 
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giving fire the grenadier company split into two platoons, one of which stood 
on each flank prior to 1771-72, when the left flank position was taken over 
by the light company. The usual role of the light company during manoeuvres 
was to skirmish in extended order upon the battalion's flanks or front - 
a role which the grenadiers practised in most regiments, too, from the mid- 
1760's. Although individual skills like marksmanship, 'running and leaping', 
firing independently from cover and so forth were encouraged, the essential 
duty of the light infantrymen was to cover the manoeuvres of the hatmen; 
and in order to practise this most effectively they, like the grenadiers, 
had to be concentrated with at least a couple of the regiment's grand- 
divisions. 
'Field days' and 'excursions' were always useful, the more so because 
they were infrequent; but it was the slow, steady practise of the linear 
manoeuvres and firings which characterized most advanced training in con- 
centration, as was proper. Dundas made the point when he stressed that, 
no matter how large or small the unit might be, marching and manoeuvring 
should be given pride of place, and were always to be conducted 'on a sup- 
position of lining with other troops, already upon their flanks. '9 Constant- 
ly dispersed, or training only in small bodies, the regiments were apt to 
forget that their main role in battle would be to conform to the movements 
of the long solid lines and brigades of which they would form but a part. 
Marching, manoeuvring, and firing on the parade-grounds, together with 
the occasional field day or excursion into the countryside, these were the 
advanced training activities commonly practiced in the peacetime regiments, 
outside of the annual concentrations in the review quarters. It was all 
good practice, considering the endless simplicities which constituted basic 
training in the dispersed troops and companies; but unfortunately it came 
both infrequently and irregularly, depending upon concentration, and in con- 
sequence means had to be found to help maintain some degree of uniformity 
within the regiment. The officers with the dispersed troops and companies, 
armed with their copies of the current regulations, could keep their men 
exercised according to a uniform system; the regulations were of course 
easily accessible, they were an excellent guide among dispersed units, and 
all ranks would need to be well acquainted with them when the reviewing 
season came round. But beyond this there was in fact little that could be 
done actively to ensure uniformity within a regiment, the diligence of the 
company officers and a close adherence by all to the regulation drillbooks 
being in themselves important but not sufficient. Rotation within the regi- 
ment in order to advance the training of outlying detachments by joining 
9. David Dundas, op. cit., 59. 
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them at the regiment's main quarter was hardly ever allowed by authority; 
the most frequent - and still, admittedly, only occasional - sort of 
inter-regimental rotation was the movement of cavalry troops between their 
quarters, to the end that the whole corps might have the opportunity of 
using the main enclosed riding house in the vicinity. But save for isolat- 
ed instances it was for purposes of relief, not rotation, that exchanges 
between quarters in a regiment occurred. Thus a regiment serving in a hard 
duty area like Cornwall and south Devon, where the duties imposed on out- 
lying detachments were apt to be onerous, was occasionally permitted to 
relieve such detachments with others found by the body of the regiment 
lying somewhat more comfortably at Exeter or Plymouth. 
10 
But only in 
exceptional circumstances could reliefs be turned to advantage, used for 
'equallizing the Discipline' within a regiment. In regiments with dedica- 
ted officers the field officers, the adjutant, and the senior nco's would 
tour occasionally the outlying units, in order to 'equalize'. In the 5th 
Dragoons in Ireland during the later 1730's and '40's, for example, the 
commanding officer and the adjutant every three months toured the regiment's 
several quarters to see 'that the Men perform their Exercise well, uniform- 
ly, and with the same Time between Motions'. Well in advance of the spring 
reviewing season the Riding Master and his assistants were to go around the 
quarters, 'employing at least a Fortnight in each Quarter to instruct both 
Men and Horse'. 
11 
Good nco's were normally employed at equalizing a regi- 
ment's timing at the manual and platoon, and at marching. In the spring 
of 1765, for example, all the corporals with The Blues were assembled to 
learn and perfect their exercise together, 'when they are to return and 
join the respective Troops to which they belong in order to fully in- 
struct the men. '12 Even among the Foot Guards, always concentrated in 
London and Westminster, 'the Drill Serjeants and Corporals of the three 
Regiments [were] to be exercised together in the Spring... that each Regi- 
ment may have the same time'. 
13 
Good nco's from well-trained regiments 
were sometimes "loaned" to others to achieve the same ends. 
14 
Later in the 
century, music was used to help maintain drill regularity among the dis- 
persed units; 
15 
and the attempts made from the later 1770's onwards to 
10. See, for example, orders of this sort to the 4th Foot, given in 1766. 
WO 5/54, pp. 41,255-6,283-4. 
11. Molesworth, op. cit., 150-60. 
12. WO 5/53, p. 238. 
13. See the Guards' Standing Orders of late 1754, in Anon., Cct rp Disci- 
pZine & Kane (1757), 81. 
14. For examples, see WO 4/1044, p. 92, and WO 3/1, p. 79. 
15. As early as 1761, Campbell Dalrymple wrote (op. cit., 95) that 'The 
companies before they join, having tunes beaten adapted to the [various 
speeds of the] march given them to practice by, will obviate great part of 
the difficulty, when the battalion joins. ' 
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regularize length and speed of pace (as in the regulations of 1778, and 
1786), likewise contributed to this end. 
In consequence, whenever a few companies or troops found themselves to- 
gether in concentration sufficient to form squadrons or grand-divisions, and 
thus able to attempt the advanced firings and manoeuvres, or perhaps even a 
route march, a field day or a mock action, they had first of all to devote 
time to 'equalizing' the mechanics and timing of their arms exercises, ev- 
olutions, and movements. Equalizing took time. The experience of three 
regiments which came into Dublin in the spring of 1777 to form the new gar- 
rison illustrates the problem, and was typical. The companies of each of 
these corps had been 'widely distributed into County Cantonments, where they 
were exercised by their respective officers', as was usual; and in that 
situation it had, as ever, been quite impossible to prevent the dispersed 
companies from becoming 'accustomed to Time and Motions differing from each 
other'. Consequently none of these regiments, as their commanding officers 
admitted, were prepared to be seen by the Dublin reviewing officer for at 
least four to six weeks - the amount of time necessary to equalize 'Time 
and Motions'. 
16 
Since time was always at a premium, and since so much had to be given 
over to equalizing the drill of troops or companies only recently dispersed 
and shortly to be dispersed once again, the result was that most of the 
advanced training conducted in the concentrations of grand-divisions or 
squadrons tended to be limited in the variety of manoeuvres attempted, and 
tended too to be unimaginative or even unrealistic. Attempting first of all 
to equalize in order that the several units might function smoothly together 
in line, and then endeavouring to perfect themselves at the regulation 
manoeuvres and firings, there was room only where time permitted for the 
regiment to essay many movements drawn from the larger store of customary 
manoeuvres - let along to attempt field days. This was the common lot of 
the majority of the regiments composing the peacetime army, that is of the 
corps stationed everywhere but in the Mediterranean garrisons, in London, 
and in the Irish garrison-towns. There, in the fortifications and the 
garrison barracks, the regiments were concentrated for as long as they re- 
mained on the station - several years at Minorca or Gibraltar, on annual 
rotation in Ireland, and permanently in London; but as we observed earlier 
it should not be imagined that the situation of the units in these places 
(save for the Guards, and the Dublin regiments), was much superior to that 
of their sister-units elsewhere. There were innumerable duties - guards 
of all sorts, policing, rounds, construction, and (most importantly, in the 
16. WO 27/37,11th Foot. The corps were the 11th, 30th, and 32nd of Foot. 
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forts), practise at the specialist attack and defence of the works - and 
it was to pursue these duties that regiments were principally stationed at 
these places. 
17 
It was therefore the army's almost invariable custom, in 
these places, to devote two days per week to linear drill; and as often as 
not the units concerned merely "tossed their firelocks". 
18 
The regiments 
quartered in the Irish garrison-towns always kept detachments operating at 
some distance afield, as we have seen. These factors restricted training- 
time in the big places, although the problem of equalizing could at least 
be avoided in this sort of concentration. For the Foot Guards and the 
Dublin regiments the great utility of St. James's, and especially of Hyde 
Park and Phoenix Park, was of the greatest importance. The Foot Guards 
every summer set up an encampment in Hyde Park, at which major manoeuvres 
were conducted; and the Dublin corps often marched out to train on the 
vast tracts and varied terrain of Phoenix Park. 
19 
Mock actions - the 
constantly ref ought "battles" of Hyde Park and Phoenix Park - were held 
by the assembled battalions during the shakedown days preceding the gar- 
rison reviews of May and June. It was for these reasons that Dublin was 
chosen as the testing-ground, during the years 1788-91, for the drill that 
became the 1792 Regulations; and Dublin was also singular in that the line 
foot, horse, and the artillery trained together there on occasion - the 
only place in the Empire where some modest attempt at inter-arm cooperation 
was possible in peacetime. 
If in the normal peacetime conditions of the army the basic training 
of small numbers could be carried on with little difficulty, and their 
initial training accomplished relatively quickly, it took a great deal 
longer to carry out sufficient advanced training to render a full regiment 
'fit for service', the rating customarily given by reviewing officers to regi- 
ments which they judged sufficiently well trained to take the field. In 
the normal routine of the British service, 'fit for service' was a rating 
which regiments were frequently unable to retain over several years running. 
Among the pitfalls awaiting corps the most obvious, of course, were the 
17. Garrison duty, with its myriad variety of activities, is best describ- 
ed in Bland's Treatise of Military Discipline, 148-206. The defence of the 
works in places like Gibraltar, the Minorcan forts, the Highland forts, and 
the rest, was the major concern of the training of the corps composing those 
garrisons; and save for those occasions on which they practised their field 
drill, the-duty of the garrison's does not concern us here since it is pro- 
perly part of the larger science of siegecraft and fortification. 
18. Most of the drillbooks remark on this timetable, eg., Molesworth, op. 
cit., 162; Bennett Cuthbertson, op. cit., 203; and that most detailed record 
of the activities in any garrison - WO 36/1 - covering events in Boston 
from June 1773 to Jan. 1776. 
19. There were permanent butts and field works in Phoenix Park - not to 
mention resident units of the Royal Artillery with field- and battalion-guns 
- adding considerably to the variety of the training there (see BM Map # 
11815. [6]. ) 1 
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usual wastage and the occasional disasters of active campaigning. Equally 
harmful could be long service abroad, heavy drafting, the simple aging of 
one corps of the infusion of a great many recruits into another, too-speedy 
expansion from cadre strength, or service on board the fleet. We have 
already seen that, in peacetime, the regiments both horse and foot were in- 
variably below their establishment strengths; and we have seen too that the 
foot had to recruit at a rate of 1.5% of its actual strength, and the horse 
at a rate of . 9% of its actual strength, every month, merely in order to 
keep up to these understrength numbers. When corps fell behind in their re- 
cruiting, as many always did, they had to cast about for even greater numbers 
of recruits than normally required; and when they found them, and put them 
in the ranks after a few weeks of basic training, the performance of the 
regiment and its efficiency rating must inevitably fall off. The army's 
manpower problem, as we have seen, was like a revolving door: recruits came 
in one way as trained men exited another, for whatever reasons among the 
many likely to operate; and the faster the door revolved, in individual 
corps, so their efficiency declined. This peacetime attrition, which our 
figures show to have been extremely heavy in the British Army, meant that 
advanced training took a long time to accomplish; experience of advanced 
training had to be "amassed", since progress was slow and back-sliding 
easy where the personnel was fluid. Most of the old regiments had period- 
ically to rebuild themselves; and (as with new-raised units preparing them- 
selves to take their place in the line), this could only be done in settled 
conditions, with plenty of time available to train in concentration. 
There was a general consensus among the senior officers of the army as 
to the length of time it took to prepare a regiment 'fit for service', once 
it had fallen behind, just as 'fit' regiments had to train without ceasing. 
Typical was the judgement made on the 45th Foot which, when seen at Cork in 
July 1767, had been home less than a year after twenty years' service in 
North America. Much understrength and full of recruits, the 45th was re- 
ported 'not yet disciplin'd, not well appointed, and unfit for service'. A 
year later, in July 1768, the regiment was seen at Dublin where, up to 
strength now but with half its men still recruits, it was again reported un- 
fit for service. In May 1769 the 45th was found 'much improved since the 
last Review'; and with a little care, reported the reviewing officer, it 
would be 'a Compleat fine Regiment against the Next Year' - which indeed it 
proved to be. It has taken more than three years of settled conditions in 
quiet Irish quarters to rebuild the regiment, and to make it fit again for 
active service. 
20 
Similarly, in April 1773 the 32nd Foot came home to 
20. WO 27/11, /14, /17. 
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England after nine years' service in the West Indies; and when seen in 
June at Devizes it was described as 'Totally Unfit for Service'. After 
more than two years of easy duty in English quarters the 32nd was reviewed 
at Guildford; and though reported 'much improved... and very forward in 
their discipline' they were judged still to required 'a few Years to be a 
fine regiment'. By 1776 the 32nd was reported in excellent shape, having 
taken three years to train. 
21 
In May 1784 the 63rd Foot was seen at 
Bury St. Edmunds, home from the American campaigns of 1775-83; the 
reviewer described 'the very shattered condition' of the regiment, which 
he attributed to 'their having suffered so much, & having been so long, 
& so much dispersed in America'. A year later the reviewing officer who 
saw the regiment at Edinburgh reported 'much attention paid to it', and 
concluded that 'in two years [it] will be a very fine Corps'. Seen at 
Glasgow in June 1786, the 63rd was reported fit for service. 
22 
The regi- 
ment had taken. over two years to re-train. Again, when the reviewing 
officers saw the 26th and 48th of Foot in 1781 - the first drafted a year 
since and full of recruits, and the second half composed of recruits and 
in poor condition from foreign service - it was reported that in the 
case of the 26th it would be 'at least, two years, before it can be re- 
turned, fitt for Service', and of the 48th that it too would be fit 'in 
two Years - but scarcely sooner'. 
23 
In the normal routine of service, 
therefore, it required from two to three years for a regiment to amass 
sufficient concentration-time during which it might prepare itself fit 
to take the field. 
24 
New-raised regiments too generally took two to three 
years to complete their training, even with the advantage of concentration 
and camps of exercise. 
25 
Time spent in the garrison-towns helped only 
marginally since, as we noted above, the special duties of these places 
reduced the opportunities for training to two days per week, despite high 
levels of concentration. The case of the 45th Foot - one of those regi- 
ments noted above which took three years to render itself fit for service 
- is typical again. Reported unfit in 1768 and unfit still in 1769, the 
regiment had spent the intervening year as part of the Dublin garrison. 
The 49th came home to Ireland after the Seven Years' War; and having spent 
more than fifteen years in the West Indies its condition was deplorable. 
The 49th too passed the year 1768-69 as part of the Dublin garrison; and 
21. WO 5/58, p. 148 through /59, p. 213, passim; and WO 27/27, /34, /35, 
and /37. 
22. WO 27/51, /54, /56. 
23. Ibid., /47. 
24. There are innumerable examples of the two to three year training period, 
in WO 27. 
25. See for example the new 77th and 81st of Foot, in WO 27/41, and /44. 
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although 'vastly improved' during that time the regiment had been unfit for 
service upon arrival at Dublin, and it required another year of training 
still when it left. 
26 
Likewise the 9th Foot, which came home to Ireland in 
poor condition after six years' service in the Floridas, served a year with 
the Dublin garrison, 1772-73; and although 'much Mended' by the experience 
it too was unfit for service upon arrival and still unfit on departure. 
27 
Whether or not a regiment spent its time in garrison or in 'county canton- 
ments', therefore, the two-to-three year period required for sufficient ad- 
vanced training applied; the key, as ever, was concentration which provided 
full opportunity for training. 
Thus there was considerable variety both in the concentration-time al- 
lowed the regiments, and in the levels of advanced training pursued. For 
virtually the whole army there was, however, an annual and regular opportun- 
ity to train little-disturbed in full regimental concentration; and for 
the great majority of the regiments this was, in peacetime, the most sig- 
nificant part of their advanced-training programmes, colouring the material 
practised and setting both a goal and a standard against which to measure 
expertise. All aspects of the army's advanced training were intimately 
bound together in the reviewing system, to which we refer here; and it is by 
following the reviewing system in detail that peacetime advanced training 
can best be described, and its efficacy best be judged. 
Regular reviewing was instituted primarily, of course, in order to en- 
sure that the interior economy and drill of the regiments was kept up and 
carried on in accordance with the regulations. It was by constant and 
regular inspection that the central authority was able to oblige the regi- 
ments to practice their drill in accordance with its wishes, thus ensur- 
ing uniformity; and in this it was largely successful. But reviewing had 
an important secondary significance in an army subject to such wide peace- 
time dispersal, since the reviews themselves provided the occasion for 
carrying on advanced regimental training, regularly and intensively. 
The system of regular inspection of regiments was introduced by George 
I in 1716, and was made annual from about 1720.28 As we have seen 
26. WO 27/14, and /17. 
27. Ibid., /26 and /29. 
28. Fortescue, II, 51 n. l; and C. Knight, op. cit., II, Pt. 1,105, 'Review- 
ing Orders', that is orders to certain general officers to see and report on 
specified units, appear annually from the early 1720's (WO 26/16). The 
directions given in these early reviewing orders changed hardly at all later 
in the century (cf., WO 26/22, pp. 363-7, for 1755 orders, and /32, pp. 247- 
51, for the 1784 orders). Most regrettably, no Inspection Returns (WO 27) 
- the reports submitted by the reviewing officers - survive before 1753. 
There are in SP 41 the occasional short reports to be met with on regiments 
before 1753, but they are too laconic to be of much use. 
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(pp. 72-73 above), it was the Adjutant General who was responsible for 
supervising the system and for coordinating the movements and timetables 
of the regiments and of the general officers involved. The copious reports 
submitted by the reviewing general officers were written up and kept at his 
office for ready reference by the King, the C-in-C, and by himself. The 
system always followed the same pattern. Late in the winter certain 
general officers were appointed to the London, Dublin, and Edinburgh staffs 
as reviewing officers for the coming season (the army was reviewed during 
the spring and early summer, once it had time to shake off the effects of 
winter rust and before the horses were turned out to grass); and both 
they and the regiments which each would see were warned of the times and 
places of the impending reviews. The generals so appointed received, soon 
after, their formal 'reviewing orders 129 - in effect Royal Warrants auth- 
orising them to perform the duty - which they set about when the part- 
icular units which they were to see had concentrated and taken up their 
'review quarters'. A typical tour of inspection was that made across the 
south of England in the spring of 1787, by Maj-Gen Sir George Osborn; he 
saw the following units, on the dates and at the places indicated: 
30 
2 May - one Independent Company of Invalids, at Tilbury Fort. 
3 May -a body of recruits destined for battalions overseas, 
at Chatham Barracks. 
4 May - 17th Foot, at Chatham. 
5 May - three Independent Companies of Invalids, at Sheerness. 
7 May - 55th Foot, at Deal. 
12 May - 43rd Foot, at Windsor. 
15 May - 41st Foot, at Portsmouth. 
16 May - 44th Foot, at Hilsea Barracks. 
19 May - 33rd Foot, at Taunton. 
22nd May - 38th Foot, within Plymouth Lines. 
23rd May - six Independent Companies of Invalids, at Plymouth. 
24 May - 8th Foot, at Plymouth. 
26 May - one Independent Company of Invalids, at Pendennis Castle. 
This was but one reviewing officer's tour; normally there were four or 
five such officers conducting reviews simultaneously in different parts of 
Britain, and three or four more doing so in Ireland. In 1774, for example, 
the fourteen regular regiments of horse and seventeen regiments of marching 
foot, in Great Britain, were seen by the five reviewing officers appointed 
for that season (Its-Gen Sir Adolphus Oughton and the Duke of Argyll, in 
29. These appear annually in WO 3 or WO 26. See for example the series for 
1734 in WO 26/18, pp. 143-7, and for 1791 in WO 3/9, pp. 198-207. 
30. WO 27/59, passim. 
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Scotland, and Majs-Gen George Preston, William Evelyn, and William Howe in 
England), while in Ireland the twelve regular regiments of horse and twenty- 
nine regiments of marching foot serving there were reviewed by Lt-Gen Lord 
Blayney, and Majs-Gen the Earl of Drogheda and James Gisborne. 
31. 
Limited inspections of those few corps in the Americas were carried 
out from early on, too, but at irregular intervals. 
32 
The same was almost 
certainly being done at Gibraltar and Minorca, though no early reports 
survive. Local commanders, not reviewing officers from Britain or Ireland, 
handled these distant duties. By 1768 however there were so many regiments 
surving abroad - the Adjutant General calculated that in 1769 there were 
13,551 rank and file serving in the battalions overseas, more by 1410 than 
all those to be found in the marching battalions in Britain and Ireland 
33 
that a Royal Warrant had to be issued, laying down guidelines for the full 
reviews which were henceforth to be carried out annually on all foreign 
stations. As in the British Isles, it was felt that regular reviews would 
'greatly tend to the Preservation of good Order and Discipline. '34 Full 
review reports were coming in from overseas stations by 1770, and con- 
tinued to do so thereafter. 
35 
At review time a regiment's outlying troops or companies were called 
in for the period of pre-review practise, usually being marched to a group 
of villages close by one another: in quarters like these, daily concen- 
trations for practise were possible, and reviewing quarters of this sort 
were usually chosen because a favourite reviewing-ground was close by. The 
dozens of villages about London served this purpose year after year, with 
Blackheath, Hounslow Heath, Kew Green, Wimbledon Common, and Hyde Park close 
at hand. In October 1728, for example, Carpenter's 3rd Dragoons come down 
from Yorkshire were quartered with two troops at Hampstead, Highgate, and 
Kentish Town, a third at Acton and Ealing, another at Hammersmith and 
Turnham Green, a fifth at Fulham and Chelsea, a sixth at Islington and 
Clerkenwell, another at Kensington, another at Knightsbridge and Hyde Park 
Corner, and the last at 'St. Giles's Holbourn without the bars & Greys Inn 
Lane'; Hyde Park was convenient to all of these quarters and, after two 
31. WO 27/30, passim. 
32. In Feb. 1729, for example, the Earl of Londonderry, 'Our Captain Genl., 
and Governor in Chief in & over our Leeward Caribbee Islands', was ordered to 
inspect and report on Lucas' 38th of Foot, stationed there. WO 26/17, 
pp. 266-7 
33. WO 3/1, p. 129. 
34. The warrant and govering instructions were sent in Jan 1768 to the com- 
manders of the forces at Gibraltar, Minorca, Jamaica, Antiqua, Grenada, the 
Senegal, and in North America. The warrant is in WO 26/27, pp. 474-6, and the 
Secretary at War's covering letter is in WO 4/83, p. 101. This was all largely 
the work of Harvey, the Adjutant General, as is clear from WO 3/1, pp. 129-36. 
35. C. E. Carter (ed. ), op. cit., II, 541-2,556. 
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weeks of intensive training, the regiment was reviewed there by George 11.36 
In June 1728 both Kirke's 2nd and Harrison's 15th of Foot, similarly, were 
in reviewing quarters near London, the former distributed between Charlton, 
Blackheath, Greenwich, Woolwich, and adjacent villages, and the latter lying 
at Eltham, Lewisham, Peckham, Deptford, and Camberwell. Kirke's, long do- 
ing the duty about Bristol, had marched in from Wiltshire quarters about 
Salisbury; and Harrison's came in from quarters about Winchester and 
Southampton, after a tiring spell in the Cornwall and south Devon duty area. 
Both occupied their reviewing quarters for about two weeks before being 
seen on Blackheath by the King. The reviews over, Kirke's was sent upon 
the Kent coast duty while Harrison's marched north for Chester and envir- 
ons37 The pattern was typical, and didn't change for the rest of the 
century. 
Of all the regiments of foot known definitely to have been reviewed in 
England during the period 1726-29, all but one had been in various states 
of dispersal for periods ranging close on a year prior to their review con- 
centrations. The average number of days during which these corps were 
fully concentrated, at review time, was eleven; the longest period during 
which any of these foot regiments remained concentrated in review quarters 
was for nineteen days. Among the regiments of horse known to have been re- 
viewed during the same period, all had been dispersed for upwards of a 
year prior to the review concentrations. Their average concentration time 
in review quarters was thirteen days; the longest concentration was for 
twenty-two days. During the five later periods isolated for statistical 
purposes (Appendix A), there was a slight increase in the average con- 
centration-time of regiments, in review quarters: a working average during 
the 1720's, '30's, and '50's would be a concentration of two weeks, and 
of three weeks during the 1760's, '70's, and '80's. 
The drill practiced at a review invariably followed an established 
sequence, and this was as true for reviews held abroad as it was for those 
held in the British Isles. Firstly the regiments of foot (and of horse, 
dismounted) formed battalion line and proceeded to go through the long, 
slow manual exercise. This was followed by the simple evolutions, and 
next came the firings by platoons and divisions standing, advancing, and 
retreating - the dismounted troopers, needless to say, being much less 
expert at this than the foot whose proper province it was. 
38 
Finally, the 
36. WO 5/-28, pp. 175-9,195,201. 
37. WO 5/28, pp. 128-33,144-6,150. 
38. When the 6th Dragoons were seen at Windsor in May 1755, they were re- 
ported in fine order and fit for service; but when they dismounted and 
fired in three ranks they succeeded only in churning up the ground close in 
front of them, since 'the Muzzles of the Firelocks were pointed too low'. 
WO 27/3. 
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regiment would proceed to a display of the more commonplace of its complica- 
ted repertoire of manoeuvres, most of which were chosen from the then cur- 
rent regulations supplemented with a few from the customary practice of the 
army. In order to carry off these performances it is clear that a great 
deal of hard practise had to go on during those limited periods when a few 
grand-divisions or squadrons had found themselves in concentration in the 
months preceding the reviews; and even more intensive drilling had to be 
gone through during the weeks in review quarters. It is therefore under- 
standable that some parts of the performances put on by the regiments were 
often less than perfect, just as the generally good overall proficiency 
displayed at the reviews reflects extremely well on the industry of the 
officers and nco's. It is clear that the corps most often rehearsed before- 
hand the order in which they would show their various manoeuvres, which 
(though still valuable training) cannot have contributed to tactical realism; 
the general officers usually preferred the resulting choreographed precision 
to spontaneity, in any case. 
39 
Still, most of the firings and manoeuvres 
shown were those which it was generally supposed would be most frequently 
required on the battlefield, so that review performances were always thought 
of as simulations, not as parades. 
There was always scope for modification in the overall pattern or 
sequence of a review, should either the regiment's training permit it or 
the reviewing officer so desire it. 
40 
The reviewing officer was usually 
provided by the regiment with a programme before the review; to this he 
would occasionally suggest alterations, and from it his staff wrote up the 
returns which were made into fair copies by the Adjutant General's clerks. 
This process made it possible for the leading parties concerned to inject 
more realism into the pre-review training, and into the review itself, than 
would have been the case had the more straightforward display of the main 
elements of the drill regulations always been followed. Regiments quite 
often, in fact, added one or two special tactical simulations to the ac- 
customed sequence of manoeuvres. Thus the 12th Foot, seen at Chatham in 
1768, in addition to its regular manoeuvres 'charged to penetrate through 
the Ennemy's supposed Line', while the grenadiers 'two deep, advanced 
briskly on the Flanks, & supported (with] a constant fire'. In their 1777 
review at Newcastle the 2nd Foot, advancing in line, detached its light com- 
pany and two left flank battalion-companies 'to attack the Enemy in a Wood' 
and 'Cover the Flank of the Battalion'in a skirmish line. In June 1777 at 
Clonmell the 8th Light Dragoons skirmished with 'a detached party of the 
39. This is clear from the verb tense of the Inspection Returns, in 110 27. 
40. See Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, #99, pp. 11-12, for an eg. at the Limerick 
reviews of 1750. 
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Infantry which had been concealed... to cut off their Retreat'. At Gibraltar 
in March 1777 the 58th Foot, 'supposed to be attacked in a disadvantageous 
situation', retired to better ground; from its new position the corps was 
able to detach some subdivisions 'who march under cover and attack the 
enemy's left flank', thereby prevailing. 
41 
Reviewing officers, having seen the corps go through their drill, 
occasionally ordered them to make speedy dispositions against some hypo- 
thetical tactical situation. In August 1771 at Plymouth, for example, Maj- 
Gen James Murray ordered the 6th Foot to assault a stone wall defended by 
the light infantry: 'This was done without hesitation by the Major', Murray 
reported, 
'By forming three Masked Columns, One upon each flank, and One in the 
Centre; The Line consisted of a Single rank, By which the Extent of 
the front was preserved. The Line kept up, in Marching on, a brisk 
fire upon the Wall or entrenchment to be attack'd, when within a 
proper distance, The Columns burst out, Attack'd, & carry'd the 
Entrenchment. ' 
The following day Murray saw the 20th Foot at the same place, and he ordered 
them to defend a large stone wall; the previous day's admirable attack 
by the 6th was used as a basis in the precautions taken by the 20th, who 
consequently `gained an easy Victory, to the Total destruction of the 
assailliants'. Later the 20th was ordered to assault the Plymouth barrack 
square: 'This was done by 
Investing the Square, Busting open the Gate by a Supposed Petard, 
entering in Column, & immediately directing the fire of the Column 
to the Windows, and other Defences within the Square, Which the 
Defenders would naturally avail themselves of. ' 
This was all, obviously, excellent practise. 
42 
Although they did so infrequently, single regiments. sometimes staged 
on their own initiative very elaborate tactical simulations. That these 
displays were infrequent reflects, of course, the lack of expertise in the 
long-dispersed regiments and also the simple difficulty of obtaining near 
their quarters a piece of ground sufficient for the purpose, as much as it 
does any lack of imagination on the part of senior officers. However little 
justice it does to the excellent state of advanced training to which some 
regiments were able to attain and display on these occasions, some account 
of these simulations must be given. In May 1773 at Plymouth the 33rd Foot, 
divided into two opposing forces, fought a realistic manoeuvre action over 
the possession of an eminence; and they went through a more involved 
41. WO 27/12, /36, /37, and /39. 
42. WO 27/21. These manoeuvres can conveniently be followed on BM 
Map # 11.86. 
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simulation for the possession of a hill at their 1774 review, this time in- 
cluding the effects of cannon-fire. 
43 
In 1790 at Portsmouth, -the 12th Foot 
advancing in line sent forward 'the Light Infantry supported 
by the Grenadiers, and these parties meeting the Enemy began an 
irregular Fire, [at which the battalion-companies advanced] from the 
Right of Grand Divisions by Files, as soon as the heads of Columns 
have advanced a little beyond the Grenadiers and Light Infantry, the 
Battln. will Form by Files running up, and dressing by the Right, will 
immediately begin the File firing; the Grenadiers and Light Infantry 
will extend to Right and Left, and attack the Enemy in Flank... '44 
At their 1788 Edinburgh review the 7th Foot fought a mock battle centring 
round the possession of a fortified house; and the following year at its 
review the 23rd Foot, more ambitiously, attempted to 'carry Windsor Castle 
by a Coup de Main'. The action fought out by the 23rd in the grounds sur- 
rounding Windsor Castle was a model of tactical fluidity and expertise. 
45 
So too was the mock action put on by the 33rd Foot at Gloucester in May 1772. 
During part of the review the 33rd probed a defended village and wood; 
later, the battalion 'Wheeled to the Left by Companies, & Crossed a Deep & 
Rugged Valley, the Light Company 
forming a flanking party on the Right, among some Bushes, & thick 
Hedges. When the Battalion Gained the Brow of the opposite Hill, the 
Light Company was Drove in, the Battalion Companies then wheeled to 
the Right, & rushed down the Hill, to Line a Strong Hedge in the Bottom 
- where they kept up a brisk & Irregular Fire. On the Retreat beat- 
ing, the Men run back Independently, to the Brow of the Hill, where 
they Instantly formed, & fired by Companies... '46 
The horse, too, was similarly employed. In April 1775 (to give but 
one example), the 10th Dragoons at their Newbury review performed two major 
series of manoeuvres. In the first, the regiment divided into halves, one 
to form the 'ambuscade' and the other an 'escort' for the attack and defence 
of a convoy of wagons upon the march. In the second manoeuvre the regiment 
again split into halves, one to act as the enemy, the other 'drawn up in a 
Plain to Attack an Enemy in March thro' a Wood, on its entry into the Open 
Country'. Both manoeuvres were most realistic, notably the first, since 
escort duty for trains was often performed by the dragoons on campaign. 
47 
Save for the Guards, it was exceedingly rare for regiments in Britain 
to practise their drill together outside the wartime camps of exercise, or 
on those special occasions when George III saw pairs of regiments in Hyde 
Park. Of the five instances which I have found of this practice, 
48 
only on 
43. WO 27/27, and /30. 
44. WO 27/66. 
45. WO 27/61, and /64. 
46. WO 27/24. 
47. WO 27/33. 
48. In Apr. 1769, and again in Apr. 1770, the 15th and 16th Light Dragoons 
drilled together on Wimbledon Common (WO 27/15, and /18), and in 1776 the 
7th and 10th Dragoons likewise drilled together at Wimbledon (WO 27/33). In 
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one was really advanced manoeuvring attempted, when early in 1756 Hawley's 
1st Dragoons, Wolfe's 8th and Honeywood's 20th of Foot found themselves 
together at Canterbury, and fought a mock action of some interest. A 
supposed enemy force (four battalions in line) was 'marked out by stakes 
of five feet seven inches above the ground, to regulate the movement of 
the troops, and to guide their levelling [ie., aiming] well'. The regi- 
ments draw up opposite, the 8th and 20th in line in the centre with one- 
third of the dragoons on each flank and the remaining third as a reserve 
behind the centre. By a heavy fire delivered advancing the English foot 
ruptured and passed through the enemy's centre, then wheeled outwards to 
left and right to complete his discomfiture; all the while the dragoons 
covered the flanks of the foot, while the reserve squadron was kept in 
hand ready to overwhelm any of the disordered opposing forces which might 
attempt to rally. 
49 
Although, as we have seen, the regiments composing the big Irish gar- 
risons were usually unable to devote much more of their time to advanced 
training than were the regiments serving elsewhere, they did nevertheless 
have the considerable advantage, when reviewing season came round, of con- 
centrating at the garrison town in brigade strength; and so it was poss- 
ible for these regiments to attempt brigade manoeuvres and large-scale 
mock actions. In July 1750, for example%Bragg's 28th, Hopson's 29th, 
Loudoun's 30th, and Otway's 35th of Foot assembled at Limerick and were 
seen there, two by two, on a nearby common; they manoeuvred together but 
performed nothing extraordinary. 
50 
There were however more useful con- 
centrations. In May 1768 at Cork the 53rd, 54th, and 58th of Foot 
manoeuvred together in one and two lines of battle, a useful and realistic 
rehearsal of linear battle-tactics of the sort that Dundas was later to 
stress. 
51 
In 1769, again at Cork, the 40th and 61st of Foot fought a 
mock battle in the traditional linear style; and among other manoeuvres the 
61st, having exchanged vollies with the 40th, 'charg'd with bayonets, threw 
the 40th into confusion & oblig'd them to break'. The 40th rallied, however, 
and forming closed column drove through the centre of the 61st. 
52 
Meanwhile 
at Limerick the 5th, 38th, and 47th were likewise being reviewed together 
that year; they performed a rather peculiar deployment to the flanks, from 
line, which may have impressed the spectators but cannot have been pract- 
icable on a field of battle; but as in all of these cases, the officers 
August 1771 at Chatham the 7th and 23rd of Foot (plus another unidentified 
battalion), formed a brigade which manoeuvred as a unit (WO 27/21). 
49. James Wolfe, op. cit., 55-7. 
50. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, // 99, pp. 10-7,44-6. 
51. WO 27/14,58th Foot. 
52. WO 27/17,40th Foot. 
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concerned could only profit from such rare training experience. 
53 
A much 
more interesting affair was held at Charles Fort on Prehan Point, across 
Kinsale harbour, before Lt-Gen Lord Blayney in May 1774. The 33rd Foot, 
commanded by the Earl Cornwallis, landed on the beach from its boats and 
moved inland, planning to capture the fort or, if it was found to be gar- 
risoned, to mask it and lay Kinsale under contribution. The 20th Foot 
sallied forth to defend the place and, after much manoeuvring, took post 
upon 'Strong ground' where the 33rd was obliged to attack. In the ensuing 
action both flanks of the 20th were 'forced in upon the Battalion', and the 
corps was driven back to a new position. There, reinforced by guns from the 
fort, the 20th took new heart; and the 33rd, seeing that their further 
progress would be bloody, gave up the design and retired to the boats. 
54 
In Phoenix Park there were generally two great reviews held annually, 
in the spring and early summer; at the first the old garrison, about to be 
relieved and rotated out into county cantonments, was seen, while at the 
second the new garrison performed. Thus the regiments composing each year's 
garrison were reviewed twice in the Park, and each review was preceded by a 
period of intensive training. The Lord Lieutenant and the Irish C-in-C 
usually attended, as did the King at London reviews. Since the Dublin gar- 
rison was large, and was rotated annually, the Phoenix Park reviews gave 
each regiment of foot on the Irish establishment a regular opportunity of 
taking part in major manoeuvres; and in the British Army the importance 
of this can hardly be exaggerated. 
The Dublin garrison was usually seen by the reviewing officers in one 
of two ways: either split into contending forces which fought a mock 
battle or manoeuvring in united brigades against an imaginary enemy. The 
mock battles were usually quite complex, with a great variety of tactics 
being practised. When the garrison manoeuvred as a whole there was a 
greater adherence to the requirements and limitations imposed by the long, 
thin line of battle; but this too was of the utmost benefit, even though 
less fluid. Both sorts of reviews were attempted regularly, and the gar- 
rison was usually supported in the field by detachments from the Royal 
Artillery, which had its own Dublin barracks and was stationed there 
permanently from 1755.55 
Before the mid-1760's the Dublin reviews, like those held elsewhere, 
were fairly rigid affairs despite the numbers of troops involved. In 1750 
53. Ibid., 5th Foot. By a quirk of fate, the 5th, 38th, and 47th were to 
find themselves acting together again six years later, advancing on the 
rebels' entrenchments at Bunker Hill. 
54. WO 27/32,20th Foot. 
55. F. Forde, 'The Royal Irish Artillery, 1755-1801', The Irish Sword, ll 
(1973), 32-8. 
197 
for example, the garrison (Bligh's 3rd Horse, and St. Clair's 1/1st, 
Fowke's 2nd, Irwin's 5th, and Hargrave's 7th of Foot) was reviewed in one 
long line of battle which did no more than show a series of firings, at- 
tempting no manoeuvres more difficult than the forming of one great square 
by the four battalions. 
56 
By the later 1780's, however, manoeuvring had 
become a much more complex art, and elaborate tactical displays had become 
the order of the day. During the period 1768-74, which we might single 
out for consideration because it most clearly shows the training and 
reviews of Phoenix Park, both the mock-battle and the brigade styles of 
reviews were carried on in equal number. 
57 
How salutary may have been the 
experience is indicated by the fact that, of the twenty-seven marching 
regiments of foot involved during those years, all saw action in the 1775- 
83 war; twenty-three fought in the Americas, two at Gibraltar, one in 
Minorca, and one served as marines. By the summer of 1774 all twenty-seven 
had at least some experience of manoeuvring in large bodies, as part of 
lines or brigades; and that was more than could be said of any of the line 
regiments, horse or foot, serving elsewhere. Of the twenty-seven marching 
regiments which took part in the elaborate manoeuvres and successful battle 
of Long Island, in August 1776, seventeen had taken part in these Dublin 
manoeuvres; and three of the remaining ten had practised mock fights for 
their review performances in Britain during the 1770's. 
We must consider, finally, the pressure exerted by the reviewing 
system as a whole in promoting regularity in the army's training and drill. 
In this regard it was of the utmost importance that not only the general 
officers acting as reviewing officers but also the Sovereign and the C's- 
in-C personally reviewed units. The Duke of Cumberland, for example, 
was constantly out reviewing - to the terror of the commanders of the 
corps concerned58- and Lord Amherst spent much time on this duty during 
the American War, as did Granby during the later 1760's and the Duke of 
56. Cumb. Pprs., Box 44, # 99, pp. 7-10; and Anon., Quarters... in 1750 
(Dublin, 1750). 
57. Detailed reports on the mock battled will be found in WO 27/14,5th Foot; 
/17,45th Foot; /29,9th Foot; /29,42nd Foot; and /32,22nd root; and on 
the brigade-style manoeuvres in WO 27/14,45th Foot; /17,27th Foot; /23, 
5th Foot; /26,9th Foot; /26,28th Foot; /32,24th Foot. 
58. Cumberland was to see Bury's 20th of Foot, of which James Wolfe was 
lieutenant-colonel, at Reading early in November 1753. The regiment was 
marching down from Glasgow, and Wolfe was apprehensive all the way. The Duke 
taking ill, Lt-Gen James Campbell reviewed to 20th on 30 Oct and reported the 
corps to be in fine order; but Cumberland insisted on having his turn. Although 
Campbell had thought the 20th to be 'Under the Utmost good Descipline', still 
Wolfe could fret that 'I wish his Royal Highness's martial spirit would sub- 
mit itself to his state of health, in which case he wouldn't persevere in 
his resolution of seeing us'. WO 27/3; and R. Reilly, op. cit., 110-3. Reilly 
confuses some dates; and he is wrong in supposing the 20th to have escaped 
the Duke's scrutiny, as is shown in James Wolfe, op. cit., 31. 
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York at the end of our period. Cumberland made it his business not only to 
review regiments passing near London, as they marched from one British duty 
area to another; he would also ride out to see the pair of regiments ret- 
urning annually (according to his fixed rotation scheme), from the Mediter- 
ranean, once they had landed at Portsmouth, 'refreshed themselves', and 
begun their long march for North Britain. Thus in 1753 the Duke saw at 
Reading Leighton's 32nd and Johnson's 33rd, come home respectively from 
Gibraltar and Hinorca59 The close attachment of the first two Georges to 
their army is well known, and needs little further expansion here. 
60 
George 
I held many reviews, notably so in the big encampments of 1722 and 1723 
formed in the south of England. George II saw regiments almost every season 
on the great heaths and commons round about London. 
61 
The embarkations for 
Flanders in 1742 provided George II with an excellent opportunity of seeing 
many corps near to the capital. On 27 April 1742, for instance, 'his 
Majesty attended by a large Train of Noblemen and Persons of Distinction, 
went from St. James's to Blackheath, and review'd Major-General Howard's 
[3rd] and Colonel Duroure's [12th] Regiments of Foot'; and the next day 
the King reviewed Peers' 23rd and William Handasyde's 31st of Foot on Kew 
Green. 'His Majesty seem'd highly pleas'd with them. '62 George III was, 
if anything, even more concerned with reviewing than had been his royal 
grandfather, a fact oddly ignored by his many biographers. Whenever corps 
marched near London, passing from one duty area to another, George III like 
Cumberland before him was apt to pounce - so that in July, 1770, the 
Adjutant General felt it wise to warn the lieutenant-colonel of the 6th Foot 
that the King 'has in General Rode out to See the Regimts. as they pass near 
London, most probably H. M. will give a look at the 6th... where you will be 
Seen, I cant pretend to tell, but if I hear will let you know. '63 Regi- 
ments were often concentrated and marched to London purposely to be seen by 
the King. Early in July 1765, for example the 4th and 43rd of Foot set out 
from Chatham, the 4th quartering in Kensington, Brompton, Knightsbridge, 
and Chelsea, and the 43rd at Paddington, Islington, Tottenham and Marylebone, 
against their joint review in Hyde Park before the King on 17 July. The 
review over, the 4th continued on to Exeter and Tiverton, but the 43rd simply 
returned to Kent from where it had been bundled for the occasion. 
64 
The King 
59. WO 5/41, pp. 424,447-8. 
60. The best account is J. Hayes, 'House of Hanover'. 
61 This is made clear, in lieu of surviving Inspection Returns, in the 
Marching Orders for these two reigns. 
62. The London Evening-Post, 29 Apr. 1742; and The DaiZy Post, for 27, and 
28 Apr. 1742. 
63. WO 3/2, pp. 67-8. 
64. WO 5/53, pp. 53-391 passim. See also L. Cowper, The King's Own: The 
Story of a Royal Regiment, I (Oxford, 1939), 217-8, and The London Evening- 
Post, 18 July 1765, for details. There is a fine illustrated MS book on this 
review in BM Add. MS 28,856. 
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not only saw regiments at random, as in the case of the 6th just noted, but 
he also prepared part of his reviewing schedule well in advance. 
65 
George 
III even had some of the designated corps informed in advance what parts 
of the drill he wished to see displayed. 
66 
At all of his reviews he was, 
furthermore, accompanied by a numerous suite - as when in June 1767 he 
saw the 12th and 13th of Foot in Hyde Park, attended by the Queen, 'their 
Royal Highnesses the Dukes of York, Gloucester and Cumberland, the Prince 
and Princess of Brunswick, her Royal Highness the Princess Amelia, the 
King's sister, the Marquis of Granby, several foreign Ambassadors, and 
several others of the nobility and general officers'. 
67 
For the majority 
of regimental officers this was august company, and every effort at a 
fine turn-out (which meant intensive drilling to the regulations) would 
be made - all to the advantage of the service. 
68 
Were their performances 
not up to the high standards expected by the King, they soon heard of it: 
George III made a practice not only of sending his comments to regiments 
which he had seen himself, but he also read most of the review reports 
submitted by the reviewing officers. 
69 
George saw the 23rd Foot at 
Chatham on 10 June 1772, for example; and although he had the Adjutant 
General write 'to Acgt the Corps, wth His great App[robation]', still the 
King found fault with the music played by the regiment and ordered them 
henceforth to conform in this particular to the established practice 
of the army - this 'not in the least meant, as any Slight to a Corps, 
who in every War has done such Service to their Country, but in Conformity 
to the Principle, which H. M. thinks so necessary, of not having the 
Estaba Rules of the Army deviated from'. 
70 
So closely did George III watch 
the army! In 1788, after he had read the report submitted on the 45th 
Foot, the King ordered the Adjutant General 'to report the deficiencies' 
65. WO 4/1044, p. 61. Thus in the spring of 1766 the Adjutant General ac- 
quainted the colonels of seven regiments that H. M. intended to review 
their corps later in the season. 
66. WO 3/1, p. 37. In April 1769 the Adjutant General informed the colonel 
of the 15th Foot, that 'When H. M. Reviews a Regt. or Regts., the Comdg. 
Offr. gives in a proposal as to what particular Exercise he intends to per- 
form. Sometimes Some... Evolutions are fixed on, Sometimes others'. WO 
3/24, p. 104. 
67. The London Evening-Post, 6 June 1767. 
68. There was a spirit of competition among the regiments, fostered by these 
reviews, as is repeatedly apparent in the correspondence of officers. The 
lieutenant-colonel of Amherst's 15th Foot, for example, soon to join other 
units at Barham Downs in the summer of 1757, wrote that the 15th was 'very 
ambitious to dispute the Superiority'; and (as he informed his colonel), 
'you may with great safety speak for us; we have had an Eye to it, are very 
desirous of it, and I will agree to the forfeiture of every thing that is 
Dear to me, if the Regiment does not do Justice to the King, and Honour to 
you whenever it is employ'd'. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 103/4, f. l. 
69. A great many of the Inspection Returns, after 1760, have 'King' scrawled 
across their covers in pencil, indicatinj that George III had read them. 
70. WO 27/24,23rd Foot; and WO 3/3, pp. 106-07. 
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to its colonel, 'accompanied with his order to him, to have them made good 
without delay'. 
71 
These were minor breaches. If a regiment made a bad 
showing, the King's displeasure could be great. When George read the 
report on the 68th Foot's miserable review of 1767 a detailed, scathing 
letter was despatched to the major of that corps: the letter was a shopping- 
list of complaints, its tone sharp and peremptory. The Adjutant General, 
perhaps slightly embarrassed by the tone, added a postscript: 'I Inclose to 
you an Exact Copy of the Returns... Least there shou'd have been any 
Mistake'. 72 
If the influence of the Kings and of the C's-in-C was of primary im- 
portance, that of the proprietary colonels in pushing training and regular- 
ity was of considerable importance too. The proprietary colonels usually 
took an interest, and often a pride, in the proficiency of their units; and 
whether or not they spent much time with their regiments they corresponded 
constantly with their lieutenants-colonel and were often likely to visit 
at review time. It was part of the duty of the lieutenants-colonel to re- 
port to their colonels on the state of their regiments. Since most colonel- 
cies belonged to general officers of great experience - notably so under 
George II - their interest, albeit occasional, might be advantageous in that 
it kept the field officers up to the mark. The papers of Jeffrey Amherst, 
for example, who was colonel of the 15th Foot from 1756 to 1768, contain much 
interesting correspondence between himself and his lieutenants-colonel on the 
state of training in the unit. 
73 
Amherst clearly expected proficiency, and 
this correspondence shows that he got it. The Duke of Cumberland, who was 
colonel of the 1st Foot Guards from 1742 until late in 1757, paid the 
closest attention to his regiment; and even when on campaign, as in 1748 
and 1757, he was kept minutely informed on the state of the corps in the 
capital. 
74 
The administration of another C-in-C, Ligonier, over the several 
regiments of which he was colonel, was also close and salutary. 
75 
Lord 
Robert Bertie, as colonel of the 7th Foot from 1754 until 1776, drove his 
lieutenants-colonel hard. After he received a thin a sketchy account of the 
recent 1764 review of his regiment from Lt-Col Richard Prescott, Bertie re- 
buked him for so summary a manner of conducting such important business; in- 
deed, said his Lordship, this was 'the first time, I ever received a Letter 
71. WO 3/8, p. 17. 
72. WO 3/1, pp. 107-09. Rebukes like this one are common enough in the 
letter-books of the Adjutant General's office. 
73. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 013/1 through 013/8. 
74. In the midst of critical operations against the French army of 
d'Estree, the Duke was corresponding with Lt-Col Dury about progress the 
Guards were making with the new manual exercise. Cumb. Pprs., Box 50, ü's 
17,167,211; and Box 52, # 64. 
75. See R. Whitworth, op. cit., passim. 
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from the Commanding Officer of my Regt. after a Review, that did not give 
me an Account of the Behaviour of the Regiment: A thing I believe never 
before omitted by any Field Officer whatever'. Prescott, no doubt squirm- 
ing, was complaining of old wounds: 'I... can Scarcely crawl across the 
room', he bleated. Further correspondence shows that Prescott made better 
reports in 1765.76 
Bertie, if not kept well informed, was at any rate a sound soldier. 
Wolfe, when major and lieutenant-colonel of the 20th Foot, was constantly 
troubled by his colonel, Viscount Bury, then a mere youth whose knowledge 
was slight but whose orders were frequent. In August 1753 Wolfe was com- 
plaining that Bury had ordered the 20th's manual changed 'from very quick 
to very slow, so that at present... we are between the two, and can neither 
do one nor the other as they ought to be done'. 'All the soldiers know', 
Wolfe added, 'that it is not very material, but some of those that will be 
present at our review may have other notions. ' After this review, Bury 
ordered Wolfe to speed up the platoon exercise (Cumberland having observed 
that Pulteney's 13th fired their platoons quicker than did Bury's 20th); 
as Wolfe put it in Regimental Orders, 'his lordship is very desirous that 
no regiment should exceed his own in the performance of every part of 
their duty'. 
77 
The reviewing officers, meanwhile, took their duty seriously, and 
they were backed up by the King, the C's-in-C, and the colonels. Obedient 
to their orders to see the regiments go through a display of the whole of 
their drill - 'taking Notice of any defect or Negligence in the Discharge 
of this part of their Duty; and Strictly Command and enjoin the Officers 
to Use their utmost diligence and Endeavours to teach and perfect their 
Men and themselves in the Knowledge and Use of their Arms 
78 
- they 
seldom pulled punches, and often reported at length on units which they 
found to be ill-disciplined, or deviating from the regulations. Typically, 
in June 1775 Maj-Gen Robert Cunninghame reported the 28th Foot (which he re- 
viewed at Limerick), to be 'greatly deficient in its Discipline', despite 
the fact that the regiment was up to strength, well-armed and accoutred. 
'The Men are slouching and ill set up; They are not Steady and do not know 
how to handle their Arms. '79 In 1775 Lt-Gen John Irwin, the Irish C-in-C, 
reported that the 34th Foot was in poor order, and added the rebuke: 'The 
Regiment wou'd be fit for Service, if the Officers took as much Pains as 
76. Berks R. O. Downshire Pprs., 039 (Bertie to Prescott, Chislehurst, 13 
Nov. 1764; and Prescott to Bertie, Gloucester, 1 Sept. 1764. 
77. Beckles Willson, op. cit., 210,217-8; and James Wolfe, op. cit., 31. 
78. WO 26/22, p. 364. 
79. WO 27/35. 
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as the Men. 
80 
Late in May, 1777, Lt-Gen the Earl of Cavan reviewed the 68th 
Foot at Dublin, reporting as follows: 'This Regiment seemed to require great 
care and attention. A dissolute Spirit some where prevailed in it, for 
there were at the time of my Review confined in Prison no less than eight 
Men... (and the 68th] has been no less singular for a daily loss of Men by 
desertion. ' When manoeuvring, nothing was well performed, nor were the men 
silent, 'there being every moment a buzz of voices heard'. 
81 
Not only 
major irregularities, but petty troubles and minor inefficiency were like- 
wise constantly reported. In his October 1754 review of Rich's 4th 
Dragoons, held at Lichfield, Lt-Gen James Cholmondeley found a certain un- 
eveness in their exercises and manoeuvres, the firings 'bad' and their 
marching in squadron rather poor; he concluded that Rich's were 'pretty 
well appointed - not quite perfect in their Discipline, but fit for 
Service'. 
82 
As was their duty, the reviewing officers ordered all of 
these regiments to correct their weaknesses, and did so on all other such 
occasions. 
When occasion required it, the reviewing officers were full of praise 
for regiments which distinguished themselves by maintaining over long 
periods high standards of training; and this was deserved praise, con- 
sidering the difficulties faced most of the time by most of them. Regi- 
ments of this sort were exceptions, even moreso than were the ill-trained 
and ill-disciplined units just described; for it took not only dedicated 
officers, a very sound system of interior economy, esprit de corps, a low 
turnover among the rank and file, and good postings, but also a measure 
of sheer luck to keep one step ahead of the friction of peace for sus- 
tained periods. We should note one or two of these corps, if only for 
the contrast they provide. One such was the 1st battalion, The Royals. 
The 1/1st Foot was reported in excellent condition at Chatham, in 1777, 
and it remained in this condition for more than a decade. A reviewing of- 
ficer who saw them at Dublin, in July 1785, observed that 'This Old Regi- 
ment keeps on in its usual Steady Pace'. In May 1786 the 1/1st was re- 
ported a 'Steady slow and sure Regiment, Orderly, and always kept in 
Strict Discipline'. 
83 
In June 1789 Maj-Gen Patrick Tonyn Waxed eloquent 
at the appearance of the 22nd Foot: 'A Steady and martial Countenance, a 
spirited & graceful manner, a peculiar exactness in all their Motions, a 
most complete military Appearance, exhibits the high discipline of this 
excellent Regiment, proud to distinguish itself... [etc] . Tonyn ' 
84 
80. WO 27/35. 
81. WO 27/37. 
82. WO 27/3. 
83. WO 27/36, /53, Pt. 2, /58, Pt. 1. 
84. WO 27/64. 
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devoted similar praise to the 33rd Foot, which he saw that same summer, 
concluding that 'to report them fit for Service without adding that they 
are adequate to any active military Service whatsoever, would be too in- 
different a representation of their gallant and warlike Deportment,. 
85 
Such praise was nothing new to the 33rd, which was unquestionably the 
best-trained regiment in the British Army during the last three decades 
of our period. In 1769 the 33rd was reported to be in an excellent state 
of training; in 1772 it was reported 'one of the finest Regiments in His 
Majesty's Service'; in 1774 Maj-Gen William Howe found the 33rd's drill 
and discipline 'Established upon the truest principles, far Superior to 
any other Corps within my Observation'; and in 1775 the Irish C-in-C re- 
ported it 'in Perfect good Order'. The 33rd performed admirably during 
the American War; and by 1787, back in Britain rebuilding, the regiment 
was again being favourably reported on. In 1788 the reviewing officer who 
saw them at Windsor reported that 'the Regiment Appears Founded upon the 
same System as in the Last War... likely to retain its usual Discipline'. 
86 
It is abundantly clear, then, that the reviewing system functioned very 
well indeed: it served admirably its primary purpose of enforcing uniform- 
ity, and so tying the individual regiments closer together; and at the same 
time it provided the regiments with an annual opportunity - an opportunity 
which came regularly, and which was of known duration - of practising in 
full and uninterupted concentration the firings and manoeuvres which con- 
stituted the advanced training of the regiment. The system was regular, it 
was carried out conscientiously, and it was a system with teeth. It en- 
sured that the particularist spirit among the regiments only very occasion- 
ally asserted itself in the field of training and tactical doctrine. 
87 
But however advantageous it was in providing the regiments with an op- 
portunity to concentrate for the purpose of training, it was not of suf- 
ficient duration to compensate for the shortcomings and the irregularity 
of advanced training as it was carried on during the rest of the year, in 
peacetime. It was therefore in wartime -by default, and of necessity - 
that the majority of the regiments composing the British Army were at last 
given the opportunity to set about intensive and sustained advanced training. 
85. Ibid. 
86. WO 27/15, /24, /30, /32, /35, /59, /61, /69. It comes as no surprize 
tha; during his 1776 New York and New Jersey campaign, Howe brigaded the 
33rd Foot with the Guards. 
87. This conclusion on general regularity of the drill practised in the 
army during the second half of the century, is based on careful examination 
of the eighty volumes of Inspection Returns (WO 27) which survive for our 
period. These contain well over a thousand review reports; and these we 
have carefully examined and collated against the various drill regulations, 
and the treatises describing customary practice. 
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ADDENDUM 
Platoon Fire & Alternate Fire: 
Although 'alternate fire' was only officially adopted with the publica- 
tion of the 1764 Regulations, it had been practised in the best-trained 
battalions, those with the least doctrinaire field officers, since the mid- 
1750's. One such corps was the 20th Foot, of which James Wolfe was lieut- 
enant-colonel; and the fire drill practised in the 20th conveniently il- 
lustrates the difference between the two systems. 
It was Wolfe's duty not only to train the 20th as an effective fighting 
force, but also to follow the current regulations; and since he thought 
alternate fire more practical than the regulation platoon-fire - 'the 
impracticable chequer', as he described it (Beckles Willson, op. cit., 368-9) 
- he was teaching both in the 20th. A Regimental Order of Jan 1755 ran 
as follows: 'As the alternate fire by platoons or devisions, or by companies, 
is the most simple, plain, and easy, and used by the best disciplined troops 
in Europe [ie., the Prussians], we are at all times to imitate them in that 
respect... [and otherwise] to conform to the established discripline, and to 
practise all those things that are required at the reviews, to which the 
knowledge of other matters will be no hindrance. ' (James Wolfe, op. cit., 
34-5). Figs. 1 and 2 show the 20th told off, accordingly. 
To perform platoon-fire (Fig. 1), the nine battalion-companies on the 
20th's establishment were told off into sixteen platoons, thus breaking up 
the companies in which the men normally trained and served. The tenth or 
grenadier company was split in half, the halves separating to stand on each 
flank of the battalion. These platoons were then told off into three 
'Firings', the platoons making up each Firing not standing contiguously 
but scattered all down the battalion line. Finally, the platoons were 
numbered. The battalion could now deliver its fire in one of two ways: 
either by vollies in which all of the platoons in a Firing let fly sim- 
ultaneously, the second Firing following the first and the third the second, 
the platoons of each Firing reloading immediately after shooting so that a 
constant succession of vollies could be delivered; or, if the enemy was 
less threatening and a less heavy fire was required along the whole of the 
battalion's front at each discharge, the platoons simply fired one after 
another according to the sequence in which they were numbered, again 
spreading their fire widely along the battalion front. 
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Fig. l. Platoon-Fire 
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Fig. 2. Alternate Fire 
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The numbers below the subdivisions show the different sequences 
in which they might fire - a. ) from right to left; b. ) from the 
centre to the flanks, right and left alternately; c. ) from the 
flanks to the centre, right and left alternately. 
To perform the alternate fire (Fig. 2), the means most favoured was to 
avoid confusing the men by splitting up their parent companies, but rather 
to turn each company into a fire-unit. These companies (now designated 
'subdivisions', their tactical title) were numbered according to the se- 
quence in which it was designed they should fire, one after another - 
either from right to left, or from the centre of the battalion alternately 
outwards to the flanks, or from the flanks alternately in towards the 
centre. The grenadier company was not split but remained in its accustom- 
ed place on the right flank, while the left-hand battalion-company - 
following French practice, and anticipating the light infantry companies 
soon to be raised - was designated a 'piquet' company and held its own 
flank. 
The main distinctions between these two systems of telling off and 
giving fire were in the absence (in the alternate system) of the big 
Firings used in platoon-fire. By not breaking up the companies the 
morale of the men was improved, since they went into action in their ac- 
customed units, among officers and men with whom they were well-acquainted. 
The alternate system, finally, was much easier to perform, since the 
elaborate telling off, the effort of separate platoons to coordinate their 
firing, and the confusion to which the platoon system was subject in 
battle, were all avoided. 
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Fig. 3. A Plan For Telling off a Battalion into 18 Platoons, after Humphrey Bland 
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Fig. 4. A Battalion Told Off According to 'the Discipline practised in Flanders', 






13 17395 11 15 12 6 10 482 14 
Front 
Platoon-fire could be carried out by battalions told off into a 
variety of sequences, and numbers of platoons, as Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate. 
Likewise alternate fire could be performed by a battalion whose companies 
(as Wolfe's orders, quoted above, suggest) had been told off into several 
platoons, though ignoring the system of telling off into Firings and 
giving fire as usual from the flanks to the centre, or from the centre to 
the flanks. 
Bland, in his 1727 treatise, (pp. 145-47) described the alternate fire 
already in use among the Dutch; and in so doing he set out the common 
English objection to it - that is, that there was no fire kept in reserve 
all down the line at all times, as was the case when the platoons were told 
off into Firings and then dispersed along the full front of the battalion. 
His objection was no longer supported by the later 1750's, by which time 
battle experience (and the success of the Prussians), had shown that 
husbanding so large a reserve was unnecessary, where alternate fire had 
cleared the battalion's front and where reloading proceded fast enough 
to keep pace with the firing. 
Horses at Grass: 
For upwards of four months per year the troop-horses of the cavalry 
regiments were nowhere near their regiments, but were "out at grass". Just 
as a racehorse, after too much hard running, can go track-sour and so must 
be rested out at pasture, so too the cavalry horses after long autumn and 
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winter months of training (and of a diet made up of too much dry forage), 
had to be "turned out to grass" every spring. Out to pasture, resting, 
grazing on green spring and summer grass (with its rich vitamin A and 
D content), shoes removed to ease their hooves and to permit them free 
growth, the grass months were an essential tonic for the horses. 
88 
They 
were also a severe limitation on the training time of the whole of the 
mounted arm. Although practised troopers would forget few of their riding 
skills (and the horses even less of their business), still the complicated 
and difficult manoeuvres of the cavalry would have to be studied long and 
drilled intensively with the coming on of autumn, and the taking up of 
the horses from grass. The training year for the cavalry, then, was very 
cyclical: an average of about seven or eight months of mounted training, 
followed by four or five months of the foot evolutions and firings. The 
long, annual separation of the troopers from their mounts must lead one to 
conclude that the regiments of horse of the British Army were by their very 
nature less thoroughly trained than the regiments of foot; and this is a 
conclusion particularly true of the army in Ireland because of the quarter- 
ing system practised there. Splendid, well-accoutred, imposing, the cavalry 
of the eighteenth century were both a very powerful and a very frail 
89 
weapon. 
We might illustrate the grass-orders cycle by following all of the 
cavalry in Britain during a typical peacetime year. In 1773 there were in 
Britain (exclusive of the Guards troops) fourteen regiments of cavalry. 
Twelve of these corps were ordered to turn their horses out to grass early 
in the month of May, under the care of their "Grass Guard" detachments; 
and the horses remained separated from their regiments until mid-September, 
when they were taken up from grass and returned to their troops. In 1773 
then, the horses were gone from the British cavalry for all of four months. 
90 
88. "Grass Guard" detachments from each troop took the horses to the pas- 
tures, and stayed with them all summer. Their duties included not only the 
obvious riding herd; they must also have a careful eye to the grazing, lest 
too much lush green grass lead to foundering. 
I am indebted to Professor 0. Kennedy of the Ontario Agricultural 
College for the information on equine diet with which he kindly provided me. 
89. Lt-Col Campbell Dalrymple noted this brittleness, in his A Military 
Essay. Containing Reflections on the Raising, Arming, CZoathing, and Disci- 
pline of the British Infantry and Cavalry... (1761), 254. 
90. WO 5/58, pp. 188-92,217,244-5,277,281. The horses of The Blues and 
of the 15th Light Dragoons were out for a shorter period. 
A similar grass-cycle was followed in Ireland. In the 5th Dragoons in 
that kingdom during the 1730's and '40's, for example it was 'the constant 
standing Order, to turn out the Horses to Grass, on every first Day of May, 
and take them in every first of October. But, as-many particular Cases may 
offer', continued the Standing Orders, 'all these are left to the Judgment 
and Discretion of the Commanding Officers. (For Instance). All Recruit- 
Horses, for the first Year, shall be taken in on or before the first of 
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CHAPTER VI 
ADVANCED TRAINING: THE WARTIME CAMPS 
Despite the fact that all but the rawest of recruits among the mass of 
private soldiers could be counted upon, at any one time, to be sufficiently 
well trained in the basic elements of the drill; despite the fact that the 
central authorities, by means of the regulations and the reviewing system, 
kept up drill uniformity throughout the army; despite the fact that the ma- 
jority of the officers serving with the corps were career-soldiers, among 
whom the field officers, the captains, and the senior subalterns were gener- 
ally men of lengthy experience of the service; and despite the fact that 
there was readily available in English a considerable body of military lit- 
erature; nevertheless it is clear that the majority of regiments found them- 
selves, on the eve of war, to be quite without or almost innocent of exper- 
ience of large-scale mock action or brigade manoeuvres, to have had in- 
adequate opportunities to conduct the training of the field days and the 
'excursions', and to be only just adequately prepared to perform on a parade 
ground the regulation firings and manoeuvres together with a selection of 
movements drawn from the army's store of customary practice. These were 
the inevitable fruits of the peacetime condition of the British Army. Ir- 
regular and generally infrequent advanced training carried on in varying 
levels of concentration, capped by two or three weeks per year of in- 
tensive pre-review drill, was not sufficient to overcome the ongoing effects 
of the friction of peace; and the rating 'fit for service' must, within 
this context, be regarded as expressing a pious hope. Major efforts were 
required in order fully to prepare a regiment; and since peacetime train- 
ing was bound to be limited it was in wartime - either in the encampments 
formed at home, or in the cantonments and in the field abroad - that 
advanced training was at last carried on with realism and with sustained 
vigour. Granted that the tacticians, the War Office, and all serious 
September. [i. e., for extra training]. 
'If the latter Season prove unusually fair; Pasture good and plentiful; 
Hay indifferent, and scarce: In this Case, the time of keeping out the Horses 
may be a little enlarged, till the Weather change, or Pasture fall off. 
'... When the Horses are turn'd out, all their Shoes shall be knock'd 
off; the thin, brittle Edge of the Hoof taken away, and the Hoofs rasp'd 
thick and round. ' Richard, Viscount Molesworth, A Short Course of Standing 
Rules, for the Government and Conduct of an Army... in The Fie7. d... (1744), 
155-6. 
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general officers recognized the need for the intensive training and 
manoeuvring of large numbers, it is extraordinary that only the immediate 
threat of invasion should provide the occasion for such practice. That the 
concentration of regiments in large encompments - thereby providing the 
opportunity for such training, itself quite clearly secondary to the overall 
strategic need for concentrations - was attempted only in emergencies, is 
eloquent testimony to the difficulties faced by the bulk of the army and its 
general officers, and to the order of priorities governing the army in peace- 
time. 
Since there was such a notable difference between peacetime and wartime 
training, the activities carried on in the camps deserve our full consider- 
ation here, as do those in the armies abroad in the following chapter. 
Certainly the three most grave military crises faced by Britain, during 
the eighteenth century, occurred in 1745 when the French landed the Stuart 
prince in Scotland and so provoked the greatest of the Jacobite risings, 
in 1779, when the combined fleets of the Bourbon Crowns lay within sight 
close off Plymouth, and in 1796, when Bouvet's squadron rode the gale in 
Bantry Bay. The threat of invasion was the principal strategic weapon which 
France possessed, in her rivalry with Britain. France was militarily the 
most powerful nation in Europe and consequently had little to fear along 
her coasts, save for the occasional raids which were hardly more than in- 
sults; but Britain, the great antagonist, was weak on land. So long as 
France was able to maintain the threat of invasion, so long as that threat 
was credible, Britain had to keep a significant part of her land forces at 
home, a large part of her fleet in the Channel, and had even (as in 1715- 
16,1719,1744-46, and yet again in 1756-57) to import Dutch and German 
troops to augment the defence forces. 
1 
In the short term this cost the 
French little, while it helped to immobilize considerable British re- 
sources. 
1. The foreign treaty-troops were always numerous on these occasions, 
since the threat was serious and the regular army small. In 1715-16 
there were 6000 Dutch foot in 11 battalions serving in Britain; and 3 
Dutch battalions landed in the north of England in 1719, while 2 bat- 
talions of Swiss in the Dutch service sailed up the Thames. (J. Baynes, 
op. cit., 200-01). More Dutch troops came over temporarily in 1744 when 
the Jacobite invasion fleet was fitting out under Saxe. By early Jan. 
1746 there were in Britain 10 Dutch battalions, 6 Hessian battalions, and 
6 Hessian squadrons (Atkinson, 'Jenkins Ear, 290-95 passim). In 1756 
there were 20 battalions of Germans in southern England: 12 Hanoverian 
battalions formed their own camp at Coxheath and 8 Hessian battalions 
encamped by Winchester, both forces with their own artillery, general 
officers and staffs (Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 084/6, f. 1). It will be 
recalled that some 33,000 Germans served in America, India, Minorca, and 
Gibraltar during the war of 1775-83. (E. Lowell, The Hessians (New York, 
1774), 20,299-301; P. Mackesy, op. cit., 62; and P. F. N. Katcher, op. cit., 
103-1270). 
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The invasion threat was, fortunately, seasonal. Not only would the 
Bourbons need to gain temporary naval control of the Channel, but they must 
do so in the summer or, better, in the earlier autumn; for only then did 
the winds serve, only by early summer could an army sizeable enough to 
invade be provisioned (and therefore assembled), in the French and Spanish 
ports, and only after autumn harvest would an invading army find an ab- 
undance of foodstuffs and fodder inland from the beaches. 
2 
Although the British did not do so, it was common practice among the 
French and Prussians to form in peacetime large military encampments in 
which major reviews and mock combats were held, new tactical doctrine test- 
ed, and in which general officers gained invaluable experience of manoeuvr- 
ing large forces of all arms. 
3 
The British did not do so in peacetime 
because of the great expence which camps and manoeuvres entailed; because 
of popular prejudices against standing - let along concentrated and en- 
camped - forces; and because, in any case, there were in the towns and 
along the coasts too few troops to support the civil power, let alone when 
tied down in one place. To guard against the invasion threat was, however, 
a different matter; and so it was the British practice, throughout our 
period, to form in wartime numbers of military encampments, thus concentrat- 
ing troops at strategic points in the south (and particularly the south- 
east) of England, largely with the view of defending London should an in- 
vading force gain a beach-head. 
4 
As the winds and seasons served the French, 
so too the British formed most camps in May, June, or early July, and did 
not break them up until October or early November. Certain principal camp- 
sites were used repeatedly, often with very large numbers of troops in 
them, while other sites were used sporadically and generally held but few 
men, as circumstances might require. In 1778, for example, there were in 
2. A. T. Patterson, The Other Armada (Manchester, 1960), 13. 
3. On the French camps, which were notably professional, see R. Villate, 
art. cit., 237-44 and passim. See also J. Colin, Tactique; R. S. Quimby, op. cit., 
J. Luvaas (ed. ), Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York, 1966); C. 
Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (Newton Abbot, 1974), all passim. 
Before the Duke of*York's reforms at the end of our period there had 
been only three occasions in peacetime when a number of regiments were drawn 
together and encamped - in 1722,1723, and 1792. The camps of 1722 and 1723 
were formed in response to Jacobite "scares" (HMC, Clements MSS [1913], p. 
342), while that of 1792 was formed largely in order to show the King the new 
drill established by Dundas. In 1774 and 1775 special training camps were 
set up at Salisbury and at Woolwich, respectively; but only seven companies 
of light infantry were present at the first, while the second was an artil- 
lery camp. These camps are noted in passing, below. 
4. For example, on operations in England to resist invasion in 1759, see 
R. Whitworth, op. cit., 281-312; on the defence arrangements in 1779, see A. T. 
Patterson, op. cit., 107-32 and passim; and see the hypothetical but carefully 
researched summary of the defence which Britain would have been able to mount 
in 1805, had Bonaparte's flotillas made good their descent on the Kentish 
coasts, in R. Glover, Britain at Bay. Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14 
(1973), 77-102. 
211 
Coxheath camp near Maidstone some 17,000 troops (a Dragoon regiment, six 
battalions of marching Foot, fifteen militia battalions, and three com- 
panies of artillery), the whole stretching over some 32 miles of ground; 
while in 1782 there were in Bromeswell camp near Woodbridge a scant 100 
officers and men of the 22nd Light Dragoons. As the wars progressed the 
number of camps being formed, during each succeeding summer, tended to re- 
main about the same; but with the number of regular regiments available 
dwindling away as overseas campaigns drew in more men, and as the naval 
pressure on the Bourbon fleets met with mounting success, the quality of 
the troops encamped declined as the place of the regulars was taken over by 
militia. There was admittedly, with naval success, less strategic need for 
camps in the later stages of most wars - save, of course, for that of 
1775-83. Thus there were few camps formed after 1741, in the 1739-48 war 
(the Guards in Hyde Park and at Finchley in 1745, and the concentrations 
in Scottish camps in 1746-47, were emergency affairs, not regular camps); 
and there were very few regulars in the camps formed after 1760, during the 
1756-63 war. In the 1775-83 war no camps at all were formed until the 
Bourbons became belligerents in 1778, and by 1780 the regular forces left 
in British camps were weak and overextended. 
Beyond their general strategic location in the southern counties, 
other factors of some significance had to be taken into consideration before 
a particular campsite could be settled upon. The ground had to be fairly 
flat, free from fences, heavy brush, and other impediiments to movement. 
The place had to be dry and well-drained, and consequently not low-lying; 
there had nevertheless to be adequate fresh water nearby. 
5 
Plenty of wood 
or furze for fuel had to be close at hand, and forage and provisions must 
be readily available in the neighbourhood. Good river transport and decent 
roads were a necessity both for supply and marches. The whole lay-out of 
the camp, moreover, must be done with a view to sanitation, the armies of 
the period being unhygienic and the medicines so little effective. Thus 
in 1780, on the Tiptree Heath site, trenches had to be dug to drain off the 
water and other effluvia - only one of the innumerable details which had 
to be looked to if the camp was to be healthy. 
6 Not least in importance, 
5. In July 1740, a 'great Scarcity of Water' at Windsor Forest camp (where 
five regiments of horse, three battalions of foot, and an artillery detach- 
ment lay), resulted in the shifting of three regiments of horse to Datchet, 
Cobham, and Cricket Hill, distant enough from the camp to be quite incon- 
venient. WO 5/34, pp. 90-204 passim; The London Evening-Post, 15 July 1740; 
and M. E. S. Laws, op. cit., 6. 
6. On Tiptree, see WO 34/125, f. 49. Concern with hygiene largely explains 
the meticulous detail with which the military treatises of the century treat- 
ed the, subject of castrametation. Of the 4230 men camped at Tiptree in 
1780, about 10% were sick by the end of August -a small percentage, the 
result of proper precautions and camp discipline. 1.70 34/203, ff. 10-11. 
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finally, was the cost of firing the ground from its private owners. 
7 
Camp sites were scouted by Engineer officers, and the Ordnance (which 
was charged with their routine maintenance, and was responsible for the 
vast stores of camp equipment), kept on file up-to-date site reports. In 
the spring of 1756, for example, Engineer-Director J. Watson surveyed the 
country between Dorchester and Petersfield, and found seven sites which 
would serve for encampments. One site, reported Watson, was half-a-mile 
to the north-west of Dorchester, lying on 'dry, rising Ground, having the 
Exeter Road in Front, and the River Froom 4a mile in the Rear'. There was 
a convenient and 'plentiful Spring of exceeding good water', and 'a great 
Extent of Ground both in Front and upon the Right of this Camp for 6 or 7 
Batts and 6 Squadrons to exercise, March, & perform any Movement' upon. 
There was unfortunately little wood roundabout, 'the common firing being 
either Furze or Coal from Weymouth'. 
8 
This same site was used for a 1757 
encampment. A similar report on three Essex sites, made in 1780, described 
one as too wet but found favour with the others. One of these latter, 
which was used in 1780 and 1781, lay 'on the north part of Danbury Common', 
and Deputy Quartermaster General William Roy reported it a fit place to 
camp three battalions upon; it was on good dry ground with a fine spring 
nearby, and the ground 'tho' covered with Furze Bushes and Roots of Brush 
Wood', could soon be cleared. 
9 
Once the sites had been selected and as occupation by the troops began 
vast quantities of stores and equipment had to be despatched by the Ordnance. 
The quantity and variety of even simple 'camp utensils' - picks, shovels, 
kettles, tents, wheelbarrows, etc. - was staggering. 
10 
Not only had the 
Ordnance to issue camp utensils and other paraphernalia, but guns, ammuni- 
tion, stores, and their transport had also to be sent out and maintained. 
Guns - two light pieces for each battalion camped, and heavier pieces for 
battery work in the larger camps - plus all of the ammunition, tools, 
spares, wagons and impedimenta which accompanied the artillery in the 
eighteenth century, had also to be prepared by the Ordnance. 
11 
Huge artillery 
parks were assembled at Woolwich and at the Tower upon the outbreak of war, 
7. In a 1778 report on a site near Billericay, it was estimated that twelve 
battalions might be squeezed onto 100 acres (a battalion in camp normally re- 
quiring 107 acres, at 700-800 men). In those parts, 100 acres could be hired 
for X600. Including levelling the site by clearing scrub, and tearing down 
(and later rebuilding) fences, the Billericay ground could be had for x, 1000 
per season. WO 30/54,1/41. See also WO 4/104, pp. 324-5,335-5; and WO 34/17, ff. 
17-19. 
8. WO 30/54,4/ 39; and WO 55/573, pp. 193-200. 
9. WO 34/125, ff. 49-50. 
10. For stores at the 1722 camps, for example, see WO 55/348, pp. 37-41. For 
1740 issues, see WO 55/350, pp. 195-7; and for 1781 see WO 55/418, p. 170, and 
WO 26/31, pp. 45-6. 
11. For examples of the extraordinarily large quantity and variety of mater- 
ials composing a train, see WO 55/351, pp. 311,316, and /352. A, pp. 8-22 (on the 
train sent to Flanders for the 1744 campaign); and see also WO 55/358, pp42, 
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and then re-assembled annually, serving as a pool from which the needs of ex- 
peditions, and of the camps, were met. Finally, ball cartridges - which, as 
we have seen, were almost unknown in peacetime - were made available in the 
camps in quantities reaching into the many hundreds of thousands, in lavish 
if belated effort to improve individual marksmanship and battalion musket- 
ry. Butts were always a feature on a campsite. 
Once the campsites had been determined upon and the Ordnance storekeepers 
had been set in motion, general and staff officers were appointed to the com- 
mand of each camp and the regiments were earmarked and informed of impending 
camp duty. Each camp was commanded by a senior general officer serving direct- 
ly under the orders of the C-in-C and the Hanoverian Kings, each of whom took 
great interest in the camps. Each senior general officer had under him (usually) 
two other generals, who commanded the 'lines' or 'wings' into which British 
armies were always subdivided before the advent of the divisional system in 
1809. Finally there came the brigade commanders. These several senior officers 
were assisted by sundry inferior officers appointed to the staff of each camp 
(serving as ADC's, brigade-majors, AQMG's, physician and surgeons in the camp 
hospitals, etc. ); chosen normally by the camp commander from friends and'ýam- 
ily", many of these staff officers came from the regiments actually serving 
in the camp. 
The regiments selected to encamp were warned well in advance; and as the 
time drew near each sent to the site its quartermaster, pioneers, and camp- 
colour men, who marked off the ground soon to be occupied by their tent and 
horse lines. A typical result was the order of battle at Coxheath camp in 1778: 
12 
Commander: Lt-Gen Keppel 
Deputy-Commander: Maj-Gen Morris 
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119-38, and Index "E" (for the train sent with the expeditions carrying out 
the descents on the coast of France in 1758). 
12. The General Evening Post, 25 June 1778; and C. Herbert, 'Coxheath Camp, 
1778-79', JSAHR, 45 (1767), 148. The county titles, of course, indicate militia 
battalions. 
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Between the outside limits of Coxheath and of Bromeswell, mentioned 
above, there were broadly speaking three sizes of camps formed during our 
period, depending upon the number of troops concentrated. 
13 
The very 
largest were eight in number: from east to west (and with the years during 
which they were occupied, in brackets), these were Barham Downs (1757-'60), 
Colchester ('41), Coxheath ('56, '78 through '82), Newbury ('40), the Isle 
of Wight camp ('40, '57, '58), Salisbury ('22, '57, '74, '78, '79), 
Blandford ('56), and Dorchester ('57). 
The middling-sized camps were thirteen in number, namely, from east to 
west: Tiptree Heath ('80), West Stowe, near Bury ('78), Cavenham Heath by 
Newmarket ('79), Warley Common, near Brentwood ('59 through '62, '78, '79, 
'81), Chatham ('56 through '62, '81, '82), Dartford Heath ('59, '80), Hyde 
Park ('22, '23, '45, '80), Hounslow Heath ('40), Sandheath near Ripley 
('59 through '62), Amersham ('57), Windsor Forest ('40, '60), Bagshot ('92), 
and Winchester camp ('56, '59 through '62, '78). 
There were, finally, some twenty-five campsites of the smallest sort, 
generally holding no more than from one to three regiments; these were, 
from east to west: Hopton Warren, near Yarmouth ('82), Mutford Bridge near 
Beccles ('82), Bromeswell ('82), Danbury ('80, '81), Lenham Heath ('81, 
'82), Westfield near Hastings ('79, '82), Playden Heights, near Rye ('80, 
'81), Woolwich camp ('75), Waterdown by Tunbridge Wells ('80), Finchley 
Common ('45, '80), Ranmore Common ('80), Datchet ('40), Cobham ('40), 
Kingsclere ('40), Wolverton near Basingstoke ('57), camps at Portsmouth 
('80, '81) and at nearby Bedhampton ('59), Southsea Common ('59), and over 
at Gosport ('80), a camp at Hungerford ('22), another by Devizes ('40), 
another near Brixham ('80), and at Plymouth and nearby Roborough and 
Kingsand each year from 1778 through 1782. 
The camps were formed, therefore, during nineteen of the years cov- 
ered by this study. As we noted above the invasion threat was seasonal, 
since men had to wait upon the winds and the crops; and consequently the 
duration of the camps was relatively constant whether early or late in the 
century. The troops lay for four months - fifteen to eighteen weeks - 
in all of the camps of 1722,1723,1740,1741, of 1757 through 1762, and 
of 1780 through 1782. The infantry camps of 1778 and 1779 lasted for five 
months, since the invasion threat was greater during those years; while 
in 1756 the various camps survived from three to six months, what with 
plenty of Germans available to face the elements (the Hessians at 
13. The size and location of the camps, together with the units which 
camped and the years of site occupation, were drawn principally from 
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Winchester broke camp only in mid-December). As a general rule, those camps 
in which only cavalry was to be found broke up about one month earlier than 
did the infantry camps, since the horses had to be spared; and by late 
summer the cavalry in all of the camps were turning their horses out to 
grass. 
The total number of units from the regular army and the artillery which 
camped during the years covered by this study are listed in the following 
table; and it should be emphasized that all militia regiments - despite 
the fact that after the reforms of the mid-1750's they were present in most 
camps, and often in sizeable numbers - are excluded, since their state of 
training and tactical proficiency (or otherwise) are not our concern here: 
14 
YEAR HORSE FOOT ARTILLERY 
1722 5 regts., +2 Guards trps. 13 bns. 1 coy. 
1723 9 bns. one det. 
1740 10 regts., +6 Guards trps. 21 bns. three dets. 
1741 7 regts. 10 bns. 
1756 2 regts. 11 bns. 
1757 7 regts. 24 bns. 3 coys. 
1758 dets. from 9 regts. 19 bns. 4 coys. 
1759 12 bns., + two dets. 
1760 11 bns. 
1761 2 bns. 
1762 4 bns. 
1774 lt. coys. from 7 bns. 
1775 4 coys. 
1778 9 regts. 12 bns. 6 coys. 
1779 11 regts. 13 bns. 5 coys. 
1780 12 bns. 7 coys. 
1781 2 regts. 8 bns. 8 coys. 
1782 5 regts. 10 bns. 8 coys. 
1792 2 regts. 4 bns. 
14. The following short forms are used in the table: trps. = troops of 
cavalry; bns. = battalions of foot; dets. = detachments from other units; 
coys. = companies; lt. = light. 
The six Marine Regiments are included here in the 1740 Isle of Wight 
camp. I have included the Guards in the camps of 1722,1723, and 1740 only; 
their annual Hyde Park camps were not really for purposes more serious than 
'airing the men' and 'tossing of the firelocks'. The 1780 camps in Hyde 
Park and on Finchley Common were not initially formed for training purposes, 
but rather to concentrate troops to reinforce the Guards and London militia 
engaged with the Gordon Rioters; some of the regiments in these two camps were 
drawn in from regular, outlying camps, and are included in the 1780 totals. 
Due to the destruction of most records, we know little more about Irish 
wartime camps than the fact that they were sometimes formed. In 1778 there was 
a large camp at Clonmell, with two regiments of horse and four of foot, and 
there was a smaller camp at Kinsale; in 1779 there were small camps at Kilworth, 
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Compared with the forces regularly encamped by the Prussians and the French 
- in 1727, for example there were in four French camps a total of 82 bat- 
talions and 131 squadrons; at the 1733 Meuse camp alone there were 26 
battalions and 62 squadrons; at Vaussieux in 1778 there were 44 battalions 
and 6 regiments of dragoons15 - these forces seem small; but given the 
total number of regiments normally to be found in the whole of England 
(Appendix B), the British camp concentrations represent major efforts, 
denuding the countryside of troops. 
A typical year's troop dispositions, in the camps, is that shown here 
for 1778: 
Camps in Britain, 1778 
Warley Common (early July - early November): 
6th, 25th, 69th, and 79th of Foot; eight battalions of militia; two comp- 
anies of the Royal Artillery. 
Coxheath (early June - early November): 
1st Dragoons; 1/1st, 2/1st, 2nd, 18th, 59th, and 65th of Foot; fifteen bat- 
talions of militia; three companies of the Royal Artillery. 
Winchester (early June - early November): 
50th Foot; six battalions of militia; one company Royal Artillery.. 
Salisbury (early July - early October): 
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Dragoon Guards; 6th Dragoons. 
West Stowe (early July - early October): 
3rd, 4th, 7th, and 10th Dragoons. 
Plymouth (mid-June - late October): 
13th Foot. 
As we noted at the outset the purpose of the camps (put forth with 
admirable clarity in the orders appointing general officers to the command 
of the 1740 camps), 
16 
was twofold; but for the general and field officers 
as well as for the tacticians it was the opportunity for advanced training, 
rather than the larger strategic view, which was of primary concern. Indeed 
the need to form camps for training purposes, come war or peace, was always 
among the military writers a constant (if futile) refrain: typically, John 
Macdonald wrote that it would 'be beneficial to discipline were the British 
army to assemble, annually, in divisions, at certain points, to practise 
evolutions. This would establish a correctness of division marching, and a 
Aghada, and Ardfinnan; and in 1780 Cashell and Kinsale had camps nearby. 
15. R. Villate, art. cit., 238. 
16. These ran: 'Whereas We have thought it Necessary that Our Land Forces 
which are now dispersed in their several Quarters throughout this Kingdom 
should be drawn together and be Encamped in Several Bodies to be more 
Usefull and more Speedily United in Case of Necessity and for the better 
Instructing Them in Military Discipline... ' SP 41/12, Secretary at War to 
Lt-Gen Sir Philip Honywood, et al, 7 May 1740. 
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skill in executing manoeuvres that would carry our excellent army to a high 
state of perfection in discipline. '17 Likewise, Capt Robert Hinde argued 
that, 'for the improvement of military knowledge in the cavalry', a few 
regiments 'might meet and encamp for some little time together, under the 
direction of a general officer, who should... instruct them in the grand 
' 18 manoeuvre. 
Once in the camps the individual regiments quickly set about the task 
of equalizing the drill of their component troops or companies, since it was 
to the firings and most especially to the manoeuvres - first by regiment, 
and then as early as possible in brigades and lines - that camp training 
was principally to be addressed. 
19 
Whenever opportunity arose the regiments 
went through the full range of firings and manoeuvres which made up the 
advanced training of individual regiments, while at the same time the camp 
commanders enforced among them such 'alterations and improvements in the 
private discipline of corps' - speed of march, length of pace, signals, etc. 
- as were necessary to establish that full uniformity among the regiments 
encamped without which they would be unable to function efficiently and 
smoothly together. Certain other activities which were characteristic of 
active service in the field, but which were seldom or never attempted in 
peacetime, were also practised at the regimental level in the camps. Thus 
battalion-guns - two light, quick-firing brass cannon - were attached to 
each battalion only when war seemed imminent, or had been declared. 
20 
Posted 
on the flanks of the battalion line, these added significantly to the bat- 
talion's firepower and were light enough to keep pace with the battalion's 
movements; manhandled by private men told off to work the drag-ropes while 
the small detachments of gunners served each piece, they accompanied the foot 
nearly everywhere on campaign until the very end of the century. The gunners 
17. John Macdonald, French Infantry Regulations, I, 171. 
18. Robert Hinde, op. cit., 58. 
19. Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 165, thought it 'necessary to premise, that 
the assembling of corps is only for them to act by brigades or in line'; but 
his precondition - 'that every regiment and battalion must be perfect in 
their discipline before they meet, for the shortness of the time will admit 
of no tossing of the firelocks' - could hardly be met in the British Army. 
20. Only at the big annual reviews of the Dublin garrison were battalion- 
guns attached in peacetime. Outside Dublin, the only example which I have 
found of a regiment practising its drill with these guns attached, in peace- 
time, occurred in December 1755 at a Rochester review of Stuart's 37th of 
Foot (WO 27/4); and by that date the army had had its battalion-guns for 
three weeks, what with war existing in all but name. (See WO 5/42, pp. 472-6 
for the mid-Nov. 1755 distribution of battalion-guns to the foot - like 
augmentations, a characteristic stage in eighteenth-century "mobilisation"). 
Very occasionally field pieces - not battalion-guns - might join a regiment 
on its review day, as happened at the 22nd Foot's review held at Perth in 
June 1773 (WO 27/27); but such occurrences were the result of unofficial 
cooperation among regimental officers and local Royal Artillery officers. 
See also 4th Foot, 1770, and 31st Foot, 1774, (WO 27/18, and /30). 
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attached to the battalions, of course, learned their business in the Ordnance 
corps; and the soldiers told off to serve with them as matrosses came under 
the command of the Royal Artillery subaltern with the guns, and were train- 
ed by him in the camps. 
In sharp contrast to peacetime training, a great deal of target practice 
with ball ammunition was carried on in the camps - as indeed it was carried 
on in all regiments, once war had broken out. 
21 
At Tiptree Heath alone, in 
1780, the 45th Foot and nine militia battalions camped there - some 4200 
men - went through more than 250,000 cartridges with ball; while that same 
summer Lt-Gen Pierson at Dartford Heath camp expected to go through, in a 
week, the 160,000 ball with which he had been issued and wanted at least a 
million - this, for three marching battalions and three of militia. In 
the 1722 Hyde Park camp, 4200 men of the Foot Guards were issued 37,000 
ball cartridges and 49,000 squibs. 
22 
Battalion musketry (and individual 
target practice too, especially among the men of the light companies) was 
daily practice in the camps; and hence at Coxheath in 1778, for example, 
the men became 'exceeding expert'. 
23 
In the camps, too, the light companies of the several battalions were 
brigaded, and were able to devote themselves to the specialist activities 
of light infantry. Several of these companies (which, as we have seen, 
were formed permanently in British-establishment battalions from 1771, and 
in those of Ireland from 1772), were assembled at a special camp near 
Salisbury during August and September 1774, where they were trained by 
Maj-Gen William Howe to a system of skirmishing and speedy manoeuvres de- 
signed by him after his experience of the light service during the late 
North American campaigns. 
24 
At Salisbury Howe attempted to establish and 
21. In the summer of 1755, with war imminent, the ammunition supplied to 
the regiments was greatly increased. In May every battalion in Britain was 
sent sufficient powder for 105,000 cartridges; and in August about 36 balls 
and an extra flint, per man, were sent to the battalions (WO 55/411, pp. 140- 
1,163-4. 
22. On Tiptree, WO 34/203, ff. 10-11; on Dartford, WO 34/126, f. 194; and on 
Hyde Park, WO 55/348, pp. 38,41. In the camp at Beaucaire, in 1753, some 
5000 French soldiers under M. de Cremille burnt 543,000 cartridges; and that 
was in peacetime. R. Villate, art. cit., 240-1. 
23. The London Evening Post, 6 Aug. 1778. The reporter claimed that the men 
'load and fire with ease five times in a minute'; but he was doubtless 
watching men using squibs, since such speed with ball cartridges was not 
possible. The men were apt to be jittery when loading ball -a suspicion 
confirmed in the 4 Aug. 1778 ed. of the same paper, where it was reported 
that at Coxheath 'Several of the regiments were on Saturday exercised at 
targets with ball cartridges, and performed exceedingly well; no accident 
happened except shooting a favourite dog. ' 
24. The light companies of the 3rd, 11th, 21st, 29th, 32nd, 36th, and 70th 
of Foot arrived at Salisbury camp on 6 Aug. 1774, and on 22 Sept. departed 
for Richmond where, on 3 Oct., they were reviewed by the King. After the 
royal review the companies rejoined their parent regiments, all in England. 
WO 5/58, pp. 462-3,480-1,491-2. 
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then to spread through the army a good system of light infantry drill, which 
had heretofore been ad hoc, established at random; and to train the light 
companies to a uniform system so that they might function together when 
joined in composite light battalions on campaign. 
25 
His system was excel- 
lent; it was characterized by endless skirmishing, forward movements in 
small parties from a two-deep battalion line, by movements carried out either 
at the quick step or at a run, and by observing both open (four feet) and 
extended (ten feet) intervals between the files. 
26 
In the wartime camps too, 
after Salisbury, similar training continued, if not to Howe's system. 
Although two days per week (according to one regimen) were devoted to 
the training of individual regiments, it was brigade drill that was properly 
given pride of place in the camps. 
27 
Not only were the interests of uni- 
formity served by brigade drill; for as Dundas observed of normal peacetime 
training, 'speculation only, aided by the practice of small bodies, will 
often mislead, when applied to the movements of larger ones'. 
28 
Outside 
of the big peacetime garrisons it was only in the camps that general and 
field officers enjoyed the opportunity of seeing and handling large forces; 
and it must be stressed that only in the camps were actual field commands 
and staffs formed, since in peacetime there was no permanent intermediate 
25. He failed in this because the events of 1774-75 in Boston overtook the 
army. The 1778 Regulations, given out by Amherst, laid down a series of 
standard light-infantry manoeuvres, as we have seen; but these were not 
spread beyong the units serving in Britain at that time. It was not until 
Moore's system at Shorncliffe spread through the army that a detailed and 
regular light drill became firmly established. 
26. At Salisbury, sufficient ammunition was issued to provide each officer 
and man with 90 squibs and 20 ball cartridges, indicating the stress put 
upon realism in this camp, and on marksmanship among the men (WO 3/4, p. 115; 
and WO 24/473). The full drill practised by these companies at Salisbury is 
in NAM MS # 6807/157/6, pp. 1-17; and on pp. 19-22 is the description of 
the review performance put on before George III at Richmond - an extremely 
realistic display of light tactics, quite equal of anything practiced any- 
where else during the later-eighteenth century. Interestingly, these com- 
panies loaded and fired according to the 1764 platoon exercise, a tribute 
to its excellence. 
27. An Adjutant General's circular of 16 May 1795, to the commanding of- 
ficers of camps, laid down the following rules (which they were to 'Strictly 
Observe') on the regimen of camp life: 
'On the Monday, & Friday, in every Week Each Corps is to be exercis'd 
separately, under the Personal Direction of its own Commanding Officer, 
practising those parts of the Exercise, set forth in His Majesty's Estab- 
lish'd Regulations, in which He Himself may find it most defective; or that 
the Commanding General may think proper expressly to Order. 
'On each Tuesday, & Saturday, the Exercising of the Troops, is to be 
perform'd by Brigades, under the immediate Conduct, & Command of their 
respective Major Generals. 
. 
'On each Wednesday, the Commanding General will take out the whole Line, & 
make them perform such Movements, Manoeuvres, or other Exercises, as He may think 
proper. ' Thursday was for rest, with extra drill for awkward or negligent units. 
The regimen was designed especially 'for the essential purpose of promoting 
Uniformity in the Discipline of the Troops'. WO 3/28, pp. 89-90. 
28. David Dundas, op. cit., 7. 
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command level between the individual regiments on the one hand and the Horse 
Guards, Dublin Castle, Edinburgh Castle or the few colonial governors on 
the other. This was greatly to the advantage of the general officers, the 
great majority of whom - excepting only the handful appointed annually as 
reviewing officers - never manoeuvred so much as a regiment, in peacetime. 
With full-time, realistic training by sizeable numbers at last possible, 
field and general officers got the much-needed opportunity of seeing and 
taking part in major manoeuvres which for many of them could, until then, 
hardly have been more than visions conjured by drillbook plates or distant 
memories. 
In the camps, it was to the manoeuvres that most time was devoted: 'as 
the feet and not the arms will be exercised', ran the controlling dictum. 
29 
Major manoeuvres, mock battles, and large-scale reviews were conducted re- 
peatedly in all camps. As ever, the Hanoverian Kings paid the closest at- 
tention; and by so doing they encouraged intensive efforts. Thus George I 
reviewed the horse in Hyde Park camp on 20 August 1722, 'where His Majesty 
was pleased to express his intire Satisfaction with the good Appearance the 
Troops made'; and he travelled on to Salisbury camp next where he reviewed 
four regiments of horse and seven of foot, a particularly large concentra- 
tion. 
30 
Later, in September, the news-sheets were reporting that the 
grenadiers in Hyde Park would soon put on a 'fine Exercise' for the King, 
since recently 'a great Quantity of Paper Hand-Grenadoes were brought up to 
the Tower from Woolwich' . 
31 
George II visited all of the main 1740 and 
1741 camps. The most senior general officers too frequently held reviews, 
Lt-Gen Sir John Mordaunt for example holding a 'general review and exercise' 
of the two regiments of horse and six of foot at Blandford camp on 31 
August 1756.32 George III took much interest in the camps. Not only did 
he see Howe's light infantry, fresh from camp, go through their drill and 
mock fighting in Richmond Park in October 1774; but in July 1775 he at- 
tended a special demonstration performed by the 1st and 3rd battalions of 
the Royal Artillery, held near Chatham (Townshend, the Master General, 
having himself put these artillerymen through their paces a month earlier). 
33 
On 12 August 1778 the whole of the very large force assembled at Coxheath 
29. Campbell Dalrymple, op. cit., 165. By "arms" he referred, of course, 
to the manual and platoon exercises. 
30. The Daily Courant, 22 Aug. 1722; The Weekly Journal or Saturday's-Post, 
1 Sept. 1722; and The London Gazette, 4 Sept. 1722. See also C. Knight, op. 
cit., II, Pt. I, 104. Three battalions which arrived at Salisbury from 
Hungerford camp came especially for the grand review. 
31. The Weekly Journal or Saturday's-Post, 22 Sept. 1722. 
32. R. Wright, op. cit., 348-9. 
33. Townshend's manoeuvres are in the Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 095/9A and 
9B; and details of the King's review are in /18, /19, and /20. 
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was rehearsing for a royal review, the actual event being attended by the 
King and Queen, escorted by Lord Amherst; 
34 
and later the King saw the forces 
at Winchester where a fine series of manoeuvres was gone through - the 
soldiers (according to an excited local correspondent), being 'emulous in 
their endeavours to make a proper appearance on the occasion'. 
35 
So late 
as 1792, a special camp was set up at Bagshot, near Windsor, to demonstrate 
to the King the new system of drill devised by Dundas. 
36 
The Duke of York, 
as C-in-C, was as zealous as had been his predecessors in the business of 
reviewing camps; and although those formed in the wars against Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France are beyond our period, camps of 1793 through 1796 
were being used to train the foot in Britain to the new 1792 Regulations, 
already established in Ireland. 
37 
Formal reviews occupied much less of the time of the regiments en- 
camped, of course, than did major marches, manoeuvres, and mock battles. 
We have space here only to outline these activities. At Winchester camp 
in Sept., 1778, a fort put up for the purpose was attacked and 'destroyed', 
and 'a mock engagement... was carried on with great dexterity' along with 
several other 'wonderful manoeuvres'; seven battalions and guns were em- 
ployed. 
38 
In August 1778 at Warley Common half the troops defended a wood 
against repeated assaults by the rest, supported by artillery; and al- 
though the attacking force was several times repulsed, their retreat was 
'dexterously covered and secured by the light infantry and grenadiers'. A 
similar attack was performed a month later at Warley in the presence of Lord 
Amherst, 'several of the Nobility, [and] British and Foreign General 
Officers'. Among the many manoeuvres performed by the four regular and eight 
militia battalions camped there, 'a line of march was... formed, and the 
flanking companies forming upon the right of the line, began a severe 
34. The General Evening post, 15 Aug. 1778; and C. Herbert, art. cit., 142-3. 
35. The General Evening Post, 22 Sept. 1778. On large-scale reviews at 
Warley camp, see the same paper for 22 Aug. and 24 Sept. 1778. For Amherst's 
1779 Warley review, see WO 34/114, f. 48; and for his 1781 Warley review see 
WO 34/196, F. 68. Warley reviews were always sizeable affairs. 
36. WO 3/10, pp. 109-73 passim; /27, pp. 116-7; and WO 55/379, p. 123. See 
also C. Knight, op. cit., II, Pt. I, 245-6. From 23 July until 8 Aug. 1792, the 
2nd, 3rd, 14th, and 29th of Foot, plus the 10th and 11th Dragoons, camped at 
Bagshot under the Duke of Richmond's command. Although intended to show the 
King the new regulation manoeuvres worked up by Dundas and Pitt in the Dublin 
garrison, the Adjutant General wrote that Bagshot was planned with the inten- 
tion 'of shewing His M. ... a few Corps of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, 
formed into one Body, the Combined Movements of which, while they gave 
Satisfaction to His M-y, would at the same time prove an useful Lesson to of- 
ficers in general; such especially as had never been employed on Actual 
Service'. WO 3/10, p. 164. 
37. The camps of 1793-94 were essentially staging camps to feed the army 
in the Low Countries; and there was much confusion, too, as the army ex- 
panded at this time. For these reasons we have not studied these camps in detail. 
38. The General Evening Post, 22 Sept. 1778. 
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firing. The grenadiers and light infantry companies were detached to force 
them to quit their position, when a desperate firing ensued, and they drove 
the enemy from the field. '39 In the 1757 Isle of Wight camp the ten regu- 
lar battalions, two composite battalions of Marines, and the artillery were 
practising siege warfare, digging entrenchments and building fortifica- 
tions. 
40 
At Kinsale camp in 1778 the light companies of nine battalions 
were exercised at skirmishing tactics, rather as Howe's companies had been 
drilled at Salisbury; 
41 
and in the countryside around Kinsale, meanwhile, 
very elaborate, realistic, and tactically sophisticated encounters between 
large opposing forces were carried out: during one such, the leading ele- 
ments of an advancing "army", after staging a series of feints which in- 
volved clearing a wood and street-fighting in a village, succeeded in gain- 
ing a river crossing in the face of much superior forces. Infantry, field 
artillery, and light cavalry all took part. 
42 
In 1779 Lt-Gen George Lane 
Parker at Warley sought to introduce more realism by marching his troops 
through rough country. Lt-Gen William Haviland at Plymouth, in 1781, 
marched seven regiments of foot for a mile in two columns, and then de- 
ployed in line of battle. In 1780 the battalions in Dartford Heath march- 
ed to Gravesend and crossed the Thames to Tilbury, in a day's outing. At 
Bagshot in 1792 the whole force decamped in the night, and marched in dark- 
ness to Farnham where they made camp next day. 
43 
Coxheath was always a 
scene of much activity, including route marches and the training of pro- 
visional light and grenadier battalions. 
44 
On 13 July 1778 the Duke of 
Gloucester saw the many regiments there form columns and march 'to Langley- 
common, where a mock fight was represented, and all the variety of bush- 
fighting, ambuscading, assaults, and other military manoeuvres' were per- 
formed. 
45 
Officers and men of the Royal Artillery were present in almost 
all of the eighteenth-century camps, taking part in joint training; and in 
the bigger camps not just battalion-guns but mortars and field pieces were 
assembled, and took part in the mock battles and sieges. 
46 
The Ordnance 
also sent down Engineer officers and artificers to prepare field works, and 
39. Ibid., 22 Aug., and 24 Sept.. 
40. W. H. Hackmann, 'English Military Expeditions to the Coast of France, 
1757-1761', unpubl. University of Michigan Ph. D. thesis, 1969,33. 
41. C. Knight, ibid., II, Pt. I, 222. 
42. A summary of these operations (with an excellent "battle-map"), can be 
found in the Bucks R. O. Howard-Vyse Pprs., B/11/5, and /7. 
43. J. R. Western, op. cit., 411-2; and WO 3/27, pp. 116-7. 
44. Many details on Coxheath training are in C. Herbert, art. cit., esp. 
140-43. 
45. The General Evening Post, 16 July 1778. 
46. M. E. S. Laws, Battery Records of the Royal ArtiZZery, 1716-1859 (Wool- 
wich, 1952), passim, lists all Royal Artillery units in the camps. In the 
summer of 1775 a special artillery encampment was formed near Woolwich. See 
the detailed MS books on gun drill, c. 1775, in the Kent R. O. Sackville of 
Knole MSS, 0186/1 and /3. 
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sometimes they took along 'portable Redoubts'. 
47 
It will be clear from the foregoing that camp experience was of the 
utmost service in the advanced training of the regiments; and indeed it 
could hardly have been otherwise, given a lot as unsettled as was that 
afflicting the peacetime British Army. All of the conditions requisite for 
the serious and effective advanced training of the regiments were now 
present, where for so long they had been denied. Each regiment, in camping, 
was concentrating; each was able to call together its scattered detachments, 
troops or companies not merely for the few weeks of pre-review drill but 
for several months of the most intensive training, in conditions closely 
approximating those of actual field service. Ammunition, varied terrain, 
field equipment and time, all were plentiful; while dozens of officers with 
the experience of other units (and other arms), with different systems of 
interior economy and customary practices, were close at hand. In the camps, 
furthermore, regiments of the same arm were brigaded, and together they 
practised the all-important movements of the line of battle and the column 
of march; while regiments of different arms enjoyed (as did the general 
officers commanding) the unique training experience of mutual tactical co- 
operation and support. In the camps the most realistic advanced training, 
therefore, was carried on intensively for extended periods. 
0 
The utility of the camps is clear; and we might best judge the 
efficacy of camp experience by looking not at regiments which came into 
the camps 'fit for service', but rather at the records of those which came 
in poorly trained, or otherwise unfit for service. Several examples of 
units in this latter condition can be followed, and point the same con- 
clusion. Typical was the 69th Foot which camped at Warley in 1778, at 
Coxheath in 1779, at Ranmore Common and at Gosport in 1780, before going 
on campaign late in 1780. Reviewed in Britain in 1777, before camping, 
the regiment was in good order but half made up of recruits; it was not 
yet 'fit for service', consequently. Seen at Coxheath late in 1779, it was 
reported 'well, steady and attentive under Arms, performs what is required 
of them with precision, and... very fit for any Service' . 
48 
The 30th Foot 
was in the Dublin garrison in 1777, camped at Clonmell in 1778, and camp- 
ed again in Ireland in 1779 before sailing for service in the southern 
colonies and the West Indies in 1781. Reviewed at Dublin late in 1777, the 
corps was 'dirty', 'slovenly', with the men 'marching very uneven and not 
compact, always waving from side to side, frequently stragling and flying 
out from each other'. The manoeuvres and firings were all badly performed; 
47. WO 3/27, p. 116. 
48. WO 27/35, and /42. 
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and in short 'This Regiment requires an immensity of care and attention'. 
Seen after Clonmell camp service, however, the 30th late in 1778 was per- 
forming complicated manoeuvres, and was in all respects fit for service. 
49 
There were other poor regiments, suffering from various ills. When Huske's 
23rd Foot was seen at Leicester in February 1757, recently returned from 
the Minorca disaster, it was in a most deplorable condition; yet the regi- 
ment was fully restored during the summer and autumn at Chatham camp, and 
went on to take part in the epic advance at Minden. 
50 
When Bentinck's 5th 
Foot was seen at Salisbury in 1755, it was 'too full of Recruits to be as 
yet fit for Service'; but by mid-1759 (having camped during the previous 
three seasons), the 5th was in excellent condition. 
51 
Bentinck's was an 
Irish regiment transferred to England in 1755, there to recruit up to the 
British establishment. When seen in May 1755 it was composed of 420 rank 
and file of whom half were recruits; by September 1759 it numbered 873 rank 
and file, almost all of whom were trained soldiers. Other regiments fol- 
lowed this pattern, new-raised regiments included. The 79th Foot, raised 
by the city of Liverpool from January 1778, camped for four months at 
Warley during the summer and autumn of that year and was deemed fit to go 
abroad in March 1779 - only fourteen months after being raised. The 87th 
Foot spent the summer and autumn of 1779 at Plymouth camp (it was in fact 
raised in the camp); and the regiment embarked upon active service early 
in 1780. The 2/73rd was raised in Scotland in 1777 and spent four months 
in Kingsand camp during the 1779 season; and soon after it joined the 
Gibraltar garrison and took part in the epic defence of that place, 
52 
Of the twenty-nine marching battalions to camp in England and Ireland 
between 1778 and 1782, sixteen had been unfit for service upon the forma- 
tion fo their camps; and of these nine were drafted regiments, using the 
camps as concentration centres where they could train and rebuild in ideal 
conditions. 
53 
As we noted earlier, eleven of the battalions serving in 
America were totally drafted there, their officers and nco's returning 
home to rebuild the regiments anew; and from among these came the nine 
battalions in question. The 18th Foot was typical of them all. In North 
America since 1767 and drafted there in 1775, the regiment was at Coxheath 
in 1778, at Warley in 1779, and at Tiptree in 1780. By the time that the 
18th had amassed eight months of camp experience it was reported by a 
49. WO 27/37, and /41. 
50. WO 27/4. 
51. WO 27/3, and /6. 
52. P. R. N. Katcher, op. cit., passim. 
53. These were the 6th, 10th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 26th, 45th, 50th, 52nd, 
59th, and 65th; all but the 16th and 26th camped in England after being 
drafted. 
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reviewing officer to be in fine condition, well trained and fit for 
service. 
54 
The 6th Foot was drafted in America late in 1776, and the 
skeleton sent home. Rebuilding in England, the 6th camped at Warley in 
1778, at Coxheath in 1779, and at Playden Heights in 1780 - where it was 
reported fully trained. 
55 
Inspection reports on the other drafted regi- 
ments show the same progress; and despite the very great difficulty in 
obtaining recruits during these years, a problem which slowed somewhat 
the training of all units, comparison with another drafted regiment (the 
26th), indicates that the camped, rebuilt at least a year more quickly than 
was normally the case. 
56 vor s 
The efficacy of camp training is clear. But how many regiments actually 
experienced it? Of the seventy-eight battalions of Foot Guards, marching 
Foot, and Marines which saw service in the Low Countries and Germany, in 
Britain, on the French coast, in the Mediterranean, and in the Americas 
during the 1739-48 war, twenty-four only enjoyed camp training; and of the 
twenty-three regiments of horse to see active service in the Low Countries, 
Germany and Britain, ten had seen camp service. Of the sixty-eight bat- 
talions of Foot Guards and marching Foot which composed the regular army 
during the war, only eighteen saw camp duty. 
During the 1756-63 war, fourteen regiments of horse and seventeen 
battalions of foot served in Germany, arriving in two contingents in 1758 
and 1760. Of this foot, all save three battalions had had camp training 
before embarking, some of the battalions having been encamped during three 
and four consecutive seasons; 
57 
and half of the horse regiments had done 
camp duty before embarking. The regiments sent to North America and the. 
West Indies, where at least forty-six regular battalions saw service at 
different times during the war, were much less well prepared than those 
which were sent to Germany. Most of them, whether sent out from Europe 
or raised in America, got their advanced training the hard way, "in the 
field. Since over half of the regiments which crossed the Atlantic during 
this war came from Ireland, we have no specific details of their previous 
camp activities; but it is almost a certainty that none of them had, in 
fact, camped. 
58 Of the battalions which came from Britain some were almost 
54. WO 27/36, and /42. 
55. WO 27/42, and. /45. 
56. WO 27/47, /49, and /53, Pt. l. 
57. The 5th Foot, for example camped at Chatham in 1756, at Blandford and 
the Isle of Wight in 1757, the Isle of Wight again in 1758, and at Sandheath 
in 1759. The 8th and 33rd of Foot, both of which also served in Germany, 
likewise spent four summers in the camps before sailing. 
58. Camping was of limited value to Irish regiments intended for service 
abroad, prior to the 1770 change in establishments; for the augmentation of 
their skeletal strength by great numbers of drafts and recruits, when they 
left that Kingdom, changed entirely the character of the unit and (in the 
short term), reduced considerably its proficiency. 
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raw (the 2/42nd, 77th, and 78th, all Highland regiments); and of the others 
most were recently raised units formed between 1755 and 1761; most of these 
had had time to prepare themselves 'fit for service', but none save the 
handful which had gone on the Belle-Isle expedition had any experience of 
active service. 
59 
Of them all, only eight battalions had had previous camp 
experience. 
Thus of the eighty -three battalions of Foot Guards and marching Foot 
which saw service in Germany, Portugal, the West Indies, America, India, 
the Mediterranean, or upon the French coasts during the 1756-63 war, thirty- 
three only are known to have experienced advanced training in the camps; 
and of the fifteen regiments of horse to campaign in Germany and Portugal, 
seven had seen camp service. Of the one hundred and twenty-six marching 
regiments of Foot which composed the army during the war, only thirty-four 
saw camp duty. 
Not until 1778, when the French became open belligerents, were camps 
necessary in the 1775-83 war; and consequently, of the seventy-nine 
battalions of foot and two regiments of horse which saw service in the West 
Indies and North America during the war, all save twenty battalions had 
crossed the Atlantic before the first camps were formed. 
60 
Of all the 
battalions to serve in the Americas only nine camped before embarking; 
and of these six served in the West Indies and only three in North America, 
and none of them saw much action. Of the total of ninety-eight battalions 
of Foot Guards and marching Foot, and two regiments of horse, which saw 
service in North America, the West Indies, the Mediterranean garrisons, 
India, or on board the fleet, during the war, only sixteen battalions 
camped before going on active service. Of the one hundred and eighteen 
battalions of Foot Guards and marching Foot composing the army during the 
war, twenty-nine battalions saw camp training; and of the thirty regi- 
ments of horse, twenty saw camp service. 
As the figures given above illustrate, it was always a minority of 
the regiments composing the army which actually encamped at all. During 
the 1739-48 war, one-third of the foot and less than half the horse 
camped; during the 1756-63 war, less than a third of the foot camped and 
only one-quarter of the horse did so; and during the 1775-83 war only 
one-quarter of the foot camped, while as much as two-thirds of the horse 
59. Not that Belleisle service gave them much of an advantage. The 90th 
(raised in 1759), 94th (r. 1760), 97th (r. 1760), and 98th (r. 1761) all came 
to the West Indies from that place, where the army commander had considered 
them all to be 'undisciplined and ignorant of their duty'. W. K. Hackmann, 
op. cit., 173. 
60. Of these seventy-nine, the 84th and 105th were raised in North 
America, and the 99th in Jamaica. 
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(the only exception) did so. This was all invaluable experience, for the 
regiments lucky enough to enjoy it; but since it was not in peacetime 
but rather in wartime that advanced training was carried on most effect- 
ively, most realistically, and most intensively, it was while actually 
in the field abroad that the majority of regiments were obliged to carry 




ADVANCED TRAINING IN THE FIELD 
In the routine of peacetime service, extensive concentration-time was 
a luxury seldom afforded the great majority of regiments; and so it was in 
wartime, when the dispersed companies and troops were concentrated in full 
regimental strength either in the encampments at home or in the field 
abroad, that the regiments at last enjoyed the opportunity to carry on 
intensive advanced training. We have seen that, as a rule, less than one- 
third of the regiments were fortunate enough to spend so much as a single 
season in the camps, prior to embarking on board the transports for the 
overseas theatres of operations; and hence it was only when actually ar- 
rived in the theatres that the bulk of the army was able to devote itself 
to sustained advanced training. 
The detailed firings and manoeuvres drawn from the regulations and 
from customary practice were now practised endlessly and vigorously by 
the regiments both individually and in brigade. We cannot too strongly 
stress _. 
how utterly commonplace this activity was, while in the 
field, from at least as early as the campaigns of Marlborough; 
1 
and it 
was as characteristic of the army abroad, in wartime, as was endless 
repetition of the mechanical basics typical of the army in peacetime. 
Advanced training was carried on year-round, as weather permitted: it 
was done most intensively in the garrisons and cantonments late in the 
winter and through the spring as the army prepared to take the field with 
the coming campaigning season; and whenever opportunities arose during 
the campaigns themselves - as they very frequently did, given the gen- 
erally slow pace at which operations were conducted -a great deal more 
was carried on. Nor was it only regulation and customary drill which 
1. From the beginning of the century we find orders to this effect. Thus 
a general order given out by Orkney to 'all Commanding Officers of ye 
British Infantry' in Flanders, in the winter quarters of 1711-12, directed 
'All Commanding Officers, to take Care that ye Officers Sarjents and 
Corpls of their Regimts be made p'fect in ye Exercise as soon as possible, 
They likewise to have there Regiments out to Exercise Once a week'. BM Add. 
MS 29,477, f. 13. The 1755 Standing Orders (p. 194), reflecting the wartime 
practice of 1742-48, directed that when serving in the field the command- 
ing officers of all regiments were to 'exercise their Battalions, at least 
once a week'. 
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regiments practised in this fashion. The commanders of armies serving in 
the field - and, in one or two cases, of expeditionary forces assembling 
in England - often made additions to or revisions in the currently- 
practised drill, in an effort to adapt the units serving under their command 
to the peculiar tactical conditions prevailing in specific theatres. At 
the same time field engineering, the petite guerre, ranginnservice and the 
like - activities with which most officers had heretofore been acquainted 
only in their studies - had now to be practised in earnest, where ap- 
propriate. 
The regiments had need of this training. Most went to war well 
trained in the basics but insufficiently trained at the advanced elements 
of the drill; most went to war with little or no experience of manoeuvring 
in brigade, let along in the lines and columns adopted on campaign by the 
army as a whole; and most went to war not long after taking in considerable 
numbers of drafts and new recruits, together with a half-dozen or so young 
and inexperienced subalterns. The peacetime training given the army was 
insufficient to enable it adequately to perform its tactical role, when 
first brought before the enemy; and many regiments suffered, in con- 
sequence, during their initial encounters. Since only a minority camped 
before proceeding abroad, most were obliged to learn their business on the 
spot; and it was to require as much as two or three campaigns before the 
army became sufficiently expert at its business, and thus formidable. 
We can illustrate this pattern, just described, by studying the per- 
formance of the regiments in initial engagements of the wars of our period, 
and by considering the training carried on during successvie campaigns. 
Initial inadequacy followed by intensive practise was a general pattern, it 
will be appreciated, wherever the enemy was militarily competent; and 
such was the case in all of the wars of the century save that of 1775-83, 
where the army was dealing initially with untrained amateurs and so was 
successful on the battlefield from the ou}set. Since the wars were so 
frequent, we cannot of course cover each of the many campaigns, much less 
do so in detail; and consequently we have limited ourselves to the key 
initial actions and successive campaigns of the Austrian Succession and 
Seven Years' Wars. These wars suit our purposes because, between them, they 
saw the army upon the most widespread and varied service - from Germany and 
the Low Countries to Scotland, and from New France and New York to the West 
Indies - and so between them embrace the full range of activities upon 
which the army was to find itself engaged during our period. 
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Where the training of the regiments was concerned, the same overall 
pattern was to prevail in the field in both wars, although there were dif- 
ferences in detail. The training carried on over the years 1740-48 was 
based almost entirely upon the 1728 Regulations, and on the several orders 
which had supplemented those regulations; and as we noted earlier (Chapt. 
III), only by the closing years of the Austrian Succession war were some 
slight departures from this body of regulation drill being made - de- 
partures which were to be brought together and themselves made regulation 
practice at the mid-1750's. Whereas Cumberland in Scotland made slight 
modifications in the drill and countenanced the minor changes which took 
place in Flanders, c. 1746-48, in general he saw to it that the regiments 
practised their drill quite 'as the Book directs'; and in so doing 
he was only repeating injunctions given out by all of the commanders-in- 
chief who served during the century. 
2 
The 1750's, however, were to be 
years of some change and innovation in the army's drill, stimulated by 
the experience of the late campaigns and by the study of Prussian and 
French models; and innovation was to be further encouraged by the tact- 
ical demands of those widely-flung theatres in which considerable British 
forces were to be engaged, during the Seven Year' War. The 'fertile 
geniuses' were to make their appearance in considerable numbers; and 
their innovations, although seldom more than practical adaptations of the 
regulation drill to fit specific circumstances, add a dimension to the 
campaigns of 1755-63 not seen in those of 1740-48. But none of this 
changed the overall pattern of initial incapacity and intensive 
practise. 
By 1740 the army had passed through a quarter-century of peace inter- 
rupted only occasionally and briefly by brush-fire action against the 
Spaniards and the Jacobites. Having been dispersed for so long, it was in 
the English camps of 1740 and 1741, and then in the Flanders cantonments 
of 1742 and early 1743, that intensive training at the level of the regi- 
ment was at last allowed to proceed little-disturbed. The immediate 
results were, however, dismal -a powerful condemnation of the training 
carried out during the preceding quarter-century, and a graphic illustra- 
tion of the influence of the friction of peace. During the early years of 
the new war it was the fire-discipline of the British foot which was found 
most wanting; and this was remarkable since, as we have seen, it was with 
2. As early as Marlborough's campaigns, a general order given out in 
Flanders ran: '[Regimental] Adjutants are constantly to keep to all the 
Rules and Forms of Discipline and Exercise established by Authority; and on 
no Pretence whatever are to change, or let fall, any of the said Customs 
without Orders. ' Anon., Rudiments of War (1777), 156. This was to be a gen- 
eral refrain in all British armies for the rest of the century. 
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the intricacies and the efficacy of the platoon-fire system that the drill- 
books and the regimental officers of the period had chiefly been concerned. 
Dettingen, fought on 27 June 1743, was the first large-scale, formal 
battle in which considerable numbers of British troops were engaged since 
Sheriffmuir, in 1715 - or perhaps since Malplaquet, in 1709. It is the 
first of the three main actions in which we shall be considering the per- 
formance of the regiments; for those engaged at Dettingen had been out of 
the British Isles only a year. 
At Dettingen the British foot held the left wing of the Pragmatic 
Army's order of battle, and the British horse made up the bulk of the 
cavalry present. 
3 
As the Allied lines advanced to close the thousand yards 
separating them from the French at the opening of the battle, there ap- 
peared the first fruits of a quarter-century of peacetime training followed 
by a year of intensive drill: ragged fire began to erupt here and there 
from the British battalions, although they were still far beyond effective 
range. Two officers likened it to a feu de joie, as other battalions down 
the line likewise opened fire, 'tho no Ennemy was at that time almost with- 
in Cannon Shot of some Corps which Fired'; it was 'neither directed by 
officers nor regulated in platoons'. 
4 
Several battalions 'popp'd at one 
hundred paces', doing little execution, observed an officer with Peers' 
23rd of Foot. 
5 
Jeffrey Amherst reported that 'our Foot fired too soon & 
in too great a Hurry'. 
6 
James Wolfe, then a young adjutant with Duroure's 
12th of Foot, spent much of the day 'begging and ordering the men not to 
fire at too great a distance... but to little purpose. The whole fired when 
they thought they could reach them, which had like to have ruined us. We 
did very little execution with it. '7 When arrived within range, the French 
cavalry advanced upon the allied foot - prompting the officer commanding 
one of the English battalions ('who was probably prepossessed with Ideas 
of Actions collected from books, or Old Soldiers Accounts') to enquire of 
a general officer standing nearby 'whether he shou'd Fire at them by 
Platoons or Ranks'. The reply was as follows: 'Keep your Battalion in a 
Line with the Regiments on your Right and Left, if you perceive any of 
them to give way, look Sharp and Guard your Flanks, give great 
attention to prevent your Men from falling into confusion after they 
have Fired and are loading again... [and] as to Platoon or Rank 
3. Of the several modern accounts of the battle, the best is M. Orr, 
Dettingen, 1743 (1972). 
4. Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, II, f. 4; and Ibid., 57. 
5. The Gentleman's Magazine (July, 1743), 381-87, contains several eye- 
witness accounts. 
6. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 01/1,27 June 1743 NS. 
7. Beckles Willson, op. sit., 37. The Austrian foot behaved in this fashion at 
Guastalla, in Sept 1734, as an officer recounts in HMC, CZements MSS (1913), p. 408. 
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firing I shall be glad to see you perform either in Action, but I 
own I never did yet on a Field day or at a Review. i8 
Such a reply may have been realistic, but can hardly have been com- 
forting to an officer trained all his career to attempt controlled fire; 
but with 'our Men, being then Novices', as Maj John LaFaussille described 
them, no more could be expected. 
9 
And so the firing continued for the rest 
of the day, some officers in fact quite approving it. Lt-Col Charles 
Russell of the 1st Foot Guards wrote that the infantry 'were under no command 
by way of Hide Park firing, but the whole three ranks made a running 
fire of their own accord... with great judgement and skill, stooping 
all as low as they could, making almost every ball take place. . . The 
French fired in the same manner... without waiting for words of command, 
and Lord Stair did often say he had seen many a battle, and never saw 
the infantry engage in any other manner. '10 
The running fire which the foot used that day was effective, fortunate- 
ly, when the lines got within range; but it did not accomplish what Bland, 
Kane, and the rest saw in the controlled platoon systems - that is, it did 
not keep off the French horse - and so the army courted disaster. The 
French cavalry broke into the lines of foot - some of them rode through 
Campbell's 21st and caught Huske's 32nd in the act of forming square 
(Huske's grenadiers kept them off long enough to complete the manoeuvre) - 
and most of the left-wing battalions seem to have been obliged to form 
square, until the British cavalry came to their assistance and restored the 
situation. Had the French foot closely supported their own horse, the 
British must have been defeated. 
Though the cavalry made a number of timely charges during the course of 
the battle, their conduct too left much to be desired. When the maison du 
roi was among the British squares, The Blues, the 2nd, and the 4th Horse were 
sent to drive them off. Over-eager, they broke their order by advancing at 
a gallop, and then topped off this blunder by firing their pistols rather 
than falling on with their swords. The 2nd Horse actually collided with The 
Blues, and both had to fall back to reform. 
11 
The behaviour of all the 
cavalry - save for the 3rd Dragoons, who early in the battle sacrificed 
themselves by attacking the whole of the horse of the maison du roi - was 
thought to be very bad by most officers. 'Our Horse had like to have broke 
our first line in the confusion', wrote Wolfe. 
12 
Russell felt that the 
behaviour of the troopers of The Blues, in particular, 'was scandalous', 
8. Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, II, f. 4. 
9. Ibid. 
10. M. Orr, op. cit., 65. Russell went so far as to observe that, in this manner, 
not the generals but rather 'our men and their regimental officers gained the 
day; not in the manner of Hyde Park discipline, but our foot almost kneeled 
down by whole ranks, and so fired upon 'em'. HMC Chequers Court MSS(1910), p. 260. 
11. M. Orr, ibid., 59-60. 
12. Beckles Willson, op. cit., 36. 
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adding that 'one general officer had ordered some platoons of his regiment 
to present and was going to fire upon the latter cavalry, but in consider- 
ation of the officers of that corps prevented it'. The Blues, he said, 
'fairly one and all faced to the right about and never stood their ground', 
while the 2nd Horse 'pretty near followed their example' and the 4th Horse 
'behaved the least ill, but bad enough'. In short, the cavalry in his 
estimation had not done their duty: 'our foot did their business for 'em, 
(and] they may properly be said to be routed and beat by the enemy's horse'. 
13 
The dragoons seem to have behaved better, though the 4th and 6th Dragoons 
were twice repulsed with loss by the French cavalry. Hawley's lst Royals, 
like Bland's 3rd, performed very well indeed; but neither Hawley nor Bland 
were colonels likely to suffer anything less from their regiments. During 
the later stages of the battle the whole of the British cavalry, now rallied, 
launched a series of effective charges - 'but not with so much success, 
tho' they had vastly the advantage by weight of their horses', wrote Maj 
Charles Colville of the 21st Foot. 
14 
So went the battle of Dettingen, in which all the regiments after a 
year of advanced training in their Flanders and Rhineland cantonments showed 
themselves still to be poorly disciplined and tactically clumsy, and as yet 
inadequately prepared to perform the drill. They were however successful 
- though it was admitted that their success was due as much to Grammont's 
folly as to their own prowess. 
Stair's forces at Dettingen, though not proficient, had at least the 
advantage of a year's training behind them; and most of those regiments 
had been in the 1740 and 1741 camps. The regiments which fought at 
Prestonpans on 2 October 1745, the first engagement of the Jacobite re- 
bellion, were not so lucky. Engaged under Cope at Prestonpans were 
Gardiner's 13th and Hamilton's 14th Dragoons, together with Murray's 46th, 
Lascelles' 47th, and five companies of Lee's 44th of Foot; two companies 
of Guise's 6th and one of the Black Watch were also present. None of these 
corps (save the handful from the 6th) had ever been in action. The 13th 
and 14th Dragoons had been raised in Ireland in 1715, and had been there 
ever since; only in 1742 had they been brought over to England. The 44th, 
46th, and 47th of Foot were all new-raised, raising in Britain early in 
1741 and doing duty there since. The Jacobite rising found them all in 
the usual state of dispersal which characterized the normal routine of the 
duty of Great Britain; and only from late August were they in concentration. 
'All the few Troops of this Country are raw, ' Cope reported in consequence, 
13. HMC Chequers Court MSS (1900), pp. 257,266-7. 
14. J. 0. Robson, (ed), 'Military Memoirs of Lt-Gen The Hon. Charles 
Colville', JSAHR, 26 (1948), 118. 
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'and unused to taking the Field. '15 
Prestonpans lasted about five minutes. 
16 
The English line was drawn 
up with a dragoon regiment upon each flank and the foot in the centre. There 
was no second line, and there were only two squadrons in reserve. The 
position was a fair one - 'There is not in the whole of the ground between 
Edinburgh and Dunbar, a better Spot for both Horse and Foot to act upon', 
said Cope17 - and since the opposing forces were about equal in numbers 
the day should have been decided by disciplined volley-fire. The foot drew 
up 'with Great Spirit, and the utmost Exactness', testified Col Peregrine 
Lascelles, 'in perfect good Order, to attack or receive the Rebels'; 
18 
and 
that done, said Lt-Col Halkett of the 44th, the field officers with the foot 
proceded 'to divide into Platoons and Firings', telling-off according to 
the 
-1-728 
Regulations, as was proper. 
19 
The Highlanders now came rushing 
pon 
downAthe front and right of the English line ('with a Swiftness not to be 
conceived'); and with that the dragoons stationed upon the right flank, 
though ordered to advance, 'immediately turned their Backs, and ran off 
with the greatest Precipitation', said Lt-Col Whitefoord of the Train. 
20 
The panic of the right flank squadrons immediately communicated itself to 
those upon the left and in reserve, and they followed suit - indeed, 'all 
of them so much at the same Instant, that it's difficult to say, which run 
first', testified Cope. 
21 
The foot, meanwhile, had attempted to fire into 
the Highlanders coming down upon them, sword in hand; but they got off only 
one or at the best two very ragged discharges (hardly vallies). Cope 
testified - generously -that 'our Foot gave them their Fire'; more ac- 
curately Lord Drummore, who was observing the action from behind the English 
line, testified that 'the Fire of our Foot was infamous, Puff, Puff, no 
Platoon that I heard', and most other officers concurred. 
22 
If the foot 
failed to fire by platoons, they broke and ran in that fashion: Maj Talbot 
of the 46th, standing on the left of the line, saw 'the breaking of the 
Foot, come on regularly, as it were by Platoons, from the Right to the 
15. R. Jarvis, op. cit., I, 11. 
16. The best account of Prestonpans is to be drawn from the testimony 
given at the enquiry held later, at the Horse Guards, and published as Anon., 
Report of the Proceedings... of the Board of General Officers on Their 
Examination of Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope... Colonel Peregrine 
LasceZZes, and Brigadier-General Thomas Fowke... in 1745 (1749). K. Tomasson 
and F. Buist, Battles of the '45 (1967), is thoroughly trustworthy; and 
R. Jarvis, op. cit., Is 3-47, sets the scene in two excellent essays. 
17. Anon., Report of the Proceedings..., 38. 
18. Ibid., 65-6. 
19. Ibid., 69. 
20. Ibid., 50. 
21. Ibid., 41. 
22. Ibid., 42,139. 
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Left', and Maj Severn of the 47th said the same thing. 
23 
To sum up, said 
Cope, 'the Pannick seiz'd the Foot... and they ran away, notwithstanding 
all the Endeavours used by their Officers to prevent it'; 'the Foot 
24 
dispersed and shifted for themselves all over the Country'. 
Braddock's 1755 expedition against Fort Duquesne was the first cam- 
paign of the new war; and the disaster which overtook his forces at the 
Monongahela, like the events which immediately preceded it, illustrates 
once again the pattern which so often prevailed in these initial campaigns. 
25 
The dispositions on the march towards the forks of the Ohio were excellent, 
as indeed they were on the day of battle. 'There Never was an Army in the 
World in more spirits than we were', wrote an officer's batman of the day 
of battle; and 'So we began our March again, Beating the grannadiers 
March all the way, Never Seasing. '26 But none of this availed. Braddock's 
regiments - the 44th and 48th of Foot, accompanied by some Provincial 
Companies - had not had sufficient time to train and were, furthermore, 
caught by the French and Indian irregulars in a difficult tactical situation. 
Attacked first in front while advancing in column through open woodland, 
Braddock's advanced party fell back in some confusion upon his van - 
rather than absorbing the initial shock and, thereby, allowing the main body 
to deploy. This confusion was compounded when the main body, coming for- 
ward along the woodland trail, became entangled with the disordered van. 
The French and Indians, meanwhile, moved down both flanks of the British 
column 'till they had Nigh Inclosed us in', and were soon pouring in from 
cover a heavy andäestructive fire. 
27 
Some part of the column was sorted 
out - the colonel of the 44th, reported one witness, 'divided his men and 
fired some platoons by his own Direction'28 - but most of the troops 
simply blazed away into the bush. Confusion slowly gave way to terror, and 
that to panic; and although the troops kept up their uncontrolled and 
largely ineffective fire for over two hours, - 
29 
they could neither be pre- 
vailed upon to counter-attack with the bayonet, nor could the officers 
23. Ibid., 57. 
24. Ibid., 50. 
25. A considerable literature surrounds this expedition, much of it excel- 
lent but more of it polemical. The best analysis of the campaign is in 
K. L. Parker, op. cit., 77-139; and without doubt the most carefully re- 
searched and balanced reconstruction of the battle is P. E. Kopperman, 
Braddock at the'MonongeheZa (Pittsburgh, 1977). After these, see C. 
Hamilton (ed), Braddock's Defeat(Univ. of Oklahoma, 1959); and R. L. Yaple, 
'Braddock's Defeat: The Theories and a Reconsideration', JSAHR, 46 (1968), 
194-201. 
26. C. Hamilton (ed), op. cit., 28. 
27. Ibid., 29. 
28. Pargellis, Military Affairs, 121. 
29. R. L. Yaple, art. cit., 195,198. 
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concert among themselves such a tactic. 'The Pannock was so universal and 
the firing so executive and uncommon that no order could ever be restor'd', 
reported an officer; 
30 
and 'Such was the confusion', said another, 'that 
the men were sometimes 20 or 30 deep, and he thought himself securest, who 
was in the Centre'. 
31 
The result was a bloody defeat and rout. 
Where the regiments caught up in the first engagement of the '45 
Rebellion had experienced no previous intensive advanced training, on 
campaign, those which fought in the first of the Pragmatic Army's battles 
and those with Braddock in the first battle of the Seven Years' War had 
all had some, for what it was worth. We described earlier the manner in 
which Braddock's regiments were taken from peacetime Irish county canton- 
ments, and their weak cadre strengths built up with drafts and recruits. 
32 
These regiments were sent to America innocent of camp experience; and they 
were in America only three months before the Monongahela battle. Facing 
a long and difficult march through a forest wilderness and liable to attack 
by a nimble and ruthless enemy who employed cover and used the tactics of 
irregulars, Braddock in the weeks available to him attempted to train his 
men to deal with the French and Indians. He 'lighten'd them as much as 
possible', leaving in stores 'their Swords and the greatest part of their 
heavy Accoutrements'; and he drilled them to form and fight in their ac- 
customed companies, rather than in the platoons where many of the men, 
told-off, would not know their officers. They practised a variety of the 
alternate fire, using the senior battalion-company in each regiment as a 
'Second Grenadier. Company upon the left', and leaving the other eight bat- 
talion-companies to form eight fire-divisions and sixteen platoons. This 
was all a very sensible modification of the current drill; and Braddock 
was pleased to report that the regiments 'behave very well and shew great 
Spirit and Zeal for the Service'. 
33 
The regiments exercised repeatedly 
during the few weeks available to them as the surviving orderly books 
show: thus at Fort Cumberland camp the 48th, eight weeks before the battle, 
'had a Field day', and together with the 44th had another field day a week 
later. 34 The Duke of Cumberland, in discussions with Braddock before the 
latter sailed, had stressed that 'the Strictest & most exact Discipline is 
always necessary, but can never be more so than on your present Service'; 
this the Duke thought essential 'to prevent any Pannick in the Troops from 
Indians, to whom the Soldiery not being yet accustomed, the French will not 
30. Pargellis, Military Affairs, 99. 
31. P. E. Kopperman, op. cit., 76. 
32. See above, pp. 37 . 33. Pargellis, Military Affairs, 82-3. 
34. C. Hamilton (ed), op. cit., 15-6. 
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fail to make all attempts towards it'. 
35 
But a few weeks of intensive 
training were insufficient to prepare these regiments, and Cumberland's 
warning proved prophetic. 
The regiments which fought at Dettingen had been on the Continent for 
a year prior to that battle, most of which time was spent in Flanders 
cantonments. No sooner had they arrived in these cantonments but they, like 
Braddock's regiments, began to practise the advanced elements of the drill. 
The journals and orderly books kept in the army in Flanders, Brabant, and 
Germany during the years 1742-48 are filled with daily entries sending 
units out to drill or to be reviewed. Typical orders, selected ar random, 
are the following taken from those issued in the brigades quartered at 
Ghent prior to Dettingen: 
36 
(18 June 1742): 'The first Battn. of Guards to march to the place of 
Exercise next Monday morning at five of clock... The 2nd Regt. on 
Tuesday, the 3rd on Thursday, & Col. Duroure's [12th Foot] on Friday 
at the same hour & place, & to continue the same weekly. ' 
(6 Sept. 1742): '[Ordered[ That Sr. Robt. Rich's [4th] Regt. of 
Dragoons be under Arms ... at Seven of clock, at their place of 
parade, & to go thro' their Exercise both on Foot & Horseback, & 
that they conform to the book of Exercise establish'd by His 
Majesty. ' 
(11 Sept. 1742): 'Genl. Hawley's Regt. [1st Dragoons] to go out to 
Exercise tomorrow at the same hour, & to observe the same orders 
given to Sr. Robt. Rich's Regt. ' 
Dettingen had shown up the unprepared condition of the regiments; and 
so during the twenty-two months between that battle and the next major en- 
gagement - at Fontenoy, in May 1745 - the army kept to its now-established 
routine of constant, almost daily practise. Typical once again are the 
orders given out in the brigades quartered at Ghent during the spring of 
1745, of which the following are random examples; 
37 
(14 March 1745): 'The weather now being warmer, the Corpls. of ye 
Several Regts. to have as many men out as they can, to perfect them 
in their marching & manual Exercise. The foot to take their motions 
from the first Regt. of guards, & the Dragoons from the Royal. 
The Awkard men to be out every day. ' 
(21 March 1745): 'The Several Battns. in Garrison to be under Arms to 
morrow morning in order to fire four Cartridges pr. Man. ' 
(25 March 1745): 'The Corpls. of the Several Grenadier Comps. to 
perfect themselves in ye grenadier Exercise, from ye first Regt. 
of guards, & care to be taken that there be no difference, or 
disparity in ye whole. ' 
(28 March 1745): 'Majr. Genl. Howard's [3rd Foot], Huske's [23rd Foot], 
& Handasydes Regt. [31st Foot] to be out tomorrow... ' 
35. Cumb. Pprs., Box 45, # 103. J. Shy, op. cit., 127-9, makes some interest- 
ing remarks on the regulars' fear of forest fighting in the Seven Years' War. 
36. Cumb. Pprs., O. B. 1, ff. 22,64,71. 
37. Ibid., 0. B. 6, ff. 116,118,120,122,126,127. 
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(6 April 1745): 'Tomorrow & Thursday the draughts & recruits to burn 
six Cartridges pr. man. ' 
(11 April 1745): 'The Several Regts. of Dragoons to be out... ' 
At Fontenoy, on 11 May 1745, the performance of all arms was a marked 
imporovement upon that shown at Dettingen, as was to be expected after so 
many more months of intensive training. The foot, indeed, performed ad- 
mirably well; and if they had to be kept on a tight rein while closing the 
French38 they performed brilliantly when actually come to grips. The con- 
trolled vollies were so effective that the Gardes Francaises panicked and 
fled; indeed, even before engaging, the Gardes had feared to enter into 
'une affaire de mousqueterie' with the English foot, knowing that it would 
have 'trop d'avantage par sa superiorite'. 
39 
Several charges were made upon 
the British front by the French horse, but were broken up by British musket- 
ry, none penetrating to within twenty paces of the line. The eventual 
withdrawal of the British foot was made possible only because they kept up 
their fire discipline, although under intense pressure; and when the army 
retreated the British horse behaved well too. 
40 
By the summer of 1745, then, that part of the army with two or three 
years' service in the Low Countries was very thoroughly trained at all as- 
pects of the service, which had not been the case in 1742 or 1743; and 
it was in most respects superior to its Bourbon adversaries. 
41 
Late in 1745 a large part of the army was hastily recalled to deal 
with the Jacobite emergency; but in the Low Countries, meanwhile, the same 
endless round was kept up in 1745 and 1746 among those regiments which had 
remained there, and was taken up by regiments returning after Culloden to 
38. LaFausille, who was at both battles, said that the British foot not 
only 'threw away their Fire to no purpose' and 'at too great a distance', 
at Dettingen, but that 'the same would have happened had it not been pre- 
vented in time at Fontenoy'. (Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4, II, f. 4). How the men were 
prevented from doing so at Fontenoy was described by an officer in one of 
the foot brigades, who heard its commanding general 'frequently giving 
directions to the Officers, to tell their Men to preserve their Ranks & keep 
their line; and to direct them to observe the word of Command, & not to 
fire till they were order'd'. (SP 87/17, f. 320). 
39. J. Colin, Les Campagnes du MarechaZ de Saxe, III (Paris, 1906), 111, 
quoting the comte de Chabannes (who commanded that part of the line struck 
by Cumberland's battalions). 
40. Ibid., 113; and J. M. White, Marshal of France. The Life and Times of 
Maurice, Comte de Saxe (New York, 1962), 152-64. 
41. This was demonstrated not only at Fontenoy but again, a few weeks later, 
in the desperate action at Melle. O,, Melle, which is tactically a most int- 
eresting affair, see H. Pichat, La campagne du marechaZ de Saxe dans les 
FZandres de Fontenoy (mai 1745) ä Za prise de Bruxelles (fe'vrier 1746) 
(Paris, 1909), 39-87; and in SP 87/19, see the accounts from Cumberland to 
Harrington, 19 July 1745 (OS); Moltke to Konigsegg, 9 July 1745; Bligh to 
Cumberland, 9 and 10 July 1745; and Abercromby to st. Clair, 10 July 
1745. 
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face the French once again. The British regiments which fought at Rocoux 
in 1746 and at Lauffeldt in 1747 behaved admirably well, being now veteran 
corps, blooded, used to the rigours of campaigning, and long since com- 
pletely familiar with and expert at the advanced elements of the drill. 
When the heavily outnumbered British (and Hannoverian) foot covered the 
withdrawal from Rocoux they 'kept their order as if they had been on a 
review before His Majesty, at every halt facing where the enemy appeared', 
wrote Ligonier; 'and let me tell you... they must be good troops that will 
do that'. 
42 
Lauffeldt was very hard-fought, the British cavalry in part- 
icular performing well, taking part in one of the largest cavalry en- 
counters of the century, involving some two hundred squadrons. 
43 
Even so late as 1747 and 1748, intensive training was still a daily 
feature. Thus in the camp of the brigades composed of Howard's 3rd, Huske's 
23rd, Crawford's 25th, and Johnson's 33rd of Foot, typical orders were as 
follows: 
44 
(9 April 1747, Bois-le-Duc): 'The Regiments are to form to morrow in 
Battalions, and afterwards to march by in eighteen Platoons, Grena- 
diers included... ' 
(7 May, 1747, Westmael camp): 'The 2 Battalions of the first, and the 
2 Battalions of the 2nd. Brigade to be under Arms to morrow morn- 
ing at 8 o'Clock, in order to be review'd by H. R. H. ... 8 Field 
Pieces with their proper Officers and Men to joyn them in order to 
go thro' the fireings. ' 
(22 May 1747, Schilde camp): 'the British Artillery will exercise and 
fire to morrow... ' 
A typical regiment, Argyll's 21st of Foot, was going through a similar round 
in its Low Countries' cantonments that year; the lieutenant-colonel of the 
21st noted the following in his journal, for example: 
45 
(31 March 1747): 'The whole Regiment assembled on a moor near the 
head quarters, and went thro' their exercises. ' 
(14 April 1747): 'Yesterday the Regiment... went thro' all their 
exercise. The Duke [of Cumberland] being out riding, the firing 
drew him that way, and he came unexpected and reviewed the 
Regiment, which was lucky enough to have his approbation. ' 
(16 April. 1747): 'Orders came from the Duke that he was to review our 
Regiment and four more... ' 
(28 April 1747): 'The Regiment was under arms, and went thro' all their 
exercise with powder. ' 
(7 May 1747): 'Our Regiment, the Welsh Fusiliers [23rd], Johnson's 
[33rd], and Flemings [36th] were reviewed by the Duke... ' 
42. R. Whitworth, op. cit., 141. 
43. For the 1746 campaign and Rocoux, and the 1747 campaign and Lauffeldt, 
see Ibid., 126-67, and J. M. White, op. cit., 179-92,204-29. 
44. Ipswich & E. Suffolk R. O. Albemarle MSS, 461/99,9 Apr. 1747; 461/100,7 
May 1747; and 461/101,22 May 1747. 
45. J. O. Robson, art-cit., 27 (1949), 73-8 passim. 
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Even during the uneventful campaign of 1748, in Brabant, the drilling 
continued. The Duke of Cumberland, for example reviewed several units both 
British and Allied in July at the 'camp of Nestelroy', near Bois-le-Duc, 
where on 9 July he saw fourteen squadrons of British dragoons perform an 
intricate series of manoeuvres. At Eindhoven on 26 September he saw the 
2/1st Foot Guards go through the whole of the review exercise, evolutions, 
and manoeuvres. 
46 
Lt-Col Colville and his 21st of Foot were still hard at 
it too, among these regiments, for on 8 July he noted that 'H. R. H. had 
another course of reviews of all the Regiments and saw Lee's (44th Foot] 
and ours on a common about half way betwixt our two quarters... All the 
Regiments had exercise and firing once a week according to orders. '47 For 
the regiments on campaign in the Low Countries, therefore, the war ended 
as it began, practising daily their advanced drill. 
Endless training of this sort was typical in regiments campaigning 
on the Continent; and although they arrived in Germany quite forward in 
their advanced drill the same round of training was followed by the regi- 
ments which served in the Allied army under Ferdinand of Brunswick, during 
the campaigns of 1758-62. Most of these regiments went out from Britain 
with at least two seasons in the camps behind them; several had spent three 
seasons in the camps, and a few had spent as many as four. Of the seven- 
teen battalions of foot sent to Germany, twelve had in addition to camping 
already seen some active service on the French coastal raids of 1757 and 
1758. Only a few days after disembarking at Emden - although troubled 
'by extream long Marches, over very heavy sands, & no water to refresh 
them' - the soldiers of the first contingent were reported 'all so eager 
to join Prince Ferdinand before a Battle, that they make no complaints of 
any fatigue or difficulty'. 
48 
It was thought best to keep these regi- 
ments in quiet quarters, however, while they continued their training; 
and so through the last three months of the 1758 campaign they were not 
engaged, nor were they drawn from their winter quarters to join in 
Ferdinand's April 1759 advanced into Hesse which brought on the battle of 
Bergen. Only in June were the British regiments brought into the field to 
play a full part in operations. 
In the meantime the British had been training intensively, as the 
orderly books once again illustrate: the following are taken at random 
from the orders given out in the brigades in Munster: 
49 
46. Detailed plans of these reviews are in the Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 05/1 
through 03/8. 
47. J. 0. Robson, art. cit., 28 (1950), 79-80. 
48. SP 87/32, Marlborough to Holdernesse, 9 Aug. 1758. 
49. HMC, Clements MSS (1913), pp. 431-67 passim. 
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(14 Feb. 1759): 'His S. H. [Prince Ferdinand] permits the regiments to 
be out to fire when the commanding officer thinks proper... ' 
(22 March 1759): 'Napier's [12th Foot] will have a field day tomorrow. ' 
(3 April 1759): 'Stuart's [37th Foot] a field day tomorrow. ' 
(4April 1759): 'Kingsley's [20th Foot] have a field day to-morrow. ' 
(6 April 1759): 'Fusiliers [23rd Foot] and Stuart's a field day to- 
morrow. ' 
(9 April 1759): 'Lord George Sackville has ordered three barrels of 
powder ... for each battalion, each regiment is to keep 18 rounds 
per man... and may make use of the remainder to practise firings. 
The Welsh Fusiliers have a field day to-morrow. ' 
And so it went until early June. By. 4 May the Duke of Richmond could report 
'Hume's regiment [25th Foot] very near as good as Kingsley's [20th Foot]', 
which was to say 'vastly improved'; and 'the Welch Fuzileers and Stuards 
are steady under arms and march very well'. 'I assure you', he wrote to his 
brother, 'that the regiments in England must be very alerte and take a great 
deal of pains, or they will not be able to show with these regiments. 
50 
Three months after Richmond penned those words, the six battalions trained 
in the Munster garrison made the epic attack on the battlefield of Minden. 
As in the Austrian Succession campaigns, the training was kept up until 
the end of the war; and orders given out in the spring of 1761, at Paderborn, 
are typical of this: 
51 
(22 April 1761): 'the Recruits both of Cavalry and Infantry are to be 
Drilled and Exercised at Fireings. The Regiments are also to 
practice the several Evolutions... particularly marching and 
Wheeling... and forming-quick, after different methods. ' 
(10 May 1761): 'Commanding Officers of Cavalry... to have their Recruits 
" exercised at Firing, and their Horses the same, in order to tame 
them as much as possible. ' 
(13 May 1761): 'no time [is to] be lost in discipling and perfecting 
the Battalions by having them frequently out at Exercise. ' 
The Coldstream Guards, at Paderborn, were sent 'out to exercise' on 11,12, 
16,18, and 26 May, and on 7,12, and 13 June, within a period of five 
weeks; and that schedule was typical for the regiments stationed there 
and elsewhere in Germany. 
52 
Where there was little action in the colonies after the 1740-42 
Cartagena expedition, during the 1739-48 war, a great many regiments, be- 
ginning with those under Braddock, were sent to the Americas during the 
Seven Years' War. As we noted earlier, only a handful of the regiments 
sent across the Atlantic went out with any camp experience behind them, so 
that much intensive advanced training had to be carried on in the 
50. HMC Bathurst MSS (1923), p. 684. 
51. Cumb. Pprs., Pt. 4,0. B. 8, ff. 8.15,17. 
52. Ibid., ff. 17-39 passim. 
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colonial theatres. 
The feeble North American campaigns of 1756 and 1757 are, for our 
purposes, of little interest: the surrender to Montcalm of Shirley's 50th 
and Pepperell's 51st, besieged at Oswego in 1756, merely underlines the in- 
efficiency of new-raised regiments. 
53 
Not until the summer of 1757 did con- 
siderable numbers of troops reach North America from the British Isles, and 
due to the strategic situation it was not until the campaign of 1758 that 
they could be employed on major operations. The main events of that year 
were Amherst's siege of Louisbourg, Forbes' advance on Fort Duquesne, and 
Abercromby's engagement at Carillon. From the training standpoint, Aber- 
cromby's seven regular battalions represented a mixed bag. One, the 44th 
Foot, had been with Braddock and had by now amassed three years' of train- 
ing time. The rest had seen no action: three (the 27th, 46th, and 55th) had 
come out without camp duty but had been in America for a year, by mid-1758, 
and were doubtless quite forward in their drill, while the rest (the 1/42nd, 
1/60th, and 4/60th) had been on the scene for two years and may be consid- 
ered fairly well trained. In the fighting at Carillon they all behaved 
extremely well, sustaining very heavy casualties while repeatedly storming 
the French abatis and breat-work. 
54 
At Louisbourg meanwhile, once Amherst's 
fifteen battalions had made good their landing -a difficult operation, 
but carried out successfully by picked light and grenadier companies - 
their ultimate-success was assured, given their great numbers and powerful 
siege train. 
55 
The careful, methodical march of Forbes' small column on 
Fort Duquesne - carried out according to the system of the 'protected 
advance' laid down in Turpin de Crisse's Art of War - was a success too, 
a masterpiece of logistical planning. 
56 
By 1759, the forces engaged in North American operations were the equal 
of the French, the Canadians, and their Indian irregulars. Since Braddock's 
defeat, the regiments after arriving in the colonies had taken advantage 
of every opportunity to carry on their advanced training; and the journals 
and orderly books kept in these corps show that the same endless practise 
which we have seen going on in the armies serving in Europe was 
53. On these campaigns, see K. L. Parker, op. cit., 140-213, and Pargellis, 
Loudoun. Pargellis, 141-6, describes these undisciplined and ill- 
administered corps, and concludes that they 'were unfit to belong to an 
army composed of separate units, each one responsible for its own 
efficiency'. 
54. The best accounts are in Fortescue, II, 322-32, and M. Sautai, Montcaim 
au Combat de CariZZon (Paris, 1909). Abercromby's journal is in WO 34/76, ff. 
154-7. 
55. Of Amherst's fifteen battalions only the 15th had had camp training, 
but most had been in America for at least two years and were by now well 
trained; indeed only four battalions were in need of further seasoning. 
56. K. L. Parker, op. cit., 252-92. 
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characteristic too of those in America. 
A few examples of this activity will be sufficient. Thus, when early 
in June 1757 seven battalions from Ireland and six from New York assembled 
at Halifax, for that summer's projected siege of Louisbourg , advanced 
training began immediately; and the following entries illustrate the 
training going on: 
57 
(16 July 1757): '... the regiments take all opportunities to exercise. ' 
(17 July 1757): 'Some intrenchments are erecting on the left of the 
camp, in order to discipline and instruct the troops, in the methods 
of attack and defence'. 
(24 July 1757): 'This morning the picquets of the line, with a working 
party from the army, marched to... where the intrenchments were 
thrown up;... one half carried on approaches, while the other defend- 
ed; frequently sallying out to obstruct the workmen, when the 
covering parties attacked, repulsed, and pursued them.... This is in 
order to make the troops acquainted with the nature of the service 
they are going upon... and is to be continued until farther orders. ' 
(31 July 1757): 'This day the trenches were stormed by the picquets; 
some field-pieces were brought there for this purpose, and every 
thing was conducted with the greatest regularity. ' 
These activities were aimed especially at preparing the troops for siege 
warfare; and although the Louisbourg, operations were postponed until the 
following season, specialist training of this sort was invaluable. 
It was to the linear, battlefield drill that most training time was 
devoted, of course, here as in Europe. The orders given out in Amherst's 
army in the winter quarters of 1758-59, and soon after in the field as 
the army moved down the Hudson - Lake Champlain route towards Montreal, 
are typical. The following are selected at random from that army's 
orderly books: 
58 
(18 Dec. 1758, New York): 'the Genl. Commanding in chief orders that 
the Regiments Should be Exercised twice a Week when the Weather 
will permit, & that the Commanding Officers will Assemble them by 
Companies or Batalion as they Judge best. ' 
(22 Jan. 1759, New York): 'The Officers Commanding Battalions are to 
practice their Men at firing Ball, so that every Soldier may be 
Accustomed to it. ' 
(5 May 1759, Albany): 'The Regiments to practice marching by files... ' 
(22 Nov. 1759, Crown Point): 'The Regiments... when the weather permits 
[, will] be assembled for Exercise. ' 
We followed earlier a single regiment, Argyll's 21st of Foot, going 
through a typical round of training in the Low Countries in the spring of 
57. A. G. Doughty (ed. ), An Historical Journal of the Ccrpaigns in North 
America for the Years 1757,1758,1759, and 1760. I, (Toronto, 1915), 34-9 
passim. This is an edited version of Capt John Knox's journal of the same 
title, published in London in 1769. 
58. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 016/1, pp. 1-3,6-7,161. 
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1747; and we can do the same with another such, Kennedy's 43rd of Foot, on 
North American service in the spring of 1759. Typical of the training going 
on in the 43rd, in garrison at Fort Beausejour in Acadia, are the following 
journal entries: 
59 
(5 April 1759): 'The 43rd regiment are out daily at exercise, though 
the country still retains its winter habit. ' 
(11 April 1759): 'The 43rd regiment are at exercise every morning, 
and discharge ammunition cartridges; in the afternoon the men are 
employed in firing at targets, in which they are encouraged by 
presents from their Officers, according to their several per- 
formances. ' 
(14 April 1759): 'The 43rd regiment are now making the most of their 
time in exercising and firing at marks; in short, every man is 
employed in rubbing off the winter's rust. ' 
(30 April 1759): 'The regiment daily out at exercise, and firing at 
the target; the Captain of the light infantry spares no pains to 
form his company, and render them expert for any kind of service. ' 
Late in May Kennedy's joined the forces in Cape Breton, and four months 
later stood in the centre of Wolfe's line of battle on the Plains of 
Abraham, taking part in delivering what Fortescue described as 'the most 
60 
perfect volley ever fired on a battlefield'. 
As a last example, we might look at the activities of the regiments 
training under Amherst on Staten Island in 1761, prior to their embarking 
with Monckton on the Martinique expedition late that autumn. In July and 
August eleven battalions came in from the quarters which they had occupied 
during the winter and spring (for the conquest of Canada was complete), and 
these encamped together on Staten Island across from New York. 
61 
Here, 
formed in three brigades, they were drilled intensively under Amherst's 
direction from late in August until embarking, late in November; and in 
this, once again, they resembled the corps in Europe in the 1747-48 and 
1761-62 campaigns, drilling intensively for the last of the war's campaigns 
just as they had done in the preceding seasons. Typical orders, selected 
at random from the orderly books, are the following: 
(28 August 1761): 'Amherst's [15th], & the 1st Royal Highland Battn. 
[1/42nd] to fire to morrow morning two Rounds of ball, man by man 
at a Butt... The Commanding Officers of the other Regiments will fix 
on places near their front by the Water side for Erecting butts to 
fire ball. ' 
59. A. G. Doughty (ed. ), op. cit., I, 301,304,306. 
60. Fortescue, II, 381. The musketry of the 43rd was excellent, as the above 
extracts will indicate. When in garrison at Annapolis in the summer of 1758, 
Capt Knox noted that the officers of Kennedy's 'for their instruction and 
amusement, fall into the ranks as privates, and practice all the evolutions 
and firings'. This was admirable. Ibid., 181. 
61. Their winter quarters are in WO 34/74, f. 6. On the movement of most of 
these units down the Hudson to New York, see J. C. Webster (ed. ), The Journal 
of Jeffrey Amherst... in America from 1758 to 1763 (Toronto, 1931), 269-72. 
62. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 016/2 passim. 
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(30 August 1761): 'The Regimts. are to practice Exercising, drawn up 
three deep... ' 
(5 Sept. 1761): 'The three Brigades63 to fire four rounds of Ball, by 
Platoons. ' 
(22 Sept. 1761): 'The Regiments that have been reviewed, to be out at 
Exercise only once a day. ' 
Amherst held a series of major brigade reviews late in September and 
early in October, at which the regiments went through an elaborate series 
of manoeuvres reminiscent of the best Dublin performances. 
64 
Among other 
manoeuvres those of the 1st Brigade, for example, 'marched [forward] by sub- 
divisions in Column', while the 2nd Brigade 'passed & forced a bridge, 
retreated over it, etc. ' 
It will be evident that target practice was given pride of place in 
the training carried on in North America by 1758-59, this being one of the 
fruits of experience in the campaigns against New France. 'Nothing steadys 
them so much to firing as by firing balls', observed Amherst in the Staten 
Island camp. 
65 
It was unfortunate that, with the coming of peace, this 
lesson should so quickly have been forgotten. 
The preceding will be sufficient to illustrate the general pattern of 
initial inadequacy, followed by endless and intensive practise, which was 
imposed upon the regiments by the shortcomings of peacetime training. In 
order to complete our summary of the training carried on in wartime we 
have only to consider the revisions sometimes made in and the additions oc- 
casionally made to the current regulations and customary drill, in certain 
regiments and field forces. 
As we noted earlier, innovation and adaptation were more noticeable 
in the Seven Years' than in the Austrain Succession War; innovation was 
stirred by the lack of success in the Low Countries battles and moreso by 
the fighting in Scotland, and by the mid-1750's innovation had gathered 
momentum. 
We have already described Prestonpans, which lasted five minutes; 
and Falkirk, the second, engagement of the Jacobite rising, was hardly more 
success u 
66 
63. The regiments on the island were brigaded as follows: 1st Brigade: 15th, 
28th, 1/42nd, 2/42nd; 2nd Brigade: 17th, 35th, 43rd, 3/60th; 3rd Brigade: 
27th, 40th, 48th. The light and grenadier companies formed separate com- 
posite battalions. Ibid., 015/10, 'Troops that form the main Expedition'; 
and 016/2,28 Aug. 1761. 
64. J. C. Webster (ed. ), op. cit., 273. Detailed summaries of the review 
performances and manoeuvres of the 1st and 3rd Brigades are in WO 34/100, 
ff. 56-60,64-5. 
65. Ibid., 273. 
66. For Falkirk, see K. Tomasson & F. Buist, Battles of The '45 (1967), 
99-127. 
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After Prestonpans and Falkirk, matters had to be taken in hand. During 
the three months which elapsed between Falkirk and Culloden, intensive dril- 
ling helped the army to restore confidence in itself. 
67 
Cumberland busily 
exercised the forces in Scotland and the North, and sent frequent orders to 
the commanders of outlying divisions to follow the same regimen. One such 
was Lord Albemarle who, reporting to the Duke's A. D. C. from Strathbogie on 
4 April, wrote that 'before I had your letter about exercising ye troops I 
had seen ye six Batts out and exercise ye Manual & go throw ye Firings, 
but had not ordered anything more, but gave out this morning H. R. H. 's 
commands (viz. ) one Batt. out every Day, ye Parade to exercise in ye 
morning, the Pickets at night & ye Recruits and aukward men twice a 
Day in ye presence of Officers'. 68 
Cumberland had laid down a new method of bayonet drill for all to practise, 
too; but it was so unrealistic as surely to be no more than a morale- 
booster. 
69 
All of this paid off at Culloden, of course, where the army 
behaved well. It was upon the platoon fire and bayonets, not upon the horse, 
that Cumberland depended; 
70 
and the event showed him to be right. Constant 
drill and minor innovations had sharpened the army: 'Sure never were 
soldiers in such a temper', wrote the Duke just after the battle; 'silence 
and obedience the whole time, and all our manoeuvres were performed without 
the least confusion. '71 
After Culloden, there was much training going on in the camps of the 
Great Glen. Blakeney, who commanded the troops there, was practising a new 
method 'for a Battalion to Fire Advancing, and retreating', and he sent 
along to Napier 'a sketch of explanations' for the Duke's perusal; and 
Cumberland gave out a few modifications in 'the manual and firings, though 
as usual 'all other Parts of the Exercise [were] to be performed as the 
Book directs without diminution from it'. 
72 
Here in the 1745-46 Jacobite 
campaign, then, were presaged some of the alterations soon to be intro- 
duced generally as the 1748 Regulations. 
Despite the several sound reforms initiated by Cumberland at the 
mid-century, and despite his preparation and issue of the 1748,1755, and 
1757 Regulations, there were several intelligent field and general officers 
who were no longer satisfied either with the platoon-fire system ('Hyde 
Park firing', as it was derisively labelled), or with the superfluous and 
67. Only three days after the battle Hawley, with the army now at Edin- 
burgh, wrote that 'every wheele is at worke to gett the Engine in motion 
again. The Foot recover theyr spiritts, they owne to their Officers they 
all deserve to be hanged, some Regts. have shooke hands and vowel all to 
dye nexte time'. Ibid., 127. 
68. Cumb. Pprs., Box 13, #149, f. l. 
69. K. Tomasson & F. Buist, op. cit., 164-5. 
70. E. Charteris, WiZZiam Augustus, Duke of Cumberland: His EarZy Life and 
Times, 1721-1748 (1913), 247-8. 
71 BM holograph display case, North Library. 
72. Cumb. Pprs., Box 16, #320; and Pt. 4, II, f. 60. 
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elaborate formalism (the 'one -two', as it was contemptuously described) 
which attended so much of the drill, and of the arms exercises in particular. 
On the eve of the Seven Years' War a few of these officers had taken to 
training their regiments to perform both the regulation-, platoon-fire system 
(to please authority), and the alternate-fire system (which they intended 
actually to employ in the field). 
73 
One such officer was Lt-Gen Sir John 
Mordaunt who, when given command of the 1757 Rochefort expedition, took the 
bit between his teeth and openly proceeded not only to tell off and train 
his battalions in the alternate fire, but also to cut back on the time spent 
on the manual and on much of the 'one - two' of the service. 
74 
Mordaunt's 
action was to prove a catalyst, for the alternate system was to spread 
quickly from his 1757 camps at Dorchester and the Isle of Wight to the armies 
both in Germany and America, and was by 1764 to become reguation practice. 
We can trace the spread of this innovation from Mordaunt's camps, where 
it was found effective and was well received; 
75 
but it was only the Kloster 
Zeven convention and Cumberland's subsequent resignation from all his mili- 
tary appointments, which occured late in October of 1757, that made this 
possible. Mordaunt's activities were 'all against orders', contrary to the 
current drill regulations. There had been hope that Cumberland, as Captain- 
General, would approve Mordaunt's innovations, and fear only that 'if he 
listens to those blockheads Napier and Dury... we shall return to one two'. 
76 
But Mordaunt's work had been reported to Cumberland in Hanover, and had 
brought forth a sharp rebuke. The Duke wrote late in August to Barrington, 
73. We described in detail the difference between platoon fire and alternate 
fire on pp. 204-06 above, where the two systems, as practised in the 20th 
Foot under James Wolfe's direction, were shown. 
74. Writing to his brother on 9 Sept. 1757, the Duke of Richmond - now 
lieutenant-colonel commanding the 33rd Foot, and a partisan of these in- 
novations - reported on Mordaunt's activities. 'He has broke through all 
the absurd regulations that General Napier [Cumberland's appointee] has been 
puzzling the army with since he has been Adjutant-General. He has abolished 
the manual exercise both old and new, and draws up all the regiments as 
Kingsley's [20th] used to do [under Wolfe's direction, as on pp. 204-06 
above, here] ... and practises no other firing but by companies from right 
and left; and they practise the same kind of evolutions as Kingsley's used 
to do and no such absurdities as squares, etc. ' HMC, Bathurst MSS (1923), 
p. 681. Richmond had served as a young subaltern and captain in the 20th, 
where he had been befriended and much influenced by Wolfe. As lieutenant- 
colonel of the 33rd, Richmond was at this time attempting to establish Wolfe's 
training and drill in that regiment. R. H. Whitworth (ed. ), art. cit., 72-6. 
75. Kingsley's 20th was already with Mordaunt and, Richmond reported to his 
brother, 'you have no idea how much it has improved the other regiments'. 
HMC, Bathurst MSS (1923), p. 681. 
76. Ibid. It was in fact these very "blockheads" - Robert Napier and 
Alexander Dury - who, as Adjutant General and lieutenant-colonel of Cumber- 
land's 1st Foot Guards, respectively, . had assisted Cumberland in the prep- 
aration of the current regulations, which Mordaunt was contravening. On 
their activities in this regard, see above pp. 110 
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the Secretary at War, with orders to 'acquaint... all General officers 
commanding Corps, Sir John Mordaunt not excepted, that I am Surprised to 
hear that my orders... approved & confirmed by His Majesty, are changed 
according to the Whim & Supposed Improvements of every fertile Genius; 
and that therefore, it is my positive order, that in the Forming & 
Telling off of Battalions, they conform exactly to those Standing 
orders, which they have all received; and that no one presume to 
introduce new Schemes, without their having been approved of by 
His Majesty, or by my orders. '» 
This was given out by Barrington and Ligonier; 
78 
but events in Hanover 
overtook Cumberland, and the innovations were then able to spread. 
Of the six marching regiments which formed the first contingent sent 
to join the army in Germany in the summer of 1758, three - Kingsley's 
20th, Home's 25th, and Brudenell's 51st - had been in Mordaunt's en- 
campments; and while training in Munster quarters during the winter of 
1758-59 and into the following spring, all six continued to practise tell- 
ing off and firing according to the alternate-fire system. 
79 
Again, it was 
the presence of the 20th Foot which counted for much: the otherregiments, 
it was reported, 'have indeed had great advantages in being together with 
Kingsley's and the Germans'. 
80 
It was alternate fire which these six 
employed with such extraordinary success soon after at Minden. 
Meanwhile, Amherst's army had assembled at Halifax in the spring of 
1758 to prepare for the siege of Louisbourg, and Abercromby had taken over 
the American command from Loudoun. Loudoun, 'whose management in the 
conduct of affairs is by no means admired', wrote Wolfe to Sackville, 'did 
adhere so literally and strictly to the one - two and the firings by the 
impracticable chequer, etc, that these regiments [ie., the 2/1st, 17th, 
22nd, 28th, 35th, 40th, 45th, 47th, 48th, 2/60th, 3/60th, and 78th, already 
in America under Loudoun's command when Amherst's forces arrived from home] 
must necessarily be cut off one after another'. 
81 
Among the regiments 
newly-arrived from England was the 15th Foot, another of those which had 
camped and trained under Mordaunt; and when in the following 1759 campaign 
Wolfe himself led ten battalions - including the 15th - up the St. 
Lawrence for Quebec, it was the alternate firing which was being practised 
in all of these regiments. Typical of these was the 43rd Foot, which had 
77. Pargellis, Military Affairs, 398. 
78. WO 4/54, p. 433. 
79. See the orders of Lord George Sackville, who commanded at Munster - 
and who was a friend of Wolfe's and in agreement with him on tactical mat- 
ters, not to mention having himself been proprietary colonel of the 20th from 
1746 to 1749 - to 'practise chiefly the alternate firing', in HMC, Clements 
MSS (1913), pp. 560-61. 
80. HMC, Bathurst MSS (1923), p. 684. 
81. Beckles Willson, op. cit., 368-9. 
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been in garrison in the Bay of Fundy posts since coming to Nova Scotia 
from Ireland, mid-way through 1757. The 43rd, as we have seen, had during 
these years been following the regulation platoon-fire system, as was 
natural; but after joining Wolfe's force it was ordered to adopt the new 
procedure. On 15 July 1759, while lying before Quebec, the regiment was 
reviewed by Wolfe (who had 'never had any opportunity of seeing the forty- 
third regiment, before they rendezvoused at Louisbourg'); and Capt Knox of 
that corps recounted that 'the method we were ordered to observe did not 
admit of any confusion, though we fired remarkably quick; our firings were 
from right and left to the centre, by platoons; and afterwards by sub- 
divisions'. 
82 
The 43rd was already well-trained, as we have seen; and 
that they found tha4the alternate fire should permit them to fire 'remark- 
ably quick' and without confusion is a testament to its utility and superior- 
ity. This same alternate fire was doubtless that employed by the battalions 
on the Plains of Abraham. 
There had been another innovation, the work of Amherst himself, intro- 
duced early in 1759 in the regiments serving in America; and it was prac- 
tised both in the forces under his immediate command moving upon Montreal 
along the Hudson - Lake Champlain route, and in the army commanded by his 
subordinate Wolfe lying before Quebec. This consisted of a simple and 
speedy means of reducing the depth of the battalion line from three to two 
ranks, and of preserving in three ranks the same frontage allowed by the 
two-deep firing line. Amherst had adopted the thin, two-deep line because 
(as he informed the men), 'the enemy have very few regular troops to oppose 
us, and no yelling of Indians, or fire of Canadians, can possibly withstand 
two ranks, if the men are silent, attentive, and obedient to their 
officers'. 
83 
Probably introduced late in January 1759, it was being practised 
late in May be some of the regiments among those preparing at Cape $reton 
for the upcoming Quebec expedition; and on 9 July the practice was made 
regulation drill for all units serving in America by a Standing Order of 
that date. 
84 
Thus was introduced the thin red line made famous fifty years 
82. A. G. Doughty (ed. ), op. cit., I, 422. See also p. 451, entry for 31 
July, where a tactical disposition to fight by companies (rather than in 
platoons or other divisions which would have broken up the company 
structure) 'afforded the highest satisfaction to the soldiers [since] this 
method... does not admit of confusion'. 
83. Ibid., 487-8. The absence of cavalry, of course, made such a dis- 
position practicably in America. 
84. Ibid., 348-9, for Cape Breton; and see pp. 487-8 for the Standing 
Order. The clearest description of the technqiue by which the rank red- 
uction was effected, is in BM Add. MSS 21,661, f. 80, 'Ordres du G. Amherst 
pr. la revue'. A short description of this review - put on by the 1/ and 
2/42nd, the 55th, and the 77th of Foot at Oswego on 4 Aug. 1760, is in 
J. C. Webster (ed. ), op. cit., 224. 
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later by Wellington, in the Peninsula; and its first use in battle was upon 
the Plains of Abraham on 13 September 1759.85 
The last and most significant of the innovations made during these 
years, in response to the tactical conditions imposed in the field, was the 
formation of light units - both horse and foot - and the development of 
specialized equipment, tactics, and training for the light service. In this 
the British were behind-hind, in comparison either with the Hapsburg forces 
or with their Bourbon adversaries; and during the Low Countries' campaigns 
of 1742-48 (where corps like the Arquebusiers de Grassin had taken such a 
toll of British lives, notably at Melle and Fontenoy), and again to a lesser 
extent during the campaigns in Germany of 1758-62, the British had been ob- 
liged to rely on the light forces of their several German allies. By 1759 
it had become abundantly clear that Britain herself must raise light 
troops, and send these to the army in Germany; 
86 
and so in the autumn of 
that year Keith's Highlanders (soon after ranked as the 87th Foot) were 
formed for the purpose and sent out to serve under Ferdinand. In June 
following another such unit, Campbell's Highlanders (88th Foot) was sent to 
join Keith's; and together with the new 15th Light Dragoons, 
87 
which regi- 
ment-arrived in Germany two weeks after Campbell's had landed, these regi- 
ments played an important part in the outpost work, ambuscades, and skirmish- 
ing of the army. 
88 
Whereas in Germany the burden of the light service could be borne by 
the assorted freikorps, jagers, hussars, and legions of the Hanoverians and 
Hessians, in America the British had themselves to make a major effort, and 
to rely on their own resources. The Canadians and their Indian allies were 
past-masters at the petite guerre, while the nature of the country made them 
formidable; and the forces from metropolitan France - the troupes de la 
marine in particular - showed themselves adept at many aspects of the light 
service. 
Braddock's disaster had pointed the need for specialist units capable 
85. D. Grinnell-Milne, Mad, Is He? The Character and Achievement of James 
Wolfe (1963), 247-55; and see 'General Orders in Wolfe's Army during the 
Edpedition up the River St. Lawrence, 1759', in Anon., Literary & Histori- 
cal Society of Quebec. Manuscripts. Series 4 (Quebec, 1875), 35-6 and passim. 
86. Single troops of light dragoons had already been attached to each of 
the regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons, in Britain, in 1756. 
87. As early as 5 Sept. 1759, when Keith's corps was still raising, Granby 
had written from Germany asking 'that some of the light Dragoons might be 
sent over, to act in Concert with the Highlanders, as I am confident they 
would be of the utmost service, on many occasions in this Country'. SO 87/32, 
Granby to Holdernesse. 
88. For a narrative of their activities, see C. T. Atkinson, 'The Highland- 
ers in Westphalia, 1760-62, and the Development of Light Infantry', JSAHR, 
20 (1941), 208-23. 
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of protecting the flanks and the march security of the heavy infantry; and 
it had shown too the need to devise tactics at which the foot could be 
trained in order to deal with irregulars - 'the manner of opposing an enemy 
that avoids facing you in the open field', it was now clear, 'is totally 
different from what young officers learn from the common discipline of the 
army'. 
89 
Rangers for long-distance scouting were needed, too. These require- 
ments were met in several ways. As early as December 1756, the Duke of 
Cumberland had advised the commander-in-chief in America to 'teach your 
Troops to go out upon Scouting Parties: for, 'till Regular Officers with 
men they can trust, learn to beat the woods, and to act as Irregulars, you 
never will gain any certain Intelligence of the Enemy', nor screen and pro- 
tect a marching column. 
90 
Loudoun acted on such advice, and in the training 
of the four battalions of the new 60th Foot he ordered that 'they are then 
for the Service of the Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire, 
lyeing on the Ground and kneeling. They are to be taught to march in 
Order, slow and fast in all sortes of Ground. They are frequently to 
pitch & fold up their Tents, and to be accustomed to pack up and carry 
their necessaries in the most commodious manner. '91 
Loudoun meanwhile increased the number of ranging companies first raised in 
1755, and at the same time sent parties of officers and picked men from the 
regular marching regiments out with the ranging companies, in order to learn 
the service and carry its principles back with them to their battalions. 
92 
Other action was taken with the regiments of marching foot. Soon after 
Braddock's disaster a battalion of highlanders, the 1/42nd Foot, was dis- 
patched to America; and by the opening of the 1759 campaign three more 
Highland battalions - the 2/42nd, 77th, and 78th - had all joined the 
forces there. For the 1758 campaigns each of the battalions of foot in 
America was ordered to form its own company of light infantry: these were 
Icept up in the regiments through to the reductions consequent upon the 1763 
peace, and they were often detached from their parent battalions and brig- 
aded in a composite Light Infantry Corps. 
93 
These light companies were 
dressed and accoutred for their service - long coatskirts were cut away, 
small caps were provided, leggings were worn, hatchets and powder horns were 
provided - and by the later stages of the 1759 campaign, notably at Quebec, 
89. HMC, Stopford-SackviZZe MSS (1910), II, p. 2. 
90. Pargellis, Military Affairs, 269. 
91. Pargellis, Loudoun, 299-300. 
92. Ibid., 304. On the discipline used in Rogers' Rangers, see K. L. Parker, 
op. cit., 214-40. The series of 'rules for the ranging-discipline' which 
Rogers prepared for the instruction of regulars attached to his corps, are 
in Rogers' Journals, op. cit., 60-70. 
93. On these light companies, see A. G. Doughty (ed. ), op. cit., I, 303, 
306,379-80; and II, 281,337,347, and 351. See also Kent R. O. Amherst 
MSS, 016/1, pp. 2-3,6-7. 
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they were putting in good service. 
Proper light infantry took more time to train than did the hatmen, not 
less - which is why the Americans proved to be of little use to the army, 
and why the army had thus been obliged to form its own rangers and light 
troops. 
94 'It is not a Short Coat or half Gaters that makes a light Infan- 
try Man, ' Lord Townshend was to write to Amherst many years later, 'but as 
you know, Sir, a confidence in his Aim, & that Stratagem in a personal con- 
flict which is derived from Experience. '95 This the light infantry comp- 
anies of the marching battalions had truly acquired by 1763; and their 
brilliant performance in quelling the 1763-64 Indian uprising led by 
Pontiac, in which the tactics and the expertise displayed in Bouquet's 
engagement at Bushy Run stand in such marked contrast to the performance 
of Braddock's men, eight years earlier, clearly attests this fact. 
96 
Such was the training pattern characteristic of the army in the field, 
in wartime. Hard, intensive training at the advanced elements of the drill 
was carried on endlessly, and of necessity. Where circumstances were part- 
icular, or where the tactical situation proved to be unexpected or peculiar, 
innovation took place; and wartime innovation sometimes became doctrine, 
after peace was made. But innovation was the exception, where as a rule 
the majority of regiments were busy enough mastering the complexities of 
their peacetime drill. With the end of a war, the friction of peace once 
again began its operation among the regiments; and with that the spirit of 
innovation had to give way to the simple need for uniformity. In the lull 
after Culloden the always inventive Maj-Gen William Blakeney (he of the 
'Pasteboard images... which the Wags of those Days called Puppets') had had 
time to show to Cumberland, in Kensington Gardens, special 'Performances' 
of new 'Firings and Evolutions' of his own design. The Duke had expressed 
his 'approbation'; and Blakeney, 'finding that they answer'd with a large 
Battalion beyond my Expectation,... made some Progress in writing the 
Words of Command, Signals by beat of Drum, and the Explanations, to 
which I design'd annexing very curious Draughts, with the Platoons 
number'd in such a manner, as to make the whole intelligible to 
young Officers'. 
But Blakeney, at this time in command of the forces in Minorca, 'stopt pro- 
ceeding any further', when after Aix-la-Chapelle the old garrison of that 
94. Pargellis notes that Loudoun had expected that 'the provincials them- 
selves could serve as irregular troops, until he discovered that the average 
provincial soldier knew less what to do if he fell into an ambush than a 
British regular, for he had never been trained, either in the discipline of 
arms or in frontier warfare'. Pargellis, Loudoun, 300-01. 
95. Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 073/21, f. l. 
96. On Bouquet's tactics and Bushy Run, the best study is K. L. Parker, 
op. cit., 292-342. J. Shy, op. cit., 111-25 and passim. 
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island was replaced by new regiments sent out from the army in Brabant. 
'The Officers lately arrived informed me that they had Orders to follow 
the Discipline they were taught in Flanders last Campaign, ', wrote the 
Duke from Mahon in August 1749, 'which I shall take great 
Ca 
e to make 
them observe Strictly'. 
97 
Peace, and with it the need to stick to the 
uniformity of the new 1748 Regulations, spelled the end of Blakeney's 
innovations. 




Where the colonial and imperial historians have oftentimes, in pass- 
ing, noted the dispersal and remarked upon the deplorable condition of 
those few regiments encountered in the overseas stations and garrisons, it 
has generally been assumed - almost as a corollary - that the great maj- 
ority of the regiments, those more fortunately situated safe at home in 
Britain and Ireland, must be in infinitely better condition, their situation 
being unexceptional. 
We set out, initially, without questioning this general line of reason- 
ing, commonly held; to essay training, we supposed, would be largely a 
matter of studying the drillbooks and, once familiar with their contents, 
of discovering their manner of application by searching the correspondence 
of officers, the orderly books of the regiments, and the orders and directives 
of the staffs. The levels of proficiency achieved in individual units could 
later be checked in the Inspection Returns submitted by reviewing officers. 
The assumption underlying this scheme, of course, was that the regi- 
ments in the British Isles were, essentially, malleable; that is, that 
they were inert, passive; more particularly, that they were concentrated 
and stationary. That the regiments could, with a minimum of fuss, be drawn 
up on the parade-squares and there exercised at the various elements of the 
drill, was taken for granted. Time and opportunity, in this scheme, were 
assumed. 
As we became familiar with the drillbooks it became increasingly 
evident that a very great deal of training, carried on intensively and in 
high levels of concentration, would be required of the regiments were they 
to master the several elements of the drill; but the Inspection Returns 
showed quite clearly that a significant proportion of the regiments were 
not by any means so accomplished. Expertise was largely a function of 
time and opportunity; and opportunity, then, could not have been so 
freely come by as heretofore assumed. We were obliged at once, in con- 
sequence, not only somehow to measure opportunity but likewise to account 
for its apparent scarcity. In order to determine how, and in what con- 
dition the regiments were spending their time, we turned to the Marching 
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Orders; and these set us back on our heels, our initial assumptions going 
by the board as the movement, duty, and dispersal patterns began to reveal 
themselves. 
As the significance of these patterns became increasingly apparent, 
so our concern with time and opportunity became primary, where it had been 
only incidental. For it was around these elemental patterns that the 
training of the regiments was arranged; it was according to their dictates 
that time was apportioned, and opportunity occasioned; indeed, such was 
their influence upon training that much else that required our attention 
was, essentially, derivative. Certain other factors meanwhile, the in- 
fluence of which was important and persistant, if not so essentially sig- 
nificant, drew our attention or suggested themselves; and these too we 
have considered in their turn, adding their analysis to the overall picture. 
Proceeding in this fashion, then, we were able to reconstruct the 
training milieu in which the regiments found themselves; and plainly it 
bore little resemblance to that supposed milieu previously assumed, or 
taken for granted. Within the actual milieu, now revealed, neither the 
physical situation nor the material condition of the regiments was at all 
conducive to a thorough training programme; while from the point of view 
of training time was squandered, and opportunities were rare. Still, the 
regiments had operating in their favour several advantages, although it 
will by now be evident that there were a great many more disadvantages in 
play, to set against these. 
Insofar as training was concerned, the following were easily the most 
significant advantages enjoyed by the regiments in the normal round of 
peacetime service: they were issued with and put into practice successive 
sets of drill regulations, carefully prepared and kept up-to-date by an 
informed and competent authority; they were subject to a system of regular 
inspection and review, by which deviation and deficiencies in their train- 
ing and drill would be discovered and, once discovered, ordered remedied or 
brought into line with uniform practice; they had available to them in the 
English language a very considerable, wide-ranging, detailed, and often 
excellent body of privately published military literature, much of which 
was relevant to their peacetime training and virtually all of which was of 
benefit to officers in their education for service in the field; and 
finally, the regiments were trained and led by an officer corps which was 
careerist, which was long-serving, which was notably experienced, and which 
was capable. 
The importance of these advantages can hardly be exaggerated - not 
only in their own right but because they were palliative, alleviating the 
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worst effects of the several burdens under which the regiments laboured, and 
not least because they have previously been so little-credited. It was 
because of these advantages, bye and large, that most of the regiments were 
kept 'fit for service', most of the time; and if, admittedly, 'fit for 
service' was an unstable condition, and as a category often expressed a 
degree of wish-fulfilment or pious hope, still training could not have been 
carried on without them, and in their absence the condition of the regiments 
would have been grievous. 
Where these advantages could shore up or stave off, however, they 
could not override the baneful influence of the friction of peace. To 
describe here once again the host of lesser problems afflicting the regi- 
ments would simply be repetitious: the reader will be aware that the great 
scarcity of ball ammunition in peacetime, for example, the difficulties 
experienced in obtaining suitable training-grounds, the weak cadre-strengths 
. of the 
Irish units, and the four-month absence of the troop-horses from 
their regiments, out to grass, were individually hurtful, or worse; and 
cumulatively, they retarded significantly the training of the regiments. 
It is rather the major, gnawing problems, the effects of which were most 
disadvantageous, which deserve repeated emphasis here. 
One such was the chronic, two-pronged manpower problem, of which all 
the regiments both at home and abroad were the constant victims. There 
were invariably too few recruits available to complete to the establishments, 
while at the same time there were too many recruits among the men already 
with the regiments. The problem was a considerable one in peacetime, and was 
aggravated in wartime - to the point where calamity could (and in 1780-83 
did) occur. Among all the regiments serving in the British Isles from the 
mid-century down to 1795 it was the normal condition of things, in peacetime, 
for the average regiment of foot to stand on only 90% of its authorised 
establishment, while of its men an average of 16% were recruits; and in war- 
time these figures fell to 83%, and 27%, respectively. In the horse mean- 
while, the average regiment stood in peacetime on 95% of its authorised 
establishment, and of its men 9% were recruits; while in wartime the 
figures fell off to 94%, and 19%, respectively. There were always a few 
regiments containing even greater percentages of recruits, or standing 
further below their authorised establishments, or both; and wherever they 
fell below the normal manpower figures, just given, the regiments so sit- 
uated were normally rendered unfit for service. 
The manpower problem had a notable effect on the training of the corps; 
but the porblems raised by the routine movements, duties, and dispersal of 
the regiments had by far the most significant impact, since these things 
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concerned training in the most fundamental way, determining time and op- 
portunity. The great damage inflicted upon a sizeable proportion of the 
peacetime army by extended overseas service - where from 1716 to 1739, and 
again from 1748 to 1755, one-quarter of the marching regiments of foot 
were disposed; and where from 1763 to 1775, and then again from 1783 to 
1793, more than one-third of the foot was to be found - can hardly be 
exaggerated. The many ills of this service could only be mitigated by fre- 
quent rotation, to share the burden; but not until half way through the 
century was this attempted, and indeed right through to the end of our 
period there were always units left abroad for too-lengthy stretches. For 
all intents and purposes we must conclude that at least one-fifth and often 
as many as one-quarter of the regiments of marching foot, strewn abroad, 
was perpetually in a low state of interior economy and training and was, 
consequently, either unfit for service or capable of only the most modest 
exertions. 
The duty of the overseas stations and garrisons, however harmful, fell 
to the lot of only a minority of the regiments. The most grave disadvantage 
under which the great majority laboured was the duty of Britain and Ireland, 
characterized as it was by wide dispersal and constant harassment. There, 
whenever a march was made, the logistics of movement meant that units spent 
much time strung out along the roads, and that they should do so moreover 
in a state of dispersal. Action in aid of the civil power, patrols upon 
the coast duty, and the maintenance of a passive police presence, these 
were the activities of primary concern to authority when the dispositions 
of the corps in the duty areas of Britain and in the police barracks and 
garrison towns of Ireland were determined; and just as the resulting 
quartering patterns effectively dispersed most regiments and, in so doing, 
deprived them of the opportunity of carrying on advanced training, so the 
pursuit of these activities ate up the time which the regiments might 
otherwise have given over to training. 
In an army so situated, whatever training might be carried on was 
determined almost entirely in accordance with the limited time and op- 
portunity afforded by the routine of service; and this is illustrated 
by the phases into which the army's training programme was divided. 
Basic training was directed, essentially, to the practise of the 
first three elements composing the drill regimen - the evolutions, and 
the manual and platoon exercises - and to the necessary attendant skills 
all of which formed the fundamental building-blocks upon which were 
grounded the other, more difficult elements of the drill. Its most signal 
feature was that it occupied so much of that most precious commodity in the 
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British Army - time - thereby reflecting the situation in which the regi- 
ments found themselves. For the individual regiments subject to the friction 
of peace were, as we have seen, commonly to be found in states of consider- 
able dispersal; and the small, dispersed bodies - bodies of fewer than 
three or four companies in the foot, or fewer than two or three troops in 
the horse, depending upon establishment strengths - could not attempt 
with profit anything more complex than these mechanical basics. Where in 
its initial or 'material' phase basic training was devoted to inculcating 
the simple elements and skills, it was both well-organized and appropriate; 
but where in its ongoing or 'mechanical' phase it substituted (and ration- 
alised) endless, numbing repetition for what should properly have been only 
regular refreshment, it was stifling and even counter-productive, afford- 
ing little scope for creativity or variety; and thus it very often re- 
solved itself into an endless and - as Dettingen and Prestonpans so 
clearly demonstrated - an ineffective 'tossing of the firelocks'. 
It was essentially the detailed firings and manoeuvres, practised in 
an infinite variety of simulated tactical situations, of varying complexity 
and sophistication, which constituted the advanced training carried on in 
the regiments. However imaginative (or otherwise) might be the adjutants 
and field officers with individual corps, the efficacy of advanced train- 
ing depended absolutely upon the numbers concentrated and the time available. 
Men to form the squadrons and grand-divisions and time for the exercising 
of these units were essential, where satisfactory and realistic performances 
were to be attempted; and yet for the majority of regiments neither of 
these conditions was for long satisfied in the normal routine of peacetime 
service. What one or two squadrons, or two or three grand-divisions could 
accomplish, was useful but limited; and save for the weeks in the review 
quarters (which at least had the advantage of coming regularly, each season), 
regimental concentrations were not common. Field days, day 'excursions', 
and mock fighting were infrequent; and brigade training was almost unknown. 
There were, meanwhile, a great many eventualities likely to arise - heavy 
drafting, service on board the fleet, and so forth - which could seriously 
retard the military efficiency built up in the regiments; and indeed it must 
be admitted that in the British Army's normal routine of peacetime service 
it took not only dedicated officers, a sound system of interior economy, 
esprit de corps, a low turnover rate among the rank and file, and good post- 
ings which permitted frequent concentration for training, but also a share 
of luck to keep one step ahead of the friction of peace for sustained periods. 
'Fit for service', consequently, was a rating which regiments were frequently 
unable to retain over several years, running, in peacetime. 
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Hence it was not in peacetime but rather in wartime - by default, 
and now of necessity - that advanced training was carried on most effect- 
ively, most realistically, and most intensively. It was only in the en- 
campments at home and in the cantonments and the field abroad that full and 
lengthy concentration was at last effected, and time and opportunity at 
last provided. Camp training was excellent: every necessary circumstance 
now pertained, and everything that had been hard come by (or not come by at 
all), in peacetime, was now available. The drawback was that only a min- 
ority of the regiments ever managed to camp at all. During the 1739-48 war, 
one-third of the foot regiments and less than one-half of the horse regi- 
ments camped. During the 1756-63 war, less than one-third of the foot and 
only one-quarter of the horse camped. During the 1775-83 war, one-quarter 
of the foot camped and - the only exception - two-thirds of the horse 
camped. Thus it was while actually in the field that the majority of the 
regiments were obliged to carry on the business - which they did, under- 
standably, without let-up season after season. That the regiments should 
be free to perfect their drill only when arrived in the theatres of opera- 
tions, almost in the face of the enemy, was to say the least a most extra- 
ordinary manner of proceeding. 
It is evident that such a programme was woefully inadequate. Most of 
the training carried on in peacetime, under this programme, was restricted. 
Only the essentials were well-practised. Since time and opportunity were 
limited, training at the more advanced manoeuvres and tactics could be con- 
ducted neither intensively, nor vigorously. There was much 'tossing of the 
firelocks', much 'equallizing'. Many regiments were poorly trained; most 
were no better than 'fit for service'; only a few regiments - the Guards in 
London, and those in the big Dublin garrison - were well trained, and they 
were exceptions proving the rule precisely because they were concentrated 
and stationary. When crisis, war, or rebellion came, it was in this con- 
dition that the army found itself - in need of intensive advanced training, 
to be carried on by the regiments in concentration, and undisturbed. But 
the weaknesses and omissions of years could not be made good in so many 
weeks, especially not at the eleventh hour -a simple fact illustrated time 
and again during the earlier campaigns of each of the wars of our period. 
In these campaigns - those of the years 1740-43,1755-57,1793-95 - the 
performance of the regiments in action was generally clumsy; while the 
results of these campaigns were almost invariably dismal. The only ex- 
ception to this pattern was the string of successes gained in the campaigns 
of 1775-77; and this was exceptional only because the regiments were facing 
not regular soldiers but a militarily incompetent adversary innocent of 
training, buoyed merely by enthusiasm. All this was done at the cost of riech 
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blood and treasure. 
Why was so inadequate a training programme suffered to prevail? We 
noted at the outset of this study that the army had three main roles to 
play. The performance of its imperial garrison role and, most especially, 
the pursuit of its police role meant - inevitably - that the army's 
peacetime preparation for its wartime battlefield role must suffer. We 
have examined in detail the conditions routinely encountered on peacetime 
service; and we have seen that it was in the very nature of this service 
that the regiments so engaged should be much preoccupied with civil matters, 
and much dispersed on that account. It was from these circumstances that 
the army's training programme was derived; and the inadequacy of the pro- 
gramme was due to the fact that most advanced training was carried on at 
the convenience of civil requirements, strictly military requirements in- 
evitably taking second place, in these circumstances. Since civil 
requirements were given precedence over military, the efficient performance 
of its wartime battlefield role was not treated as the essential and over- 
riding role of the standing army. The army was the guardian of civil order, 
as much as the instrument of foreign policy. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES OF THE ROLES & DISPOSITIONS OF THE REGIMENTS IN ENGLAND, 
EXPRESSED IN TIME 
Although the Quartermaster General, concerned with logistics, deter- 
mined the routes of marching troops from the network of roads and halting- 
places, constitutional law saw to it that no officer of the regular mili- 
tary forces whatsoever his rank had the authority to move soldiers from 
any one place to another within the Kingdom of England without first 
receiving due authorisation, in the form of written orders, from the civil 
power. These orders - no matter how urgently the soldiers might be re- 
quired, nor how few might be the number of soldiers to be moved - had all 
to be issued by the Secretary at War, at the instance of a responsible 
Secretary of State. All of these Marching Orders - the typical example of 
which included the date upon which a march was to be begun or concluded, the 
units which were to perform the march, the unit's ultimate destination and 
place of origin, -the reason for the movement, and quite often a route list- 
ing each of the daily stages or halting-places to be used for quartering 
upon the march - were entered in the letter-books at the Secretary at 
War's office (WO 5)l; and from these we can plot in the most minute detail 
all troop movements and dispositions in eighteenth-century England and 
Wales. 
With this great mass of information available, six series of consecu- 
tive years were selected at random, and used for statistical "bores" through 
the letter-books; specifically: 
Total 
From To Years 
Spring 1726 - Spring 1729 3 
" 1737 - of 1743 6 
" 1751 - if 1756 5 
" 1764 - it 1767 3 
" 1772 - to 1776 4 
1786 - it 1790 4 
By recording every troop movement made during each of these series, it was 
possible to isolate and plot the routes and stages used by the army, to- 
gether with their incidence of use and the reasons for the movements: and 
at the same time the pattern of quarters emerged. 
1. These books were kept up so that the disposition of all troops in the 
country could, be readily ascertained, and so that mileage-rates for cartage 
- of regimental baggage in wagons legally impressed upon the march, and of 
military equipment and stores sent from suppliers and government agencies 
to the regiments - could be assessed and paid. J. R. Western, op. cit., 360 
n. 2. 
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The following tables, drawn from these series of Marching Orders, 
are concerned particularly with time - time spent on the march, time spent 
in aid of the civil power and upon the coast duty, and time spent in various 
levels of concentration and dispersal. The amount of time spent on these 
activities, and in these conditions, is expressed in the tables in per- 
centages. To arrive at these percentages, a basic unit of measurement had 
to be established which would represent the smallest appropriate sub-unit 
of the regiment. The Marching Orders, since they deal in day marches, had 
themselves provided the day as a measure of time. The "company/day" for 
the Foot, and the "troop/day" for the Horse, suggested themselves, and 
were used quite as the "man/hour" is used in manpower and time studies. 
The method is perhaps best illustrated with a brief example. 
Thus, during the period 1737-43, the infantry battalion stood on an 
establishment of 10 companies. During this same period, Barrell's 4th 
of Foot spent 1127 days in England - which is 11,270 company/days. By 
using the company/day, the amount of time spent by each individual company 
of Barrell's, performing any task or billeted in isolation or concentra- 
tion with other companies of the regiment, was computed. When broken into 
the figures which were the basis for those in the six columns of the tables, 
we found that 684 company/days were spent by Barrell's in concentration at 
the level of three grand-divisions, 4992 company/days either totally dis- 
persed or on the march, etc. Reduced to percentages of 11,270, we arrive 
at the figures in the tables. 
We must define "dispersal", as it has been used here in our analysis 
of training. Although there were several different tactical divisions into 
which the battalion might be told off for purposes of advanced training and 
tactics, it was from the earliest decades of the century the "grand-division" 
which was by far the most important and the largest commonly-used tactical 
unit below the level of the full battalion itself. 
2 
The grand-division was 
always composed of one-quarter of the "hatmen" of the battalion-companies: 
a battalion deployed in line always formed four grand-divisions which often 
served as fire-units and, much more commonly, as manoeuvre-units. The 
linear drill and tactics of the battalion of foot rested on the grand- 
division. However, a single grand-division was not by any means a unit 
large enough with which to practise, with any worthwhile degree of realism, 
2. The practice of training and fighting in four grand-divisions began to 
be widely adopted in the army during the War of the Spanish Succession (the 
drill used in the Flanders' regiments, by 1708, will be found in the 
Ingoldsby-Parker MS book, DD. R. H. 388, Cornwall R. 0. ); and it had clearly 
become standard practice by the later 1720's, as all succeeding treaties, 
regulations, orders, and inspection returns, etc. - dealt with at length 
in Chapt. III above - show. 
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the various complicated methods of giving fire - not to mention the ad- 
vanced manoeuvres; plenty of officers and nco's were needed to conduct 
platoon fire (and alternate fire, after 1764), and there were too few of 
these available in a single grand-division to simulate either. Two grand- 
divisions was the lowest level of concentration at which sufficient numbers 
of officers were likely to be available to carry this on profitably. We 
have, therefore, an excellent basis for a definition of "dispersal": where 
there are +oo few companies gathered together in one place to form two 
grand-divisions, they may be said to be dispersed. "Concentration", on the 
other hand, occurs in three ascending stages: at the level of two grand- 
divisions, of three, and of four. Since the battalion almost always fought 
as a unit, and since it was for the full battalion that tactical theory and 
drill regulations were scored, training at the level of four grand-divisions 
was of course the most valuable training experience which a regiment could 
enjoy. The presence of the flank company (or companies) would also add to 
the realism of the experience. Three grand-divisions would be that much 
less effective at simulating the condition of the battalion on the battle- 
field. Two would only barely suffice. 
Whereas the infantry regiment formed in battalion for tactical pur- 
poses, the cavalry regiment generally formed in three squadrons, depending 
upon the number of troops making up the regiment and - to a degree un- 
known in the infantry, which manoeuvred much more slowly - upon the im- 
mediate tactical situation. 
3 
As with the foot, basic skills could be 
learned by small detachments; but the troops had to concentrate at the 
level of one, two, or three squadrons if the more intricate and important 
evolutions and manoeuvres were to be learned both by the horses and the 
men. The fact that both horses and men had to be trained added a dim- 
ension not found in the infantry's training; and the cavalry had also to 
be very ini-ensively trained because, once set in motion, it was difficult 
to recall and could soon become dispersed. The squadron in the cavalry 
regiment, -then, can be taken to correspond with the foot's grand-division, 
since it stood in about the same relation to the cavalry regiment as a 
training and tactical unit as did the grand-division in the infantry 
3. Throughout the eighteenth century the Horse and Dragoon regiments 
trained and fought in three squadrons or, much less commonly, in two. Thus 
the British Dragoon regiments in Flanders, for example, commonly formed in 
three squadrons 1742-48 (Kent R. O. Amherst MSS, 05/4); and Lt-Gen Henry 
Hawley, an old and experienced cavalryman, based his MS 'Plans of Evolu- 
tions... for Squadrons', submitted to the Duke of Cumberland c. 1750, on three 
squadrons (BM King's MS 239). Three squadrons was the standard disposition 
as all of the treatises, regulations, orders, inspection returns, etc. - 
as described at length in Chapt. III above - illustrate. 
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battalion. Dispersal in the cavalry occurred, therefore, when there were 
fewer troops gathered together and stationary than were necessary to form 
one squadron out of the three most commonly formed by a regiment. Con- 
centration, on the other hand, occurs in three ascending stages: at the 
levels of one, two, and three squadrons. Just as with the infantry, train- 
ing was more sophisticated and effective the greater the number of*squadrons 
concentrated. 
We must also add the obvious proviso that any concentration of com- 
panies or troops sufficient to form one or more squadrons, or two or more 
grand-divisions must, if they are to be considered as capable of carrying 
on tactical training, be stationary. A regiment spent a good deal of time 
strung out along the roads simply marching from one set of billets to an- 
other. As we have seen, regiments marched in three or four sections, each 
one a day's distance from the next. A marching regiment was therefore 
fully occupied in covering ground, and was quite dispersed while doing so. 
The following short forms are employed in the tables: 
Ft - Foot 
Hor - Horse 
D. G - Dragoon Guards 
Dgn - Dragoons 
L. D - Light Dragoons 
M&De Time spent Marching and Dispersed. 
ACP - Time spent in Aid of the Civil Power. 
CST - Time spent on the Coast Duty. 
GD's - Grand-Divisions. 
Sqn - Squadron[s]. 
Mon/Yr - Month and Year. 
Explanatory notes are appended at the end of the tables, where required, 
and where a few anomalies are dealt with. 
APPENDIX A (cont'd) 266 
Regt. 1&0 ACP CST 2. GD's 3. GD's 4. GD's+ 
In England 
From To 
INFANTRY: Mon/Yr. Ilon/Yr. 
2nd Ft 49 1 20 17 4 9 Jan 27 Jul 29 
3rd Ft 49 - - - - 51 Oct 26 May 27 
7th Ft 47 1 - 2 9 41 Jan 27 Jul 29 
11th Ft 50 - - 28 16 6 Jul 26 Aug 28 
13th Ft 24 - - 20 - 56 Apr 28 Jul 29 
14th Ft 81 - 3 16 - - Jul 26 Mar 27 
15th Ft 39 2 3 8 12 36 May 26 May 29 
16th Ft 60 2 1 - 22 15 Jan 27 Jul 29 
19th Ft 72 - - - 16 12 Jan 27 Jul 27 
21st Ft 66 - - 28 - 6 Jan 27 Jul 27 
23rd Ft 62 1 - 5 - 32 Apr 27 Jul 29 
37th Ft 44 - - - 22 34 Jan 27 Jul 27 
Regt. 'M &D ACP CST 1. Sqn. 2. Sqn. 3. Sgn. 
In England 
From To 
CAVALRY : Ikon/ Yr . Mon/ Yr. 
Blues 82 1 - 16 - 1 Nov 26 May 29 
2nd Hor 86 - - 13 - 1 Jun 26 Jul 29 
3rd Hor 19 - - 81 - - Oct 26 Apr 29 
4th Hor 31 - - 51 18 - Jan 27 Jun 29 
1st Dgn 81 - - 19 - - Oct 26 May 29 
2nd Dgn 54 - - 45 - 1 Jan 27 Jul 29 
3rd Dgn 72 - 3 23 - 2 May 28 Jul 29 
4th Dgn 63 - - 33 3 1 May 26 Jul 29 
6th Dgn 66 - - 30 - 4 Mar 28 Apr 29 
7th Dgn 56 - - 44 - - Oct 26 Jul 29 
10th Dgn 47 4 - 49 - - Oct 26 Jun 28 
11th Dgn 51 2 - 47 - - Oct 26 Apr 26 
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1737 - 1743 
Regt. M&D ACP CST 2. GD's 3. GD's 4. GD's+ In Eng land 
- -- Fr om - - 
To 
- 
INFANTRY: Mon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
1/1st Ft 49 - - - - 51 Dec 42 May 43 
(a)3rd Ft 51 - 34 - 15 - Apr 37 Aug 37 
(b)3rd Ft 44 7 - - 4 45 May 40 Apr 42 
4th Ft 44 1 - - 6 49 Jul 39 Aug 42 
8th Ft 35 - 20 - 45 - Jun 39 Jun 42 
11th Ft 32 2 19 4 37 6 May 36 Jul 38 
May 41 May 42 
12th Ft 52 - 30 - - 18 May 39 Apr 42 
13th Ft 71 - - - 4 25 Apr 40 May 42 
14th Ft 91 - - - 9 - Sep 42 May 43 
15th Ft 11 2 37 1 1 48 -Apr "37-- Oct- 40 ---- 
Dec 42 May 43 
16th Ft 63 2 17 - 5 13 Apr 37 Apr 43 
18th Ft 94 - - - - 6 Sep 42 Jun 43 
21st Ft 100 - - - - - Sep 41 May 42 
23rd Ft 62 - 23 - 2 13 May 38 May 42 
(a)24th Ft 67 2 - - 4 27 Jun 39 Aug 40 
(b)24th Ft 40 - - - - 60 Dec 42 Mar 43 
28th Ft 98 - - - - 2 Apr 42 Apr 43 
31st Ft 35 1 - - 14 50 Jun 39 May 42 
34th Ft 4 - 9 - 3 84 Jun 39 Jul 40 
36th Ft 99 - - - - 1 Jun 39 Jul 40 
43rd Ft 41 - - - 15 44 Mar 41 May 42 
45th Ft 41 43 16 - - Mar 41 May 42 
46th Ft 33 - - - - 67 Mar 41 Oct 42 
48th Ft 11 - 48 40 - 1 Apr 41 Aug 42 
APPENDIX A (cont'd) 
, '? I'? - 11A 
Regt. 11 &0 ACP 
Blues 49 - 
2nd Hor 61 - 
3rd Hor 42 - 
4th Hor 39 - 
8th Hor 49 - 
1st Dgn 42 - 
2nd Dgn 56 2 
3rd Dgn 32 - 
4th Dgn 58 - 
6th Dgn 42 - 
7th Dgn 36 - 
10th Dgn 41 
11th Dgn 32 - 
a 
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CST 1.. Sgn. 2. Sqn. 3. Sgn. In Enn1and From To 
CAVALRY: Mon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
- 46 -5 Apr 37 Aug 42 
- 30 -9 May 39 Aug 42 
- 53 -5 Oct 37 May 43 
- 56 -5 Apr 37 May 43 
- 42 -9 Apr 42 Sep 42 
20 32 -6 Apr 37 Jul 42 
13 22 16 Apr 37 Jul 42 
46 12 - 10 Apr 39 Jun 42 
29 6 7- Apr 39 Jun 42 
1 50 -7 
May 37 Dec 41 
Apr 42 Aug 42 
19 39 -6 Apr 37 Dec 41 
8 40 - 11 Apr 41 May 43 
Apr 37 May 39 
4 64 -- Apr 41 May_ 43 
_ 
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1751 - 1756 
Regt. M&0 ACP CST 2. GD's 3. GD's 4. GD's+ In England From To 
INFANTRY: Mon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
3rd Ft 59 - - 27 - 14 Jul 54 Jul 56 
4th Ft 49 1 47 1 - 2 Aug 51 Apr 53 
5th Ft 7 - - 8 - 85 Feb 55 Jul 56 
6th Ft 36 - 29 35 - - Aug 51 Mar 53 
7th Ft 12 - - - 3 85 Mar 55 Mar 56 
8th Ft 31 4 - - 5 60 Jul 54 Jul 56 
9th Ft 24 - - 34 - 42 Mar 55 Nov 55 
11th Ft 48 1 7 23 19 2 Aug 53 May 55 
Jul 55 Feb 56 
12th Ft 16 - - - - 84 
Jun 51 Sep 51 
Mar 55 Jul 56 
13th Ft 40 - 7 32 - 21 Jul 52 Apr 54 
14th Ft 50 1 48 1 - - Apr 51 Apr 52 
15th Ft 14 1 - 13 13 59 Mar 55 Jul 56 
18th Ft 52 2 - 44 - 2 Apr 55 Nov 55 
20th Ft 33 6 11 16 23 11 Sep 53 Jul 56 
23rd Ft 51 4 32 7 - 6 Aug 52 Mar 54 
24th Ft 26 7 46 21 - - Apr 51 Mar 52 
25th Ft 83 - - - - 17 Oct 55 Jul 56 
30th Ft 20 - - 12 19 49 Mar 55 Jul 56 
33rd Ft 43 - - 4 33 20 Oct 55 Jul 56 
36th Ft 88 - - - - 12 Oct 55 Jul 56 
37th Ft 25 - - 5 - 70 Mar 55 Jul 56 
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1751 - 1756 
Reg t. M&D ACP CST 1. Sqn. 2. Sqn. 3. Sgn. In En gland From To 
CAVALRY: Ilan/Y(r . Mon/Y-r. 
Blues 81 1 - 18 - - Nov 51 Jul 56 
1st D. G 22 1 14 37 6 20 Jun 51 Nov 52 
Sep 54 Jul 56 
2nd D. G 38 - - 44 9 5 Oct 51 Oct 54 
3rd D. G 22 37 37 - 4 Sep 51 Jul 56 
1st Dgn 19 - 29 33 6 13 Oct 52 Jul 56 
2nd Dgn 24 8 4 37 16 11 Sep 51 Jul 56 
3rd Dgn 15 - 52 21 4 8 Jun 51 Jul 56 
4th Dgn 25 2 22 48 - 3 Sep 51 Jul 56 
6th Dgn 28 3 40 24 1 4 May 51 Aug 56 
7th Dgn 31 10 - 25 12 22 Jun 51 Oct 53 
10th Dgn 19 1 33 39 5 3 Aug 53 Jul 56 
11th Dgn 22 1 45 15 10 7 Sep 51 Jul 56 
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1764 - 1767 





INFANTRY: Mon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
4th Ft 11 2 11 11 5 60 Jul 64 Mar 67 
7th Ft 45 - 6 32 12 5 May 64 May 66 
8th Ft 32 18 - - 29 21 Mar 66 Mar 67 
13th Ft 8 7 20 - 26 39 Aug 64 Jan 67 
14th Ft 25 - 2 1 24 48 Aug 64 Jun 66 
22nd Ft 3 - 22 - 35 40 Sep 65 Feb 67 
23rd Ft 31 1 10 21 27 10 Nov 64 Feb 67 
32nd Ft 14 - - - - 86 May 64 Oct 64 
43rd Ft 35 13 17 4 1 30 Jul 64 Feb 67 




CAVALRY: Man/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
Blues 58 - - 23 - 19 May 64 Sep 66 
1st D. G 46 2 15 20 - 17 Jun 64 Apr 66 
2nd D. G 18 4 34 21 18 5 Oct 64 Feb 67 
3rd D. G 41 - - 49 - 10 Oct 64 Apr 65 
1st Dgn 18 - 14 58 - 10 Oct 64 Oct 66 
2nd Dgn 9 - 29 16 22 24 Jun 64 Mar 67 
3rd Dgn 31 6 - 56 - 7 Mar 65 Feb 67 
4th Dgn 11 7 16 30 27 9 Apr 65 Feb 67 
Aug 64 Mar 65 
6th Dgn 15 9 12 36 25 3 Apr 66 Mar 67 
7th Dgn 34 2 35 32 2 5 Nov 64 Mar 67 
10th Dgn 18 2 10 66 - 4 Nov 64 Mar 67 
11th Dgn 19 6 27 46 - 2 Aug 64 Mar 67 
15th L. D 60 6 - 27 - 7 Feb 65 Feb 67 
16th L. D 67 2 - 9 - 22 May 64 Feb 67 
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1772 - 1776 
Regt. M&D ACP CST 2. 0's 3. GD's 4. GD's In England From To 
INFANTRY: Mon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
2/1st Ft 51 - - - 9 40 Jan 76 Apr 76 
3rd Ft 32 2 33 - 3 30 Jun 72 Apr 75 
4th Ft 13 - - - - 87 Mar 73 Apr 74 
7th Ft 7 2 24 - 12 55 Jun 72 Apr 73 
11th Ft 23 8 - 1 68 Jun 72 Apr 75 
13th Ft 40 - - - 47 13 Dec 75 Apr 76 
20th Ft 19 - 12 19 25 25 Jun 72 Apr 74 
21st Ft 8 - 30 22 18 22 Aug 73 Mar 76 
23rd Ft 9 -3 7 - - 81 Jul 72 Apr 73 
29th Ft 2 - 36 - 64 8 Sep 73 Feb 76 
30th Ft 28 - - - 38 34 Jan 73 Jun 73 
31st Ft 20 1 - - 23 56 May 73 Nov 75 
32nd Ft 9 - 14 - 39 38 Apr 73 Dec 75 
33rd Ft 17 9 15 41 - 18 Sep 72 Apr 74 
35th Ft 3 - - 16 - 81 May 72 Apr 73 
36th Ft 7 - 10 - 27 56 Jun 73 Nov 75 
43rd Ft 28 - - - 3 69 Oct 73 Apr 74 
66th Ft 24 - - - - 76 Apr 73 Oct 73 
67th Ft 23 - 14 - 53 10 Jun 72 Oct 73 
68th Ft 30 - - 5 64 Apr 73 May 74 
69th Ft 66 - - 32 - 2 Dec 75 Apr 76 
70th Ft 14 - - 37 11 38 Feb 74 Mar 76 
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111' - 177 
Regt. M&0 ACP CST 1. Sqn. 2. Sgn. 3. Sgn. In England From To 
CAVALRY: ikon/Yr. Mon/Y'r. 
Blues 78 - - 19 2 1 Apr 73 Apr 76 
1st D. G 49 - 22 24 2 3 Mar 73 Feb 76 
2nd D. G 6 - 21 46 18 9 
Jun 72 Mar 74 
Mar 75 Apr 76 
3rd D. G 20 - 19 24 - 37 Mar 73 Apr 76 
1st Dgn 21 3 27 12 10 27 Aug 72 Mar 74 
Apr 75 Mar 76 
2nd Dgn 21 - 17 17 16 29 Apr 73 Mar 75 
3rd Dgn 29 1 13 47 5 5 May 72 Apr 75 
4th Dgn 15 - 32 22 15 16 Mar 73 Mar 76 
6th Dgn 24 - 11 44 - 21 Sep 72 Apr 76 
7th Dgn 20 - 4 28 14 34 





10th Dgn 37 - 8 41 - 14 
Jun 72 Mar 73 
Mar 74 Apr 76 
11th Dgn 25 15 27 - 33 Mar 73 Mar 76 
15th L. D 27 2 - 46 15 10 Oct 72 Apr 76 
16th L. D 23 - - 45 9 23 Sep 72 Apr 76 
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1786 - 1790 
In En gland 
Reg t. M&D ACP CST 2. G0 's 3. G0's 4. GD's+ From To 
INFANTRY: klon/Yr. Mon/Yr. 
8th Ft 3 - 15 - 14 68 Mar 86 Mar 90 
12th Ft 20 75 
Oct 87 Mar 88 
Feb 90 Jun 90 
17th Ft 14 - 18 26 36 6 
Aug 86 Oct 87 
Apr 88 Jun 90 
Mar 86 Mar 87 
22nd Ft 12 - 4 - - 84 Oct 87 Mar 90 
23rd Ft 19 - 7 5 24 45 Mar 87 Mar 90 
29th Ft 13 - 8 - 3 76 Oct 87 Nov 89 
33rd Ft 10 - 12 - 42 36 Sep 86 Dec 89 
34th Ft 9 1 - - - 90 Nov 87 Nov 89 
35th Ft 15 1 - - 7 77 Apr 86 Jan 89 
38th Ft 3 - 25 - 68 4 May 86 Dec 89 
40th Ft 28 1 17 31 13 10 Mar 86 May 89 
42nd Ft 15 - - - - 85 Aug 89 May 90 
43rd Ft 32 - - 30 - 38 Sep 86 Dec 87 
Jul 86 Oct 87 
44th Ft 15 - - - 29 56 May 88 May 89 
53rd Ft 9 2 - - 2 87 Aug 89 Jun 90 
55th Ft 25 - 7 28 - 40 Sep 86 Nov 88 
64th Ft 3 14 - 8 75 Aug 86 Mar 87 
APPENDIX A (cont'd) 
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1786 - 1790 
Regt. M&D ACP CST 1. Sqn. 2. Sqn. 3. Sqn. In England From To 
CAVALRY: 
Ikon/Yr. MQn/ Yr. 
Blues 70 - - 28 - 1 Mar 86 Jun 90 
1st D. G 19 1 25 20 25 20 Apr 86 Mar 87 
Aug 88 May 90 
2nd D. G 10 - 32 22 11 25 Mar 86 Apr 89 
3rd D. G 21 2 14 35 18 10 Apr 86 May 88 
Jun 89 May 90 
1st Dgn 14 - 35 31 6 14 Apr 86 Apr 90 
2nd Dgn 28 1 27 27 7 10 Apr 86 Jun 90 
3rd Dgn 21 - 33 28 4 14 Apr 86 Jun 90 
4th Dgn 14 3 30 20 12 21 Apr 86 Jun 90 
6th Dgn 12 - 32 27 22 7 Apr 87 Jun 90 
7th L. D 20 2 23 29 21 5 May 86 Jun 90 
10th L. D 13 - 37 35 7 8 May 86 May 90 
11th L. D 18 - 33 40 - 9 Apr 86 May 90 
15th L. D 23 - 24 36 - 17 Apr 86 May 90 
16th L. D 28 2 27 26 3 14 May 86 Jun 90 
APPENDIX A (cont'd) 2.76, 
AVERAGES OF THE FOREGOING 
INFANTRY: 
M&D ACP CST 2. GD's 3. G0's 4. GD's+ Period: 
54 1 2 10 8 25 1726 - 1729 
53 1 12 3 12 19 1737 - 1743 
38 1 11 13 5 32 1751 - 1756 
23 4 10 8 18 37 1764 - 1767 
32 1 9 7 17 44 1772 -1776 
14 - 8 7 15 56 1786 - 1790 
CAVALRY: 
M&D ACP CST 1. Sgn. 2. Sqn. 3. Sqn. 
59 1 - 37 2 1 
44 - 11 38 1 6 
29 3 23 31 6 8 
31 3 14 35 7 10 
28 - 13 32 8 19 
22 1 26 29 10 12 
Period: 
1737 - 1743 
1764 - 1767 
1772 - 1776 
1786 - 1790 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX "A" 
1. ) The three Regiments of Foot Guards and the Troops of Horse Guards and 
Horse Grenadier Guards (Life Guards Regiments, from 1788), only very rarely 
left the London-Westminster area, and so seldom appear in the Marching Orders. 
For this reason they are excluded from these tables. 
2. ) The final Table of Averages-is included so that records of individual 
regiments can be compared with the overall trend. 
3. ) A regiment may not (in most cases, was not) have been in England for 
the whole of one of the survey periods. The dates during which it was present 
in England (or, in a very few cases, the dates during which the WO 5 entries 
are clear enough for calculations), are therefore entered in the last column 
of each table. Thus during the survey of all troop movements in England during 
the period 1786-90, for example, the 42nd Foot is entered from August 1789 
(when the corps disembarked at Portsmouth, from overseas service), to May 1790 
(when it was ordered to march into Scotland). 
In a number of cases, two sets of dates are entered for a regiment during 
one survey period. This indicates that the unit had temporarily left the King- 
dom, and returned again. In the 1786-90 table, for example, the 22nd Foot is 
entered from March 1786 to March 1787, and from October 1787 to March 1790. 
During the intervening period, the regiment had done garrison duty on Jersey 
and Guernsey. 
In two cases (designated "a" and "b"), regiments are entered twice in the 
same list. Each represents a special case. The 3rd Foot, after a normal tour 
in England, marched into Scotland in the summer of 1737 and did not return to 
our survey area, England, for three years. The 24th Foot, again after a normal 
tour in England, was luckless enough to ship with the ill-fated Cartagena ex- 
pedition of 1740; its pitiful remains, returned home, can hardly be included 
in the first sequence. The 15th Foot too was on the Cartagena expedition, but 
came home in much better condition. 
4. ) Where regiments spent less than ten weeks in England (as occasionally 
they were met at the very beginning or end of one of our survey periods), they 
are not included, since their short stay could not be taken as establishing 
any sort of pattern. 
5. ) Figures for the Marine Regiments, raising from December 1739 and 
January 1741, are not included in the tables. They spent little time in Eng- 
land, continually sending detachments to sea on board the men-of-war or (in 
the case of the original 1st through 6th Marines), were sent en masse with the 
Cartagena expedition shortly after being raised. The Marine Companies raised 
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for service with the fleet in the Seven Years' War and kept on foot thereafter, 
seldom strayed beyond their navy garrisons and dockyards; and consequently they 
are not often met with in WO 5, and are not included here. 
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APPENDIX B 
ANNUAL CHARTS ILLUSTRATING THE DISTRIBUTION & ROTATION OF THE REGIMENTS, 
DURING SELECTED PERIODS 
The charts overleaf, compiled annually for the years from 1726 to 1729, 
1738 to 1742,1751 to 1755,1764 to 1767,. and 1772 to 1776, show the year-end 
distribution of all the regiments - Horse, Foot, and Guards - composing the 
regular British Army; and in addition, all of the movements made by the corps 
from one station or garrison to another, during each year, are shown. The world- 
wide distribution of the army and the patterns of relief or rotation (or other- 
wise), as described above in Chapt. II, Pt. A, appear at a glance. 
The following should be kept in mind, when examining the charts: 
1. ) The 41st Foot, or the Invalid Regiment, is excluded here as elsewhere 
in this study. 
2. ) The three regiments of Foot Guards are considered as forming a total 
of six battalions prior to 1760, and seven thereafter. How very small the num- 
ber of "marching regiments" serving in England actually was, will be found by 
subtracting these six (or seven) Guards battalions, always concentrated in West- 
minster and London, from the total number of battalions shown serving in the 
whole of England. Thus in 1738, for example, there were only three battalions 
of marching foot in the rest of the kingdom; from 1750 to 1754, only four. 
3. ) Prior to 1746, the Guards cavalry consisted of six independent Troops 
of "Life Guards" - properly, the 1st through 4th Troops of Horse Guards, and 
the 1st and 2nd Troops of Horse Grenadier Guards. The 3rd and 4th Troops were 
absorbed into the 1st and 2nd in 1746, so that from then until 1788 there ex- 
isted the 1st and 2nd Troops of Horse Guards, and the 1st and 2nd Troops of 
Horse Grenadier Guards. Only from 1788 were these several troops amalgamated 
to form regiments proper - the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Life Guards. 
These unregimented Guards Troops always stood on very large establish- 
ments, not to be compared with those in the regular line cavalry. For simpli- 
city's sake, therefore, these Guards Troops are considered throughout the fol- 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX "B" 
(a) The 26th, 29th, and 39th of Foot crossed to England late in 1726, and in 
Jan 1727 sailed from Portsmouth to reinforce the Gibraltar garrison. 
(b) The 8th, 19th, and 37th of Foot crossed to England from Ireland early in 
1727, only to return to Ireland later in the same year, the Spanish threat 
having passed. The movements of these corps are not shown. 
(c) The figures for 1739 include neither the 1st through 6th Marines, nor 
Spotswood's four-battalion 61st, all new-raising from lat Nov and Dec and 
not yet effective corps. Crawford's 43rd (Black watch), raised in Oct 1-39, 
is included, since it was formed from already existing Independent Compan- 
ies. 
(d) The 1740 figures include Gooch's (late Spotswood's) 61st, and the 1st 
through 6th Marines, all now effective; excluded however are de Grangue's 
60th and the 7th through 10th Marines, new-raising from November and not 
yet effective. The four battalions of Gooch's from North America, plus the 
15th and 24th of Foot together with the 1st through 6th Marines, from Eng- 
land, all bound for the West Indies on the Cartagena expedition, are shown 
still at sea at the year's end. 
(e) Included in the 1741 figures are de Grangue's 60th, the 7th through 10th 
Marines, and the 54th through 59th of Foot (later renumbered 43rd through 
48th), all new corps but effective by mid-1741. 
The 2/1st and 6th, from Ireland, and the 27th from England, sent to re- 
inforce the Cartagena expedition, are shown still at sea at the year's end. 
(f) Richbell's 61st and Battereau's 62nd, new-raising from March, are inclu- 
ded in the 1742 figures since both were effective by mid-autumn. Only rem- 
nants of the four battalions of Gooch's survived the West Indies fiasco; 
they are shown returning to America but the corps did not outlive the year. 
(g) Shirley's 50th and Pepperell's 51st of root, new-raising from Sept 1754, 
are included in the 1754 totals. 
(h) The 52nd through 61st of Foot, all raising from Dec 1755, are not inclu- 
ded in this year's totals because they were not yet effective. 
(i) The 2nd Foot established itself on the Isle of Man in 1765, to deal with 
the smugglers; and other corps followed in their turn thereafter. I have in- 
cluded Man with the Irish totals throughout the 1760's and '70's. 
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(j) The 66th Foot sailed from the West Indies late in 1772, and'is shown 
still at sea at the year's end. 
(k) The 3/ and 4/60th, and the 1/ and 2/71st, new-raising in Britain in 1775, 
are not included in the year's totals. 
(Z) A composite Guards corps, formed by skimming fifteen men from each of 
the companies in the three regiments of Foot Guards, was sent to America 
in mid-1776. It is not shown here. 
The 6th, 50th, 59th, and 65th of Foot were drafted in America in 1776, 
cadres only returning to England to rebuild. I have included these in the 
English totals for that year. 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLE OF REGIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENTS 
DURING SELECTED YEARS 
The figures in the following tables show the establishment strengths of 
regiments as voted annually by Parliament for service on the various stations 
and garrisons, both at home and abroad. Most of the figures are for 'Guards 
and Garrisons', that is the troops allowed to be kept standing in Britain 
during peacetime; and since, as we have seen, the regiments were invariably 
under strength, these establishments must be regarded not as actual but as 
paper strengths. 
Appended at the end of the table are some examples of establishments for 
marching regiments of Foot serving in Ireland and overseas, which might be com- 
pared with those for their sister regiments serving in Britain. 
Establishments are shown by individual troop and company: and beneath these 
figures the total number of such troops and companies in each regiment are shown. 
Certain corps on the British establishment - The Blues, the 2nd or King's 
Own Regiment of Horse (KDG's after 1746), and the Foot Guards Regiments - had 
special establishments peculiar to themselves, and these are shown. The six 
Troops of Horse Guards are excluded, since their inclusion would take up more 
space than their strengths warrant. 
The following short forms are used in the tables: 
Hor = Horse 
Dgn's = Dragoons 
L. D's = Light Dragoons 
Ft Gds = Foot Guards 
Bn-Coys = Battalion-Companies 
Gren Coys= Grenadier Companies 
Lt Coys = Light Companies 
The figures in the tables are taken from the Establishments (WO 24/84 through 
/558, passim). 
The Irish Establishment tables - since there are almost none in WO 24 - are 
taken from various sources, notably the Cumberland Papers, the Inspection Returns 
on Irish corps (WO 27), and by subtracting figures for augmentations made to Irish 
corps crossing onto the British establishment. 
Notes are appended at the end of the tables, where anomalies are dealt with. 
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Captain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lieutenant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cornet/Ensign 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quartermaster 1 1 1 1 . 
Sergeant 1 3 3 2 
Corporal 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Drummer . . . 1 2 2 2 
Trumpeter 1 1 1 . . 
Hautbois . 
Fifer/Piper . . . . . . . 
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Bn-Coys . . . . 24 16 11 
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1727, '28, '29 
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2 3 3 3 
2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 . . . 
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. . . 49 . . 
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. . . 24 16 11 
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1735 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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2 3 3 3 
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1 1 1 . 
. . 1 . . 
30 28 28 . . . . 
. . . 49 . . . 
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9 9 6 6 . . . 
. . . . 24 16 9 
4 2 1 
1764 thro' 1769 
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1771 thro' 1774 
Captain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lieutenant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cornet/Ensign 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quartermaster 1 1 1 1 . 
Sergeant 2 2 2 3 3 2 
Corporal 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Drummer 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Trumpeter 1 C . d 
Hautbois 1 1 1 . . 
Fifer/Piper . . . . . a a 
Troopers 28 . . . . . . 
Dragoons . 28 28 28 . . 
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Corporal 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Drummer 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Trumpeter 1 . c . 
d 
Hautbois . 
Fifer/Piper . . . . . a a 
Troopers 28 . . . . . . 
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Bn-Coys . 24 16 8 
Gren Coys . 4 2 1 
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1785, '86 , '87 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 . . 
2 2 2 3 3 2 
2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
1 1 1 2 2 2 
1 c . . d 
a a 
28 . . . . . . 
28 28 28 . . . 
. . . . 47 47 42 
9 9 6 6 . . . 
. . . . 24 16 6 
4 2 1 
1 
MINORCA - Foot 
1717: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 2 Drums, 
(+1718,37 Private Men. Establishment = 11 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren Coy (of 45 Gren- 
'27, '28, adiers). 
& '29) 
1748: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 
(+1749 2 Drums, 70 Private Men. Establihhxent =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren Coy. 
thro' 
1754) 
1768: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 
2 Drums, 47 Private Men, +2 Fifers in the Gren Coy. 
Establishment =8 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren Coy. 
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GIBRALTAR - Foot 
1718: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
2 Drums, 31 Private Men. Establishment = 11 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy (of 37 Grenadiers). 
1727: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
(+1728) 2 Drums, 31 Private Men. Establishment = 11 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy (of 34 Grenadiers). 
1729: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 
2 Drums, 50 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1748: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 Sergeants, 3 Corporals 
(+1749 2 Drums, 70 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
thro' Coy. 
1754) 
1768: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 3 Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 
2 Drums, 47 Private Men, +2 Fifers in the Gren Coy. 
Establishment =8 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren Coy. 
PLANTATIONS - Foot 
1727: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
(+'28,2 Drums, 35 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
'29) Coy. 
IRELAND - Foot 
1718: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
2 Drums, 35 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1727: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1-Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
1 Drum, 37 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1729: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
1 Drum, 34 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1734: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
1 Drum, 34 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1739: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
1 Drum, 36 Private Dien. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
Coy. 
1749: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
(+1750 1 Drum, 29 Private Men. Establishment =9 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
thro' Coy. 
1754) 
1765: 1 Bn-Coy =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Sergeants, 2 Corporals, 
(+1766 1 Drum, 28 Private Men. Establishment =8 Bn-Coys, 1 Gren 
thro' Coy. 
1769) 
After 1770, the establishments of the Foot in Ireland were exactly the 
same as those of the Foot in Britain. 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX "C" 
(a) As we have seen, fifers began to appear in the Foot Guards and marching 
Foot during the later 1740's; but they were not allowed (that is to say, not 
made provision for or paid, as such), until 1764, from which date two fifers 
were allowed on the strength of each grenadier company. Prior to that date, 
some of the drummers in each corps where fifes were taken up learned to play 
the instrument, and although officially entered as drummers they acted as fifers. 
(b) In the table for 1779 and '80, the Dragoon establishments only are shown, 
since the establishments of the Light Dragoon corps differed. These were as 
follows: 1 Troop =1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Cornet, 1 Quartermaster, 3 
Sergeants, 3 Corporals, 2 Drums, 1 Hautbois, 1 Trumpeter, 
54 Dragoons. Establishment -6 Troops. 
(c) Although usually excluded in the official Establishments, there were in fact 
trumpeters serving with the Light Dragoons from 1760 onwards, and with the heavy 
Dragoons from c. 1775. It is however difficult to determine what their role 
may have been: in 1764, for example, there were (according to Capt Robert Hinde) 
both trumpeters and buglers in the corps. He wrote: 'In 1764 His Majesty 
thought proper to forbid the use of brass side drums in the Light Cavalry, 
and introduce brass trumpets, so each troop has one trumpeter who when they 
are dismounted form a band of music, consisting of two French horns, 2 
clarionettes and two bassoons and also one fife to a regiment, but when 
mounted trumpets only are sounded. They use also a bugle horn which is 
slung over the shoulders of one of the trumpeters and is a signal to assem- 
ble the Troops in the same manner as beating to arms formerly. ' (R. Hinde 
op. cit., quoted in C. C. P. Lawson, op. cit., IV, 8-9). 
Prior to c. 1775, the trumpeters in the heavy Dragoons were part of the 'band 
of music', and from then on they gave signals in manoeuvring on their trumpets, 
just as the buglers were doing in the Light Dragoons. The drums continued to 
be used in the manoeuvres of heavy Dragoon until the end of our period, as is 
clear from the Inspection Returns. 
(d) Buglers, carrying hunting-horns or 'bugle horns', were usually added to the 
light infantry companies, from their first being raised. Not included in the 
official establishments, they were most likely the drummers allowed the light 
companies but taught the bugle in immitation of German jagers. 
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w nnr. wTrTV n 
EXPANSION OF THE STANDING ARMY, 1718-1793 
1718- 1748- 1764- 1783- 
1739 1755 1775 1793 
Horse Guards (trps) 6 4 4 2c 
Horse (regts) 8 5 5 1 
Dragoon Guards (regts) - 3 3 7 
Dragoons (regts) 14 14 13 5 
Light Dragoons (regts) - - 5 15 
Foot Guards (bns) 6 6 7 7 
Foot (bns) 40a 49b 71 74d 
Royal Artillery (coy: ) 4 10 30 42 
Wartime Peaks - Battalions of Marching Foot: 
1702: 28 bns. 
1709: 73 bns. 
1714: 31 bns. 
1715: 46 bns. 
1746: 63 bns. (+ 10 regts of Marines, and 13 bns of fencible Foot). e 
1762: 133 bns. (+ 2 corps of Rangers). 
1781: 111 bns. 
1814: 186 bns. 
a. ) Two more regiments of Foot, Philips' 40th and Oglethorp's 42nd, each 
were added in 1717 and 1737 respectively. The 41st, or Invalid Regiment, 
is excluded from the above totals. 
b. ) Two more of Foot, Shirley's 50th and Pepperell's 51st, were added at 
the end of 1754. 
c. ) From the two troops of Horse Guards and two of Horse Grenadier Guards, 
there were formed in 1788 the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Life Guards, as 
shown here. 
d. ) The 41st Foot is included here for the first time, since it had be- 
come a regular line battalion in 1787. 
e. ) The exact status of these 13 battalions - since they were raised in 
England only to assist in the suppression of the Jacobite rebels - is a 
matter of some controversy. The term "fencibles", as distinct from true 
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[Regulations] 
All extant printed regulation drillbooks and orders are listed below, 
chronologically; the shorthand system by which these regulations were des- 
cribed in the text (ie, Z728 Regulations) is repeated here, for purposes of 
cross-referencing. All regulations were, of course, anonymously written. 
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The English Military Discipline. 1672. 
The English Military Discipline, or the way and method of exercising 
Horse & Foot, according to the practice of this present time... 1680. 
(another ed. of above). 
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An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline. 1676. 
An Abridgement of the English Military DiscipZine. By His Majesties 
Permission. 1678. (another ed. of above). 
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An Abridgment of the English Military Discipline. Reprinted by His Majes- 
ties Special Command. 1682. 
An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline. Printed by Especial 
Command, for the Use of his Majesties Forces. 1686. (a rev. ed. of the 
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The Exercise of the Foot; with the EvoZutions ... By Their Majesties Conanand. 1690. 
Ibid. 1696. (a rpt. ) 
The Exercise of the Foot;... To which is added, the Exercise of the horse 
grenadiers of horse, and dragoons. Dublin, 1701. (a rev. ed. of the above). 
CZ708 Regulations] 
The Duke of Marlborough's New Exercise of FireZocks and Bayonets; Appointed 
by His Grace to be used By all the British Forces, and the Militia... 
n. d. (c. 1708). 
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Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons, and Foot Forces. 1728. (many times re- 
printed, the last impression being in 1743). 
[1756 Regulations] 
A New Exercise, To be observed by His Majesty's Troops on the Establish- 
ment of Great-Britain and Ireland. 1756. 
[1757 Regulations] 
- as noted in the text (pp., 109-10 above) there is no known full copy of 
these regulations extant. Several reprints of certain elements, and of ex- 
tracts, appeared as follows: 
Manual Exercise As Ordered By His Majesty, For The Year 1758.1758. 
New Manual Exercise, As Performed by His Majesty's Dragoons, Foot-Guards, 
Foot, Artillery, Marines, And by the MiZitia... Second Edition. 1758. 
Ibid. Dublin and Limerick, 1758. 
The New Manual Exercise as Performed by His Majesty's Dragoons, Foot-Guards, 
Foot, Light Infantry, Artillery, Marines, and by the Militia... Third Edi- 
tion. Dublin, 1760 
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tions as ordered by His Majesty, 1778.1778). 
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and Explanations of the Method Generally Practised at Reviews and Field- 
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Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Movements of the Army in 
Ireland. Dublin, 1789. 
[1792 Regulations] 
Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field-Exercise, and Movements, 
of His Majesty's Forces. 1792. 
There were many subsequent eds. of these regulations, as we noted in the 
text above (pp. $49- SO); and among these a set of supplementary general 
orders needs particular attention, namely: 
General Orders and Observations on the Movements and Field Exercise of 
the Infantry. 1804. 
The arms exercise accompanying the 1792 Regulations was: 
By His Majesty's Command. The Manual and Platoon Exercises. 1792. A slightly 
revised ed. of this appeared as The Manual and Platoon Exercises, Etc., Etc., 
1804. 
[1795 Regulations] 
By His Majesty's Command. Rules and Regulations for the Cavalry. 1795. 
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Cavalry. 1796. 
An Elucidation of the Several Parts of His Majesty 's Regulations for the 
Formations and Movements of Cavalry. 1798. (an abridged ed. of the above). 
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All three of the above appeared in subsequent revised eds. (on which, 
see pp. 192-s3 of text above). 
[1798 Light Regulations] 
Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry, and Instruc- 
tions for their Conduct in the Field. 1798. (reprints were to appear at 
least twice). 
[Contemporary Private Publications, Translations, Etc.: ] 
Anon. The Complete Militia-Man, Or a Compendium of Military KnowZedge ... By 
an Officer in the British Forces. 1760. 
Commands for the Exercise of Foot, Armed With Fire lock Muskets and 
Pikes; with the Evolutions. 1690. 
Exercise for the Horse, Dragoon, and Foot Forces, upon the Establish- 
ment of Ireland. To Which is Added, the Manual Exercise of the Prussian 
Infantry... Now Practised in the Armies of most. . . States in Europe. Dub- ýe'Exercise 
of the Foot, with the Evolutions, According to the Words 
of Command, As they are Explained. As Also The Forming of Battalions 
... in Their Majesties Armies... 1690. 
The General Review Manoeuvres: or, the whole Evolutions of a Battalion 
of Foot... To which is Annexed, The Manual Exercise. 1779 
Instruction sur Z'Exercise de Z'Infanterie, du 29 Juin Z753. Paris, 1753. 
Instruction sur Z'Exercise de Z'Infanterie, du 44 Mai Z754. Paris, 1754. 
Manoeuvres for a Battalion of Infantry, upon Fixed Principles... By a Ger- 
man Officer. 1766. 
Memoirs of the Life and particular Actions, of that brave Man, General 
BZakeney... London & Dublin, 1756. 
The Militia-Man. Containing, Necessary Rules for both Officers and 
Soldiers... Illustrated with-different Positions of a Soldier under 
Arms. 1740. 
A New Military Dictionary; or, The Field of War. -.. by a Military Gen- 
tleman. 1760. 
New Regulations for the Prussian Infantry: Containing an exact Detail 
of the Present Field-Service... and recent Parts of the Foot-Exercises 
... 1757. 
The Proceedings of a General Court-Martial held at the Horse-Guards... 
Upon the Trial of Lord George SackviZle. Published by Authority. 1760. 
Report of the Proceedings... of the Board of General Officers on Their 
Examination of Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope... Colonel Peregrine 
Lascelles, and Brigadier-General Thomas Fowke... in Z745.1749. 
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The Rudiments of War: Comprising the Principles of Military Duty, in a 
Series of Orders issued by Commanders in the English Army... 1777. 
A System of Camp Discipline-and other Regulations for the Land Forces. 
Collected by a Gentleman of the Army. In which are included, Kane's Dis- 
cipline for a Battalion in Action... Improved. 1757. 
Adye, R. W. The Little Bombardier, and Pocket Gunner. 1801. [this work had reached 
an 8th, rev. ed. by 1827]. 
Belidor, Bernard Forest de. Le Bombardier Frangois, ou Nouvelle Methode de Jetter 
Zes Bombes avec precision... Paris, 1731. 
Bever, Capt Samuel. The Cadet. A Military Treatise. 1756. 
Ibid., 2nd, rev. ed. 1762. 
Binning, Capt Thomas. A Light to the Art of Gunnery... With the most necessary Con- 
clusions for the Practice of Gunnery... 1676. (rpt. 1703]. 
Blakeney, Col William. The New Manual Exercise, by General Blakeney. To which is 
added, The Evolutions of the Foot, by General Bland. Philadelphia, 1746. 
[several subsequent colonial imprints, in 1747, '54, '55, and '56]. 
Bland, Gen Humphrey. A Treatise of Military Discipline; In Which is Laid down 
and Explained The Duty of the Officer and Soldier, Thro' the several 
Branches of the Service. London & Dublin, 1727. 
Ibid., 2nd ed., 1727 
Ibid., 3rd ed., 1734. 
Ibid., 4th ed., 1740. 
Ibid., 5th ed., London & Dublin, 1743 
Ibid., 6th ed., 1746. 
Ibid., 7th ed., 1753. 
Ibid., 8th Edition, revised, corrected, and altered to the present prac- 
tice of the Army. 1759. [revision by Sir William Fawcett]. 
Ibid., 9th rev. ed., 1762. 
An Abstract of Military Discipline; more particularly with regard to the 
Manual Exercise, Evolutions, and Firings of the Foot. From Col Bland. Bos- 
ton, 1743. [several subsequent colonial "abstracts" of Bland appeared, in 
1744, '47, '54, '55, and '591. 
Bosroger, Le Roy de. The Elementary Principles of Tactics: with New Observa- 
tions on the Military Art... transZated by an Officer of the British 
Army. 1771. 
Breton, William. Militia Discipline. The Words of Command and Directions for 
Exercising... 1717. 
Ibid., Boston, 1733. 
Clarke, Lt John. Military Instructions of Vegetius ... With a Preface and Notes. 1768. 
Cole, Benjamin. The Gentleman Volunteer's Pocket Companion, describing the Var- 
ious Motions of the Foot Guards, Drawn from an Officer long experienced 
in ye Military Disciplin... 1745. 
The Soldier's Pocket-Companion, or the Manual Exercise of our British Foot, 
as now practis'd... 1746. 
Cuthbertson, Capt Bennett. A System for the Complete Interior Management and Eco- 
nomy of a Battalion of Infantry. Dublin, 1768. 
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Dalrymple, Lt-Col William. Tacticks. 1781. 
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Donkin, Maj Robert. Military Collections and Remarks. New York, 1777. 
Dundas, Col David. Principles of Military Movements, Chiefly Applied to 
Infantry. Illustrated by Manoeuvres of the Prussian Troops, and 
by An Outline of the British Campaigns in Germany, During the 
War of Z757... 1788. 
Ibid., 2nd rev. ed., 1795. 
Ehwald, Col Carl von. A Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops. Translated 
from the German... 1803. 
Fage, Edward. A Regular Form of Discipline for the Militia, As it is Perform'd 
by the West-Kent Regiment... 1759. 
Feuquieres, Antoine de Pas, Marquis de. Memoirs Historical and Military... 
Translated from the French with Preliminary Remarks-by the Trans- 
Zator. 2 vols., 1735-36. 
Frederick II of Prussia. Military Instructions by the King of Prussia. 1762. 
[first English trans. of the Instructions of 1748]. 
Military Instructions From the Zate King of Prussia to his Generals... 
Sherborne, 1797. 
G[isors], M. le D[uc) de. Tactique et Manoeuvres des Prussiens. Paris, 1750. 
[BM entry is under 'D[uc]', incorrectly; it should be 'Comte']. 
Gordon, Capt Anthony. A Treatise on the Science of Defence, for the Sword, 
Bayonet, and Pike, in Close Action. 1805. 
Grant, George. The New Highland Military Discipline, or a short Manual Exercise 
Explained... 1757. Rpt. Ottawa, 1967. 
Gray, John. A Treatise of Gunnery. 1731. 
Grose, Francis. Advice to the Officers of the British Army. 1782. 
Military Antiquities respecting A History of the English Army from the 
Conquest to the Present Time. 2 vols., 1786-88. 
Guibert, J. -A. -H., Comte de. A*GeneraZ Essay on Tactics. With an Introductory 
Discourse... Translated from the French-by an Officer. 2 vols., 
1781. 
Haly, Capt Aylmer. Military Observations. 1801. 
Hinde, Capt Robert. The Discipline of the Light Horse. 1778. 
Kane, Brig-Gen Richard. Campaigns of King WiZZiam and Queen Anne; From 1689, to 
1712. Also, A New System of Military Discipline, for a Battalion of 
Foot on Action; with the Most Essential Exercise of the Cavalry... 
1745. 
Campaigns of King WiZZiam and the Duke of Marlborough... The Second Edi- 
tion. 1747. 
La Mamie de Clairac, L. A., Chev. de. The FieZd Engineer... TransZated from the 
French, with Observations and Remarks. 1760. 
Ibid., 2nd rev. ed. 1773. 
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Blond's large Elemens de Za Guerre des Sieges. Paris, 17431. 
EZemens de Tactique; Ouvrage dans Zequel on traite de Varrangement & 
de Za formation des troupes... Paris, 1758. 
Le Cointe, Capt J. -L. The Science of Military Posts, for the Use of Regimental 
Officers, who frequently conDnand Detached Parties... Translated from 
the French. By an Officer. 1761. 
Commentaires sur le Retraits des dix-miZZe de Xenophon, ou, nouveau 
traite de Za guerre... Paris, 1766. 
Lens, Bernard. The Granadier's Exercise of the Granade, in his Majesty's first 
Regiment of Foot-Guards... 1735. Rpt. 1969. 
Lloyd, Maj-Gen Henry. History of the Late War in Germany; between the King of 
Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and Her AZZies... Vol. I, 1766. 
Ibid., rev. ed. 2 vols, 1781. [rpt. 17901. 
Loch4e, Lewis. An Essay on Military Education... 1773. 
A System of Military Mathematics. 2 vols., 1776. 
An Essay on Castrametation. 1778. 
Elements of Fortification. 1780. 
Macdonald, John. Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manoeuvres of 
the French Infantry, Issued August Z, 1791. Translated. .. with Explana- tory Notes, and Illustrative References to the British, and Prussian 
Systems of Tactics... 2 vols., 1803. 
Instructions for the Conduct of Infantry on Actual Service... Translated 
. 
from the French with Explanatory Notes... 1807. 
MacIntire, Lt John. A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, 
When at Sea: Together with Short Instructions for Detachments Sent to 
attack on Shore. 1763. 
Maizeroy, Joly de. A System of Tactics, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical. 
Translated from the French... by Thomas Mante. 2 vols., 1781. 
Molesworth, Lt-Gen Richard, 3rd viscount. A Short Course of Standing Rules, for 
the Government and Conduct of an Army, Designed for, or in The Field. 
With Some Useful Observations... 1744. Rpt. Dublin, 1745. 
Molyneux, Thomas More. Conjunct Expeditions: Or Expeditions that have been car- 
ried on jointly By the Fleet and Army, with a Commentary on a Littoral 
War. 1759. 
Muller, John. A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification, Regular 
and Irregular... 1746. [rpt'd. in 1756, '74, '82, and '99]. 
The Attac and Defence of Fortified Places... 1747. 
Ibid., 2nd rev. ed., 1756. [rpt'd. in 1770 and '91]. 
A Treatise Containing the Practical Part of Fortification... 1757. [rpt'd. 
1764 and '74]. 
A Treatise of Artillery... 1757. 
Ibid., 2nd rev. ed., 1768. [rpt'd. 1780]. 
Papacino d'Antoni, Maj-Gen A. V. A Treatise on the Service of ArtiZZery in Time of 
War: Translated from the ItaZian... 1789. 
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Pleydell, Lt J. C. An Essay on Field Fortification; Intended Principally for 
the Use of Officers of Infantry... 1768. 
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from the German Original. 1754. 
Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry. Translated from the German Ori- 
ginal. 1757. 
Regulations for the Prussian Infantry. TransZated from the German Ori- 
ginal ... to which is added The Prussian Tactick... 1759. 
Reide, Capt Thomas. A Treatise on the Duty of Infantry Officers and the Pre- 
sent System of British Military Discipline... 1798. 
The Staff Officer's Manual; in which is detailed the Duty of Brigade 
Majors, and Aides de Camp-with a Preliminary Essay on the Education 
of Young Gentlemen Intended for the Military Profession... 1806. 
Robins, Benjamin. New Principles of Gunnery... 1742. 
Robson, Joseph. The British Mars. Containing Several Schemes and Inventions... 
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Rogers, Capt Robert. Journals of Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account 
of the several Excursions he made ... upon the Continent of North 
America... 1765. 
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